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Introduction
CHAD P. BOWN1
The Great Recession of 2008–9 caused a negative shock to the global econ-
omy that is comparable with the Great Depression of the 1930s. The major
advanced nations experienced painful economic contraction, severe disloca-
tion to industrial production and sharp spikes in unemployment. Trade ﬂows
collapsed across all the regions of the world. Even the high-achieving emerg-
ing markets, seemingly isolated from the underlying ﬁnancial-system mishaps
that triggered the recessions in advanced economies, suﬀered a severe slow-
downintheirgrowthtrajectories.Thesimultaneityanddepthofthisrecession
were new, and with them came an uncertainty that was especially endemic
to the early periods of the crisis. There was uncertainty regarding the nadir
to which global economic activity would ultimately plunge. There was uncer-
tainty regarding the policies that governments were committed to implement-
ing. There was particularly acute uncertainty regarding trade policy. Could the
modern trading system withstand such a devastating economic blow? Specif-
ically, would governments live up to their early-crisis pledge to refrain from
protectionism?
In many ways, the 21st century world economy is very diﬀerent from the
1930s. The possibility of a simultaneous and widespread economic calamity
is greater given that trade volumes are larger, technology is more advanced,
information ﬂows more quickly, trade costs are lower, supply chains are
extended across more countries, and nations are more economically and
ﬁnancially integrated with one another. And yet, cooperative international
institutions—such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Group of Twenty (G20)—have arisen
since the 1930s to establish rules, norms and means of communicating and
coordinating national policy decisions, especially during times of crisis, to
help prevent calamity.
Ex post, one fundamental distinction between the Great Depression and the
Great Recession is that the 2008–9 global economic contraction did not result
in a massive wave of new protectionism. International trade was one of the
1Development Research Group, Trade and International Integration (DECTI), The World
Bank, MSN MC3-303, 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, USA. Email: cbown@
worldbank.org. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Aksel Erbahar. Car-
oline Freund and Cristina Neagu also shared useful data. All remaining errors are my own.
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2 The Great Recession and Import Protection
casualties of the 1930s as countries responded to recession by implementing
policies designed either to isolate themselves from the global economy or to
discriminate among potential trading partners as a form of retaliation (Irwin
2011). The 1930s policies contributed to the immediate disruption of inter-
national commerce and had the eﬀect of impeding resumption of multilateral
trade when underlying national economic conditions ultimately improved. In
the midst of the 2008–9 global economic crisis, international trade ﬂows also
suﬀered a precipitous collapse. Nevertheless, international commerce quickly
resumed on the path towards recovery. It is now unequivocal that the 2008–9
Great Recession did not lead to a set of catastrophic protectionist policies on
anywhere near the scale of the 1930s Great Depression.
Comprehending why the 2008–9 economic crisis failed to trigger a down-
ward spiral of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies is fundamental to understand-
ing the resilience of the global economy and the 21st century multilateral
trading system. The lack of a more potent protectionist response is still a puz-
zle, and the potential causes of the system’s resilience will be investigated by
researchers over the near and long term. Was it that the WTO architecture was
impeccably constructed for the handling of the crisis? Or was it completely
unrelated to WTO rules, and was the lack of a major protectionist response the
result of a new political–economic order based on global supply chains? That
is, because ﬁrms are exporters and importers, and lobbying for protection no
longer happens, has the multilateral, rules-based WTO system become redun-
dant? Was it the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that
dampened the incentive to impose new trade barriers that would have ulti-
mately only favoured PTA partners through trade diversion and not domes-
tic industry? Was the policy discipline the result of developed economies’
decisions to use ﬁscal stimulus as opposed to alternative (and arguably less
eﬃcient) trade policy to subsidise domestic industry and to address falling
aggregate demand and political pressure? Or was it that the ‘lessons learned’
from earlier eras of economic calamity, including the Great Depression, cre-
ated a stalwart resolve of the world’s leaders this time around?
What is clear is that an ultimate understanding of how the multilateral trad-
ing system survived the crisis requires an accurate assessment of how the
import protection landscape did change alongside the events of 2008–9. While
there was not a large-scale resort to protectionism, the facts simply do not
support the idea that countries did not adjust their trade policies during this
period. Many countries were quite active with their trade policy during the cri-
sis, and an understanding of the details of this activity is required in order to
generate insight into how the trading system withstood the threat of collapse.
Policies like anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing duties (CVDs)—
what this volume refers to collectively as temporary trade barriers (TTBs)—
played an important and perhaps even critical role during the 2008–9 crisis.
Governments are authorised, under the rules of the WTO system, to have
access in place to such policies and to implement new trade restrictions that
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Introduction 3
temporarily limit imports if certain economic conditions are met. During the
crisis, the media focused tremendous public attention on certain high pro-
ﬁle TTB cases, such as European Union (EU) treatment of imported footwear
from China, the US safeguard on imports of tyres from China, and China’s
retaliatory use of anti-dumping—in one instance on EU exports of steel fas-
teners and in another on US exports of autos and chicken parts. Nevertheless,
TTBs arguably made substantial contributions to the stability of the trading
system during 2008–9, although the channels through which this took place
are complex. These channels include not only the ways in which TTBs were
used, but how they were not used, and how their availability made it possible
for governments to avoid using other, potentially more draconian protection-
ist measures. This volume oﬀers a collection of research that begins to ﬁll a
major information gap by providing empirical details of many of the impor-
tant changes taking place under these trade policies during 2008–9.
This volume focuses on 11 of the largest economies in the world.2 By 2007,
these 11 economies—including 4 developed and 7 emerging—collectively
accounted for nearly three-quarters of world GDP and nearly two-thirds of
world merchandise imports. Each of these economies is a member of the G20
and the WTO, and is thus subject to multilateral disciplines on TTB use. They
each had substantial pre-crisis experience with TTB use, and collectively they
account for 76% of total TTB investigations initiated by all WTO members
between 1995 and 2007. The approach of each chapter in the volume is to
establish facts on how one economy used TTBs in 2008–9 given the context
of its historical use, how these TTBs relate to its other trade policies, and how
the economy was aﬀected by prevailing conditions during the crisis. Collec-
tively, these facts improve our understanding of how the WTO system was
able to withstand the crisis intact, and the facts contribute an insight into
what policy and institutional challenges remained as a legacy of the crisis.
The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. Next, I provide a
more detailed timeline and summary of events in the Great Recession, includ-
ing its macroeconomic and trade impacts, the uncertainty over trade policy in
2008–9, and the response to calls for additional monitoring of trade policy. In
particular, Section 1 highlights the real time monitoring eﬀorts of the World
Bank’s Global Antidumping Database and subsequent Temporary Trade Bar-
riers Database. These contributions have addressed some of the immediate
concern about the unknown scale of protectionism taking place in 2008–9,
but they have also revealed a lack of informational preparedness that has ulti-
mately spurred this volume’s research. In Section 2, I introduce a relatively
simple methodological framework to improve intertemporal assessment of
the scope of TTB use, an approach that many of the volume’s chapters adopt
or modify to construct better measures of the ‘stock’ and ‘ﬂow’ of imported
2In particular, and in chapter order, these 11 economies are the USA, the EU, Canada,
Korea, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa.
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4 The Great Recession and Import Protection
products that countries subject to TTBs. (A more technical description of the
methodology is provided in the Appendix (Section 6), along with details of the
many common data sources used across the subsequent chapters.)
What are the empirical results? Section 3 provides a simple application of
this methodology and ﬁnds that, during the crisis, these economies collec-
tively increased by 25% the imported products that they subjected to TTB
import protection. Nevertheless, it turns out this collective expansion in TTB
coverage during 2008–9 was dominated by emerging economies. Developing
countries used TTBs to cover 39% more imported products by the end of 2009
compared with 2007, whereas recession-ravaged high-income economies sur-
prisingly increased their coverage by only 4%. However, it is also clear from the
data that understanding these crisis changes demands recognition of longer-
term trends. Thus, given these high-level results, Section 4 turns to a num-
ber of common questions that the subsequent chapters investigate, on an
economy-by-economy basis, in more detail. This section provides a short pre-
view of how the volume’s authors subsequently address these questions by
placing the trade policy changes of 2008–9 into historical context. Section 5
then concludes.
1 A WALK THROUGH 2008–10
1.1 The Great Recession, Trade Collapse and Protectionist Uncertainty
The 2008–9 Great Recession resulted in a massive global economic contrac-
tion. The IMF has estimated that world output contracted by 0.2% in 2009, led
by a developed economy decline of 3.2% and relatively anaemic emerging and
developing economy growth of only 2.5% (IMF 2010).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the abrupt and simultaneous decline in economic
activity during the Great Recession for the 11 economies studied in this vol-
ume. In the quarterly data, panel (a) illustrates that real US GDP began to
decline in the ﬁrst quarter (Q1) of 2008.3 After a brief respite in Q2, US GDP
fell sharply in Q3 (−4.0% at an annualised rate) and Q4 (−6.8%) and contin-
ued its decline into 2009 Q1 and Q2. Quarterly GDP for the EU and Canada
followed a similar trend—each also experienced steady declines until the EU
(respectively, Canada) shrank by a stunning 9.4% (respectively, 7.0%) at an
annualised rate in 2009 Q1. Each of these three major developed economies
did not achieve positive quarterly growth again until 2009 Q3.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1.1 indicate similar trends on GDP growth for
other major economies. Korea, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico had all been experiencing positive growth until 2008, when economic
conditions sharply deteriorated and each of them witnessed at least one quar-
3The National Bureau of Economic Research’s oﬃcial Business Cycle Dating Committee
marked the monthly beginning of the US recession as December 2007 and its conclusion
as June 2009 (NBER 2010). In the full quarterly data, US GDP did not fall until 2008 Q1.
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Introduction 5
ter of economic contraction. The exceptions in Figure 1.1 are China and India,
presented in panel (d), whose economies did not contract during 2008–9. Nev-
ertheless, even China’s and India’s real GDP experienced sharp slowdowns to
their growth trajectories in the second half of 2008 and the ﬁrst half of 2009,
coinciding with the timing of the economic contractions experienced in other
economies.
In comparison, international trade ﬂows collapsed shortly after the decline
in real GDP growth in the major developed economies in early 2008. Figure 1.2
presents indices of nominal, seasonally adjusted merchandise imports by
country on a quarterly basis for 2007–10. European Union imports began
to decline sharply in 2008 Q3 and bottomed out in 2009 Q1. US and Cana-
dian imports began to fall in 2008 Q4 and did not reach their lowest point
until 2009 Q2. The sharp contraction in international trade ﬂows beginning in
2008 Q4 is apparent for each of the other economies illustrated in Figure 1.2
as well. This includes China and India, countries that did not experience eco-
nomic contraction. The peak-to-trough decline in nominal imports for these
11 economies during this period ranged from a low of 30% for the EU to a
high of 49% for South Africa, with all of the others in between.4
The economic uncertainty beginning in late 2008 was palpable. Was this
another Great Depression? How deep would the economic contraction get?
Why were international trade ﬂows falling so much faster than even GDP,
which itself was contracting sharply? How much of the trade collapse was
due to protectionism? Would a continued recession spark additional demands
by injured industries and unemployed workers for isolationist trade policies?
While it was diﬃcult even for economic analysts to address these questions at
the time given the delay in data reporting and the lack of comprehensive and
up-to-date information, public attention quickly picked up on these themes.
Figure 1.3 illustrates some of this uncertainty and the associated public
interest by plotting a Google Trends time series of data for two Internet
searches. Internet searches for the term ‘Great Depression’ spiked sharply
in 2008 Q4 (October), a timing that corresponds with the deepening contrac-
tion illustrated by the macroeconomic indicators of Figure 1.1.5 In September,
4Freund (2009a,b) provides a thorough comparison of the 2008–9 trade collapse with
other historical downturns. It is important to highlight that the indices in Figure 1.2 are
presented in nominal terms by design. The collapse in real imports during this period
was much smaller than the collapse in nominal imports, due to the sharp drop in import
prices that accompanied the fall in volumes. (The sharp run-up in oil and other commodity
prices reversed itself in the middle of 2008, the price decline moderating the impact on
real imports.) Nevertheless, because this price decline was potentially not immediately
understood by all market participants, the nominal ﬁgures are illustrated here.
5Figure 1.3 does not seasonally adjust the search terms. For example, it might be the
case that Internet searches for ‘Great Depression’ tend to increase during the spring and
fall, when students are writing term papers. For a discussion of uses of Google Trends in
research, see Choi and Varian (2009).
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Figure 1.1: The Great Recession: real GDP growth by quarter, 2007–10.
the investment bank Lehman Brothers had ﬁled for bankruptcy, setting oﬀ US
government support for other major ﬁnancial institutions that ultimately led
to the US establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in October.
The ﬁrst G20 leaders’ summit took place in Washington in November 2008,
and world leaders announced the need for major policy coordination. One
particularly important and oft-cited announcement was their call for self-
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Figure 1.1: Continued.
Source: OECD (2011) for all countries except China and India, for which the data are
World Bank estimates. Each ﬁgure presents the percentage change in quarterly real
GDP growth at an annualised rate. Brazil’s ﬁgures are estimates.
restraint on protectionist behaviour.6 Nevertheless, the scope of new trade
barriers that countries may have already imposed was, for data availability
6The G20 leaders’ summit on 15 November 2008 included the following in its declara-
tion (emphasis added): ‘We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism
and not turning inwards in times of ﬁnancial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12
months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and
services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing WTO-inconsistent measures
to stimulate exports’.
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Figure 1.2: The great trade collapse and recovery: merchandise imports by quarter,
2007–10.
reasons, still largely unknown. The trade collapse that had begun in 2008 Q3
(see again Figure 1.2) was still in the early stages of being detected by the
government statistical agencies charged with collecting and disseminating
monthly trade data. The extent to which previously undetected protection-
ism may have somehow contributed to the deepening and ongoing trade col-
lapse was unclear, but the idea that new trade barriers had been contributors
was likely under suspicion. Furthermore, a second and increasing concern
was that the deepening contraction to the global macroeconomy might stoke
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Figure 1.2: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations based on data provided by World Bank’s Trade Watch
(Freund and Ngeau 2011). Each ﬁgure presents an index of seasonally adjusted, nom-
inal merchandise trade ﬂows.
nationalist sentiment and populist demands that governments impose future
trade barriers in an attempt to isolate national economies from the events of
the global economy.
Figure 1.3 documents this uncertainty over trade policy and the increased
public interest during 2008–9 by plotting the Google Trends time series of
data for an Internet search of the term ‘Protectionism’. This search term
tracked the increased search for ‘Great Depression’, with an accompanying
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Figure 1.3: Increased public interest in the Great Depression and Protectionism during
2008–9.
Source: author’scalculationsfromGoogleTrendsbasedonInternetsearchesfor‘Great
Depression’ and ‘Protectionism’. Data reported weekly and each index averages a value
of 1 for 2004–10.
uptick in November 2008, which was also likely to be due to public curiosity
drawn by the attention of the Washington G20 summit. The public interest
in ‘Protectionism’ continued to increase until it reached a peak in 2009 Q1
(February).
During the period of November 2008 to February 2009, what facts did the
public and policymakers know about recently occurring changes to national
trade policies? The answer is ‘not much’. While there were anecdotal stories
about events taking place, the next section describes how it was not until
March 2009 that data began to emerge and facts began to be learned about
how national governments had been adjusting their trade policies in 2008.
Hence, March 2009 was the turning point at which suﬃcient information
began to be revealed so that some of this public uncertainty on the scope
and impact of any ‘Protectionism’ in 2008 could begin to be resolved.
1.2 The Trade Collapse and Great Recession
Spur New Trade Policy Monitoring Initiatives
Thespectreofpotentialprotectionismandtheuncertaintyoverhowthemajor
economies were utilising their trade policy inspired a number of monitor-
ing initiatives in 2009 that were designed to improve transparency. Table 1.1
provides a timeline of three major initiatives and how their activities took
shape over the course of the year. In January 2009, the WTO published a
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Table 1.1: Timeline of major new trade policy monitoring initiatives in 2009.
Organisation Date Information and data provided
WTO Secretariat: report to the TPRB
from director-general on the
ﬁnancial and economic crisis and
trade-related developments
23 January Identiﬁcation of problem of
potential of new crisis-induced
trade barriers; no provision of any
detailed lists of new trade or
trade-related measures
World Bank: Global Antidumping
Database
5 March Provides public list and detailed
data on anti-dumping use through
December 2008
WTO Secretariat: report to the TPRB
from the director-general on the
ﬁnancial and economic crisis and
trade-related developments
20 April Provides public list of trade and
trade-related measures imposed
from September 2008 to March
2009
World Bank: Global Antidumping
Database
11 May Provides public list and detailed
data on anti-dumping, global
safeguards, China-speciﬁc
safeguards, and CVD use through
March 2009
Global Trade Alert 8 June Launch begins its ongoing and
continuous provision of detailed
and real-time information on state
measures likely to aﬀect foreign
trading partners
report from the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) identifying the problem of
new crisis-induced protectionist barriers. Nevertheless, the TPRB did not yet
make public any new information on actual trade barriers that members had
imposed.
In March 2009, a World Bank-sponsored initiative called the Global Anti-
dumping Database provided its ﬁrst crisis-era update. This database had pub-
lished historical details of cross-country use of anti-dumping, CVDs and safe-
guard policies—with information dating back to the 1980s—and had been
made freely available on the Internet since 2005.7 The March 2009 release
provided details on policy activity that had taken place through 2008 Q4,
and it was accompanied by a brief monitoring report that examined simple
7Bown (2008) provides a ﬁrst use of the Global Antidumping Database information to
document the heterogeneous application of anti-dumping over time across developing
countries. The database had been updated periodically since 2005, and the last complete
update(priortothecrisis)waspublishedinJune2007.In2009–10,theGlobalAntidumping
Database was folded into the World Bank’s larger Temporary Trade Barriers Database,
since it contains detailed policy data on other, increasingly used TTBs such as CVDs and
safeguards in addition to anti-dumping. The Temporary Trade Barriers Database is the
source of much of the detailed policy data used by the authors in the subsequent chapters
to this volume.
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12 The Great Recession and Import Protection
Table 1.1: Continued.
Organisation Date Information and data provided
WTO Secretariat: report to the TPRB
from the director-general on the
ﬁnancial and economic crisis and
trade-related developments
15 July Provides public list of trade and
trade-related measures imposed
from 1 March to 19 June 2009
World Bank: Global Antidumping
Database
23 July Provides public list and detailed
data on anti-dumping, global
safeguards, China-speciﬁc
safeguards, and CVD use through
June 2009
World Bank: Global Antidumping
Database
21 October Provides public list and detailed
data on anti-dumping, global
safeguards, China-speciﬁc
safeguards, and CVD use through
September 2009
WTO Secretariat: overview of
developments in the international
trading environment—annual report
by the director-general
18 November Provides public list of trade and
trade-related measures imposed
through October 2009
Source: reports to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) were documents JOB(09)/2, WT/
TPR/OV/W/1 and WT/TPR/OV/W/2 and the November annual report by the director-general was
WT/TPR/OV/12. The monitoring reports for the Global Antidumping Database (now Temporary
Trade Barriers Database) are all available online at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/. Global Trade
Alert’s website is www.globaltradealert.org.
indicators on the newly collected policy data. It was this March 2009 release
that provided the ﬁrst public evidence on the relative increase in trade pol-
icy activity during 2008.8 While this initial step was informative, it too was
incomplete for a number of reasons that are addressed in more detail in the
discussion below. However, and most importantly for transparency reasons,
the data used in the analysis were made public immediately for other policy
analysts to examine, verify and include in their own monitoring eﬀorts. The
World Bank continued to update this policy data publicly and promptly at
the end of each of the nine quarters between 2008 Q4 and 2010 Q4. Public
8This monitoring report was published on the initial website of the Global Antidumping
Database at www.brandeis.edu/˜cbown/global_ad/monitoring/. The evidence from this
report was also published in March 2009 as Bown (2009a) and was circulated most pub-
licly as part of the information provided in Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009a,b). Later in
the crisis, the ongoing monitoring eﬀorts were transferred to a new World Bank website for
the Temporary Trade Barriers Database, http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/. The Temporary
Trade Barriers Database website also provides examples of media dissemination begin-
ning in March 2009 of the World Bank-sponsored monitoring through reporting featured
in, among others, Economist, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, BusinessWeek, Reuters,
Xinhua and VoxEU.org.
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monitoring reports that interpreted the newly arriving data were provided for
those ﬁrst six quarters from 2008 Q4 to 2010 Q1.
The other monitoring eﬀorts also continued through 2009. In addition
to the ongoing Global Antidumping Database monitoring reports and data
releases, the WTO initiative came out with its ﬁrst list in April of trade and
trade-related measures that members had imposed between September 2008
and March 2009. The WTO followed up with additional, periodic lists in July
and November. The third and ﬁnal monitoring initiative—the Global Trade
Alert (GTA)—was introduced through a public launch in June 2009. The GTA
quickly became the most publicly visible and aggressive watchdog to report
on trade policy changes during 2009–10.9 While each of the initiatives pro-
vided useful information and served an important role during this period, the
WTO and GTA eﬀorts were somewhat limited by the fact that there existed no
comparable historical (ie pre-crisis) data against which to evaluate the mag-
nitude of the information on their lists. For comparative purposes, it was
unclear whether the trade policy activity that these two initiatives identiﬁed
was any larger or more frequent than what WTO members undertook during
the ‘normal’ course of operation, ie even in the absence of a crisis.
1.3 New TTBs in 2008 Did Not Cause the 2008–9 Trade Collapse
While the collective monitoring eﬀorts continued throughout the crisis, a ﬁrst
rough estimate of the potential trade impact and hence economic scale of the
new, 2008-to-date protectionism was not published until July 2009. This ﬁrst
estimate in Bown (2009b) focused on the G20’s new anti-dumping, global safe-
guard, China-speciﬁc safeguard and CVD activity for the ﬁve quarters between
2008 Q1 and 2009 Q1.10 These estimates indicated that at most 0.45% of the
major G20 economies’ merchandise imports were being aﬀected by newly
imposed import restrictions under TTB policies. Hence, this evidence made
clear for the ﬁrst time that the massive, global trade collapse of 2008 Q4 to
2009 Q1 (see again Figure 1.2) had not been caused by new TTB activity during
that particular time period.
9Many interpreted the GTA approach as an attempt to ‘name and shame’ governments
and prevent countries from imposing, in an undetected way, a trade policy to successfully
pawn oﬀ its domestic economic woes as a negative externality on its trading partners.
Nevertheless, the GTA was also subject to criticism during the crisis; see, for example,
Rodrik (2009) and the Reuters interview with Richard Eglin, Director of the WTO’s Trade
Policies Review Division (Lynn 2009).
10The Bown (2009b) approach was to match product-level, six-digit Harmonized System
import data on pre-crisis trade ﬂows to the TTB-aﬀected product codes. A full description
of the data and approach to the July 2009 estimates was later published in Bown (2009c).
Kee et al (2010) provide later evidence broadly conﬁrming the relative size of the initial
estimates from Bown (2009b,c) through a more rigorous approach that relies on trade
elasticities and the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) methodology.
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14 The Great Recession and Import Protection
It is worth noting one additional caveat before returning to an exami-
nation of the escalating use of TTBs in 2009. First, and as the WTO and
GTA information revealed, governments made many other policy adjust-
ments beyond TTBs during 2008–9 in ways that also may have aﬀected trade
ﬂows. This includes governments subsidising industries directly (including
through bailouts), intervening in currency markets to aﬀect relative exchange
rates, inserting local content requirements into stimulus packages, and even
changing applied tariﬀ rates— both upwards and downwards—in selected
instances. Nevertheless, most of the measures that these initiatives have iden-
tiﬁed were also imposed in 2009 or beyond and thus could not have been
responsible for the global trade collapse that began in 2008 Q4.
Thus, a focused examination of the data and information provided in the
World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database—which admittedly only
reported data on anti-dumping, CVD and safeguard use—does not provide
a comprehensive assessment of all trade-impacting policies in use during the
crisis. Where possible, the chapters in this volume attempt to complement
TTB data with other information so as to begin to address the more complete
picture. That being said, this volume is still a ﬁrst step in the research litera-
ture with a primary aim of establishing clear facts on the use and role of TTBs
during 2008–9.
1.4 Tracking Protectionism and Lessons Learned from
Monitoring TTBs through 2009–10
The World Bank’s ongoing contribution to the monitoring of TTBs continued
throughout 2009 and into 2010 even though it had become clear by July 2009
that new TTBs in 2008 had not caused the trade collapse.11 In addition to
that initial, ﬁrst-order concern about the contributing causes to the 2008–9
collapse, the impact of future TTBs on a potential ‘V-shaped’ trade recov-
ery was still an unknown. To what extent would the industries and workers
devastated by the global economic contraction increasingly petition their gov-
ernments for additional TTBs? Would their governments respond favourably
to domestic political pressure and impose such barriers?
Figure 1.4(a) presents quarterly data on anti-dumping use during 2007–10
in a manner consistent with the reporting approach of earlier prominent
research on the global proliferation of the policy (Prusa 2001; Zanardi 2004).
Though the ﬁgure breaks down the information into a higher frequency (quar-
terly) than anti-dumping use has traditionally been reported, this method
of listing the counts of new investigations was also how such policy activ-
11For a collection of early research (published in November 2009) assessing the sus-
pected causes of the 2008–9 trade collapse, including the contraction of global demand
and supply-side credit constraints, see Baldwin (2009).
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ity would typically be reported semi-annually by the WTO.12 In March 2009,
the Global Antidumping Database initially adopted this approach of count-
ing anti-dumping investigations (and newly imposed ﬁnal measures) as the
‘headline’ summary statistic for its ﬁrst monitoring report that accompanied
the public release of the full data for 2008. For the 11 major economies illus-
trated here, the number of new anti-dumping initiations in 2008 had grown
by 33% relative to 2007.13 Furthermore, the second half of 2008 experienced
38% more anti-dumping investigations than the ﬁrst half of 2008. The 2008 Q4
data alone saw a 65% increase in anti-dumping investigations relative to the
same period in 2007, and a 69% increase relative to 2008 Q3.
However, when the 2009 Q1 information in the Global Antidumping Data-
base arrived, it became clear that basing the headline summary statistic
on anti-dumping alone and simply counting the number of new investiga-
tions might not provide an accurate assessment of the demands that indus-
tries and workers were making for new trade barriers.14 In particular, newly
available information increasingly suggested that countries were using other
TTB instruments, many of which were extremely close substitutes for anti-
dumping in terms of the desired eﬀect of shielding domestic industries from
what was perceived as injurious imports. Figure 1.4(b) illustrates the newly
initiated CVD investigations over this full period, including a bunching of
cases that would occur later in 2009 Q3. Similarly, Figure 1.4(c) documents the
counts of newly initiated global safeguard investigations, including a spike
in 2009 Q2. Finally, Figure 1.4(d) shows the China-speciﬁc safeguard inves-
tigations, including the highly publicised US investigation of tyres that was
initiated in 2009 Q2 (April).
To explain this potential concern most clearly, let us focus on the case of
India. Consider the problem that arises when examining its anti-dumping use
in isolation and ignoring the other TTB policies. In 2009 Q1, India initiated 7
new anti-dumping investigations, a sharp decline in industry demand for new
12The WTO reported information on new anti-dumping activity typically twice per year,
and thus with a substantial delay relative to when the activity had occurred, due to the
fact that it was constrained to obtain information from member economies’ self-reporting
to the Committee on Antidumping. The Global Antidumping Database approach was to
gather its information directly from oﬃcial, national government sources from their Inter-
net websites. As such, it was able to update its data publicly and to disseminate quarterly
monitoring reports relatively quickly.
13TheseﬁguresareslightlydiﬀerentfromthemonitoringreportpublishedinMarch2009
(which found a 31% increase) because that report covered a wider sample of countries than
those covered by this volume.
14For ease of discussion, this section focuses only on the data released covering newly
initiated TTB investigations. In reality, the monitoring eﬀorts in 2009–10 also tracked
(and provided detailed data on) the imposition of ﬁnal measures and even preliminary
measures. The text here focuses on newly initiated investigations as its leading indicator of
domestic economy demands for new import protection. The discussion below also focuses
in substantial detail on important other indicators including, of course, imposed measures.
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Figure 1.4: Monitoring TTBs: initiations of new investigations by policy, by quarter,
2007–10.
protection when compared with the 39 new anti-dumping investigations it had
initiated in 2008 Q4. However, also in 2009 Q1, India initiated three diﬀerent
China-safeguard investigations, two diﬀerent global safeguard investigations,
and its ﬁrst-ever CVD investigation. Furthermore, an examination of the prior
period’s Indian anti-dumping data (ie 39 new investigations, a major share of
the aggregate spike for the 11 economies illustrated in Figure 1.4(a)) reveals
that 29 of the 39 new investigations in 2008 Q4 were associated with only
3 products (cold-rolled ﬂat stainless steel, hot-rolled steel and carbon black)
that were imported from many foreign sources.15 This example illustrates
15Put diﬀerently, because of the means of reporting the information inherent in Fig-
ure 1.4, the 2008 Q4 data presented in Figure 1.4 would have looked much diﬀerent if
India had initiated three global safeguard investigations (over cold-rolled ﬂat stainless
steel, hot-rolled steel and carbon black) instead of 29 anti-dumping investigations over
those same products, even though the economic impacts might have been quite similar.
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(c) Global safeguards
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(d) China-speciﬁc safeguards
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Figure 1.4: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010a). Each panel includes data for the 11 policy-imposing economies in this volume:
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, India, Mexico, South Africa, Korea, Turkey
and the USA.
that, even when focusing on TTBs, an examination of anti-dumping alone
had the potential to miss one important part of the new import protection
and to overstate another. To be more comprehensive, reporting a headline
statistic on protectionism through TTBs needed to capture more accurately
the expanding use of these other policy instruments. Although more coun-
tries were beginning to expand use of CVDs, global safeguards and China-
speciﬁc safeguards, the Indian 2008 Q4 data also revealed that focusing on
anti-dumping based on the number of initiated investigations could poten-
tially overstate a run-up in protectionism.
With these considerations in mind, beginning in 2009 Q1, the subsequent
Global Antidumping Database monitoring reports presented an alternative
headline summary statistic characterising the newly reported data on pro-
tectionism. Instead of focusing on anti-dumping alone, the headline for the
2009 Q1 report included all four TTB policies—anti-dumping, CVDs, global
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Figure 1.5: Monitoring TTBs: combining data on TTB investigations over non-redun-
dant products by quarter, 2007–10.
Source: author’s calculations from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010a). Figure includes data for the 11 policy-imposing economies in this volume:
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Mexico, South Africa, Korea, Turkey and
the USA. This ﬁgure makes comparable the data on policy use across diﬀerent (anti-
dumping, CVD, safeguards, China-speciﬁc safeguards) TTBs by counting, for each
policy-imposingeconomy,multipleinvestigationsoverthesameproductatmostonce,
regardless of how many policy instruments (eg anti-dumping or CVDs) simultaneously
investigate the product and regardless of how many foreign sources of imports of the
product (eg anti-dumping versus safeguards) are investigated.
safeguards and China-speciﬁc safeguards. Furthermore, so as to make these
policies more comparable, it also no longer simply counted up all investiga-
tions against all named foreign sources. Instead, in order to reduce the likeli-
hood of double counting, the approach was to provide information on ‘non-
redundant’ cases and the products behind those investigations—regardless
of how many foreign trading partners were being investigated and how many
diﬀerent TTB policy instruments were being used against the same product.16
Figure 1.5 presents this alternative reporting approach and applies it to
these 11 economies’ TTB use over the period 2007–10. The ﬁgure shows that
2009 Q1 experienced 9% more of these non-redundant, product-level TTB
investigations than a year earlier (2008 Q1), though there was a small decline
from the spike of the previous quarter (2008 Q4). Under the approach illus-
trated in Figure 1.5, these 11 economies continued to show increases in newly
initiated investigations in each of 2009 Q2 and 2009 Q3. Then in 2009 Q4, new
investigations were cut nearly 50% from the previous quarter, and new initia-
tions remained remarkably ﬂat at this new, lower level through each quarter
of 2010. This measure suggests 2009 Q3 as the clear end to at least the initial
16This was designed to address the issue that, increasingly, governments were simulta-
neously initiating CVD investigations over the same product and against the same foreign
target as their anti-dumping investigations. For a discussion, see Bown (2011).
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run-up in demands for new TTB activity associated with the 2008–9 global
economic crisis.
While this reporting during the crisis provided useful information about
the ﬂows of new TTB investigations, and it made some improvement relative
to earlier approaches, the information provided was nevertheless still incom-
plete for at least two additional reasons.
First, the monitoring still did not accurately reﬂect the concern that a ‘prod-
uct’ was reported however an industry’s TTB petition deﬁned it, for which
there was no standard. One petition’s product could cover billions of dollars
of trade, and another less than one million.
Second, reporting information on the ﬂow of newly initiated investigations
and newly imposed measures revealed insuﬃcient information on the accu-
mulating ‘stock’ of TTBs, because it ignored other potentially important ele-
ments of the TTB process. In particular, the ongoing TTB monitoring eﬀorts
ignored whether countries were removing on schedule what were supposed
to be temporary trade barriers that had been imposed prior to the crisis.
Indeed, one of the highest proﬁle TTB cases captured by media attention did
not involve the imposition of any new barriers, but whether, in 2008 and again
in 2009, the EU would remove anti-dumping measures on imported footwear
from China that had been imposed long before the crisis. Eventually, the EU
decided to renew the TTB and keep it in place. While such an important policy
decision prevented an anticipated decline in the stock of products covered by
TTBs during 2008–9, this was not picked up by the monitoring approach at
the time.
One of the lessons learned from the monitoring of TTBs during 2009–10
is that, despite even the prior data collection eﬀorts through the Global
Antidumping Database, the research community was still not well enough
positioned to provide an immediate assessment on the scale and potential
impact of new protection. Trade policy monitors can do better. The more
formal approach described in the next section, as well as the results reported
beginning in Section 3 that are developed in great depth throughout the chap-
ters in this volume, should inspire much improved and responsive monitoring
eﬀorts earlier in the next crisis.
2 TRANSITIONING TO RESEARCH ON TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS:
INSTITUTIONS, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA
2.1 Institutional Aspects of Anti-Dumping, CVDs and Safeguards
Anti-dumping, CVDs, global safeguards and China-speciﬁc safeguards—col-
lectively referred to as TTBs—are the four policy instruments of central focus
to this volume of research. This section brieﬂy introduces some of the more
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20 The Great Recession and Import Protection
formal institutional aspects of TTBs.17 Collectively, TTBs are some of the pri-
mary means through which many governments have ﬂexibility with respect
to their trade policy. In particular, in the face of binding legal commitments
on WTO members’ most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariﬀ rates as well as prefer-
ential tariﬀ commitments, many economies are prevented from simply rais-
ing their applied tariﬀ rates to respond to political–economic shocks. The
WTO’s legal agreements covering TTBs create conditions by which countries
can impose new trade barriers in potentially WTO-consistent ways and thus
achieve some trade policy ﬂexibility in response to changes in domestic eco-
nomic conditions.18
The four TTBs have a number of common elements, which, for domes-
tic industry users and policymakers, implies some degree of substitutability.
First, each can be permissible under the rules of the WTO, provided certain
economic conditions are met and certain procedures are adhered to so as
to justify new measures being imposed under their auspices. For example, a
necessary condition required before implementation of a new trade barrier
is evidence of injury (or threat thereof) to a domestic industry that competes
with the imported products. Second, each of the trade barriers imposed under
these TTB provisions is supposed to be temporary. While the relevant WTO
agreements implemented after the Uruguay Round precisely deﬁne the legal
requirements, anti-dumping and CVDs are typically supposed to be removed
after ﬁve years after a sunset review investigation, and global safeguards are
typically terminated after three (if no compensation is granted) or four years.
The China-speciﬁc safeguard is a transitional policy introduced into the WTO
under the terms of China’s WTO accession in 2001, and other WTO members
have the right to use the policy to address injurious import surges from China
until the policy expires in 2013.
Despite a number of common characteristics, there are important distinc-
tions between the TTB policies. Perhaps most importantly, triggering the safe-
guards provisions requires no evidence that trading partners have done any-
thing ‘unfair’. Broadly put, all that is required is evidence of injury that can
17This section does not attempt to provide a thorough legal analysis of the similarities
and diﬀerences among the TTBs since the literature is vast in this area. Mavroidis et al
(2008) is an accessible legal–economic assessment with a much more detailed discussion
of the relevant WTO agreements on TTBs; see also Hoekman and Kostecki (2009). Blonigen
and Prusa (2003) and Nelson (2006) provide extensive surveys of the economic research on
anti-dumping, and Bown and Crowley (2005) survey the economic literature on safeguards.
Reynolds (2008) discusses CVDs. Bown (2010b) describes early use of the China-speciﬁc
safeguard. Bagwell and Staiger (2002) present a classic political–economic theory of the
WTO, including one particular role for TTBs (Chapter 6).
18See, in particular, the WTO Agreement on Antidumping, Agreement on Safeguards,
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For the China-speciﬁc safe-
guard, see China’s Accession Protocol.
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be linked to proper evidence of changes to imports.19 The other two TTBs—
anti-dumping and CVDs—require a second piece of important evidence. In
addition to demonstration of injury, use of anti-dumping requires evidence
that the injury can be linked to imports that have been priced at a value
that is ‘too low’. Use of CVDs requires evidence that domestic injury can be
linked to imports that have beneﬁted from foreign subsidies. A ﬁnal impor-
tant distinction between the TTBs involves how they are applied. Global safe-
guards are supposed to be applied on a relatively non-discriminatory basis
across all trading partners, regardless of the source of imports. On the other
hand, anti-dumping and CVDs allow for much more discrimination between
foreign sources of the same product. In fact, the imposed duties are often
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, indicating the possibility of using trade policy to discriminate
between ﬁrms within the same exporting country, let alone between ﬁrms
in one country versus another. Finally, as indicated by its name, the China-
speciﬁc safeguard is also discriminatory as it can only be applied against
imports from China.
In a typical TTB case, a domestic industry petitions its government under
one (or more) of these TTB laws. The government quickly makes the decision
whethertoinitiateaninvestigation—inmostinstanceschoosingtodoso—and
then begins collecting information on whether the case has merit. Each WTO
member has its own distinct domestic implementing legislation that generates
some variation in timing of when new trade barriers would subsequently get
imposed. Nevertheless, the government makes a preliminary determination,
typically within 30–90 days, of whether the case has enough merit to impose
a preliminary trade barrier and to continue to the ﬁnal investigation. The ﬁnal
investigation then takes longer to complete. The investigation of whether to
impose a ﬁnal (deﬁnitive) measure can take as long as 14–18 months depend-
ing on the investigating country and the TTB policy being used.
Historically, anti-dumping has been the most frequently used TTB policy.
As such, anti-dumping has also been the most thoroughly researched of the
TTB policies, though until the late 2000s much of the detailed research in
this area focused on developed economy use, mainly due to data availability
reasons. With the spread of increased use to developing economies in the
1990s and the initial publication of detailed data in the Global Antidumping
Database in 2005, additional research has emerged assessing the policy’s use
by other countries, including a number of major emerging economies.
19Nevertheless, the practical evidence necessary to impose a WTO-consistent safeguard
is still relatively unsettled, given the evolving jurisprudence on this issue under the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding (see, for example, Sykes (2003) and Irwin (2003)). For a
legal–economic assessment of the substantial number of WTO Panel and Appellate Body
decisions regarding WTO consistency with regard to applied TTBs, see also the American
Law Institute-sponsored research (Mavroidis and Horn 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009).
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22 The Great Recession and Import Protection
2.2 Methodological Approach and Data
As suggested in Section 1, the approach to monitoring new TTBs during
the crisis so as to provide useful information on their economic importance
amid fear of growing protectionism was still incomplete. First, simply count-
ing cases relied on a domestic industry’s own, self-reported characterisation
of a ‘product’ subject to a newly initiated investigation or imposed barrier.
There is no uniform deﬁnition of a ‘product’—it results from the petition
ﬁled by the domestic industry and is designed so as to increase the likelihood
that the petition will be accepted and that a new barrier will be imposed. If
there is substantial heterogeneity in the amount of product coverage across
TTB investigations, countries or time, relying on this measure may not accu-
rately reﬂect the economic importance or unimportance of TTBs. Second, the
information on the initiation of new investigations or even the imposition
of newly imposed barriers only reports on ‘ﬂow’ variables, and these vari-
ables may themselves be aﬀected by the pre-existing ‘stock’ of TTBs already
in place. However, examining the ‘stock’ build-up of such trade barriers not
only requires information on past ﬂows, but it also requires up-to-date infor-
mation on removals of previously imposed barriers. Data on policy removals
have typically been more diﬃcult to obtain systematically. For example, dur-
ing the crisis, reliable data on removals were obtained only after a substantial
time lag relative to the ﬂow data on newly initiated investigations and newly
imposed barriers, thereby hindering the construction of stock measures.
Bown (2011) proposes two methodological approaches to move beyond pre-
vious accounting eﬀorts that assess TTB proliferation. Each method addresses
some of these concerns by constructing ﬂow and stock measures of imported
products and the share of a country’s imports that are aﬀected by its use
of TTBs. The merits of such an approach include the ability to better assess
the scope of TTB coverage in the face of heterogeneity in the timing of newly
imposed barriers, the length of time that such barriers stay imposed, and the
trading partners aﬀected. The remainder of this section summarises and pro-
vides the intuition behind the Bown (2011) approaches. The technical details
are explained in the Appendix (Section 6).
The ﬁrst methodological approach of Bown (2011) constructs ‘count’ mea-
sures of the annual stock of Harmonized System products at the six-digit level
(HS-06) subject to TTBs, measured as the share of the importing economy’s
total set of that year’s imported HS-06 products from all sources. This count
measure reﬂects information on the country’s newly imposed trade barriers,
previously imposed trade barriers, and the removal of previously imposed
barriers. The methodology starts with the approach of Bown and Tovar (2011,
Figure 1), which focused on India’s use of anti-dumping over the 1992–2003
period, and modiﬁes it along three important dimensions: ﬁrst, by examin-
ing not only cumulative stocks but also ﬂows; second, by examining not only
anti-dumping, but also HS-06 products subject to other TTB policies such as
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CVDs, global safeguards and China-speciﬁc safeguards to address the concern
raised in Section 1.4 (when comparing Figure 1.4(a) with Figure 1.5); and third,
by normalising the count of TTB-aﬀected HS-06 products by the economy’s
stock of HS-06 products with positive imports in that year.
The second approach reﬁnes the ‘count’ measure by using data on import
values to trade-weight the importance of TTBs at the HS-06 product level.
Construction of this complementary ‘value’ measure is one way of investi-
gating the possibility that there may be signiﬁcant variation in the economic
(trade) importance across HS-06 products aﬀected by TTB use. Some TTBs are
applied against multiple foreign sources and can aﬀect more imports than a
TTB used against a single foreign supplier. Furthermore, some HS-06 prod-
ucts may be larger contributors to the economy’s overall level of imports than
others; one product from one foreign source may cover only a few hundred
thousand dollars of trade, while another may cover billions of dollars. The
‘value’ approach uses HS-06 import-value data from the United Nations Com-
trade database to construct year-by-year trade-weighted coverage ratios of
imports subject to TTBs. The results reported in this chapter construct the
economy’s TTB-aﬀected imports as a share of the economies’ non-oil imports.
The Appendix (Section 6) provides a more detailed explanation of methodol-
ogy and data.
The product-level TTB policy data are taken from the World Bank’s Tempo-
rary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
3 HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF RESULTS: CHANGES TO THE STOCKS OF
IMPORTS SUBJECT TO TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
This section applies the methods described in Section 2 and in the Appendix
(Section 6) to provide a broad and suggestive overview of results. The added
context then raises questions for the country-speciﬁc research in the subse-
quentchapters.Inparticular,thissectionreportstheresultsfromBown(2011)
and begins with evidence aggregated over the countries in this volume—so as
to make comparisons with Figure 1.4(a) and Figure 1.5—before introducing
some country-speciﬁc results. Note ﬁrst that the results reported in this sec-
tion are all based on annual data—as opposed to the quarterly information
highlighted earlier—due to data availability constraints on policy removals
and HS-06 imports.
Before turning to a discussion of results on TTB use over the longer period
of 1997–2009, it is useful to ﬁrst describe how Figure 1.6 presents four dis-
tinct pieces of information.20 First, the solid grey line deﬁnes the TTB indi-
20The aggregated data in Figures 1.6 and 1.7 begin in 1997 because 1997 was the ﬁrst
year for which all of the economies in this volume were using TTBs. (China was the last
of these economies to initiate use.) The economy-speciﬁc results of Figures 1.8, 1.9, 1.10
and 1.11 illustrate TTB use beginning in 1990. These four ﬁgures, discussed in more detail
below, use the same visual approach as Figure 1.6 to present the results.
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Figure 1.6: The major economies’ imported products collectively aﬀected by TTBs,
1997–2009.
Source: ﬁgure based on annual data, author’s calculations using a modiﬁed version
of Equation (1.1) from data in the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
Data are aggregated over the following ten policy-imposing economies: Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, India, South Africa, Korea, Turkey and the USA. Of
the economies analysed in this volume, Mexico is the only user of such policies not
included in construction of the data for the ﬁgure, for reasons explained in Chapter 10
by Raymond Robertson (this volume). See also Figure 1.10.
cator based on imported products aﬀected by newly initiated investigations
under any TTB policy, and is thus a broad measure of the potential annual
‘ﬂow’ of new barriers. Second, the dashed grey line deﬁnes the indicator sim-
ilarly, but captures the ﬂow of potential imported products aﬀected by the
anti-dumping policy alone. For countries that only used anti-dumping and did
not have any CVD, global safeguard or China-speciﬁc safeguard investigations
during this period, the solid grey line and the dashed grey line would over-
lap. Any divergence between these two lines represents the products subject
to investigations under the countries’ other (non-anti-dumping) TTB policies.
For the reasons described in the last section, these two lines serve as more
informative ‘ﬂow’ indicators of new protectionism than the data presented in
Figures 1.4(a) or even Figure 1.5. The solid black line in Figure 1.6 presents
the third piece of information on the annual ‘stock’ of import products sub-
ject to any TTB policy. It deﬁnes the TTB indicator as taking on a value of 1
whenever the import was subject to some TTB that had been imposed in that
year or a prior year (and had not yet been removed). Fourth, the dashed black
line represents the stock of products subject to anti-dumping policy only.
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3.1 These Economies Collectively Increased
TTB Product Coverage by 25% During the Crisis
Figure 1.6 illustrates the data cumulated across the policy-imposing econo-
mies in this volume over the period 1997–2009. It uses the ‘count’ method
described in Equation (1.1) (see the Appendix (Section 6)) and constructs mea-
sures of the aggregated stocks and ﬂows of imported products subject to
TTBs.21 By the end of 2009, the solid black line indicates that these economies
had collectively increased the stock of imported products they subjected to
imposed TTBs by 25% relative to the pre-crisis levels of 2007. By 2009, 2.7%
of HS-06 products that these economies imported were subject to a TTB, hav-
ing increased from 2.4% of imported products prior to the crisis in 2007.
Despite the potential concern over TTB policy substitutability raised in Sec-
tion 1, the vast majority of the increase in TTB product coverage came through
anti-dumping policy (dashed black line) and not through CVDs and global or
China-speciﬁc safeguards. The ﬁgure reveals that this diﬀers from the major
TTB increase during 2001–3. During that period it turns out that global safe-
guards on steel products were a major contributor to increased TTB use.
Figure 1.7 further divides the black and grey lines of Figure 1.6, ie the
stock and ﬂow series based on all TTBs, according to whether the policy-
imposing economy was developed or developing. The result shows that the
main source of the overall increase in the stock of product coverage during
the 2008–9 crisis was new TTBs imposed by developing economies. The devel-
oping economies in this volume combined to have 39% more products subject
to a TTB by 2009 (2.9% of their imported HS-06 products) than before the cri-
sis in 2007 (2.4% of their imported HS-06 products). On the other hand, the
developed economies combined to have only 4% more products subject to a
TTB in 2009 (2.4% of their imported HS-06 products) than before the crisis in
2007 (2.3% of their imported HS-06 products).
Did the 2008–9 crisis cause the observed changes in new TTB protection?
The second main insight from Figure 1.7 is that, visually, it is diﬃcult to rule
out the possibility that the relative changes in the data between 2007 and
2009 are simply part of a longer-term trend in TTB use. In particular, the 39%
increase for developing economy users may have taken place even under more
‘normal’ macroeconomic conditions had the 2008–9 crisis not occurred, given
the pre-crisis upwards trend. Furthermore, the relatively small (4%) increase
in TTB coverage between 2007 and 2009 for developed economies, while sur-
prising in the face of a crisis, is consistent with the secular decline in the
importance of TTB coverage for these economies since 2003.
21Of the economies analysed in this volume, Mexico is the only user of such policies that
is not included in construction of the data for the aggregate Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7. For
reasons explained below (see also Figure 1.10) and in Chapter 10 by Raymond Robertson
(this volume), Mexico coincidentally removed TTBs over imports of hundreds of products
from China in late 2008 that had been in place since 1993.
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Figure 1.7: Developed economy versus developing economy imported products collec-
tively aﬀected by TTBs, 1997–2009.
Source: ﬁgure based on annual data, author’s calculations using a modiﬁed version
of Equation (1.1) from data in the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
Data are aggregated over the following ten policy-imposing economies: Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, India, South Africa, Korea, Turkey and the USA. Of
the economies analysed in this volume, Mexico is the only user of such policies not
included in construction of the data for the ﬁgure, for reasons explained in Chapter 10
by Raymond Robertson (this volume). See also Figure 1.10.
One way to investigate this question more formally is to decompose these
overall trends into economy-by-economy use of TTBs. Table 1.2 presents data
on the percentage change in the stock of product coverage of TTBs between
2007 and 2009. The table reports both the count (column 1) and value (col-
umn 4) methods of Equations (1.1) and (1.2), respectively. First, the table sum-
marises the data based on Figure 1.7 reported above: developed economies
increased their count of products covered by 3.93% compared with the devel-
oping countries’ combined increase of 39.29%. By category of country, the
economies are then ordered according to which had the largest percentage
change in TTB product coverage between 2007 and 2009 using the count
method. Two major emerging economies—India and Argentina—lead the list
with the largest percentage increases in the stocks of products covered by
TTBs during this period.
Table 1.2 also provides simple, economy-by-economy forecasts of the 2009
level of TTB coverage based on predictions from each economy’s histori-
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28 The Great Recession and Import Protection
cal data. (The economy-speciﬁc historical data are discussed in more detail
below.) Motivated by Figure 1.7, results are reported from a simple regression
of the 1997–2007 import share data on a linear time trend; the estimated
coeﬃcient from the regression is then used to predict the (out-of-sample)
import share for 2009. Column 3 reports the prediction which uses the count
measure, and column 6 reports the prediction that uses the value measure.
Compare the prediction for 2009 in Table 1.2 with the realised data. Regard-
less of whether one compares column 2 with column 3 or column 5 with col-
umn 6, there is hardly conclusive evidence that the change in TTB product cov-
erage taking place between 2007 and 2009 is diﬀerent from that predicted by
the historical trend. According to the count measure, seven economies (four
developing and three developed) had a larger share of 2009 imports becoming
subject to TTBs than was predicted from the models. Four economies (China,
South Africa, Mexico and Korea) had less product coverage by 2009 than was
predicted. A comparison of column 5 with column 6, which uses the value
measure, gives diﬀerent results. Only three economies (one developing and
two developed) had a higher-than-predicted share of imports become subject
to TTBs by 2009. While these economies (India, Canada and the USA) did expe-
rience increases in the share of imported products subject to TTBs during the
economic crisis (see column 4), the simple linear time-trend model predicted
this. Thus, it is really only the small diﬀerence between the realised 2009
data and the 2009 forecast that would be the unpredicted component to the
new import protection to be associated with the crisis. For a country such as
Argentina, column 6 suggests that it actually experienced a smaller increase
in imports covered by TTBs in 2009 than that predicted by the time-trend
model.
3.2 The 4% TTB Increase: High-Income-Economy
Use Before and During the Crisis
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 present the ‘stock’ and ‘ﬂow’ TTB information (format-
ted in the same way as Figure 1.6) on an economy-by-economy basis for the
developed economies. Figure 1.8 illustrates the time trend of product cover-
age using the ‘count’ measure of Equation (1.1), and Figure 1.9 illustrate the
time trend of import coverage using the ‘value’ measure of Equation (1.2). For
each economy, I examine TTB use dating back to either its inception or 1990,
whichever is later.
First, consider the USA and the EU. Across developed economies, the USA
and the EU have the ﬁrst- and second-highest annual stock of products cov-
ered by TTBs on average, and their historical use tends to track (counter-
cyclically) domestic macroeconomic indicators. The USA, for example, experi-
enced a spike in TTB ﬂows (and increases to stocks) during its 1990–1 reces-
sion, in response to the surge in imports during the 1997–8 Asian crisis, and
during the 2001–2 recession. In terms of policy choice across TTBs, most US
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Figure 1.8: Developed economies’ use of TTBs by economy, 1990–2009, using Equa-
tion (1.1): counts of products.
Source: Bown (2011, Figure 1).
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Figure 1.9: Developed economies’ use of TTBs by economy, 1990–2009, using Equa-
tion (1.2): share of value of imports.
Source: Bown (2011, Figure 1).
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and EU use involves anti-dumping policy during 1990–2009. The exception for
both was 2001–3, during which the two economies used the global safeguards
policy over a large share of imported steel products. Furthermore, in compar-
ing Figure 1.8 with Figure 1.9, the ‘count’ and ‘value’ measures for these two
economies tend to track fairly closely over time. Divergences between the two
series reveal instances in which counts of products overstate or understate
the trade-weighted importance of the TTBs. Finally, the time trend also sug-
gests a relatively ﬂat or declining importance attached to TTB use by these
economies during 2005–9 in particular, lacking even a major uptick in import
coverage in response to the 2008–9 crisis, as reported in Table 1.2.
The other panels of Figures 1.8 and 1.9 illustrate TTB use for Canada and
Korea. While at a lower average level, the time series changes to Canada’s TTB
coverage also tracks US and EU changes; the one diﬀerence is a slightly larger
increase in TTB use during 2008–9. Korea has the lowest average TTB coverage
of these four developed economies, and the pattern to its time series is quite
diﬀerent as well.
3.3 The 39% TTB Increase: Emerging-Economy
Use Before and During the Crisis
Developingeconomies’useofTTBsaspresentedinFigure1.10andFigure1.11
indicates a diﬀerent story. To highlight some of the distinctions from devel-
oped economy use during this period, consider the example of India. India
only began using TTBs in 1992. While the ﬂow of products under India’s inves-
tigations spiked at various points in time (1999, 2002 and 2007), the stock of
Indian imports aﬀected by TTBs indicates a steady, continual increase over
1992–2009. By 2009, India had a stock of TTBs in place that covered 6% of its
imported HS-06 product lines and 3% of the value of its imports. While India is
now a user of each of the four TTB policy instruments—it initiated the most
anti-dumping, global safeguard and China-speciﬁc safeguard investigations
during 1995–2009, and it initiated its ﬁrst CVD investigation in 2009—the
divergences between the straight and dashed lines in Figure 1.10 and again in
Figure 1.11 are relatively small. This reveals that anti-dumping has been the
instrument that has aﬀected most of the products impacted by India’s total
use of TTBs.
Each of the developing economies illustrated in Figures 1.10 and 1.11 has
its own distinct history of TTB use, though many share characteristics with
the Indian experience. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, China, Mexico and
Turkey each experienced substantial increases in TTB coverage after they
undertook transformative episodes of trade liberalisation. Some of them also
witnessed a substantial increase in TTB coverage during the 2008–9 crisis.
Othereconomiesdidnot. Mexicoevenmanagedtheastonishingresult,despite
being in the middle of the 2008 Q4 trade collapse, of following through with
the planned removal of TTBs that had covered 20% of its imported products
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Figure 1.10: Developing economies’ use of TTBs by economy, 1990–2009, using Equa-
tion (1.1): counts of products.
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Figure 1.10: Continued.
Source: Bown (2011, Figure 2).
from China since 1993. For all of these economies, as well as South Africa,
the chapters that follow document how TTB use relates to the countries’
own macroeconomic conditions; paths towards trade liberalisation and use
of other (ie non-TTB) trade barriers; political–economic relationships between
industry, workers and government; comparative advantage; and trading rela-
tionships.
To summarise the results of this section, while there is an increase in TTB
coverage alongside the 2008–9 crisis, this is mainly attributable to an increase
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Figure 1.11: Developing economies’ use of TTBs by economy, 1990–2009, using Equa-
tion (1.2): share of value of imports.
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Figure 1.11: Continued.
Source: Bown (2011, Figure 2).
in usage by developing countries. For many of these emerging economies, TTB
coverage was already increasing prior to the crisis. Thus, there is an evolving
consensus that the response of the overall WTO system, and how it with-
stood the crisis, was positive—TTBs may have increased, but WTO members
weathered the severe uncertainty and economic calamity of 2008–9 with the
multilateral trading system intact. Nevertheless, even at this broad level, the
import protection in place at the end of 2009 appears somewhat diﬀerent
from how it was before the crisis hit. The next section provides a preview

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 36 — #56






36 The Great Recession and Import Protection
of the details of trade policy changes taking place, economy by economy, in
the chapters that follow. This research also begins to examine explanations
for this policy response based on a more micro-orientated analysis as well
as a more nuanced historical context that better reﬂects how each economy
arrived at its pre-crisis trade policies by 2007.
4 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS’ RESULTS
The ﬂavour of the results presented in Figures 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11 suggests
heterogeneity in TTB use across these major economies over time. Indeed,
the main purpose of this volume is to document the economic signiﬁcance
and details of 11 major economies’ varied use of TTBs, in order to better
understand the implications for the world trading system. These ﬁgures also
make clear that understanding the trade policy changes of 2008–9 requires a
recognition of prevailing, pre-crisis trends in the evolution of national trade
policies.
4.1 Baseline Questions: Putting 2008–9 TTB Use into Historical Context
The authors of the subsequent chapters have been tasked with addressing a
fundamental question. Each has been asked to shed light on how TTB policies
were used during the global economic crisis of 2008–9, and how this use
(and non-use) compares with expected use based on economic theory and
pre-crisis experiences. To form those expectations, each chapter considers
many additional questions and thus considers a much longer time horizon
than 2008–9.
The formation of expectations of the economy’s potential TTB use in
response to the events of 2008–9 is likely to be fuelled by a number of fac-
tors from its political–economic history. How has the economy’s TTB use been
aﬀected by prior macroeconomic shocks such as recessions and crises (Knet-
ter and Prusa 2003)? Even in the absence of prior macroeconomic shocks, how
has TTB use evolved alongside the economy’s other fundamental trade pol-
icy changes, such as episodes of trade liberalisation and commitments to the
multilateral system (Bown and Tovar 2011)? Is there a relationship between
the economy’s TTB use and its applied MFN tariﬀs, bound tariﬀs and PTA
tariﬀs? Does the amount of ‘water’ in the economy’s tariﬀ structure (deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between its legally bound and the applied tariﬀ rates) aﬀect
the economy’s TTB use?
Table 1.3 provides a snapshot of these economies’ trade policies imme-
diately prior to the crisis. It reports information on their levels of tariﬀ
protection and the restrictiveness of their import regimes in 2007. Even at
this extremely aggregated level, the table reveals substantial variation across
policy-imposing economies based on a number of trade policy indicators that
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Table 1.3: Tariﬀs, trade restrictiveness and TTBs immediately before the crisis in 2007.
Average Share of
Average Average MFN applied TTB world
applied bound tariﬀ tariﬀ coverage merchandise
MFN MFN binding (including by value imports
Economy tariﬀ tariﬀ coverage preferences) OTRI by 2007 in 2007
USA 3.5 3.5 100.0 1.3 6.3 2.3 19.6
EU 5.2 5.4 100.0 2.1 6.4 2.8 20.1
Canada 5.5 6.5 99.7 3.1 5.1 0.5 3.7
Korea 12.2 17.0 94.6 6.8 — 0.5 3.6
China 9.9 10.0 100.0 4.8 9.8 2.3 8.7
India 14.5 50.2 73.8 7.8 18.0 2.0 2.2
Brazil 12.2 31.4 100.0 7.0 20.3 2.0 1.2
Argentina 12.0 31.9 100.0 5.4 9.3 1.7 0.4
Mexico 12.6 36.1 100.0 11.1 18.0 0.9 2.8
Turkey 10.0 28.3 50.4 1.8 3.8 3.4 1.6
South Africa 7.8 19.1 96.6 4.9 6.3 0.5 0.7
Source: ﬁrst three columns of data are from WTO (2008). The data on average applied tariﬀ (including
preferences) are trade-weighted. These data and the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) are
from the World Bank’s World Trade Indicators. For data availability reasons, Mexico’s and Turkey’s
OTRI are for 2006. Temporary trade barrier coverage by value by 2007 is calculated by the author
according to Equation (1.2). The share of world merchandise imports in 2007 excludes intra-EU trade
and is taken from Comtrade.
many of the individual chapters investigate further in detail. High-income
economies, such as the USA, the EU and Canada, came into the crisis with
relatively low applied and bound MFN tariﬀ rates, nearly 100% of their tar-
iﬀs being legally bound in the WTO, and also very little water in their tar-
iﬀ structure. Other measures of their import regimes in 2007—such as the
trade-weighted applied tariﬀs inclusive of preferences, and the Overall Trade
Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) developed by Kee et al (2009)—also indicate evi-
dence of relative openness. For the major emerging economies, on the other
hand, Table 1.3 indicates that they were not nearly as open by 2007. On aver-
age, emerging economies had much higher OTRIs, applied tariﬀs and bound
tariﬀs, and they had much less tariﬀ binding coverage.
Nevertheless, a number of the individual chapters highlight a major point
that can be missed by focusing on the Table 1.3 snapshot of 2007 data, ie even
these emerging economies were much more open by 2007 than they had been
15 years earlier. The chapters investigate the potential role of TTBs in those
liberalisation processes, and how liberalisation forces may have also shaped
the economy’s TTB response to the events of the 2008–9 crisis.22 Each chapter
22See Finger and Nogués (2005), for example, which provides an interesting collection
of case studies describing the potential role that TTBs played during the major wave of
Latin American trade liberalisation in the 1990s. Moore and Zanardi (2009) use relatively
aggregated data to examine the cross-country relationship between average tariﬀ cuts and
previous resorting to anti-dumping for a number of developing economies.
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38 The Great Recession and Import Protection
also investigates the within-country, cross-product variation in TTB use rela-
tive to some of the other trade policies listed in Table 1.3 to better understand
the interrelationship across instruments of import protection. An important
research question is how these TTB policies interact, ie as substitutes, comple-
ments or independently, both with each other and with other important trade
policy changes to the economy’s applied MFN or preferential trade agreement
tariﬀs.
Furthermore, many of the chapters address, in empirical detail, the impor-
tant issue of the temporary nature of TTBs. The time coverage of the average
TTB may be changing in addition to any changes in the scope of TTB product
coverage. Moore (2006) and Cadot et al (2007) were among the ﬁrst to exam-
ine the Uruguay Round’s addition of a formal sunset review requirement for
anti-dumping that attempted to limit the time duration of imposed measures.
How have such innovations aﬀected the impact of TTBs, and did this change
systematically during the crisis?
Finally, consider the set of TTB-aﬀected economy-wide imports. Are there
changes across industries as to which sectors’ imports are covered by TTBs?
Can changes in this structure of TTB-aﬀected industries be linked to the evo-
lution of political–economic forces and changes to comparative advantage?
Furthermore, the broad evidence aggregated across countries (Bown and Kee
2011) is that TTBs overall, but anti-dumping in particular, are increasingly tar-
geting imports from developing countries. The practice of using TTBs to target
imports from China is well known (Bown 2010b) but, for the chapters on TTB
policy use by emerging economies in particular, is the targeting of develop-
ing countries speciﬁc to China’s exports, or are there other emerging-country
exporters increasingly and signiﬁcantly impacted by TTB use, and was China
simply the ﬁrst casualty of TTBs aﬀecting more south–south trade?
This section has raised a number of questions. While not all of the following
chapters address each of these issues, each chapter addresses most of these
questions. Furthermore, each chapter also pursues a number of more subtle,
economy-speciﬁc questions that arise from the authors’ examination of the
details of the underlying events.
4.2 High-Income-Economy Use of TTBs
In Chapter 2, Thomas Prusa examines the USA’s TTBs, ﬁnding a sharp decline
in the ﬂow of TTBs over the longer term (2000–2009) and only a modest uptick
during 2008–9. Despite experiencing a macroeconomic slowdown that tradi-
tionally would have triggered a sharp increase in TTBs, the USA initiated rel-
atively few investigations during the 2007–9 US recession. With respect to
the targets of protection, he ﬁnds that US TTBs are increasingly directed at
imports from developing countries in general, and China in particular. While
the steel industry has long been the heaviest user of TTBs within the USA,
other industries such as seafood and wood products display signiﬁcant ebbs
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and ﬂows in TTB protection. Surprisingly, the Uruguay Round mandatory
sunset provisions have adversely aﬀected developing countries as US TTBs
brought against developing countries are at least 60% more likely to remain
in place than those against developed countries. Finally, he brieﬂy examines
the widely publicised 2009 China safeguard on tyres, highlighting how the
availability of many alternative tyre suppliers limited the likely impact of the
discriminatory import restriction.
HylkeVandenbusscheandChristianViegelahnexaminetheEU’suseofTTBs
in Chapter 3. They too fail to ﬁnd clear signs of a major trade policy change
since the outbreak of the crisis. Like many other economies, EU anti-dumping
policy has increasingly focused on China as a target. The chapter provides an
innovative method of analysis and ﬁnds that the EU is more likely to impose
protection against countries and country–industry combinations the more
similar they are to the EU in their product mix. Country–product combina-
tions subject to a preferential tariﬀ are also more likely to be targeted by
the EU’s TTBs. In terms of product characteristics, the shares of consumer
goods and diﬀerentiated goods covered by EU anti-dumping measures have
increased rapidly, and they have remained at a relatively high level during
the crisis. These TTB patterns do not appear to be driven by a few outlying
countries within the EU but are also similar when considering individual EU
member states.
Canada’s use of TTBs during 1989–2009 is the focus of the study by Rodney
Ludema and Anna Maria Mayda in Chapter 4. Despite the retreat in the stock
of products covered by TTB over the 2000s, they ﬁnd signs of a rebound. The
connection of anti-dumping protection to the business cycle remains strong
as new Canadian anti-dumping cases have surged since the crisis, which por-
tends a rise in anti-dumping stocks that could last for several years. They also
provide evidence of a major structural shift occurring in terms of the prod-
ucts and countries on which Canada’s TTBs are applied. The product scope of
anti-dumping protection has narrowed, and increases in anti-dumping pro-
tection have taken place in sectors with relatively small reductions of MFN
tariﬀs. China and, to a lesser extent, other developing countries are being
targeted with far greater intensity than before 2000. Finally, the duration of
anti-dumping remedies fell during the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, though this
seems to have been reversed in the later half of the decade.
Chapter 5 presents an examination of Korea. Moonsung Kang and Soon-
chan Park describe Korea’s export-led growth strategy beginning in the 1970s,
which led its exporters to become a major anti-dumping target in the 1980s
and 1990s. As Korea has become more market-orientated and liberalised its
import regime, it has slowly used TTBs with more regularity. In particular,
Korea had a dramatic increase in usage during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of
1997–8, immediately before the recession of 2000, and a small increase dur-
ing 2008–9. Korea’s TTB use has most frequently targeted China, followed by
Japan and the USA. Finally, evidence from Korea’s anti-dumping use during
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2008–9 suggests that its politically organised sectors tend to receive more
protection than unorganised ones.
4.3 Emerging-Economy Use of TTBs
The last seven chapters of the volume focus on developing economies’ emerg-
ing use of TTBs, beginning with Piyush Chandra’s analysis of China in Chap-
ter 6. While the ﬂow of new Chinese anti-dumping investigations increased
during 2008–9, the stock of China’s imports subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures decreased as China terminated a number of previously imposed mea-
sures covering large numbers of products and shares of imports. Neverthe-
less, the 2008–9 crisis did lead to a number of changes in how China is using
anti-dumping in particular. The increase in the ﬂow of China’s anti-dumping
investigations was a reversal of the trend from the previous ﬁve years. Fur-
thermore, whereas prior to the crisis almost all of China’s anti-dumping
use was conﬁned to only ﬁve industrial sectors, during 2008–9 China ini-
tiated new, large-scale anti-dumping investigations in previously unaﬀected
sectors—including the controversial cases against US autos and chicken parts
that immediately followed the US-imposed China safeguard on tyres in 2009.
Furthermore, China is similar to other countries in the large number of anti-
dumping measures that last longer than ﬁve years, but it is diﬀerent from
other countries in that most of its anti-dumping targets high-income trading
partners. Finally, Chandra also provides evidence that, despite anti-dumping
aﬀecting a relatively sizeable share of China’s imports, very few Chinese ﬁrms
have participated as petitioners in the process.
Patricia Tovar analyses India’s increasing reliance on TTBs in Chapter 7.
While India did not use anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing mea-
sures prior to 1992, it has subsequently become the WTO system’s domi-
nant user of TTB policies. There has been an increase in the stock of Indian
imports subject to anti-dumping measures during 1992–2009; in particular,
the percentage of tariﬀ-line products aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure
increased from 1.8% in 2007 to 4.0% by 2009. Another dimension along which
India’s anti-dumping protection increased during 2008–9 was via the failure
to remove previously imposed policies that came up for review during the
crisis. Furthermore, the incidence of India’s anti-dumping policy has shifted
over time towards China and other developing countries. Finally, while India
increased its use of anti-dumping, global safeguards and China-speciﬁc safe-
guards during 2008–9, India’s process of tariﬀ liberalisation continued during
the period. As such, it is possible that India’s use of TTBs may have con-
tributed to its sustained move towards greater openness.
Marcelo Olarreaga and Marcel Vaillant present the case of Brazil in Chap-
ter 8. Brazil put a regime of TTB protection into place in the late 1980s,
when it began its process of trade liberalisation. In the period 1990–2009,
Brazil’s TTBs were highly concentrated in a few sectors and its government
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relied most heavily on anti-dumping measures, as opposed to countervailing
or safeguards measures. While Brazil’s TTBs aﬀect a relatively small share
of its imports overall, 18% of imports within politically sensitive sectors are
aﬀected. The main historical targets of Brazil’s TTBs are high-income and
upper-middle-income countries, with imports from China and lower-middle-
incomecountriesincreasinglytargetedoverthe2000s.Thereissomeevidence
of complementarity between Brazil’s MFN tariﬀs and its use of TTBs, which
could signal that politically strong sectors are able to obtain both forms of
protection. Furthermore, although Brazil had a signiﬁcant amount of ‘water’
in its MFN tariﬀ structure during this period, the TTBs are twice as large as
would be allowed by the water in the existing tariﬀ structure. Interestingly,
any acceleration of Brazilian TTBs during 2008–9 appears to be unrelated to
the performance of the Brazilian real economy (which continued to grow in
annual terms), relating instead to an appreciation of the real with respect to
the currency of Brazil’s trading partners.
In Chapter 9, Michael O. Moore investigates Argentina’s use of TTBs. Argen-
tina, once a prominent example of the ‘Washington consensus’, took dramatic
steps to reduce its integration into the world economy in the aftermath of
the peso crisis in 2001. Thus, while it would not have been unprecedented
for Argentina to use TTBs aggressively in response to the 2008–9 crisis, the
share of imports subject to ongoing Argentine TTBs increased from 1.2% of
total imports in 2006 to only 2.7% by 2009. Considering a broader deﬁni-
tion of suppressed imports allows the aﬀected import share to rise to 5% by
2009. With respect to export targets, while Argentine anti-dumping continues
to focus on developing countries, this focus has shifted from Brazil in ear-
lier periods to almost all of the recent anti-dumping activity being narrowly
focused on China.
Raymond Robertson documents Mexico’s experience with TTBs in Chap-
ter 10. Among developing economies, Mexico was one of the early liberalis-
ers of its overall import regime. In the early 1990s, Mexico stood out as one
of the largest users of TTBs—almost entirely in the form of anti-dumping
measures—but consistent with its other trade barriers, Mexico has reduced
the use of these measures over time. Mexico’s two primary targets have been
and remain China and the USA. Unlike many other developing countries, Mex-
ico’s increased use of TTBs during the 2008–9 crisis was slight (if at all), espe-
cially when compared with historical use. The most signiﬁcant Mexican TTB
activity during the crisis was the removal in 2008 of anti-dumping measures
over hundreds of tariﬀ lines that had been in place against China since 1993
(see Figure 1.10).
Turkey’s use of TTBs is the subject of Baybars Karacaovali’s study in Chap-
ter 11. Turkey has been an active user of anti-dumping since the 1990s and
more recently began using safeguards and CVDs. Turkey’s use of TTBs dur-
ing the 1990s took place at the same time that it was liberalising its import
regime as a founding member of the WTO and through formation of a customs
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union with the EU in 1996. Turkey has also signed numerous PTAs that the EU
has been involved in as part of its EU candidacy. The drastic intra-group and
extra-group trade liberalisation brought on by the relations with the EU in par-
ticular is a likely contributing determinant to the rise of Turkey’s use of TTBs
during 2000–2009. Turkey continued to use TTBs aggressively during 2008–9
as it was signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the global economic crisis. Finally, Turkey
has not targeted established EU members with TTBs but instead has targeted
developing countries, and especially China, at rates that are disproportionate
to their import market share.
Lawrence Edwards concludes with a detailed analysis of South Africa’s use
of TTBs in Chapter 12. South Africa’s TTBs exhibit many similarities with other
emerging economies: an increase in the use of anti-dumping measures during
the 1990s and a shift in the incidence of anti-dumping policy towards China,
India and other emerging economies in the 2000s. Yet there are important
diﬀerences that reﬂect the unique domestic characteristics of South Africa’s
anti-dumping policy. While South Africa was a world leader in the use of anti-
dumping measures during the 1990s, it had dramatically reduced the number
of products subject to TTBs by the late 2000s. South Africa responded to the
global economic crisis in 2008–9 by revoking over a third of all anti-dumping
measures. This, however, was not a proactive response by the government
to the crisis, but rather the consequence of a High Court ruling that various
anti-dumping measures had exceeded the ﬁve-year period allowed under the
WTO. South Africa’s anti-dumping measures were not used to oﬀset the 1990s
multilateral tariﬀ liberalisation but were more likely used to cover products
that already had high tariﬀs and faced relatively low tariﬀ reductions, sug-
gesting common political economy determinants of South Africa’s tariﬀ and
anti-dumping policy. Finally, there is little evidence that the political economy
determinants of anti-dumping policy have changed, despite the integration of
previously unrepresented economic interests after the demise of apartheid
in 1994.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The chapters in this volume clarify a number of important facts on TTB policy
changes during the 2008–9 crisis. These changes are presented in the context
of a longer-term perspective; the trading system and global economy have
undergone a signiﬁcant evolution over the previous 20 years. Ultimately, these
facts raise more questions for research than they answer. Recall the questions
described earlier. What are the likely contributing causes to the resilience of
the WTO system in the face of the 2008–9 global economic shock? How is this
related to the evolving landscape of import protection through TTBs that, for
some WTO members, forms an increasingly important portion of its overall
portfolio of protection? What does the changing nature of TTB use mean for
the future of a cooperative, multilateral WTO system?
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The legacy of the TTB policy changes taking place during the crisis is far
from decided. The 25% increase in product coverage by 2009 has established
new barriers that are likely to remain in place for a number of years, before
the battles begin for their removals under sunset reviews. Nevertheless, other
battles over crisis-era TTBs have already been initiated. By 2010, a number
of these TTBs were already subject to a formal dispute settlement challenge
at the WTO—including the US-imposed China safeguard on tyres, China’s
anti-dumping and CVDs on US exports of grain-orientated electrical steel, the
EU’s decision to continue duties on Chinese exports of footwear, and China’s
imposed anti-dumping duties on steel fastener imports from the EU. This is
also consistent with pre-crisis trends; the relative importance of TTBs is also
accounted for by its increasingly signiﬁcant role as a source of formal WTO
legal challenges (Bown 2009d).
To conclude, it must stressed that, despite the contribution of the fol-
lowing chapters to economic research, it will be a long time before we can
close the book on the 2008–9 crisis and its long-term implications for import
protection.
6 APPENDIX
6.1 Technical Explanation of Methodological Approach
This description follows from Bown (2011). The ﬁrst methodological approach
takes an importing economy’s set of HS-06 products as the unit of observation
and builds from Bown and Tovar (2011, Figure 1). More formally, let k be the
policy-imposing (importing) economy and let mk
i,t ∈{ 0,1} be an indicator for
whether the economy had non-zero imports of product i in year t. The HS-06
product i is in the economy’s time-varying set of HS-06 products with non-
zero imports, deﬁned as Ik
t . Next, let bk
i,t ∈{ 0,1} be an indicator for whether
the importing economy k ‘applies’ a TTB on imports of product i in year t.
Thus, deﬁne the ﬁrst ‘count’ measure of the share of annual stock of economy
k imported products subject to a TTB as

Ik
t bk
i,tmk
i,t

Ik
t mk
i,t
. (1.1)
The approach can rely on a variety of deﬁnitions for the TTB indicator bk
i,t
depending on the application. Sometimes it may be deﬁned as an indicator
of the initiation of a TTB investigation of product i in year t; alternatively,
bk
i,t may be deﬁned as the actual application of a barrier (eg import duty,
quantitative restriction, price undertaking) imposed over product i in year t.
Note that, when referring to applied barriers, the approach adopted in the
text is to take the year of imposition as the ﬁrst year that the barrier was
imposed, even if it was only a preliminary barrier and even if that preliminary
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barrier was subsequently removed after completion of the full investigation.
The application, even of preliminary barriers, can aﬀect trade both directly
(raising costs to exporters) and indirectly (increasing uncertainty about future
policy); see Staiger and Wolak (1994).
ThesecondapproachreﬁnesEquation(1.1)byreplacingthebinaryindicator
variable for imports, m
k
i,t, with import-value data at the product level and thus
trade-weighting the bk
i,t indicator by the HS-06 product-level value of imports
from country j, vk
i,j,t. While this approach builds from Equation (1.1), it is
adapted in two ways.
First, redeﬁne the product-speciﬁc, time-varying TTB indicator to now be at
the bilateral level: let b
k
i,j,t ∈{ 0,1} be an indicator for whether a TTB applies
to the economy k imports of product i from exporter j in year t. This modiﬁ-
cation allows the approach to address the possibility of heterogeneity across
foreign sources in terms of which trading partners are negatively aﬀected by
the TTB and which are not.
The second adaptation requires a slightly more detailed explanation. In
order, ultimately, to create coverage ratios that are comparable within a coun-
try over time, an assumption is required for the counterfactual level of econ-
omy k imports in t (as well as t +1, etc) from a supplier j whose exports had
been subject to a TTB imposed in an earlier year (eg t −1, t −2, etc) and thus
did not grow at a ‘normal’ rate in later years (eg t, t+1, etc). To determine the
counterfactual level of imports for such products, the approach in the text
is to make the simple and conservative assumption that, beginning in year t,
yearly imports of TTB-impacted products would have grown at the same rate
as the economy’s non-TTB impacted products.23 To make this clear, decom-
pose the set of economy k imported products Ik into two subsets. Deﬁne the
ﬁrst subset as ˆ Ik and allow it to contain those HS-06 products i subject to a
TTB imposed during the sample and for which there is a need to construct
counterfactual import values, deﬁned as ˆ v
k
i,j,t, for all years that the TTB is
in eﬀect. Deﬁne the second subset of products as I∗k and allow it to contain
all (other) imported HS-06 products i that were never subject to an imposed
TTB and for which there is not a need to construct counterfactual import val-
23There are arguments to suggest that such products may grow at a rate that is diﬀerent
from other products in the economy. For example, these are products that typically had
been growing at rates faster than the average rate of import growth, perhaps because of
a technological innovation or productivity improvement, and thus one might expect that
to have continued. On the other hand, if the imports were growing at faster rates because
they were dumped or subsidised (and if the dumping or subsidisation had terminated),
one might expect the rate of growth to fall (if the dumping or subsidising stopped), even
in the absence of the TTB. While acknowledging the range of theoretical arguments for
counterfactual import growth, to construct these measures the approach adopted here is
to rely on the conservative assumption of TTB-impacted imports growing at the same rate
as imports not impacted by TTBs.
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ues, and thus for which only the observable import data vk
i,j,t is required.24
This modiﬁcation also addresses the well-known concern that any TTB policy
imposed in year t may reduce the (contemporaneous) year t value of imports,
and this would underweight the economic importance of the trade barrier in
the averaging.
The second measure of the share of annual stock of economy k imported
products subject to a TTB in year t, reﬂecting the three modiﬁcations to Equa-
tion (1.1) and thus weighted by the ‘value’ of imports, is deﬁned as25

Ik
t bk
i,j,t ˆ vk
i,j,t

ˆ Ik
t ˆ vk
i,j,t +

I∗k
t vk
i,j,t
. (1.2)
There are at least three other, more subtle transmission mechanisms through
which Equations (1.1) and (1.2) can diverge beyond ways through which trade-
weighting the HS-06 products leads to diﬀerences between the two series that
have already been identiﬁed. First, deﬁning the series according to the stock
of covered HS-06 products prevents the case of a product already subject
to a TTB in t − 1 from being double counted if a new TTB is imposed over
the same product in subsequent years (eg in year t). For example, suppose
a HS-06 product from a given foreign trading partner became subject to an
anti-dumping barrier in t − 1 and then a CVD in t. Since the approach is to
measure the ‘stock’ of products aﬀected by TTBs, this would not result in a
change to series (1.1) or (1.2) between t −1 and t. On the other hand, if there
is a new trading partner being subject to the TTB between t − 1 and t, even
if the underlying product is unchanged, there can be a change in series (1.2).
A change in trading partner coverage could occur because either the second
partner was targeted under a diﬀerent underlying TTB policy instrument (eg
anti-dumping versus CVD) or because of diﬀerences in the timing under the
same policy instrument (eg the ﬁrst anti-dumping imposed over the HS-06
product was imposed against country A in t − 1 and not against country B
until t). Third, the stock series can also be aﬀected through diﬀerential timing
in the removal of a previously imposed TTB over the same HS-06 product. For
example, if the TTB on trading partner A is removed in t − 1 but the TTB on
trading partner B is not removed until t, this diﬀerential timing in the removal
will aﬀect series (1.2). However, there will be no change in series (1.2) until all
previously imposed TTBs aﬀecting this product are removed.
24The approach in the text adopts the mean annual growth rate of products from the
set I∗k in t to construct the counterfactual import levels for the products in ˆ Ik in t, which
are denoted ˆ vk
i,j,t.
25The ‘value’ share measures presented throughout the Introduction are based on non-
oil import data only. In the country-speciﬁc chapters of this volume, the authors have
made alternative applications of this and related methodological approaches to diﬀerent
samples of trade data.
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Before concluding this section, consider ﬁve remaining caveats to these
approaches.
First, some economies impose TTBs at a level of product disaggregation
(eg HS-08, HS-10) that is ﬁner than the HS-06 level that is the focus here.
Nevertheless, examination at the HS-06 level is desirable for the context of
this chapter, since HS-06 is the ﬁnest level of disaggregation that is both
comparable across countries and that has available import-value data back
to the early 1990s. While the application of measures using HS-06 data will
overstate the trade impact (in the level) for any economy that typically does
not cover all subproducts within an HS-06 category, because these measures
are deﬁned consistently over time and across trading partners, measurement
error is much less of a concern for two questions of interest to this and the
subsequent chapters in the volume: intertemporal changes (ie whether the
scope of imported products subject to a country’s use of TTBs is increasing
or decreasing over time) and the relative exporter incidence (ie whether certain
exporters are relatively more or less frequently targeted than others by the
stock of imposed TTBs).
Second, these approaches concentrate entirely on the potential ﬁrst-order
impact of TTBs on trade. There is a substantial theoretical and empirical lit-
erature from case studies that identiﬁes potentially important second-order
eﬀects of TTBs (especially anti-dumping) on trade ﬂows. Some accentuate
the potential negative trade eﬀects identiﬁed here, while others are oﬀset-
ting and reduce the overall size of the trade eﬀects. Examples of accentuat-
ing eﬀects include downstream impacts, tariﬀ-jumping foreign direct invest-
ment, and retaliation, while examples of oﬀsetting eﬀects include trade diver-
sion. For an excellent survey of the anti-dumping literature, see Blonigen and
Prusa (2003). Furthermore, alternative approaches to measuring the economic
importance of anti-dumping in particular include Egger and Nelson (forthcom-
ing) and Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) for gravity-model-style assess-
ments and Gallaway et al (1999) for a computable general equilibrium style
assessment.
Third, even trade-weighting the incidence of TTBs does nothing to address
heterogeneity in the size of the imposed trade barriers. Bown (2010b), for
example, notes substantial heterogeneity in the size of duties imposed across
both policy-imposing economies and across targeted exporters by (within)
a policy-imposing country, especially with respect to barriers imposed on
imports from China.
Fourth, these approaches do not address potential heterogeneity in the
form of the applied TTBs. For example, some economies apply anti-dumping
as ad valorem duties, whereas others may be more likely (or against certain
trading partners or over certain imported products) to apply it as a speciﬁc
duty or a ‘price undertaking’ in which the exporter voluntarily raises its price
above some threshold under the threat of an imposed duty. Global safeguards,
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Table 1.4: Industry classiﬁcation in the Harmonized System.
Two-digit
Section HS codes Description
I 01–05 Live animals, animal products
II 06–14 Vegetable products
Iii 15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils
IV 16–24 Prepared foodstuﬀs
V 25–27 Mineral products
VI 28–39 Chemicals
VII 39–40 Plastics and rubber
VIII 41–43 Leather, raw hides and skins
IX 44–46 Woods and articles of wood
X 47–49 Pulp of wood
XI 50–63 Textiles
XII 64–67 Footwear
XIII 68–70 Stone
XIV 71 Pearls
XV 72–83 Metals
XVI 84–85 Machinery and electrical
XVII 86–89 Vehicles
XVIII 90–92 Optical instruments
XIX 93 Arms and ammunition
XX 94–96 Miscellaneous manufacturing
XXI 97–98 Works of art
on the other hand, are frequently applied as quantitative restrictions such as
tariﬀ rate quotas.
Fifth, these approaches do not address the issue of the likely import
demand or export supply responses to the imposed TTBs because they do
not control for import demand or export supply elasticities. For an applica-
tion of the OTRI approach to the global economic crisis of 2008–9, see Kee
et al (2010).
6.2 Data
Detailed data on anti-dumping, CVDs, global safeguards and China-speciﬁc
safeguards are available from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers
Database (Bown 2010a). For anti-dumping and CVD policies, the data in Bown
(2010a)arederivedfromoriginalgovernmentsourcedocuments.Eachgovern-
ment reports tariﬀ-line product codes that are subject to the investigations,
the dates and countries from whom imports are being investigated, and the
decisions regarding whether to impose preliminary and ﬁnal trade barriers, as
well as when they are removed. The data on the use of global safeguards and
China-speciﬁc safeguards are derived from both original government source
documents and what governments report to the WTO’s Committee on Safe-
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guards. Bown (2010a) provides a complete discussion of the data sources, as
well as the other information contained in the database that is not used in the
analysis here.
The tariﬀ-line product codes from Bown (2010a) are then matched to
bilateral import data at the product level taken from UN Comtrade via the
World Bank’s Internet-based, freely available World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS).26 Comtrade has two levels of disaggregation available: at the HS-06
level and at the tariﬀ-line level, which may be at the 8-, 10- or 12-digit level,
depending on the economy. Only the HS-06 data are publicly available. Chap-
ter authors also have access to the tariﬀ-line import data, though they diﬀer
on which of the diﬀerent import series they chose to apply given tradeoﬀs
associated with each. For example, whereas the tariﬀ-line level import data
provide more granularity, they are generally not available in as long a time
series as the HS-06-level data (which date back at least to the early 1990s),
and they also may be more susceptible to classiﬁcation changes of products
over the sample.
This volume also takes advantage of data on tariﬀ-line MFN applied tariﬀ
rates and PTA rates, as well as information on tariﬀ-line WTO bindings from
the WTO’s Consolidated Tariﬀ Schedules. While there are many years of tariﬀ
data available for these economies, most countries are missing at least one or
two years’ worth of tariﬀ data.
The chapter authors then further supplemented the data on TTBs, trade and
tariﬀ policies with data on the macroeconomy, industries or national features
of the domestic political economy from a number of other sources. Additional
details are provided within each chapter where appropriate.
Finally, many of the chapters in this volume use a common approach to
deﬁning ‘industries’ so as to examine more detailed data on TTB policy use
and trade ﬂows. In many instances, the authors refer to industries based on
the two-digit Harmonized System ‘sections’ that are documented in Table 1.4.
Chad P. Bown is Senior Economist at the World Bank in the Development
Research Group, Trade and International Integration Team (DECTI).
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USA: Evolving Trends in
Temporary Trade Barriers
THOMAS J. PRUSA1
1 INTRODUCTION
The USA has long been among the most active seekers of contingent pro-
tection. This was true in the 1980s and 1990s and remains true in the ﬁrst
decade of the 2000s. While other policies such as ‘buy American’ provisions
and domestic content rules have received considerably more press attention
during the economic crisis of 2007–9, the simple truth is that contingent trade
policies remain the primary means of changing the relative cost and/or avail-
ability of imports. Under WTO rules, contingent protection policies like anti-
dumping, CVDs, China safeguards and global safeguards should be applied
for a limited duration.2 Consequently, the term ‘temporary trade barriers’
(TTBs) is a particularly apt description of the policies.
In this chapter the trends in US TTB activity since 1990 are discussed. In
order to provide a broad perspective on the issue, the trends are examined
using several diﬀerent metrics. We begin with the traditional case metric. How-
ever, Bown (2011b) argues that, for many questions, a product metric provides
more insight into the trends and thus both unweighted and trade-weighted
product metrics will be used.
These ﬁndings indicate that US use of TTBs is evolving. Some of the stylised
facts of the past are no longer true. Although the USA continues to be a heavy
user of TTBs (as compared with other countries), the number of new TTBs
sought by US industries has fallen markedly since 2004. Over 2005–9, the
number of new requests for TTBs (case metric) by US industries has fallen by
about 60% compared with the late 1990s.
This decrease is especially noteworthy in light of the sharp decline in US
economic activity in 2007–9, a development that one would have expected to
1Department of Economics, New Jersey Hall, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton St, New
Brunswick, NJ 08901–1248, USA. Email: prusa@econ.rutgers.edu.
2I discuss what is meant by ‘limited duration’ later in the chapter.
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produce increased calls for protection.3 Interestingly, using any of the three
metrics for TTB activity, little evidence is found that the 2007–9 recession
spurred a surge in US protectionism, or at least protectionism in the form of
TTBs (Evenett (2010) presents evidence that other forms of protection have
increased).
The current level of TTB activity for the USA is even more striking from
a longer-run perspective. During 2006–10, the US initiated fewer cases than
during any ﬁve-year span since 1960.4 In fact, the two years with the fewest
new TTB petitions, 2006 and 2010, have both occurred in this period.
The decline in new TTB activity, however, does not indicate that the USA has
turned its back on TTBs. The USA continues to have a large stock of products
under existing TTB orders. It seems that the USA is now far more reluctant to
remove existing orders than in the pre-Uruguay Round period. In this sense,
US TTBs are more onerous than those imposed previously. For example, this
study ﬁnds that 75% (respectively, 90%) of US TTB orders were removed in the
1980s within ﬁve (respectively, ten) years; since 1995 only about 25% (respec-
tively, 50%) of TTB orders were removed within ﬁve (respectively, ten) years.
This trend in longer duration is seen in both anti-dumping and CVD orders.
Temporary trade barrier measures are far less likely to be removed (or ‘sun-
set’ as it is often termed) now than in the past. These trends are particularly
noteworthy since the Uruguay Round agreement included a mandatory sun-
set provision for TTBs. Clearly, what was negotiated and what has happened
in practice are two diﬀerent things.5 The ﬁndings suggest that, in the USA,
the term temporary trade barrier means something diﬀerent today from what
it did previously. Perhaps the term ‘semipermanent’ trade barrier is a more
accurate description. It is certainly debatable whether the term ‘temporary’ is
an accurate description when a trade barrier is imposed for 20 years.
At least equally as concerning is the discovery that the increased duration
of TTBs is especially felt by developing countries. In the post-Uruguay Round
period, at the initial sunset review stage, approximately 40% of anti-dumping
measures against developed countries are revoked as compared with fewer
than 25% of measures against developing countries. The diﬀerence between
developed and developing countries is even starker for CVD measures. About
10% of CVD measures against developing countries are revoked at the initial
review versus 40% of CVD measures against developed countries.
What do these trends mean for the stock of TTBs? The reduced ﬂow of
new TTBs should result in a smaller stock of TTBs. On the other hand, longer
3Levchenko et al (2010) provide evidence that the reduction in trade relative to overall
economic activity in the 2007–9 period was far larger than in previous downturns. Their
ﬁndings might partially explain why there was not a surge in contingent protection.
4Comprehensive data on worldwide use of anti-dumping prior to 1980 are not available
(Bown 2010a; WTO 2010). The statistics presented in Irwin (2005) suggest that the USA
has probably been a leading anti-dumping user since the 1950s.
5These ﬁndings are consistent with those in Moore (1999, 2002).
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duration of existing TTBs means less attrition in existing TTBs and this, in
turn, should increase the stock of TTBs. Using either the unweighted measure
or trade-weighted measure, the two eﬀects are found to essentially oﬀset each
other; as a result, the stock of US TTBs is far more stable than the ﬂow.
There have also been striking developments to the pattern of who is tar-
geted by US TTBs. In the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of TTBs was directed
against imports from developed countries. Historically, somewhere between
one-half to two-thirds of both the ﬂow and the stock of TTBs were against
developed countries. This is no longer the case. By 2009, only about one-third
of the US stock of TTBs was against developed countries. The change in the
ﬂow of TTBs is even more noticeable: more than 80% of the ﬂow of TTBs is
against developing countries.
While China is the main reason for the shift, China alone does not explain
the changing pattern. Even if China were excluded, there would still be a
marked increase in the share of US TTBs directed against developing coun-
tries. Non-China developing countries accounted for about half of US TTBs
by 2009; in comparison, in the mid-1990s, non-China developing countries
accounted for about one-third of US TTBs.
Although developing countries are getting greater attention, China is easily
the major target of US TTBs. As is the case for many US trade policy issues,
China looms large in US TTB activity. With respect to the stock of TTBs, the
USA now has more TTBs in eﬀect against China than against all developed
countries taken together. China also dominates the ﬂow of new TTBs.
When one accounts for the fact that anti-dumping and CVD protection is
often sought against multiple suppliers in a single investigation (ie the US
industry alleges unfair behaviour against more than one import supplier), it
becomes apparent that the attention paid to China is even more intense. In
2006–10, China was involved in about 85% of anti-dumping and CVD investi-
gations. In contrast, in the late 1990s, only about one-quarter of anti-dumping
investigations involved China.
The distribution of TTBs by industry is also examined. Not surprisingly,
the steel industry dominates US activity throughout the period, consistently
accounting for 30–50% of TTBs. The value of the trade-weighted measure of
TTB protection is most apparent when examining the pattern of TTBs by
industry. When the long-standing Canadian softwood lumber dispute was
resolved, the wood product industry went from roughly 20% of all imports
subject to TTBs to having less than 5% subject to TTBs. By contrast, when
duties were imposed on over $1 billion of warm-water shrimp, the share of
all seafood imports covered increased dramatically.
The ﬁnal section of the chapter considers the impact of the one instance
in which the USA levied protection under the China safeguard provision—the
2009 dispute involving Chinese exports of passenger and truck tyres. This
has been one of the most widely publicised TTB during 2005–9, garnering
signiﬁcant press attention both in the USA and in China. While Chinese volume
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Figure 2.1: US anti-dumping cases initiated and change in real GDP.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010).
and market share had grown in the years prior to the case, China was just one
of many countries supplying tyres to the USA. In such circumstances, the
country-speciﬁc nature of the China safeguard provision is likely to hinder
any real change in overall trade ﬂow.
Due to space limitations and because it is rarely invoked, global safeguards
are not discussed here.6 Readers interested in US use of global safeguards
should consult Bown (2004, 2011b).
2 CONTEXT FOR CURRENT TRENDS: THE 2007–9 RECESSION
The recent US recession was quite severe by historical standards. The 4.1%
peak-to-trough fall in US GDP was greater than any recession since the end of
World War II. The 2007–9 recession was certainly far larger than any recession
since accurate statistics have been kept on TTBs. For instance, peak-to-trough
GDP fell by about 2.7% in the early 1980s recession, by about 1.4% during the
early 1990s recession, and by about 0.3% in the 2001 recession.
Knetter and Prusa (2003) show that the ﬂow of new TTB cases is counter-
cyclical; typically, TTB activity increases (respectively, decreases) during eco-
nomic downturns (respectively, expansions). Figure 2.1 depicts this general
relationship using anti-dumping cases. In the ﬁgure, the number of new anti-
dumping cases (solid line) initiated in each year is plotted along with the
6The USA did not initiate any global safeguards during the 2008–9 economic crisis. In
fact, in the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s there was only a single global safeguard case and that
was in 2001. While that case (steel) was broad, received heavy press coverage and resulted
in a WTO dispute, the trade impact was muted for several reasons: the largest volume
products and suppliers were already covered by existing anti-dumping and countervailing
orders; the order was only in place for 18 months; and over 700 product exemptions were
granted (Bown 2004).
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Figure 2.2: PercentagechangeinUSmanufacturingoutputandnon-farmemployment.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010).
lagged change in real GDP (dashed line). The negative correlation between
economic activity and the ﬂow of anti-dumping cases is most clearly seen
during the recessions in the early 1980s, early 1990s and early 2000s, during
which there were large increases in TTB activity (the global safeguard cases
triggered by the recessions in the early 1980s and 2000s is not captured in
the ﬁgure). By contrast, the signiﬁcant decrease in GDP in 2007–9 was met
with only a modest increase in US TTB activity.
Other measures of economic activity reinforce the ﬁnding that the level of
TTB activity during 2008–9 is quite modest. Figure 2.2 depicts two common
measures of US macroeconomic performance, the annual percentage change
in manufacturing output and the percentage change in non-farm employment.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the drop during 2008–9 in both measures
was deeper than the declines during the 1991 and 2001 downturns. The fall
in manufacturing output during the 2007–9 recession was more than twice
as large as the 2001 recession and more than three times as large as the
early 1990s recession. Only during the recession of the early 1980s has the
unemployment level approached the 2007–9 recession’s 10%+ level; notably,
during the early 1980s recession, there was a large surge in anti-dumping and
CVD investigations.
The performance of the steel sector, perennially the heaviest TTB-using
industry, further buttresses the view that conditions in 2007–9 were ripe for
a surge in TTB activity. In Figure 2.3, steel industry production is shown. Steel
output fell by more than 50% during the 2007–9 recession, from a monthly
output of over 9 million tons to about 4 million tons. Given a drop of this
magnitude, it is not surprising that numerous steel-making facilities were
shuttered or operated at unproﬁtably low rates (Uchitelle 2009). In the pre-
vious three downturns, 1982–3, 1991, and 2001, the steel industry used the
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Figure 2.3: US raw steel production (quarterly).
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute (2010).
recession to justify their need for TTBs. Yet that is not what occurred in the
2007–9 recession.
Given historical TTB trends, one would have expected the 2007–9 recession
to have spurred a signiﬁcant increase in US TTB activity in 2008–9. US anti-
dumping and CVD activity did increase—from 8 anti-dumping initiations in
2006 to 20 in 2009, and from 3 CVD initiations in 2006 to 14 in 2009. Yet
this level of activity is quite modest by historical standards. In 1992 there
were 94 anti-dumping initiations and in 2001 there were 75 anti-dumping
initiations. In fact, the current level of TTB is more akin to the level of activity
during previous periods of robust economic activity. Given the severity of the
2007–9 recession, the modest increase in TTB activity is surprising and one
of the major ﬁndings of this chapter.
This ﬁnding will be returned to at various times in the chapter. The fact that
US TTBs did not return to previous recessionary levels is important. No matter
whether TTBs are measured using a case metric, product metric or trade-
weighted metric, there is little evidence that the 2007–9 recession spurred a
signiﬁcant increase in TTB activity. In the ﬁnal section of the chapter some
possible explanations are oﬀered as to why TTBs did not surge during the
2007–9 recession.
3 PATTERNS IN US TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS: CASE METRIC
3.1 General Discussion
With this backdrop, let us take an extended look at US TTB activity. In this sec-
tion, the traditional case metric is used. This metric has several advantages.
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First, it is consistent with how the USA and the WTO report TTB activity. Sec-
ond, it is the most convenient metric for a long-run perspective on TTB activ-
ity; given changes in product code deﬁnitions, it is quite diﬃcult to construct
long time series using the product metric. On the other hand, as discussed in
the next section, the case metric also has some weaknesses: most notably, the
case metric treats a relatively small case (eg plastic shopping bags) the same
as a very large case (eg warm-water shrimp). If the type and size of cases vary
over time, the case metric will not adequately capture the changing impact of
TTBs on imports.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give statistics on anti-dumping and CVD activity since
1990 using the case metric. The data are drawn from Bown (2010a). The tables
report activity against developed countries, developing countries, China, and,
ﬁnally, all targets (total cases). The number of cases initiated each year from
1990 to 2009 is listed.7 The tables also report the number of measures taken,
which are the cases that result in duties being levied. Finally, in the last column
of each table, the number of conducted investigations is reported. The term
‘case’ refers to each individual country involved (eg warm-water shrimp from
Thailand, warm-water shrimp from China) and ‘investigation’ refers to the set
of countries involved (eg warm-water shrimp from all source countries). A
single investigation often involves multiple countries. On average, a typical
anti-dumping or CVD investigation involves two or three countries.8
As shown in Table 2.1, between 1990 and 2009 there were 741 anti-dumping
cases. Of these, 346 resulted in imposed measures. Table 2.2 gives similar
statistics for CVD disputes: there were 187 CVD cases, 82 of which resulted
in measures. Put diﬀerently, over the entire period, about 45% of anti-dumping
and CVD cases resulted in measures.
Figure 2.4 depicts the ﬂow of new anti-dumping and CVD activity (petitions)
using the case metric and provides visual evidence of the cyclical nature of
TTB ﬁling patterns. Both anti-dumping and CVD cases increased signiﬁcantly
during the economic slowdown in 1991–2 and 2001–2. As discussed above,
there was only a modest uptick in activity in the 2007–9 recession.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 also list the number of measures in eﬀect during each
year. If more measures are revoked than imposed in a given year, then the
aggregate number of measures in eﬀect will fall. For example, as shown in
Table 2.1, the USA had 269 anti-dumping measures in eﬀect during 2000 and
248 measures in eﬀect during 2001. The USA imposed 28 new anti-dumping
7One caveat when looking at the annual numbers is that investigations typically take
11–14 months, so usually the measure will not be taken until the following calendar year.
This makes it quite possible that more measures can be imposed in a given year than new
cases initiated.
8Distinguishing between a case and an investigation has little impact on the later dis-
cussion in this chapter. Nevertheless, it can be important for other questions, such as, for
example, Hansen and Prusa’s (1996) study of cumulation and Bown and Crowley’s (2007)
study of trade depression, diversion and deﬂection.
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Figure 2.4: US anti-dumping and CVD case initiations.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
Figure 2.5: US anti-dumping and CVD measures in eﬀect.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
measures in 2001. This implies that 49 anti-dumping measures were ‘sunset-
ted’ in 2001.
When using the case metric, ‘measures in eﬀect’ give the stock of TTB activ-
ity. The trends are depicted in Figure 2.5. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, there
have always been far more anti-dumping measures than CVD measures, but
the diﬀerential has grown since 1990. Countervailing duty measures have
declined modestly, while anti-dumping measures have grown signiﬁcantly
over the period, and, consequently, the relative importance of the two TTBs

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has widened: in 1990 the ratio of anti-dumping to CVD measures was 3:1 and
by 2009 it was 5:1.
Figure 2.5 also provides some evidence of the impact of the inclusion of
the mandatory sunset provision in the Uruguay Round. In the ﬁrst two years
of its use (1999–2000), mandatory sunset reviews had an appreciable impact
on measures in eﬀect; the USA revoked almost 100 orders.9 Since that initial
trove of sunset cases, however, the USA has been disinclined to remove orders
(Moore 1999, 2002). This issue will be returned to in Section 6.
The number of CVD measures in eﬀect has been relatively stable. As seen in
Figure 2.5, CVD measures declined in the mid-1990s but have since remained
nearly constant at 40–50 measures in eﬀect. The impact, if any, of mandatory
sunset reviews is not seen in the stock of CVD measures. Table 2.2 reveals
that the main development with respect to CVDs is the decrease in the ﬂow.
About one-tenth as many CVD cases were initiated during 2000–2009 as dur-
ing the 1980s.
3.2 Target Countries
It is also interesting to examine TTB patterns after dividing the target
countries into development groupings: developed, developing (not includ-
ing China), and China. China is separated from other developing countries
because of the intense trade scrutiny to which it is subject within the USA.
There are several important insights gleaned by looking at the targets by
development status.
First, developed countries were targeted far less frequently by either anti-
dumping or CVD actions over the 2000s relative to the preceding two decades.
In the 1980s, about two-thirds of US anti-dumping and CVD cases targeted
developed countries. The share of cases targeting developed countries fell
throughout the 1990s and even more dramatically over the ﬁrst decade of the
2000s. Since 2004, the number of cases brought against developed countries
has dropped sharply; during 2005–9, fewer than ten cases in any year were
aimed at developed countries. Averaging over the 1990–2009 period, 42% of
the initiated cases targeted developed countries, but over 2005–9, only 20% of
the cases targeted developed countries. The decline in cases brought against
developed countries is even sharper for CVDs. Over 2003–9, only three CVD
cases involved developed countries and none resulted in measures. By the end
of 2009, only nine CVD measures were in eﬀect against developed countries.
Second, the trends against developing countries are more stable. For most
of the period, about 40% of US anti-dumping and CVD cases have targeted
developing countries.10 The total number of anti-dumping and CVD measures
9Moore (1999) points out that the majority of the initial trove of sunset orders involved
measures that had been in place for more than 10 years.
10There is more volatility in the CVD trends due to the relatively small number of cases
in any one year.
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Figure 2.6: Share of US anti-dumping and CVD measures, by development status (and
China).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
in eﬀect against developing countries has also remained fairly stable during
the 1995–2009 period, with 90–100 anti-dumping measures and 20–25 CVD
measures in eﬀect in most years.
Third, and very importantly, China has emerged as the single most promi-
nent target of US TTBs over the 2000s. Table 2.1 indicates that the absolute
number of anti-dumping cases brought against China is about the same over
the 2000s as during the 1990–1995 period. However, given that the number
of TTBs targeting all other countries has fallen so sharply, China has emerged
as the leading target. In a sense, other targets have taken two steps back while
China stood still.
Perhaps the most startling statistic is the growth in the number of measures
in eﬀect against China. Over the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s, the number of US
anti-dumping measures in eﬀect against China’s exporters increased from 40
to 81. As a result, as of 2009, a full one-third of all US anti-dumping measures
in eﬀect are against China.
In addition, China now ﬁnds itself under unprecedented CVD scrutiny. Prior
to 2007, no US CVD case against China had ever successfully resulted in a
measure. This is largely because the US rules made it impossible to levy a
CVD against a non-market economy. In 2007, the USA changed its rules and
broadened its interpretation of CVDs. Under the new rules, CVDs could be
levied on non-market economies like China. Subsequent to this rule change,
a remarkable 23 of 30 US CVD cases have involved China.
Figure 2.6 depicts the yearly share of anti-dumping and CVD measures
in eﬀect, grouped by development status. The ﬁgure highlights the growing
importance of China. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, over 1990–2009, devel-
oping countries accounted for about 40% of all measures. The big diﬀerence
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Table 2.3: US contingent protection against China (number of cases).
Cases China Only
initiated involved China
(%) (%) (%)
(a) China’s share of US anti-dumping actions
1980s 4 7 4
1990–94 13 34 16
1995–99 12 27 15
2000–04 18 50 21
2005–09 49 83 42
Cases China Only
initiated involved China
(%) (%) (%)
(b) China’s share of US CVD actions
1980s 0 1 0
1990–94 3 7 7
1995–99 0 0 0
2000–04 0 0 0
2005–09 72 85 78
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
is the diminished role of developed countries and the growing role of China.
By the end of the sample period, China accounts for almost one-third of all
TTB measures in eﬀect.
While the above trends indicate the growing prominence of China for US
TTBs, the focus on China is arguably even greater. As mentioned above, often
domestic industries initiate cases against multiple import sources and these
cases are almost always considered within a single investigation. While China
accounts for a large share of cases, its inﬂuence on investigations is even
greater. Consider the information in Table 2.3. In panel (a), information for
anti-dumping cases is tallied and, in panel (b), CVD cases are considered.
In the ﬁrst column of panel (a), China’s share of anti-dumping cases is
reported. China accounted for less than 20% of anti-dumping cases up until
2004. During 2005–9, however, China’s share jumped to almost 50% of all
cases. Yet, as is argued by Bown (2010b) and Prusa (2010), this statistic does
not capture the true extent to which China dominates the action. In the sec-
ond column, the fraction of investigations where China was involved is given.
China has been a major target since the early 1990s. From 1990–1999, China
was involved in no more than one-third of all anti-dumping investigations.
During 2000–2004, China’s anti-dumping participation rate jumped to 50%.
A remarkable 82% of anti-dumping investigations have involved China since
2005. In the ﬁnal column, the fraction of investigations that involve only China
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66 The Great Recession and Import Protection
is reported. Amazingly, over 40% of US investigations target only China. The
ascent of China is even more startling for CVDs (panel (b) in Table 2.3). China
went from zero CVD activity prior to 2005 to account for 85% of all CVD
investigations in 2005–9. To a large extent, US TTB policies have become ‘stop
China’ policies.
4 PATTERNS IN US TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS:
PRODUCT (HS-06) METRIC
4.1 General Discussion
An issue with the case metric is that it treats each case the same. It does not
allow the scope to vary by case. For example, under the case metric, ﬁve small
cases would be considered to have ﬁve times the impact of one large case, even
if the one large case covered billions in imports and the small cases involved
a few million dollars of imports. Thus, it may be desirable to use a metric that
captures the size of each case. Bown (2011b) argues that this ‘better’ measure
can be computed using information on the products involved.11 For more
than 20 years the USA has used the Harmonized System to classify imports.
These codes are reported for every TTB case and deﬁne the products involved
in each dispute.
The advantages of the product measure are two-fold. First, cases rarely
involve a single-tariﬀ-line item. A case almost always involves a number of
tariﬀ lines. As a result, the scope of a case can be measured by the num-
ber of HS products involved (ie an unweighted measure of products). Second,
the dollar value of trade varies by product. Therefore, the breadth of trade
aﬀected by a case may be more accurately measured by the value of trade
involved (ie a weighted measure of products).
As discussed in Chapter 1 by Bown, constructing a trade-weighted metric
is not a trivial task since subject imports fall as a result of the measures. Sup-
pose, for example, that US TTBs completely eliminate subject imports. Since
no trade value is measured, a trade-weighted measure of TTBs would imply
that no trade is covered by TTBs; given what actually happened, this would
be an odd interpretation of TTBs. Instead, here we follow Bown’s (2011b)
approach and create a measure that adjusts for the trade distortion created
by the TTB. Interested readers should consult Chapter 1 for a full discussion
of how the trade-weighted product measure is computed.
Despite the product metric’s advantages, there are two drawbacks. Both
highlight the diﬃculty in creating accurate time-series trends with the product
metric. First, the Harmonized System was only implemented in 1989. While
attempts have been made to concord the Harmonized System with the old
11Until relatively recently, such product information was not available but this informa-
tion is now publicly available in Bown (2010a).
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Figure 2.7: Percentage of HS-06 lines under US anti-dumping/CVD measures (all sup-
pliers).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
tariﬀ system, the reality is that measurement error becomes a serious concern
if the product measure uses pre-1989 cases. As a result, only measures since
1989 are considered. Consequentially, because TTBs prior to 1989 have been
excluded, my product metric will understate the true trade coverage of TTBs.
This is likely to be especially problematic prior to the mid-1990s. It becomes
less of a concern by the mid-to-late-1990s as more and more of these pre-1989
TTBs were revoked. Consequently, in an attempt to reduce the impact of these
pre-1989 codes, results are reported using HS-06 metrics only from 1995.
Second, the Harmonized System has undergone regular revisions since it was
instituted. As a result, the codes for about one-third of the products have
changed since 1990. While an attempt is made to control for these product
code changes, some lost coverage is inevitable. In an attempt to balance the
desire to use disaggregated data with a desire to minimise the number of code
changes, the decision was made to use the HS-06 level to measure products.12
With these caveats in mind, let us now turn to examination of TTBs using
the product metric. In Figures 2.7–2.9, unweighted and trade-weighted mea-
sures are presented. Figure 2.7 summarises the overall trends. In this ﬁgure,
12In most cases the products are identiﬁed at the eight-digit or ten-digit level. I opt to
do my analysis at the six-digit level because doing so reduces the number of product code
changes over time. Code changes occur more frequently at more disaggregated levels.
Given that I report the fraction of imports subject to TTBs rather than the absolute level
of imports subject to TTBs, I believe the cost of performing my analysis at the higher level
of aggregation to be small.
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of HS-06 lines under US anti-dumping/CVD measures by devel-
opment status (and China).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
the dashed line depicts the fraction of HS-06 products (unweighted) subject
to anti-dumping/CVD orders; the solid line illustrates the fraction of HS-06
import value subject to anti-dumping/CVD orders. In terms of the overall pic-
ture, the two measures are broadly consistent: both measures indicate that
4–6% of all US imports are subject to TTBs. However, the two metrics diﬀer
when it comes to the trends in TTB coverage. The unweighted metric indi-
cates that TTB coverage has increased fairly consistently over 2003–9, and
especially over 2006–9. On the other hand, the weighted metric implies that
TTB protection has fallen since 2003 and has only risen modestly in 2007–9.
The diﬀerence in the trends reﬂects the impact of the removal of TTBs on sev-
eral large import-value products such as galvanized sheet steel and softwood
lumber.
4.2 Unweighted Measure
Figure 2.8 partitions the subject countries by development status. In Fig-
ure 2.8, the products covered are measured relative to the entire universe
of products (eg the number of Chinese products subject to TTBs relative to
all US imports of all products from China, the number of developed country
products subject to TTBs relative to all US imports from developed countries,
etc).
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Figure 2.9: Percentage of import value under US anti-dumping/CVD measures by
development status (and China).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
Figure 2.8 echoes the trends found using the case metric. First, TTBs against
developed countries peaked in about 1998 (solid line) and declined thereafter.
At the peak, about 4.5% of imported products from developed countries were
subject to US TTBs. Beginning in 1998, the USA conducted its initial trove of
sunset determinations, and these early sunset reviews involved a large share
of products from developed countries. As is shown by the ﬁgure, these revo-
cations resulted in a big decline in TTB coverage. The reduced ﬂow of new
TTBs over the 2000s resulted in the coverage ratio steadily declining to about
3% by 2009. Second, TTBs against developing countries (dashed line) rose in
the mid-1990s but have remained quite stable at about 2.5% for more than
a decade. Third, TTB coverage against China has nearly quadrupled over the
1995–2009 period. In 1995 about 1% of China’s products were subject to TTBs;
by 2009 China’s TTB coverage had risen to more than 4%. As can also be seen
when using the case metric, when it comes to TTBs, China is ‘wearing the
bull’s-eye’.
4.3 Trade-Weighted Measure
Figure 2.9 is similar to the previous ﬁgure but relies on the trade-weighted
metric. While the trends are consistent across the two metrics, the changing
incidence of TTBs is much starker under the trade-weighted metric. Using
the unweighted metric (Figure 2.8), developed countries’ TTB coverage fell
from about 4.5% to 3% by 2009. Using the trade-weighted metric (Figure 2.9),
developed countries’ TTB coverage fell substantially faster, from about 6%
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Table 2.4: Distribution of new US anti-dumping/CVD TTB initiations (case basis, ﬂow).
1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2007–2009
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Animal and 0.7 4.9 5.3 0.0 0.0
animal products
Vegetable products 1.3 3.5 3.3 0.0 0.0
Foodstuﬀs 1.6 8.3 4.1 3.2 0.0
Mineral products 5.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0
Chemicals and 17.4 4.9 16.3 24.2 27.0
allied industries
Plastics/rubbers 1.3 11.1 9.0 8.4 10.8
Wood and 3.0 0.0 1.6 11.6 6.8
wood products
Textiles 5.3 2.1 0.0 6.3 5.4
Stone/glass 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.1 2.7
Metals 48.4 55.6 50.6 30.5 29.7
Machinery/electrical 4.9 6.3 3.7 8.4 10.8
Transportation 6.3 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.0
Miscellaneous 3.9 2.1 3.3 5.3 6.8
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
to under 3%. The diﬀerence is even more pronounced for China. Using the
unweighted metric, China’s TTB coverage rose from about 1% to 4% by 2009.
Under the trade-weighted metric, China’s TTB coverage rose from about 1.5%
to about 9%.
Taking the two ﬁgures together, not only are a very large number of prod-
ucts from China under TTB protection, but as compared with other countries,
the TTBs against China (on average) involve larger trade volume than those
against other countries.
5 INDUSTRY PATTERNS
Next, let us turn to the question of whether the US industries seeking TTB
protection have changed over 1990–2009. We begin by examining the ﬂow of
TTBs. In Table 2.4, I use the case metric and report each industry’s share of
new cases as ﬁve-year averages.13 What is remarkable is how TTB activity is
dominated by just a few industries. Very few cases involve food, vegetables,
minerals and textiles.
As can be seen from the table, in every subperiod the US steel industry
has been the leading seeker of TTB protection. The steel industry was a par-
ticularly heavy user during the 1995–2004 period when a large number of
13Reporting annual ﬁlings would produce extremely volatile patterns from year to year.
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Figure 2.10: Percentage of import value under US anti-dumping/CVD measures by
industry.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
ﬁrms went through bankruptcy and restructuring. In this ten-year period the
industry accounted for more than half of all TTB cases. Throughout the entire
1990–2009 period, chemicals and plastics were the second and third most
active industries, respectively.
Filings during the 2007–9 period are also reported in order to examine
whether there is any evidence that the recession spurred a signiﬁcant change
in the industry ﬁling patterns. The short-answer is ‘no’. The same handful of
industries that account for most US TTB activity prior to the crisis are the
same industries that account for most TTB activity during the recession.
The stock of TTBs is probably a more revealing metric when considering
industry patterns of protection. The lack of new TTB requests (small ﬂow)
for a given industry may simply reﬂect that it already has a large fraction
of its import competition subject to TTBs; this pre-existing coverage will be
evident when looking at the stock measure. When examining the stock of
TTBs by industry, the trade-weighted product metric is used to compute the
fraction of each industry’s trade value subject to TTBs. The results are given
in Figure 2.10 and Table 2.5.
First, consider that, across all industries and suppliers, the USA has about
4–5% of total imports subject to TTBs (see Figure 2.7 and Table 2.5). The
average misrepresents the impact at an industry level. For example, the steel
industry’s persistent use of TTBs has resulted in large coverage. For much of
the period, the steel industry had more than 15% of all competing imports
subject to TTBs. The industry’s coverage peaked at almost 20% during the
steel crisis of 1999–2002.14 It should be noted that a large fraction of steel
14Temporary trade barrier coverage would be even larger in 2002–3 if the trade eﬀects
of the steel safeguard action had been included.
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Table 2.5: Trade impact of US anti-dumping/CVD measures in eﬀect (trade-weighted).
1995–99 2000–2004 2005–2009 2007–2009
(%) (%) (%) (%)
All suppliers 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.8
By development status
Developed 6.1 5.1 3.6 2.8
Developing 2.9 3.3 2.1 2.1
China 1.5 4.1 7.5 8.4
By industry
Animal and animal products 1.7 6.2 13.9 13.9
Vegetable products 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.4
Foodstuﬀs 2.6 3.8 6.5 6.5
Mineral products 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.6
Chemicals and allied industries 0.5 1.6 1.5 1.6
Plastics/rubbers 5.3 3.1 3.9 5.1
Wood and wood products 20.1 18.4 11.7 3.5
Metals 12.3 18.5 13.4 13.0
Machinery/electrical 6.8 4.2 2.5 2.6
Transportation 3.9 3.6 4.6 4.9
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a) and Comtrade.
trade is intra-ﬁrm trade; one would not expect this trade to be threatened with
TTBs. Hence, the industry’s TTB coverage on non-aﬃliated trade is even more
impressive. For instance, if one-third of US steel imports is intra-ﬁrm trade,
then 30% of all unaﬃliated imports are covered by TTBs.
Second, other industries have experienced large changes in their stock of
imports subject to TTBs. Until 2006, the wood and wood products industry
had about 20% of its import competition subject to TTBs. Despite the fact
that this industry ﬁled few cases over the period (Table 2.4) it was able to
maintain TTBs on a large share of its competition. This was possible because
softwood lumber dominates US wood imports and Canada accounts for nearly
all of US softwood lumber imports. For this industry, a single dispute against
a single supplier can create high coverage. The USA and Canada litigated
this dispute for over 20 years. Given the amount of trade involved, neither
side was willing to compromise. Finally, after numerous North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) panel and WTO appellate body decisions, the US
and Canada agreed to settle the dispute in 2006. The USA revoked the CVDs
on softwood lumber and Canada agreed to limit how much softwood lumber
it would export to the USA. As can be seen from Table 2.4, the removal of this
order reduced the coverage ratio from over 20% to below 5%.
The ‘animal products’ industry makes for an interesting comparison with
the wood industry. Akin to the wood products industry, the animal and ani-
mal products industry has not ﬁled a large number of TTB cases (Table 2.4).
However, the cases that have been pursued have been large. Most notably,
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in 2004 the USA imposed anti-dumping duties on shrimp from six develop-
ing country suppliers, resulting in over $2 billion of trade to be covered in
a single TTB. This single case increased industry coverage from about 5% to
about 14%.
6 DURATION OF TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
The length of the period that measures remain in eﬀect is vital for under-
standing the protection aﬀorded by US TTBs. A mandatory sunset provision
for anti-dumping and CVD measures was included in the Uruguay Round
because developing countries were frustrated by the challenge involved in get-
ting orders removed.15 As part of the grand bargain to conclude the Uruguay
Round, developing countries were able to insert language that required a
mandatory sunset review for each TTB every ﬁve years. As Moore (1999, 2002)
discusses, some users interpreted the language to mean that TTBs were to be
removed after ﬁve years, while others, including the USA, interpreted the pro-
vision to mean that only a mandatory sunset review was required. Under US
law, the presumption is that the order will be removed unless doing so would
lead to a resumption of unfair trade and injury.
The extent to which the new provision matters depends on the basis for
determining the likelihood of resumed unfair trade and injury. Moore (1999,
2002) documents that the US procedures make revocation via the sunset
review a diﬃcult proposition. With respect to the question of whether there
would be a resumption of unfair trade if the order was removed, Moore doc-
uments that the USA has always found that there would be a return to unfair
trading. In every case, no matter how long the order has been in eﬀect, no
matter how much evidence administrative reviews have revealed about the
changed pricing, the USA always concludes that the aﬀected countries will
trade unfairly. With respect to the recurrence of injury, the USA has become
far more hesitant to remove orders as it has gained more experience with sun-
set reviews. In the initial set of reviews covering measures that were in place
prior to the 1995, the USA revoked about 50% of the orders.16 Once these
transition orders were ﬁnished, the USA adopted a much harder line towards
revocation. Only about one-third of the post-Uruguay Round cases have been
revoked.
15While a higher proportion of cases were brought against developed countries pre-1990,
developing countries pushed the sunset provision. To begin with, many of the TTB cases
brought against developed countries in the 1980s were ‘settled’. Second, the accounting
requirements to obtain TTBs were particularly diﬃcult for developing countries to master.
Hence, developing countries felt that there was a lot to gain by mandatory sunset reviews.
16Some of these transition orders were so old that there was no domestic interest in
continuing them.
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The duration of TTBs is quantiﬁed by computing the number of measures
that are revoked as a fraction of the total number of measures that are in
eﬀect each month/year. Each measure’s key calendar dates (date the measure
went into eﬀect and date of revocation) are converted into a duration basis.
For instance, a measure that went into eﬀect in January 2000 and was revoked
in January 2005 would have a duration of 60 months.
Statistically, duration is estimated using the non-parametric Kaplan–Meier
survival function. In Figures 2.11 and 2.12, the survival estimates for anti-
dumping and CVD measures, respectively, are reported. Both ﬁgures are based
on the case metric. First, considering panel (a) of each ﬁgure, three lines have
been graphed: the grey dashed line is the survival experience for cases ﬁled
pre-mandatory sunset, the black dashed line is the survival experience for
transition cases, and the solid line is the survival experience for cases initi-
ated post-mandatory sunset reviews. Note that these ﬁgures use TTB informa-
tion on cases prior to 1990. Because the case metric is used for the duration
analysis, we are not hindered by the fact that the Harmonized System codes
are unavailable for these early cases.
The lines depict the fraction of cases that survive through a given time
period. As seen, within 36 months, more than half of both anti-dumping and
CVD cases during the pre-Uruguay Round period were revoked (grey dashed
line). By contrast, in the post-Uruguay Round period, less than 10% were
revoked (ie more than 90% were still in eﬀect). In the pre-mandatory sun-
set era, cases ended more or less continuously. In the post-Uruguay Round
period, the survival curve is almost constant until the sunset review, and then
it drops sharply. About 25–33% of initial sunset reviews result in the order
being revoked.17 In the post-Uruguay Round period, almost all revocations
occur during the sunset review.
Mandatory sunset reviews appear to have had two eﬀects on the removal
of orders. First, it appears that foreign ﬁrms do not seek to have the orders
removed via demonstrating multiple years of zero margins. This is not that
surprising given the large expense associated with each administrative review.
Also, given that the probability of revocation is small (zero unless several
prior reviews already demonstrated zero margins), foreign ﬁrms seem to have
decided to preserve resources for the sunset review.18
To get a sense of why they might do so, suppose a TTB was imposed on
three ﬁrms exporting from a given target country. Each administrative review
can cost each ﬁrm over $1 million. Thus, if all three ﬁrms were to pursue an
administrative review sunset, they could jointly spend $9 million. By contrast,
17Due to the time required for the sunset review investigation, the initial sunset review
often occurs between 60 and 72 months after the initial order is imposed.
18The foreign ﬁrms’ reluctance to pursue administrative reviews is also possibly due to
the ‘zeroing’ procedures used by the Department of Commerce. We could see more eﬀort
on administrative reviews once the USA changes its zeroing policy (Bown and Prusa 2011).
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Figure 2.11: Percentage of US anti-dumping measures in eﬀect by duration (in months):
(a) pre- versus post-mandatory sunset review clause; (b) developed versus developing
countries (pre-mandatory sunset); (c) developed versus developing countries and China
(post-mandatory sunset).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
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Figure 2.12: Percentage of US CVD measures in eﬀect by duration (in months): (a) pre-
versus post-mandatory sunset review clause; (b) developed versus developing countries
(pre-mandatorysunset);(c)developedversusdevelopingcountries(post-mandatorysun-
set).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
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pursuing a sunset review is a decision common to all three ﬁrms and would
likely be jointly funded. A sunset review might cost a total of $1 million, about
one-ninth the cost of the sunset via the administrative review process.
Second, if countries thought the Uruguay Round’s sunset review language
would appreciably lower the duration of anti-dumping and CVD orders,
they were mistaken. The US implementation of sunset review has produced
the opposite eﬀect—measures are now in place longer than they were pre-
Uruguay Round. That is, the fraction of measures revoked in two, three, four
and ﬁve years in the pre-Uruguay Round era far exceed the fraction of mea-
sures revoked by four years in the post-Uruguay Round era.
In panels (b) and (c) of Figures 2.11 and 2.12, developed and develop-
ing countries’ sunset experiences are compared. In panel (b), the duration
of orders prior to mandatory sunset is examined. In this period there were
suﬃciently few cases brought against China that the decision was made not
to report China separately. Both Figure 2.11 (anti-dumping) and Figure 2.12
(CVDs) show that, in this early period, developed and developing countries
had very similar experiences. The two survival curves are very similar. A log-
rank test of equality of the curves cannot reject that they have the same sur-
vival experience.
A very diﬀerent story emerges for the post-Uruguay Round period. Tempo-
rary trade barriers against developing countries are far longer lived than those
against developed countries. With anti-dumping, developed and developing
countries have a similar experience during the ﬁrst ﬁve years. However, at the
initial sunset review stage about 40% of measures against developed countries
are revoked as compared with less than 25% of measures against developing
countries. Moreover, the diﬀerence persists for years. About as many cases are
revoked against developing countries after 11 years as are against developed
countries after 5 years. This is a remarkable result that is especially surpris-
ing given that it was developing countries that pushed hardest for mandatory
sunset. This observation can be made from Figure 2.11(c), where China is sep-
arated from other developing countries as the activity against China becomes
signiﬁcant in the mid-1990s.
The diﬀerence between developed and developing countries is even starker
when CVDs are considered. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, US CVDs imposed
against developing countries are rarely revoked. The data indicate that more
than 90% of measures against developing countries remain in eﬀect after the
initial review. By contrast, measures against developed countries have been
removed fairly consistently throughout the period. By year ﬁve about 40% of
the orders have been removed, and by year ten about 75% of the orders have
been removed. The gap in duration is large.
The diﬀerence in duration is a serious issue for developing countries. The
dataindicatethattheUSAismuchmorelikelytokeepanorderinplaceagainst
a developing country than it is against a developed country. This policy issue
certainly warrants further analysis.
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7 CHINA SAFEGUARD ON PASSENGER AND TRUCK TYRES
Arguably the most publicised TTB during the 2008–9 crisis involved auto-
mobile and light-truck tyres imported from China under the ‘China safeguard’
statute. Prior to the tyre case, US industries had ﬁled six China safeguard peti-
tions between 2002 and 2009. None had resulted in measures being taken. In
each case the USA decided that either the imports from China were not a
cause of injury to the US industry or that the costs of protection (greater ten-
sions with China, consumer costs) exceeded the beneﬁts (increases in output
and/or employment for the domestic industry). In September 2009, the USA
announced that it would impose tariﬀs on tyres from China for three years:
35% tariﬀ in year one, 30% in year two and 25% in year three. The decision
not only provoked public criticism and a WTO complaint by China but it was
likely a contributing factor in China initiating TTBs on US exports of automo-
tive products and chicken parts. What made this case diﬀerent from others?
Was all the attention warranted?
The primary explanation for the press attention is size: the passenger and
truck tyre case involved considerably more trade than any prior China safe-
guard case. In the last year before the safeguard case was initiated, the USA
imported $6.9 billion of tyres—$1.8 billion from China alone. The next biggest
China safeguard case involved welded steel piping in 2005. In the last year
before the steel piping case was initiated, the USA imported $725 million of
steel piping, of which $154 million was sourced from China. Thus, in terms
of trade value, the tyres case was about ten times the size of the next largest
case.
Yet, there are at least two reasons to believe that too much was made of
the involved trade value. First, while the case was easily the biggest China
safeguard case, it was not extraordinarily large as far as TTBs go. Figure 2.13
gives information on trade value for other TTB cases in 2009. Trade values
for three signiﬁcant cases initiated earlier in the decade are also included. As
can be seen from the ﬁgure, the tyre case was not even the biggest TTB case
in 2009; the anti-dumping/CVD dispute involving oil-country tubular goods
aﬀected almost a billion dollars more of imports (from China alone). The
China safeguard on tyres also involved less trade value than earlier TTB cases
on shrimp, furniture or dynamic random-access memory, none of which gar-
nered as much of the spotlight as the tyre case. Second, while tyre imports
from China were indeed large, the USA also imported almost $5 billion in tyres
from other suppliers. The availability of signiﬁcant alternative suppliers likely
diminished the chance that US consumers would experience shortages or sig-
niﬁcantly higher prices.
Another reason why the tyre case drew so much press was that it was not
initiated by domestic producers of tyres. In fact, the public record indicates
that domestic producers were opposed to the safeguard action. The case was
initiated by tyre workers. The argument was that injury from imported tyres
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Figure 2.13: Annual import values of selected products subject to US measures (annual
import value corresponds to the year before the case was initiated).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
was accruing to workers, not the ﬁrms. It might seem surprising that the
ﬁrms and workers viewed imports so diﬀerently before it is understood that
the ﬁrms accounting for nearly all US domestic production also accounted for
most of the tyres imported from China (see United States International Trade
Commission (2009, Table II-3)). The vast majority of tyres are produced by
large global multinational ﬁrms and US tyre facilities are just one part of
their global manufacturing base. A trade policy focusing exclusively on China
overlooked the many other developing countries who, but for China, would
export more tyres to the US market.
Despite the availability of other suppliers, the trade data show that China
had indeed gained market share during the late 2000s. Figure 2.14 illustrates
imports of tyres, showing both total imports and imports from China alone.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, China was selling more than twice as many
tyres to the USA in early 2008 than it had just a few years earlier.
The case also highlighted the problem of discerning injury caused by the
recession from injury caused by subject imports. Given the lack of support
from domestic producers, injury essentially boiled down to evidence of job
losses. Nevertheless, blaming imports from China for the losses was con-
founded by the fact that, during the 12 months prior to the ﬁling of the case,
tyre imports from China had fallen. Overall imports were falling, imports
from China were receding, tyre demand was plummeting and tyre workers
were being laid oﬀ, all at the same time. China felt that the case was a prime
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Figure 2.14: US tyre imports (quarterly).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
example of it being made the scapegoat for woes caused by the worldwide
recession.
8 CONCLUSION
This review of US TTB activity has yielded a number of interesting insights.
One important ﬁnding is methodological—most key insights are not sensitive
to the metric used to measure TTBs. The diﬀerent metrics (case, unweighted
product, trade-weighted product) are all found to portray similar qualitative
results with respect to the ﬂow of new activity. However, the stock of TTBs is
sensitive to choice of metric. While the merits of each metric can be debated,
it is clear that the weighted metric reveals details on the scope and depth
of TTBs that the easier-to-use metrics miss. Exploring these diﬀerences is
something future research should investigate.
A second key ﬁnding is the extraordinary extent to which US TTBs are
focused on a single supplier (China). Depending on exactly how the question
is framed, the data show that China now accounts for 50–85% of new US TTB
activity. China now has a higher fraction of its trade under US TTB measures
than all developing countries put together and all developed countries put
together. This would be remarkable under any circumstances, but it is even
more striking when one realises that China was subject to very few TTBs just
a decade ago.
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The relative lack of TTB surge during (and following) the 2007–9 recession
is also a key ﬁnding. While anti-dumping and CVD ﬁlings did increase, the
overall level of activity was modest by historical standards. The recession
also seemed to have inﬂuenced the ﬁrst (and only) China safeguard measure,
but one action cannot reasonably be called a surge.
Why wasn’t there a sharp increase in new petition ﬁlings in the 2007–9
recession that has been typical in past recessions? Here, four contributing
explanations are given. First, the single biggest user of TTBs in the US—the
steel industry—already had TTB measures on most of its key products. The
eﬀorts by the steel industry to pressurise US authorities into not sunsetting
cases meant that most of the usual suspects were already subject to large TTB
tariﬀs. For example, key products such as hot-rolled steel, plate, ball bearings
and piping fuelled the surge in TTB activity in the early 1980s, early 1990s, and
early 2000s.19 In the 2007–9 recession, the key foreign suppliers of each of
these products (and many other steel products) were already subject to TTBs.
Second, in earlier recessions, the decline in imports appears to have been
roughly proportional to the decline in US manufacturing activity. In the
2007–9 recession, imports fell by a greater amount than the decline in US
manufacturing activity (Levchenko et al 2010). US imports declined by more
than 25% in 2009. In earlier recessions, imports declined by about one-quarter
that amount. This unusually severe contraction meant that there were not a
lot of products where imports were increasing, either absolutely or relative to
domestic production or consumption. On average, the fall in import market
share makes it more diﬃcult to allege that imports ‘cause’ the domestic indus-
try’s injury. In such circumstances, the recession is a more apparent cause of
the downturn.
Despite the evidence, it must be stressed that the role of the decline in
imports is speculative. Trade cases are ﬁled on speciﬁc products that usually
make up a very small share of total industry imports, so extrapolating from
industry-wide data to a conclusion as to why a particular product within that
industry did not seek TTB protection involves a leap of faith that may or may
not be warranted. In addition, there is clear evidence that cases were ﬁled
and received TTB protection despite large falls in import volume and market
share. At least some industries were able to take advantage of the demand
fall. Three cases adjudicated in 2010—oil-country tubular goods, drill piping
and coated paper—all experienced huge declines in imports. Moreover, in each
casethedomesticindustrywasabletoremainproﬁtabledespitetherecession.
Consequently, in each case the domestic industry claimed the recession made
it vulnerable to imports. The USA was apparently sympathetic to this claim.
In each case the US imposed the TTB measure not because the industry was
injured but because it was threatened with injury.
19Moore (1996) discusses the steel industry’s surge of cases during the recessions of the
early 1980s and early 1990s.
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Third, the changing role of manufacturing in the US economy might also be
inﬂuencing trends. Trade remedy laws like anti-dumping and CVD only apply
to goods, not to services. Yet the US economy continues to shift from manu-
facturing to services. Moreover, an increasing portion of that manufacturing
takes place in segments where there is some unique US advantage, or where
the industry is highly globalised so that intra-industry trade occurs and each
involved country is necessary to the overall functioning. The traditional users
of trade remedy laws—industries with large capital costs, and large invest-
ments in ﬁxed assets—are becoming a smaller and smaller part of the overall
economy.
Fourth, as documented by Knetter and Prusa (2003), the exchange rate plays
an even larger role in driving new TTBs than changes in GDP. Since 2001,
the US dollar has depreciated relative to other currencies (except the Chinese
yuan). This tends to put a damper on import levels, as stronger foreign curren-
cies makes exports to the USA less competitive in US dollar terms. Similarly,
China’s ﬁxed exchange rate is likely a key contributing factor behind many US
TTBs targeting Chinese exporters.
Thomas J. Prusa is Professor at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey,
and Research Associate at The National Bureau of Economic Research.
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European Union: No Protectionist Surprises
HYLKE VANDENBUSSCHE AND CHRISTIAN VIEGELAHN1
1 INTRODUCTION
On 3 October 2008, the EU launched a review of anti-dumping duties on
leather shoes from China and Vietnam. In December 2009, the EU decided
to extend duties on the imports of leather shoes from China and Vietnam
for another 15 months.2 This aﬃrmative decision was taken despite heavy
protests from consumers, importers and outsourcing ﬁrms, and it overruled
the negative advice that had been formulated earlier by the EU Anti-Dumping
Advisory Committee.3 The review procedure was launched just a few days
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which marked the outbreak of the Great
Recession and fuelled the fear that the EU would engage in a ‘protectionist spi-
ral’. In such a spiral, some countries would raise protection in order to counter
the negative spillovers from the ﬁnancial sector on the real economy. Other
countries would become adversely aﬀected by this protection and then start
to retaliate. The question is whether this review marked the beginning of a
more protectionist attitude in the EU in the face of the global recession.
Though the impact of the crisis varied considerably across EU member
states, the EU as a whole has been strongly hit, indicating that protection-
ist pressure was likely to be high after the outbreak of the crisis at the end of
2008. The macroeconomic indicators in Figure 3.1 show that, for the EU27 as a
whole, GDP growth plunged from 3.0% in 2007 to 0.5% in 2008 and turned into
a negative growth of −4.2% in 2009. Export and import growth slowed down
1Hylke Vandenbussche: Department of Economics, Université catholique de Louvain,
Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Email: hylke.vandenbussche@uclou
vain.be. Christian Viegelahn: Department of Economics, Université catholique de Lou-
vain, Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Email: christian.viegelahn@
uclouvain.be
2See Council Implementing Regulation No. 1294/2009 of 22 December 2009, available
from EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm), and press release from
European Commission of 2 October 2008, available on the website of the Directorate Gen-
eral for Trade of the European Commission.
3See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (2010).
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Figure 3.1: EU macroeconomic conditions: (a) real export, import and GDP growth
(EU27); (b) unemployment rate (EU27).
Source: Eurostat.
dramatically in 2008, before falling roughly by 12.5% in 2009. The unemploy-
ment rate, shown in Figure 3.1(b), jumped from 7% in 2008 to 9% in 2009 after
having decreased continuously since 2004.
Deviation from free trade is tempting for any country in times of economic
downturn and trade protection is regarded as a quick and easy way of safe-
guarding jobs and replacing imports by domestic production. Trade protec-
tion is often perceived as being a far less painful remedy than ﬁscal auster-
ity and budget cuts since it is likely to raise tariﬀ revenue for the protecting
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Figure 3.2: EU average MFN tariﬀ, bound and applied rates.
Source: authors’ calculations based on UN TRAINS and the WTO’s consolidated tariﬀ
schedule. Maximum and minimum rate correspond to maximum and minimum tariﬀ
at the tariﬀ line level for each HS-06 product (HS revision 1996). Average is calculated
as simple average over all HS-06 products. Only HS-06 products for which applied and
bound rates are ad valorem duties are included. Only HS-06 products with 1:1 match
between HS revisions 1996, 2002 and 2007 are included.
country. However, if all countries start applying protectionist measures, trade
between countries will dry up. With no more beneﬁts to reap unilaterally, indi-
vidual country welfare will be much lower than in the case of free trade, and
countries will revert to a state of relative autarky, thereby forgoing the bene-
ﬁts from trade. For members of the WTO like the EU, there are generally three
ways to raise import protection.
First, countries can pull their applied MFN tariﬀ rates up to the level of
their WTO-committed bound rates. In Figure 3.2, we show the tariﬀ overhang,
ie the diﬀerence between bound and applied MFN rates for the EU. Average
applied MFN rates have remained roughly constant, suggesting that the EU
has not used this channel to raise protection during the crisis. Average tariﬀ
overhang was in fact close to zero throughout 2004–9 and a more detailed
look at the underlying data reveals that tariﬀ overhang actually equalled zero
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Table 3.1: ‘Doing Business’ indicators on importing, EU27.
Mean: Mean:
number of time to
documents import
Year to import in days
2005 6.25 14.75
2006 5.54 13.46
2007 5.46 13.25
2008 5.33 13.29
2009 5.33 13.25
All EU27 countries are included except Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.
Source: authors’ calculations based on ‘Doing Business’ indicators from World Bank.
for 97% of all products or more, implying that the EU’s scope for using this
channel has been quite limited.
Second, countries may increase protection through the imposition of tech-
nical trade barriers such as an increase in administrative obligations related
to a shipment or the technical clearance time at the border.4 Table 3.1 illus-
trates that EU member states generally seem to have refrained from doing
so. The ‘Doing Business’ indicators from the World Bank measure business
regulations for local ﬁrms around the world and also include information on
the procedural requirements related to importing.5 Table 3.1 indicates that
the EU average of both the number of documents that are required to ﬁll out
and the number of days needed to import a standardised cargo of goods have
largely remained unchanged in 2008–9, suggesting that there has not been an
increase of technical trade barriers during the crisis.6
Third, countries can use temporary trade barriers (TTBs) that are exceptions
to the WTO’s overall goal to promote free trade and to abstain from imposing
unilateral tariﬀs.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify major trends in the EU’s appli-
cation of TTBs and to verify whether there has been any sign of a change in
the use of TTBs during the 2008–9 crisis. There are three TTBs available to
countries: safeguard, countervailing and anti-dumping measures. Since, for
4The extent to which this is legal is determined by the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.
5See Doing Business (2011) for methodological details. A third indicator related to
importing measures the fees (in dollars) levied on a 20-foot container. However, since
this indicator has to be deﬂated and converted into euros to make a comparison and is
therefore largely dependent on the inﬂation and exchange rate, we exclude this indicator
from our analysis.
6The only EU member state for which we observe an increase in any of these indicators
in 2008 or 2009 is Czech Republic, where it took 17 days in 2008 instead of 16 days in
2007 to import a standardised cargo of goods.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 89 — #109






European Union: No Protectionist Surprises 89
the EU, as in many other countries, the use of TTBs mainly coincides with the
use of anti-dumping measures (with almost 90% of TTB cases consisting of
anti-dumping cases), we predominantly focus on the EU’s use of anti-dumping
policy. We match data on anti-dumping cases from the World Bank’s Tempo-
rary Trade Barrier Database (Bown 2010) with UN Comtrade data, which detail
product-level trade at the HS-06 (HS six-digit) level by country of origin. Our
period of analysis runs from 1995 until 2009. To facilitate the comparison
over time, we construct a set of ‘count’ and ‘value’ indicators. These indicators
will be used to examine anti-dumping policy with respect to product cover-
age, country coverage, product–country coverage and import-value coverage.
We will distinguish between anti-dumping case initiations and anti-dumping
measures in force. The methodology we use primarily consists of a graphical
examination of these indicators over time.
We carry out our analysis not only for aggregate imports (so as to iden-
tify overall trends in the use of anti-dumping policy) but also for targeted
countries in speciﬁc income groups and analyse behaviour by industry. Fur-
thermore, we investigate the link between anti-dumping policy and more ‘tra-
ditional’ forms of protection such as applied MFN and preferential tariﬀs. We
also reveal new insights regarding the link between product-mix similarity
of a country to the EU and EU anti-dumping policy. Another novelty that we
introduce is the link between anti-dumping policy and product characteristics
using the well-known Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation of homogeneous versus dif-
ferentiated goods and a distinction between industrial, consumer, and capital
goods based on the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classiﬁcation. Finally, by
engaging in an analysis at the individual EU member state level, we examine
the extent to which results for the EU as a whole are driven by a few outlying
member states or whether they reﬂect an EU-wide pattern.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
discuss anti-dumping law and the features of it that are speciﬁc to the EU. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the methodology that we apply. In Section 4 the main results
on product, country, product–country combination and import-value cover-
age are presented. Section 5 examines the link between ‘traditional’ forms of
protection, product-mix similarity and product characteristics, respectively,
and anti-dumping policy. Section 6 presents results for individual EU member
states and, ﬁnally, Section 7 concludes.
2 ANTI-DUMPING POLICY: THE RULES IN THE EU
The WTO regulates the use of anti-dumping policy in the General Agreement
on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
which are currently implemented in the EU by Council Regulation 1225/2009.
Byandlarge,theEU’santi-dumpinglawspeciﬁesthreeconditionsthatmustbe
met before the EU can impose import protection in the form of anti-dumping
measures on imported products.
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The ﬁrst condition is the presence of dumping by a foreign ﬁrm into the EU
market. Interestingly, there appears to be a divide between the legal deﬁnition
of dumping and a more economic one. From a legal point of view, any form of
price discrimination by a foreign ﬁrm, where the ex-factory price in the for-
eign ﬁrm’s own home market is higher than the price for export markets, is
regarded as international dumping. From an economic point of view, however,
there are very few instances where dumping also implies ‘unfair’ behaviour.
Mainstream economics suggests that predatory dumping is an instance where
there is room for government intervention. However, a predatory pricing strat-
egy only works under very speciﬁc circumstances. First, predation can only
be successful in industries with high entry barriers to prevent easy entry after
exit from a market. Second, the foreign trading partner must have very deep
pockets to wait for domestic competitors to exit the market. Third, predatory
pricing only works in concentrated markets with few domestic ﬁrms. When it
comes to the establishment of dumping, it is important to note that none of
these issues are considered in the anti-dumping legislation.
The second condition speciﬁed in Article VI of the GATT is that only dump-
ing that causes domestic injury is a reason for protection. The WTO rules do
not clearly deﬁne what is meant by ‘injury’. The Anti-Dumping Agreement
mentions a list of injury indicators including the decline of domestic sales,
proﬁts, output, employment and stocks, amongst others. However, in the EU’s
practical application of this agreement, injury is very often regarded to be
present whenever the foreign good is sold at a price that is lower than that of
a similar domestic product in the EU market. Put diﬀerently, this simple price
comparison often decides a positive or negative injury ruling (Vandenbussche
1996; Vermulst and Waer 1991).
The third condition embedded in the EU’s anti-dumping regulations is that
imposed anti-dumping measures have to be in the EU’s community interest.
The existence of this ‘community interest clause’ marks an important diﬀer-
ence from, for example, the anti-dumping law in the USA and many other
countries. This clause implies that protection should be in the interest of the
EU as a whole and not just in the interest of EU producers. This requires EU
oﬃcials to at least consider whether prices on the EU market are likely to rise
dramatically after the imposition of a duty, as this would be against the inter-
est of consumers. The EU’s anti-dumping case on leather shoes imported from
Vietnam and China described earlier is an illustrative example. In this case,
the European Commission justiﬁed the imposition of anti-dumping duties by
claiming that the price of European shoes would increase by at most €1.50 a
pair. This is in contrast to the USA, where welfare issues need not be taken
into account in the evaluation of whether or not to impose protection.
On the whole, many economists have expressed doubts as to whether anti-
dumping rules are suﬃciently well equipped to discriminate between ‘fair’
and ‘unfair’ foreign imports. However, some economists have recently argued
that their existence generates an equilibrium that is more desirable in terms of
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worldwide welfare than pure free trade (Martin and Vergote 2008; Hartigan
and Vandenbussche 2010). If governments act as welfare-maximisers, this
could explain the WTO members’ apparent reluctance to change anti-dumping
rules fundamentally or even to get rid of them.
The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve this debate but merely to point
out that the use of anti-dumping duties driven by industrial policy motives
cannot be ruled out. The current anti-dumping rules cannot discriminate well
whether domestic injury from import competition is due to ‘unfair’ imports
or an ‘uncompetitive’ domestic industry suﬀering from tough but fair com-
petition from a more eﬃcient foreign supplier. This implies that a rise in
anti-dumping measures need not necessarily reﬂect an increase in ‘unfair’
behaviour but could simply stem from an increasing use of anti-dumping
policy to shelter domestic ﬁrms from import competition, in which case anti-
dumping policy would be nothing more than a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ pol-
icy. It is important to make that distinction to interpret any changes in anti-
dumping policy in the course of the 2008–9 crisis.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to compare the EU’s use of TTBs before and during the crisis, we
construct a broad set of indicators that will allow us to analyse the coverage
of TTBs over time in several dimensions. We will then use these indicators
to examine the main trends in the EU’s use of TTBs, enabling us to detect
whether any major policy changes occurred during the Great Recession.
We use information from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers
Database (Bown 2010), which contains detailed data on anti-dumping, coun-
tervailing and safeguard cases initiated by the EU. We overcome the problem
of changes in the HS product classiﬁcation over time by using concordance
tables from the United Nations Statistics Division.7 From this database we
extract data on initiations and measures in force.8 We will refer to the former
as the ﬂow of TTBs, while the latter will be referred to as the stock of TTBs.
Since we are interested in the 2008–9 crisis period, it is important to consider
more than just the stock of TTBs, as it can usually take up to a year or more
from the initiation of a case to the imposition of a measure. Changes in the
7Results are based on the 1992 revision of HS-06.
8The Temporary Trade Barriers Database was complemented with additional infor-
mation from original EU notiﬁcations, taken from the EUR-Lex webpage. For a few anti-
dumping measures, information on the revocation date is missing in the TTB database.
In these cases, we assume that anti-dumping measures were in place for ﬁve years as
foreseen by EU anti-dumping law. We do a robustness check in which we exclude these
anti-dumping measures from our whole analysis and ﬁnd that results are generally very
similar.
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use of TTBs during the crisis would therefore be observed ‘in real time’ only
when looking at the ﬂow of TTBs.
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the number of case initiations for the three
types of TTBs used by the EU in the period before and during the crisis. For
anti-dumping policy and countervailing duties, which are trading partner spe-
ciﬁc, we use two distinct case deﬁnitions. One is to consider a case by targeted
country (panel (a)), while the other is to consider a case by country and product
(panel (c)). For global safeguard measures, which do not discriminate between
trading partners, we count the total number of initiations (panel (b)) and mea-
sure a case by product (panel (d)). Whatever deﬁnition we use and whichever
way we count cases, Table 3.2 does not suggest a major change in the EU’s use
of TTBs during the crisis. Based on the numbers provided in Table 3.2, we ﬁnd
that the EU’s TTB policy largely coincides with anti-dumping policy. Since, in
addition, the EU initiated relatively few countervailing cases and no safeguard
cases in 2008 and 2009, we focus our subsequent analysis on anti-dumping
policy only. Also, since the number of cases does not provide any information
on the number of products and countries aﬀected nor on the extent to which
the EU’s value of imports is aﬀected, we will deﬁne a ﬁner set of indicators.
For this purpose we match data on EU anti-dumping policy to UN Comtrade
data on import values for each EU member state over a period from 1995 to
2009, provided at the HS-06 product level and by EU trading partner.9 One
issue that we face is the changing EU composition over time, which has some
implications for our methodological approach.10 First, since previously tar-
geted countries have become members of the EU customs union and can no
longer be targeted with anti-dumping measures, we only consider extra-EU27
imports.11 Second, the results reported for the EU as a whole are based on
imports of ten EU member states that have always been EU members between
1995 and 2009 and for which data coverage is typically the best: Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United
Kingdom. These ten member states represented around 64% of all extra-EU27
imports in 2008. However, for robustness, we also verify our results for alter-
9Import data for some EU member states are missing, particularly before 1995, which
is why we opt for our period of analysis to start in 1995. For more detailed information
on the data sources described in this section, please see Chapter 1.
10In 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU15. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became EU member
states.
11Extra-EU27 imports do not comprise imports from Réunion, French Guiana, Martinique,
Guadeloupe, Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey and the Åland Islands that are current members
of the EU customs area and, thus, cannot be targeted with anti-dumping measures. We also
exclude imports of commodities ‘not elsewhere speciﬁed’ in the data.
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native EU deﬁnitions.12 Results are always very similar and all of our main
ﬁndings are equally valid across other EU deﬁnitions.
With the database at hand, we construct four indicators that we will refer
to extensively in the following sections. In the baseline speciﬁcation, we use
actual import values in order to compute these indicators.
Indicator 1 assesses the product coverage of anti-dumping. This indica-
tor counts the number of products under anti-dumping protection that are
imported into the EU from at least one country targeted with anti-dumping
measures. In order to control for variations in the product scope of the EU’s
imports, we divide the resulting number by the total number of products
imported by the EU.
Indicator 2 measures country coverage of anti-dumping. It counts the num-
ber of countries targeted with anti-dumping measures and importing at least
one product under anti-dumping protection into the EU. We divide this num-
ber by the total number of countries importing into the EU.
Indicator 3 combines indicator 1 and indicator 2 and looks into product–
country combinations covered by anti-dumping. This product–country cover-
age counts the number of product–country combinations for which imports
are positive and anti-dumping measures are imposed as a share of all combi-
nations for which imports are observed.
The three indicators described thus far are all ‘count’ measures but do not
reﬂect the importance of anti-dumping protection in terms of import values.
To address this issue we introduce a fourth indicator (indicator 4). This is a
‘value’ measure corresponding to the import value covered by anti-dumping
measures as a share of the EU’s total import value.
One limitation of the above approach is that it does not take into account
the impact of anti-dumping measures on imports. For example, Vandenbuss-
che and Zanardi (2010) ﬁnd strong evidence for a substantial decrease of
imports in response to anti-dumping policy. For this reason, indicator 4 is
likely to underestimate the ‘true’ impact of anti-dumping policy on imports.
For indicators 1–3, such an underestimation can equally occur, but only in
the extreme cases in which anti-dumping measures are prohibitive, ie when
the anti-dumping causes a disruption of imports for some product–country
combinations.
We therefore carry out several robustness checks and recalculate our indi-
cators using import counterfactuals instead of actual import values for those
imports that are under anti-dumping protection. First, we follow a relatively
simple approach and assume that import values do not change when anti-
dumping protection is set in place, ie we assume that the import values in
the year before an anti-dumping measure is imposed are the ones that pre-
vail in the years under anti-dumping protection. Second, we construct the
12This includes an analysis for EU15, EU27, and a ‘current’ EU that follows the changes
in EU composition over time.
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96 The Great Recession and Import Protection
import counterfactual for products under anti-dumping on the basis of indus-
try import growth rates for products that are never subject to anti-dumping
throughout our data period.13 Due to import data restrictions, we restrict
the use of counterfactuals to anti-dumping cases for which measures were
imposed after 1995 and stick to actual import values otherwise.
For indicators 1–3, the two robustness checks are in fact methodologically
identical and yield results that are very similar to those in our baseline speci-
ﬁcation. This allows us to conclude that anti-dumping measures are generally
non-prohibitive in nature. For indicator 4, results from the robustness analy-
sis also support our ﬁndings from the baseline speciﬁcation. Though we ﬁnd
that coverage shares are indeed frequently higher when using counterfactuals
instead of actual import values, the diﬀerence is relatively small. Addition-
ally, trends in coverage are very similar to the baseline speciﬁcation. Thus, we
report our results only for the baseline speciﬁcation.
Though our ﬁndings are robust to using import counterfactuals, it is impor-
tant to note a couple of other caveats. First, the indicators deﬁned above only
capture the ‘direct eﬀects’ of anti-dumping. There may also be a number of
‘indirect eﬀects’ such as import diversion, downstream eﬀects, tariﬀ-jumping
foreign direct investment, domestic market entry, and retaliation or strategic
behaviour. We do not attempt to capture such eﬀects, though research lit-
erature has shown that they exist.14 Second, we do not consider the size of
measures or the type of measures applied. Third, in the absence of ﬁrm-level
data, it was not possible to engage in an evaluation of the impact of anti-
dumping on EU ﬁrm performance. Finally, while EU anti-dumping measures
are imposed at the eight-digit product level, we performed our analysis at the
six-digit product level due to import data limitations.15
One ﬁnal remark is in order before turning to the results. While we have
deﬁned the four diﬀerent coverage indicators above in terms of stocks, we
also compute them for the ﬂows of anti-dumping (ie for case initiations), and
13Note that this methodology is directly related to Equation (1.2) in Chapter 1 and Bown
(2011b). Equation (1.2) is the formal description of the application of our second counter-
factual to indicator 4, except for two diﬀerences. First, we calculate the counterfactual on
the basis of industry-speciﬁc import growth rates for non-anti-dumping products rather
than economy-wide import growth rates for non-anti-dumping products. Second, only ﬁnal
anti-dumping measures are taken into account. According to EU anti-dumping law, pre-
liminary duties can only be imposed for a maximum period of nine months and, since we
use annual data, are likely to be negligible.
14See Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) for a comprehensive overview of these ‘indirect
eﬀects’.
15The EU usually imposes anti-dumping measures at the eight-digit Combined Nomen-
clature (CN) level. The ﬁrst six digits of the CN code actually correspond with the ﬁrst six
digits of HS, allowing us to base our study on HS-06.
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for subsamples of products, countries, product–country combinations and
imports.16 All results are reported in the following results sections.
4 GENERAL TRENDS IN THE USE OF EU ANTI-DUMPING POLICY
4.1 Overall Trends
We start by showing the trends in EU anti-dumping initiations during 1995–
2009 in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3(a) shows the ﬂow of new cases and Figure 3.3(b)
shows the stock of cases, ie the number of anti-dumping measures in force in
a particular year.17
Two alternative deﬁnitions of a ‘case’ are applied in Figure 3.3. The ﬁrst
one is ‘by target country’ and the second one is ‘by target country and HS-06
product’.18 To illustrate the diﬀerence, consider the following example. In
May 2008, the EU initiated an anti-dumping case against China, Moldova and
Turkey, each involving 7 HS-06 products. Using the ﬁrst deﬁnition, we count 3
anti-dumpingcases.Usingtheseconddeﬁnition,wecount21casesinvolvedin
the investigation.19 Since an anti-dumping measure was imposed only against
China for the 7 HS-06 products in August 2009, we count this as one anti-
dumping measure in force against China according to the ﬁrst deﬁnition.
Using the second deﬁnition, we count this as 7 anti-dumping measures in
force against China.
Whatever deﬁnition we apply, the crisis period does not look unusual. In
terms of anti-dumping initiations in panel (a), we observe about ﬁve peaks
between 1995 and 2009. There is also one in 2008, but it seems a stretch to
attribute this peak to increased protectionism at the outbreak of the ﬁnancial
crisis. First, the magnitude of the peak suggests that this can still be regarded
in the range of ‘normal’ ﬂuctuations. Second, only 44% of cases initiated in
2008 resulted in protection due to a considerable share of cases withdrawn
by EU ﬁrms or terminated by the EU authority, compared with 58% for 1995–
2007.
The stock of anti-dumping measures in force, shown in panel (b), shows
a clear downward trend in the 2000s according to the ‘traditional’ count
16Note that the use of counterfactuals is redundant for the calculation of coverage shares
for ﬂows of anti-dumping policy assuming that the mere initiation of an anti-dumping case
does not have an impact on imports.
17Note that, for some cases initiated in 2009, the outcomes were not yet known at the
time of writing. The number of initiations that result in measures is therefore not reported
for 2009 in Figure 3.3(a).
18Previous literature has predominantly used the ‘by target country’ deﬁnition of a case.
See, for example, Prusa (2001) and Zanardi (2004).
19Note that if the EU had initiated another anti-dumping investigation in the same year
against one of the same countries and on one of the same HS-06 products, this anti-
dumping investigation would have been counted as a separate case.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.3: EU anti-dumping policy. (a) Flow: total number of anti-dumping initiations
and number of anti-dumping initiations that result in measures. (b) Stock: number of
anti-dumping measures in force.
Source: authors’ calculations based on Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010). For the number of anti-dumping initiations that result in protection, the 2009
value was not yet available at the time of writing. For anti-dumping measures with a
missing revocation date, we assume that anti-dumping protection was in place for ﬁve
years. Anti-dumping cases that have missing HS codes in the database are excluded.
Cases against EU27 member states before their EU accession are excluded.
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of anti-dumping cases by target country. However, when we deﬁne an anti-
dumping case by target country and HS-06 product, we observe a clear upward
trend beginning in 2004. This suggests that the average number of products
involved in an anti-dumping investigation against a certain trading partner
has increased over time. Indeed, aggregating anti-dumping case initiations
over time, we ﬁnd an average of 1.9 products per case for 1995–2003, while
for 2004–9 this number is 2.5 products per case.
Due to the sunset clause in EU anti-dumping law, the usual duration of
an anti-dumping measure is ﬁve years. However, the duration can be shorter
or longer if accompanied by a justiﬁed decision from the trade authority.
Figure 3.4 provides some descriptive statistics on the duration of EU anti-
dumping measures deﬁned by target country and HS-06 product. Panel (a)
counts the number of anti-dumping measures, expired before the end of 2009,
by their duration.20 The duration varies between 1 and 18 years, and the
most frequent duration is 5 years, accounting for 62.9% of all measures. The
duration exceeds 5 years for 23.7% of all measures and is smaller than 5 years
for 13.4%. Panel (b) considers those anti-dumping measures that are still in
force by the end of 2009. Roughly 74.2% of measures were in force for less
than 5 years before the end of 2009, while 25.8% were in force for more than
5 years.
Figure 3.4(c) examines whether the EU has increased protection during the
crisis through a prolongation of existing anti-dumping measures in force. For
this purpose, we calculate the share of those anti-dumping measures that
were supposed to expire due to the sunset clause but were still in force after a
sunset review. To state this more precisely, we calculate the share of measures
that are still in place despite having being imposed more than ﬁve but less
than six years ago. This share exhibits substantial variation over time and was
at its peak in 1995, when none of the anti-dumping measures imposed ﬁve
to six years before were removed. It has been decreasing since 2007, which
suggests that there has not been an increase in protection during the crisis
through the channel of prolonging the duration of existing measures.
Next, we compute indicators 1–4 on product coverage, target-country cov-
erage, product–country coverage, and import-value coverage for both anti-
dumping initiations and measures in each year. For the count indicators 1–3,
in addition to calculating anti-dumping coverage for all products, countries
and product–country combinations, we also separately show the coverage in
the respective top quartile by import value. To establish the top quartile of
products, we aggregate imports by product over 1995–2009 and then keep the
highest 25% of products by import value. We take an equivalent approach to
obtain the top 25% trading partners and the top 25% product–country combi-
nations. For indicator 3, we additionally calculate the anti-dumping coverage
20We exclude a few cases for which information on HS code or revocation date is missing
in the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.4: Duration of EU anti-dumping measures: (a) number of anti-dumping
measures expired before 31 December 2009 by duration in years; (b) number of
anti-dumping measures in force on 31 December 2009 by duration in years; (c) per-
centage of anti-dumping measures imposed more than ﬁve and less than six years and
still in force.
Source: authors’ calculations based on Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010). Measures counted by target country and HS-06 product. Anti-dumping mea-
sures with revocation date or HS code missing in the database are excluded. In
panel (a), duration of x years on the horizontal axis implies a duration of between
x − 0.5 and x + 0.5 years. In panel (b), duration calculated referring to 31 Decem-
ber 2009, the end of the data period. In panel (c), percentage of total anti-dumping
measures not removed by 30 June of the year on the horizontal axis despite being
imposed more than ﬁve and less than six years ago.
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after excluding ‘de minimis’ trading partners that are deﬁned as those coun-
tries that account for less than 1% of EU imports of a certain product in a
certain year. Results are shown in Figure 3.5.
The ﬁrst observation that stands out from Figure 3.5 is that products,
countries and product–country combinations that are ‘important’ in terms
of import value are more frequently subject to anti-dumping protection.
Figure 3.5(a) illustrates that product coverage of anti-dumping measures
has clearly increased since 2004, with many products covered by new anti-
dumping initiations especially in 2004–6. Panel (b) suggests that target-
country coverage did not change much over time. If anything, we observe
a weak inverse-U-shape, suggesting a slight decrease in country coverage of
anti-dumping measures after 2004. For the share of product–country com-
binations that fall under anti-dumping protection (shown in panel (c)) we
expect to see the combined eﬀect of product and country coverage. Indeed,
we observe an upward trend since 2004, which is likely driven by the increase
in the share of products covered by anti-dumping measures. All three ‘count’
indicators for the stock and the ﬂow of anti-dumping policy in panels (a)–(c)
indicate that the EU approximately followed its pre-crisis path during 2008–9.
Figure 3.5(d) illustrates our results for the ‘value’ indicator, ie the import
share covered by anti-dumping initiations and measures. No clear patterns
stand out. The only noticeable patterns are a sharp decrease in the import
share covered by anti-dumping measures until 1998, and a relatively larger
import share covered in 2006 and 2007. During the crisis, however, coverage
shares of both stock and ﬂow of protection remain at a relatively modest level.
In unreported results, we have also calculated indicators 1–4 with infor-
mation on coverage shares of newly imposed anti-dumping measures being
in place in year t but not in year t − 1, and expired anti-dumping measures
being in place in year t−1 but removed by year t. This allows us to investigate
whether, due to expired measures, Figure 3.5 hides a substantial increase in
new anti-dumping coverage during the crisis. Indeed, we ﬁnd an increase in
the share of products, product–country combinations and imports covered
by anti-dumping measures newly imposed in 2009. However, to say that this
pattern represents a major change in the application of anti-dumping policy
would be too strong a conclusion since the increase is still in the range of
pre-crisis ﬂuctuations for all three indicators.
In the aggregate, there is no evidence of any major shift in EU anti-dumping
policy around the time of the global crisis in 2008–9. The EU appears to have
applied its policies during the crisis the way it did before.
4.2 By Country Income Group
We next categorise targeted countries according to broad income groups. Our
data conﬁrm earlier studies (Rovegno and Vandenbussche 2011) and show
that China has increased its importance as an anti-dumping target both in
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Figure 3.5: Total coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy. (a) Stock/ﬂow: share of
products covered. (b) Stock/ﬂow: share of countries covered.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 103 — #123






European Union: No Protectionist Surprises 103
(c)
(d)
Figure 3.5: Continued: (c) Stock/ﬂow: share of product–country combinations covered.
(d) Stock/ﬂow: share of imports covered.
Source: panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) calculated using indicators 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
All ﬁgures based on EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. For deﬁnitions of ‘top
quartile’ and ‘de minimis’, see Section 4.1.
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104 The Great Recession and Import Protection
terms of initiations and imposed measures. The number of anti-dumping ini-
tiations against China as a share of the total has increased dramatically from
around 15% in 1995–2003 to about 40% in 2004–9.
When constructing diﬀerent income categories of countries we follow the
latest World Bank classiﬁcation but take into account the special status of
China as a main EU anti-dumping target.21 This results in four groups of coun-
tries: high-income countries, upper-middle-income countries, lower-middle-
and-low-income countries (excluding China), and China. For each of these four
groups, we compute indicator 1 to measure product coverage and indicator 4
to measure import-value coverage.
The share of products coming from China and falling under EU protec-
tion has been increasing rapidly since 2004, as illustrated in Figure 3.6(a),
which reports the product coverage of the stock of protection by country
income group. Products from other lower-middle-and-low-income countries
have also been increasingly falling under anti-dumping protection.22 This is
not the case for countries in the high-income group, for which the share of
products aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures has remained roughly stable
over time. The product coverage of ﬂows of anti-dumping policy shown in
panel (b) is largely consistent with our observations for the stock values. The
share of products imported from China and covered by anti-dumping case ini-
tiations is relatively high throughout 1995–2009, but initiations against other
lower-middle-and-low-income countries also cover many products, especially
in 2005–6.
The import-value indicator for the stock of protection, shown in Fig-
ure 3.6(c), reveals that while a large share of China’s imports is subject to EU
anti-dumping measures, this share decreased during the 2008–9 crisis. Never-
theless, China clearly remains the dominant target country during the crisis,
followed by other lower-middle-and-low-income countries. Panel (d) reports
a peak in import-value coverage of initiations against China and other lower-
middle-and-low-income countries around 2005. The leather shoe case against
China and Vietnam described earlier likely plays an important role in explain-
ing this pattern since this case was initiated in 2005.
Figure 3.6 suggests that anti-dumping coverage has remained relatively low
in all country income groups during the crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels
of protection. Furthermore, we ﬁnd some evidence for the increasing ‘north–
south’ divide in anti-dumping policy, with the EU targeting the ‘south’ more
and more, at least in terms of product coverage. Given the recent proliferation
of anti-dumping laws, particularly in the ‘south’, an important question is to
what extent the retaliatory power of the ‘south’ may shift the future targeting
21This classiﬁcation contains all World Bank member economies and all other economies
with a population of more than 30,000.
22In fact, positive anti-dumping coverage for lower-middle-and-low-income countries
results exclusively from anti-dumping measures against lower-middle-income countries.
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pattern. Miyagiwa et al (2010) suggest that, in a global world with multilateral
trading relations, market size may be the key to understanding these patterns.
4.3 By Industry
In this section we analyse anti-dumping coverage by industry, deﬁned accord-
ing to the 21 sections of the Harmonized System. The EU’s anti-dumping pol-
icy is not equally applied across industries and, in fact, a simple count of
case initiations between 1995 and 2009 suggests that anti-dumping policy is
concentrated in a few sectors. ‘Base metals’, ‘chemicals’, ‘textiles’, ‘machinery
and electrical appliances’ and ‘plastics and rubber’ accounted for 82% of all
EU anti-dumping initiations during the data period. However, these ﬁgures do
not account for industry size or product scope per industry. A few cases could
have a large impact in industries where the import value and the number of
products imported are low. Hence, to simply focus our analysis on the ﬁve
industries that have the highest number of anti-dumping cases over time is
not suﬃcient.
We compute indicators 1 and 4 for the stock of protection across all indus-
tries. One way to visualise the breadth and depth of anti-dumping policy at the
industry level is to examine an industry–year matrix in which cells are shaded
according to the degree of protection: darker cells indicate higher levels of
protection. Table 3.3 illustrates the matrices and provides an overview of the
industries under anti-dumping protection for each year in 1995–2009, both
in terms of product coverage (panel (a)) and import-value coverage (panel (b)).
The table shows how anti-dumping does not only aﬀect the ‘usual suspect’
industries listed above, as coverage reaches high values for other industries
as well.
For example, the EU mineral products industry was intensively protected
by anti-dumping between 1996 and 2001, attaining product coverage ratios
of up to 8%. The animal products industry had 15–16% of the total import
value covered by anti-dumping between 2006 and 2008. Within ‘animal prod-
ucts’, EU anti-dumping measures on rainbow trout and farmed salmon were
the main underlying cause of the relatively high coverage. The breakdown of
protection by industry also reveals that the EU footwear industry had substan-
tial anti-dumping protection with an annual import-value coverage of 15–22%
between 2006 and 2009, mainly due to the imposed anti-dumping measures
on certain footwear from China and Vietnam.
An important observation on coverage across industries is that the num-
ber of industries protected under anti-dumping increased, a trend that began
around 2004 and that may partially explain the increased product cover-
age over time. Only industries like arms and ammunition, art, and precious
stones are not covered by anti-dumping. The EU’s new user industries of anti-
dumping policy are animal products, vegetable products, fats and oils, and
foods and beverages. As only fats and oils started to be a user industry in
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.6: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy by country income group.
(a) Stock (share of products covered). (b) Flow (share of products covered).
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Figure 3.6: Continued: (c) Stock (share of imports covered). (d) Flow (share of imports
covered).
Source: panels (a) and (b) calculated using indicator 1. Panels (c) and (d) calculated
using indicator 4. All ﬁgures are based on an EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom.
HI: high-income. UMI: upper-middle-income. LMI and LI (without CHN): lower-middle-
and-low-income (without China). CHN: China.
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2009 during the crisis, the evidence seems too weak to suggest an increased
coverage across industries related to the crisis.
With few exceptions, the pre-crisis levels of anti-dumping protection within
industries prevailed during the crisis. The base metals industry is one excep-
tion, where anti-dumping protection increased tremendously and attained
an unprecedented high in 2009 both in terms of product and import-value
coverage.
To summarise Section 4, we have not found any signiﬁcant overall change
in the EU’s use of anti-dumping policy in 2008–9. While product and indus-
try coverage of anti-dumping have increased since 2004, country coverage
remains at a roughly constant level over the period of analysis, with a slight
decrease in the set of targeted countries after 2004. Anti-dumping measures
are increasingly imposed on products coming from lower-middle-and-low-
income countries, especially from China, which has been an ongoing trend
since 2004.
5 WHAT MAKES PRODUCTS AND TRADING PARTNERS
PRONE TO ANTI-DUMPING PROTECTION?
5.1 ‘Traditional’ Trade Protection
According to the ‘substitution hypothesis’, trade liberalisation eﬀorts in the
form of tariﬀ reductions have gone hand in hand with increased trade protec-
tion through other means such as anti-dumping policy. The existing evidence
that examines the extent to which anti-dumping substitutes for eliminated
tariﬀ protection has not resulted in uniform patterns across countries.23 For
the EU, the average applied MFN tariﬀ plotted in Figure 3.2 and our data on
MFN and preferential tariﬀs suggest that tariﬀs have not changed much in the
2000s. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to examine the ‘substitution hypothesis’ and to
relate the use of EU anti-dumping policy to changes in ‘traditional’ trade pro-
tection. We can, however, explore the relationship between EU anti-dumping
policy and the level of ‘traditional’ protection. If the EU grants import prefer-
ences to some countries or sets a low applied MFN tariﬀ on a certain product,
the level of ‘traditional’ protection is rather low. One interesting question
is whether these products and trading partners are more prone to EU anti-
dumping protection.
We start by investigating the relationship between anti-dumping policy and
preference margins, ie the diﬀerences between applied MFN tariﬀs and pref-
erential rates of the EU vis-à-vis its preferential trading partners in the WTO.
With numerous multilateral and bilateral PTAs in place, the question for the
23See, for example, Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), Moore and Zanardi (2009) and Bown
and Tovar (2011).
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EU is whether anti-dumping policy has focused on product–country combina-
tions subject to a preferential regime.
We calculate preference margins as the diﬀerence between applied MFN
tariﬀs and preferential tariﬀs, using data from UN TRAINS.24 Then we divide
product–country combinations into two categories distinguishing between
those for which preference margins are zero and those for which they are
positive. We calculate indicators 3 and 4 on product–country combinations
and import-value coverage, respectively, for each of the two groups, basing
indicators for year t on the preference margins granted in t − 1. The results
are shown in Figure 3.7.
Figures 3.7(a) and 3.7(c) show that the share of product–country combina-
tions and imports subject to anti-dumping measures are considerably higher
among those with a preference margin greater than zero. Similarly, the cov-
erage shares of anti-dumping case initiations reported in panels (b) and (d) of
Figure 3.7 predominantly involve product–country combinations subject to a
preferential EU regime. This suggests that anti-dumping policy is largely used
for product–country combinations subject to preferential tariﬀs and tends to
be a substitute for the lower import tariﬀs granted under preferential regimes.
Next, we investigate the link between applied MFN tariﬀ rates and anti-
dumping policy. We are interested in whether anti-dumping measures are
most frequently imposed on products with high or low applied MFN tariﬀs.
For this purpose, we calculate indicator 1 on product coverage and indicator 4
on import coverage for subsets of products that diﬀer in the size of applied
MFN duty. No clear pattern stands out from the data. If anything, the EU is
imposing more anti-dumping on products with intermediate levels of MFN
tariﬀs, but less on products subject to very high or low tariﬀ levels. We con-
clude that there is no evidence for a clear link between anti-dumping policy
and the level of applied MFN tariﬀs in the EU.25
5.2 Product-Mix Similarity
An interesting question that has not been explored in the earlier literature is
the extent to which countries with an export product mix that is similar to
the EU are a focus of EU anti-dumping policy. For reasons related to direct
competition, exporting countries that overlap in their product mix with the
EU would be more likely to be targeted by protection (Facchini et al 2010). For
this purpose, we develop a ‘similarity index’ ﬁrst introduced by Finger and
Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott (2008). To create the similarity index, we
use detailed data on exports for all exporting countries in the following way:

i∈J
min(shipt,shiEUt)
24For each product–country combination, we calculate the preference margin as the max-
imum of all preference margins at the more disaggregated tariﬀ-line level.
25Corresponding ﬁgures can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.7: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy by preference margin. (a) Stock:
share of product–country combinations covered. (b) Flow: share of product–country
combinations covered.
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Figure 3.7: Continued: (c) Stock: share of imports covered. (d) Flow: share of imports
covered.
Source: panels (a) and (b) calculated using indicator 3. Panels (c) and (d) calculated
using indicator 4. All ﬁgures are based on an EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Preference margin corresponds to the diﬀerence of applied MFN and preferential tariﬀ
as described in Section 5.1.
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with shipt being the exports of product i, which is an element of the total
set of products J, from country p in year t as a share of total exports from
country p in year t. The variable shiEUt is deﬁned as the exports of product i
from the EU in year t as a share of total exports from the EU in year t.
We ﬁrst calculate the index for each exporting country by comparing its
shares with respect to total exports to those of the EU across all products. This
will eventually give us an indicator of product-mix similarity by country. Sec-
ond, we calculate the index by industry–country combination and compare the
shares with respect to total exports of the speciﬁc industry to those of the EU
across products in the industry. In this case, the indicator yields an industry–
country speciﬁc measure by assessing the similarity of, say, China’s textile
industry to EU’s textile industry. In both cases the indicator lies between 0
and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate a more similar product mix of the coun-
try or the industry–country combination with the EU.26 Ideally, we would use
product-level production data rather than export data to assess the product
mix of countries. However, these data are not available and we approximate
product mix with export data at the HS-06 level from UN Comtrade.
To assess whether product-mix similarity by country and by industry–coun-
try combination result in greater anti-dumping incidence, we assign observa-
tions into quartiles depending on their index value.27 For country observa-
tions in the same quartile in year t−1, we determine the country and import-
value coverage ratios of anti-dumping policy in year t, ie indicators 2 and 4.
For industry–country observations, we do the same to determine product–
country and import-value coverage ratios, ie indicators 3 and 4.
Figure 3.8 shows the coverage ratios (indicators 2 and 4) for the quartiles
of country-speciﬁc product-mix similarity calculated in this way. Panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 3.8 illustrate that, for both stock and ﬂow measures of anti-
dumping policy, countries most similar to the EU are targeted relatively more
frequently with anti-dumping than less similar countries. One explanation
could be that the trade volume between similar trading partners is also larger
and that this may be driving the higher incidence of anti-dumping cases in that
group. Hence, we are not able to distinguish between product-mix similarity
and volume of imports as drivers of anti-dumping incidence. To overcome
this, panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3.8 illustrate the relative import value covered
by anti-dumping policy, ie indicator 4, which should account for the larger
26In case the exports of a country to the world are zero in an industry for a certain year,
we set product-mix similarity index by industry–country combination equal to zero.
27In order to avoid any dependency of results on changing data availability over time, we
only include those countries into our analysis for which export data are available for all
years between 2000 and 2009. This drops mostly small developing economies that have
never been subject to EU anti-dumping measures. We end up with a balanced panel of 77
countries containing the main EU anti-dumping targets.
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trade between similar partners. Here, we still ﬁnd that similar trading partners
appear more often in EU anti-dumping policy than others.28
In unreported results, we have also calculated indicators 3 and 4 for quar-
tiles of the industry–country-speciﬁc similarity index. Here, we also conclude
that foreign industries that are similar to the EU are targeted relatively more
by its anti-dumping policy.
5.3 Product Characteristics
We introduce a further novelty to the literature by linking anti-dumping policy
to certain product characteristics. To see whether anti-dumping policy is more
orientated towards homogeneous or diﬀerentiated products, we apply the
Rauch (1999) indicator of product diﬀerentiation. Also, we analyse whether EU
anti-dumping focuses primarily on products for industrial purposes (referred
to as industrial goods), products for household consumption (referred to as
consumer goods) or capital goods, for which we use the BEC classiﬁcation.29
The Rauch (1999) indicator classiﬁes products into three categories: diﬀer-
entiated goods, homogeneous goods quoted on an organised exchange, and
homogeneous goods whose reference prices are quoted in trade publications.
For our purposes, we merge the latter two categories into one broad category
of homogeneous products. Imports are then split into homogeneous versus
diﬀerentiated goods.30 Our methodology consists of assessing indicators 1
and 4 involving the share of products and imports covered by anti-dumping
and computing them for each class of products. Figure 3.9 illustrates our
results.
In terms of Rauch (1999) product types, anti-dumping policy is used both
on homogeneous and diﬀerentiated products. The main diﬀerence appears
to be that indicator 1, the count measure, always takes on higher values for
homogenous products than for diﬀerentiated products (panel (a)), while the
reverse is true for indicator 4, the value measure (panel (c)). This suggests
that the number of diﬀerentiated products under anti-dumping appears to be
relatively low, while their import value is relatively large.
28Doing so generates an unexpected outcome in the quartile of trading partners that
are least similar to the EU. Panel (d) shows a somewhat unexpected spike in 2002 of the
import value covered by anti-dumping initiations against the trading partners least similar
to the EU, contributing to considerable coverage shares of anti-dumping measures, as can
be seen in panel (c). A closer look at the data suggests that this is mainly due to one outlier
case, ‘large rainbow trout’ imported from Faroe Islands, initiated in 2002, such that our
general results remain valid.
29In order to match Rauch (1999) and BEC classiﬁcation to HS-06, we use concordance
tables provided by the United Nations Statistics Division.
30Rauch (1999) deﬁnes a ‘liberal’ and a ‘conservative’ classiﬁcation, the latter deﬁning
some products as ‘diﬀerentiated’ that are ‘homogeneous’ according to the former clas-
siﬁcation. Our results are reported for the ‘conservative’ classiﬁcation, but a robustness
check shows that they are very similar when using the ‘liberal’ classiﬁcation.
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Figure 3.8: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy by product-mix similarity
at country level. (a) Stock: share of countries covered. (b) Flow: share of countries
covered.
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Figure 3.8: Continued: (c) Stock: share of imports covered. (d) Flow: share of imports
covered.
Source: panels (a) and (b) calculated using indicator 2. Panels (c) and (d) calculated
using indicator 4. All ﬁgures based on EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. Index
for product-mix similarity by country calculated following Finger and Kreinin (1979).
Degree of product-mix similarity is based on assignment of index value to correspond-
ing quartile as described in Section 5.2.
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Figure 3.9: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy for homogeneous and dif-
ferentiated goods. (a) Stock: share of products covered. (b) Flow: share of products
covered.
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Figure 3.9: Continued: (c) Stock: share of imports covered. (d) Flow: share of imports
covered.
Source: panels (a) and (b) calculated using indicator 1. Panels (c) and (d) calculated
using indicator 4. All ﬁgures are based on EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Deﬁnition of diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods follows ‘conservative’ Rauch
(1999) classiﬁcation.
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Figure 3.10: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping policy for consumer, industrial and
capital goods. (a) Stock: share of products covered. (b) Flow: share of products covered.
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Figure 3.10: Continued: (c) Stock: share of imports covered. (d) Flow: share of imports
covered.
Source: panels (a) and (b) calculated using indicator 1. Panels (c) and (d) calculated
using indicator 4. All ﬁgures based on EU deﬁnition that includes Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. The
exact link between the deﬁnition of consumer goods, industrial goods and capital
goods and BEC is available from the authors of this chapter upon request.
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Figure 3.9(a) illustrates that the share of diﬀerentiated products covered by
anti-dumping measures increased between 2004 and 2007. This suggests that
the onset of the increase in product coverage that we noted earlier is mainly
driven by diﬀerentiated products. The coverage share of anti-dumping initia-
tions (depicted in panels (b) and (d)) points at such a conclusion as well. Case
initiations cover a large share of diﬀerentiated products and imports, partic-
ularly after 2004. We ﬁnd that not one, but several industries account for this
peak, including footwear, base metals and machinery and electronic equip-
ment. The share of homogeneous products under anti-dumping protection
also rises, but a few years after 2004.
Another product classiﬁcation for which we verify the link to anti-dumping
policy is the BEC that we aggregate to three broad categories: capital goods,
industrial goods and consumer goods.31 For each group of products, we again
compute indicators 1 and 4 on product and import-value coverage, respec-
tively. The indicators are plotted in Figure 3.10.
Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3.10 indicate that both the share of consumer
goods and the import share of consumer goods subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures increased tremendously shortly after 2004. Although there is a weak
reversal trend during the crisis with anti-dumping initiations focusing on
industrial goods as shown in panels (b) and (d), consumer goods continue to
play a more important role in anti-dumping policy than before. The increased
importance of consumer goods is a general tendency, not driven by a few
peculiar cases. It is also in line with the increase in the number of industries
covered by anti-dumping documented earlier, where the new users of anti-
dumping policy include animal products, food and beverages and vegetables,
ie all ﬁnal consumer goods industries.32 Capital goods played a minor role in
EU anti-dumping policy in the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s.
One potential explanation for a shift in the relative importance of anti-
dumping policy from industrial products to consumer products could be
related to the fragmentation of production across countries. European Union
ﬁrms that oﬀshore the production of intermediates they used to produce
domestically may be less prone to formulating dumping complaints against
imported intermediates when these intermediates are shipped back to the
EU. This is because anti-dumping measures may raise the prices of imported
intermediates and are then likely to have a negative impact on ﬁrms’ sales, as
shown by Konings and Vandenbussche (2009).
31The BEC classiﬁcation is available on the website of the United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion. The link between BEC and the categorisation into consumer, capital and industrial
products is available from the authors upon request.
32A closer look at the data indeed shows that the newly covered products that led to
this jump include farmed salmon, preserved sweet corn and frozen strawberries. Also,
refrigerators, leather footwear, ironing boards and bike saddles are consumer products
on which anti-dumping measures were imposed.
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6 IS THERE EU MEMBER STATE HETEROGENEITY?
This section inspects individual EU member states’ imports more closely in
order to verify the results regarding the coverage of anti-dumping measures
in terms of products, countries, product–country combinations and import
values. For each individual member state in the EU, we calculate product and
country coverage as well as import-value ratios 1–4 using extra-EU27 imports
only. Results could diﬀer across EU member states because the import com-
position of each member state is diﬀerent. This approach gives us a measure
of the exposure to anti-dumping protection for each EU member state. Since
results are quite similar for indicators 2–4, we focus on indicator 1, which
measures product coverage. Results are shown in Table 3.4.
With respect to product coverage of anti-dumping measures, the results for
most individual EU member states are consistent with the results obtained
for the EU as a whole. Product coverage has increased for all countries and
is at a similar level across countries. There are relatively few member states
that are outliers. Luxembourg is an outlier as product coverage is somewhat
smaller than in other member states, which may be due to its small country
size and heavy specialisation in banking and ﬁnance. However, an alterna-
tive explanation could be that Luxembourg imports those products that are
under anti-dumping protection only indirectly via other EU member states,
something that would not show up in our coverage ratios.
The relatively homogeneous response across member states is reassuring.
Not only does it show that aggregate EU trends are not driven by a few outlying
countries, but it also reﬂects a similar pattern across most individual member
states. Moreover, it suggests that trade policy shocks in the EU aﬀect member
states in a similar manner. From the outset of the European integration and
the creation of the eurozone, EU policies have been aimed at convergence
since symmetric shocks in an optimum currency area constitute a necessary
condition for eurozone survival.
7 CONCLUSION
One of the most important conclusions arising from this chapter is that there
is no evidence of a major change in the EU’s trade policy since the outbreak
of the crisis. After failing to ﬁnd evidence that applied MFN tariﬀ rates or
technical trade barriers have increased, we examine EU anti-dumping protec-
tion. The detailed descriptive evidence on EU anti-dumping policy patterns
suggests that there was no major change in the EU’s policy regime through
2008–9. The EU seems to have largely remained on its pre-crisis path of anti-
dumping policy.
Our analysis is based on several newly constructed indicators. In terms of
the ‘value’ indicator, the analysis shows that the value of imports covered by
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Table 3.4: Coverage shares of EU anti-dumping measures in force across EU member
states: share of products covered.
Year
  
Member state ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Finland
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden
UK
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Malta
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Romania
Missing share denoted by blank entries; coverage rate of 0–1.2% denoted by light grey box; coverage
rate of 1.2–1.6% denoted by medium grey box; coverage rate of 1.6–2.0% denoted by dark grey box;
coverage rate > 2.0% denoted by black box. Based on calculation of indicator 1.
EU anti-dumping measures as a share of total import value remained at a rel-
atively modest level during the crisis. Results arising from ‘count’ indicators
point at a turnaround in EU’s trade policy beginning in 2004. The interest-
ing pattern arising from the analysis is that the share of products under EU
anti-dumping protection has been on an upward trend since 2004. At the
same time, we detect a small decrease in the number of countries targeted
by anti-dumping that started after 2004. Product–country coverage under
anti-dumping as a share of total product–country combinations, with positive
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imports, has gone up. This conﬁrms that the increase in product coverage is
the stronger pattern. The higher product coverage does not seem to come
from the EU initiating a higher number of anti-dumping investigations with a
constant number of products. Rather, it reﬂects that the number of products
per investigation has increased.
Another trend is an increasing EU focus on China as a target for anti-
dumping cases, with cases brought against China representing around 40% of
EU anti-dumping initiations between 2004 and 2009. To a lesser extent, other
lower-middle-and-low-income countries have also become more frequent tar-
gets of EU anti-dumping measures, suggesting a clearer ‘north–south’ divide
in trade policy with the EU targeting developing countries more frequently
over time. At the industry level, anti-dumping policy now aﬀects nearly every
industry, so industry coverage has gone up. Again, this is not a crisis phe-
nomenon but a trend that started earlier.
When analysing the relationship between EU anti-dumping policy and
its preferential tariﬀs, evidence suggests that anti-dumping measures are
imposed relatively more often on products and against countries subject
to a preferential import regime. However, when analysing the relationship
between anti-dumping policy and the levels of applied MFN tariﬀs, we do not
ﬁnd any clear pattern of substitution. In addition, we assess the relationship
between product-mix similarity of trading partners and the EU’s use of anti-
dumping policy. We ﬁnd that anti-dumping measures are more often imposed
against country and country–industry combinations that are similar to the EU.
In terms of product characteristics, we observe that, in particular, the shares
ofconsumergoodsanddiﬀerentiatedgoodscoveredbyEUanti-dumpingmea-
sures have increased rapidly after 2004. Although there is a weak reversal
trend during the crisis, consumer goods and diﬀerentiated goods continue to
play an important role in anti-dumping policy. Finally, we also verify that the
results we obtain for the EU as a whole are not driven by any outlying pattern
in the import composition at the level of the individual EU member states. We
ﬁnd that general patterns surrounding anti-dumping policy mostly hold up,
even when results are considered at the level of individual EU member states.
TheEU’santi-dumpingpolicythroughthelate2000sismainlycharacterised
by trends that had already started by 2004. While there are a number of events
that coincide with this date and that could provide an explanation, it is hard
to pinpoint a single one for the change in the trend. One possible explanation
is that a new European Commission entered oﬃce in 2004 with the arrival of
a new trade commissioner.33 Another potential explanation is that, in 2004,
ten new EU member states joined the EU, which may have altered the policy
mix and the decision-making. Alternatively, it could just be that European
ﬁrms, the ultimate initiators of anti-dumping cases, have been subject to new
33The trade commissioner taking oﬃce in 2004 was Peter Mandelson, a UK national.
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globalisation forces that may have aﬀected the demand for protection and
some of its characteristics.
More importantly for this chapter is the fact that we have not found any
evidence that points at a major turnaround in EU trade policy during the crisis.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether governments such as the EU can
continue to resist the use of anti-dumping as a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy
in the aftermath of the crisis. Research by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) suggests
that negative eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises, in terms of unemployment and other
output related variables, tend to linger much longer, which could make trade
protection a tempting option in the coming years.
Hylke Vandenbussche is the Chaire Jacquemin Professor in International
Economics at the Université catholique de Louvain (IRES and CORE), and a
research fellow at CEPR and LICOS–KULeuven.
Christian Viegelahn is a PhD candidate at the Université catholique de Lou-
vain in Belgium, and a researcher at IRES.
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4
Canada: No Place Like Home for
Anti-Dumping
RODNEY D. LUDEMA AND ANNA MARIA MAYDA1
1 INTRODUCTION
Canada is the ancestral home of anti-dumping law. In 1904, it became the ﬁrst
country to adopt an anti-dumping law; other industrialised countries quickly
followed suit. Anti-dumping provisions were later incorporated into the GATT
in 1947. Today, virtually all members of the WTO have anti-dumping laws in
operation.
Despite its prominent (some would say infamous) place in anti-dumping
history, Canada has not been among the major users of anti-dumping or other
TTBs since 1989. At their two-decade peak in 2000, Canadian anti-dumping
duties covered around 2% of all HS-06 products and less than 1% of total
Canadian imports by value. While this is roughly average for industrialised
countries, it lags well behind the USA, the EU and several developing coun-
tries (eg India, China, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). Moreover, anti-dumping
coverage has retreated substantially since the peak, despite the 2008–9 global
economic crisis. Thus, neither the aggregate level nor the aggregate trend of
Canadian TTB usage seems to indicate a strong protectionist tendency. Could
it be that anti-dumping policy is no longer welcome in its home and native
land, or will it return in the wake of the global economic crisis to stand on
guard for Canada once again? In what follows, we explore this question in
greater detail.
The main ﬁnding is that, despite the retreat in TTB stocks in the ﬁrst decade
of the 2000s, there are signs of a rebound. New anti-dumping cases surged
during the crisis, which portends a rise in anti-dumping stocks that could
last for several years. Thus, the connection of anti-dumping protection to the
business cycle remains strong. A second ﬁnding is that there appears to be
1Rodney D. Ludema: Department of Economics, Georgetown University, 37th and O
Streets, NW, Washington, DC USA 20057. Email: ludemar@georgetown.edu. Anna Maria
Mayda: Department of Economics, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, NW, Wash-
ington, DC USA 20057. Email: amm223@georgetown.edu.
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a major structural shift underway in terms of the products and countries on
which TTBs are applied. China and, to a lesser extent, other developing coun-
tries are being targeted with far greater intensity than ever before, and sectors
that compete against Chinese imports are the ones seeking protection. Indeed,
although China accounts for less than 10% of Canada’s imports, seven out of
the ten anti-dumping cases initiated during the 2008–9 crisis were against
China. Moreover, as the typical anti-dumping duty against China remains in
eﬀect for over ten years (nearly twice as long as against the rest of the world),
the anti-dumping surge during the 2008–9 crisis could be unprecedented in
its duration.
1.1 Aggregate Trends in Canadian TTBs
All Canadian TTBs during the sample period 1989–2009 were in the form of
either anti-dumping or CVDs. Only four safeguard cases—three general and
one special case against China—were initiated, but none resulted in duties. Of
the CVDs imposed, almost all were imposed on the same products covered by
existing anti-dumping remedies (anti-dumping duties or price undertakings).
Thus, CVDs add virtually nothing to the TTB coverage ratios. For this reason,
we focus our analysis on anti-dumping remedies.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (and the corresponding Figures 4.1 and 4.2) show
the overall stocks and ﬂows of anti-dumping remedies at the HS-06 level.2
Table 4.1, which shows count measures, is based on Equation (1.1) of Chap-
ter 1. For the stock, the count measure refers to the fraction of all six-digit
HS codes (with positive imports) in which an anti-dumping remedy was in
force in a given year. For the ﬂow, the count measure refers to the fraction of
all six-digit HS codes (with positive imports) in which an anti-dumping case
was initiated in that year. Table 4.2, which shows value measures, is based on
Equation (1.2) of Chapter 1. Value measures provide information on the share
of total imports aﬀected by an anti-dumping remedy (stock) or an initiation
(ﬂow).
Anti-Dumping Initiations
Figure 4.1 shows three distinct spikes in the count measure of anti-dumping
initiations. The ﬁrst was 1992, the second was the period from 1997 to 2001,
2Ideally, we would like to construct these measures at the ten-digit HS level, which is the
level of disaggregation of Canadian data in the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers
Database(Bown2010).TheproblemisthattheHSclassiﬁcationwasmodiﬁedfourseparate
times during this period. The TTB database records only the ten-digit code of the aﬀected
product at the time of the initiation, which means that a TTB in force for multiple years
could get lost if the ten-digit code of the aﬀected product is modiﬁed. The only way to
track TTBs accurately over time is to use a ten-digit concordance for each modiﬁcation.
However, the Canadian Border Services Agency provides a concordance only for the most
recent modiﬁcation (Canadian Border Services Agency 2007).
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Table 4.1: Canada’s count measure by year (anti-dumping only).
Count measure
  
Year Stock Flow
1989 1.11 0.32
1990 1.30 0.12
1991 1.07 0.26
1992 1.22 0.69
1993 1.52 0.22
1994 1.53 0.04
1995 1.52 0.16
1996 1.44 0.12
1997 1.62 0.39
1998 1.53 0.45
1999 1.92 0.39
2000 2.15 0.55
2001 2.11 0.66
2002 2.09 0.25
2003 1.95 0.17
2004 1.72 0.17
2005 1.43 0.04
2006 1.29 0.12
2007 1.18 0.02
2008 1.10 0.22
2009 1.45 0.44
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) and Comtrade.
and the third was 2009.3 When measured in value (Figure 4.2), we see spikes
in 1992, 1997 and 2009. A discrepancy between the two series occurs in 2001,
whereasurgeispresentinthecountmeasurethatdoesnotappearinthevalue
measure, suggesting that cases initiated in 2001 targeted numerous products
with relatively small import value.
Theory suggests that anti-dumping initiations should increase during peri-
ods of weak domestic demand, weak foreign demand and an appreciating real
exchange rate (see Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Hallworth and Piracha (2006)
for further discussion and evidence regarding the macroeconomic determi-
nants of anti-dumping ﬁlings). The reason has to do with the material injury
test that is the main determinant of the success or failure of an anti-dumping
ﬁling. In practice, there are two parts to the test. The ﬁrst requires show-
ing that the domestic industry is suﬀering injury, based on indicators such as
proﬁts, employment, prices, or capacity utilisation. The second requires show-
ing that the injury is due to the dumped imports, which normally requires
establishing that imports have increased. When an industry experiences a
decline in domestic demand, as would normally occur during a recession at
3While our data only go back to 1989, Malhotra and Rus (2009) document earlier surges
in initiations in 1985 and 1987.
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Table 4.2: Canada’s value measure by year (anti-dumping only).
Value measure
  
Year Stock Flow
1989 0.20 0.08
1990 0.27 0.05
1991 0.36 0.12
1992 0.46 0.19
1993 0.48 0.11
1994 0.51 0.04
1995 0.52 0.09
1996 0.53 0.01
1997 0.65 0.22
1998 0.58 0.05
1999 0.62 0.09
2000 0.76 0.10
2001 0.82 0.10
2002 0.78 0.01
2003 0.67 0.02
2004 0.49 0.09
2005 0.39 0.02
2006 0.31 0.04
2007 0.29 0.03
2008 0.28 0.05
2009 0.35 0.12
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) and Comtrade.
home, the industry has an easier time convincing the government (speciﬁcally,
the Canadian International Trade Tribunal) of injury. A decline in demand for
the same product in foreign markets causes ﬁrms in those countries to export
more to Canada, thereby increasing Canadian imports. Similarly, an appre-
ciation in the real exchange rate increases Canadian imports. Thus, reces-
sions both in Canada and abroad and an appreciating Canadian dollar tend
to increase the likelihood of satisfying the material injury test.4 Anticipating
this greater likelihood, industries should increase their initiations.
The response of initiations to the macroeconomic experience of Canada
appears reasonably consistent with the theory. Figure 4.3 shows real GDP
4The other half of an anti-dumping investigation involves estimation of dumping mar-
gins, which is conducted by the Canadian Border Services Agency. Like injury, dumping
margins may also be aﬀected by macroeconomic conditions. For example, foreign ﬁrms
may respond to an appreciation in Canada’s real exchange rate by raising prices charged
to Canadian importers, thus reducing the dumping margin. This suggests a theoretically
ambiguous eﬀect of real exchange rates on initiations. Empirical work by Knetter and Prusa
(2003) shows that currency appreciations signiﬁcantly increase anti-dumping ﬁlings in a
sample consisting of Canada, Australia, the EU and the USA for 1980–1998, suggesting
that the material injury eﬀect is dominant.
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Figure 4.1: Canada’s count measure by year (anti-dumping only).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
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Figure 4.2: Canada’s value measure by year (anti-dumping only).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
growth, unemployment, the real exchange rate (US dollars per Canadian dol-
lar, adjusted for inﬂation), and the current account. Canada experienced deep
recessions in 1991 and 2009 in parallel with the global recessions of those
time periods. These episodes were accompanied by current account deﬁcits
and relatively high real exchange rates. All of these factors predict a surge in
anti-dumping initiations.
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Figure 4.3: Canada’s macroeconomic indicators, 1989–2009: (a) real GDP growth rate
and unemployment rate; (b) real exchange rate and current account.
Source: authors’ calculations using World Development Indicators (2010).
The macroeconomic basis for initiations during the 1997–2001 period is
less obvious. Neither the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 nor the US recession of
2001 caused major disruptions in Canadian GDP growth or unemployment.
Furthermore, the real exchange rate was at a historic low. The only indica-
tion of impact of the foreign shocks on Canada was a short-lived current
account deﬁcit corresponding to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. It could be that
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the foreign shocks alone were suﬃcient to drive the surge in initiations that
occurred. However, as a more disaggregated analysis will reveal in subsequent
sections, the reality is more complex. Part of the rise in initiations is due to
sectors renewing protection obtained in the earlier surge. Furthermore, while
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis did coincide with a strong shift in anti-dumping
actions towards Asian countries, this shift appears to have had long-lasting
eﬀects.
Anti-Dumping Stocks
Turning to the stock measures, the average stock over the sample period by
the count measure is 1.5%, with a maximum of 2.1% in 2000 and a minimum
of 1.1% in 1991. The average stock by value is 0.5%, with a maximum of 0.78%
in 2001 and a minimum of 0.2% in 1989. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also show that
stocks display a very clear hump-shaped pattern with a peak between 2000
(count) and 2001 (value). Compared with this peak, the increases in stocks
associated with the recessions were quite minor. Furthermore, the stock of
TTBs rose steadily during the 1990s and fell rather dramatically during the
2000s. If anything, these trends in TTB stocks appear to be procyclical. The
correlation between the anti-dumping stock count measure and Canadian GDP
growth is 0.5 (while the correlation with real exchange rate is −0.86).5
At ﬁrst glance, the ﬁnding that TTB stocks are procyclical seems puzzling.
After all, why would a system that is arguably designed to provide protec-
tion to industries under stress give more protection in good times? It is also
somewhat troubling, because it would imply that TTB stocks are likely to con-
tinue to rise as Canada emerges from the aftermath of the global recession of
2008–9.
One explanation for the procyclical pattern in TTB stocks has to do with
the persistence of anti-dumping remedies. Once in eﬀect, an anti-dumping
remedy typically remains in place for ﬁve or more years, which means that
a surge in initiations during a recession will lead to an accumulation of anti-
dumping stocks lasting well into the recovery. That is, it could be that the
bulge in anti-dumping stocks in the late 1990s is simply the lagged result of
the recession-driven ﬂurry of initiations in the early 1990s. If this is correct,
then the future will indeed feature more protection, as the 2009 surge in
initiations works its way through.
A more optimistic possibility is that the Canadian government has changed
its policy. Speciﬁcally, it could be that the decline in TTB stocks that began in
2001 is the result of a permanent change in Canadian government’s likelihood
of awarding or revoking anti-dumping remedies.
Can we detect whether the Canadian government has changed its anti-
dumping policy? One way to get at this question is to assume that it has
5The correlation with GDP growth is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the
correlation with real exchange rate is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Figure 4.4: Canada’s predicted versus actual stock (count) measure (anti-dumping
only).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
not—that is, assume constant award and revoke rates—and ask to what extent
initiations alone can explain the pattern of anti-dumping stocks. If initiations
do a poor job of explaining anti-dumping stocks, we would take this as an
indication that award and revoke rates are changing over time. This would
then warrant further investigation into the source of such changes.
By deﬁnition, the stock of anti-dumping remedies is equal to the sum of all
past successful initiations (ie initiations that result in a remedy) minus reme-
dies revoked. There are three key rates that determine the motion of the stock:
the rate at which initiations receive preliminary anti-dumping remedies, the
rate at which preliminary remedies are converted into ﬁnal remedies, and the
rate at which ﬁnal remedies are revoked. Assuming these rates are constant,
we can estimate a simpliﬁed version of this model as follows:
St = α + β1Ft + β2Ft−1 + β3St−2 + εt,
where St and Ft are our stock and ﬂow measures in year t, respectively. The
coeﬃcient β1 is the rate at which initiations in year t are awarded duties in
year t. The coeﬃcient β2 is the rate at which initiations in year t − 1 are
awarded duties in year t, either because of delayed preliminary duties or ﬁnal
duties being imposed. The coeﬃcient β3 measures the rate of carry-over from
earlier stocks.
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Figure 4.5: Canada’s count and value (stock) measures by HS section (anti-dumping
only).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
Figure 4.4 shows that the estimated model is reasonably good at predict-
ing the actual stocks, based on past ﬂow and stock data. In fact, the model
explains 70% of the variation in anti-dumping stocks. The estimated coeﬃ-
cients are also plausible: β1 = 0.33, β2 = 0.8 and β3 = 0.56. Thus, we expect
that the upswing in anti-dumping stocks in 2009 will continue for several
more years.
On the other hand, the model does have a tendency to under-predict the
stocks during the late 1990s and to over-predict them after 2000. This is
indicative of either the success rates being greater, or the revoke rates being
smaller, in the 1990s than in the 2000s. Indeed, the raw success rate of initi-
ations in the data (percentage of initiations that result in ﬁnal anti-dumping
remedies) is 70% in the 1990s and 53% in the 2000s. This may reﬂect a change
in policy or a change in the quality of cases. We discuss several possibilities
in later sections.
1.2 Canadian TTBs by Industry
In this section we break down the count and value measures (both stock and
ﬂow) according to product category. We use the 21 sections of the Harmonized
System as our product categories. Figure 4.5 shows the shares of HS-06 codes
within each section that have been aﬀected by an anti-dumping remedy (stock)
at any time during the 1989–2009 period, both in count and in value terms.
Of the 21 sections, 14 have experienced at least one anti-dumping remedy
during the sample period.
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Canadian anti-dumping activity tends to be concentrated in a few product
categories. The most active is footwear and headgear. Some 33% of products
and 20% of the value of imports in this category have been subject to an
anti-dumping remedy. The second most active by count is base metals, which
includes steel. About 15% of products and 5% of the value of imports in this
category have been subject to an anti-dumping remedy. Close behind is pre-
pared foodstuﬀs, beverages, spirits and tobacco, with 14% (count) and 10%
(value), and vegetable products, with 5% (count) and 8% (value). It is worth
noting that, except for steel, this list of most active users of anti-dumping is
quite diﬀerent from the rest of the world. Worldwide, the chemical industry
is the most active, followed by steel, machinery and textiles (Stevenson 2007).
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show stocks and ﬂows of anti-dumping remedies over
time across industries. Figure 4.6 shows the count measure, while Figure 4.7
shows the value measure. A few conclusions are evident immediately. First,
the number of sectors active in seeking anti-dumping remedies seems to have
declined with each wave of anti-dumping initiations. All sectors were active
in seeking anti-dumping protection during the recession of the 1990s. The
majority of sectors initiated anti-dumping investigations during 1997 and
2001, though fewer than in the previous wave. Only ﬁve sectors initiated
anti-dumping investigations in 2009: plastics, footwear, steel, machinery and
miscellaneous manufactures. For two of these (machinery and miscellaneous
manufactures), only a tiny fraction of imports by value were targeted, as can
be seen in Figure 4.7. Thus, there is a clear narrowing of the product scope of
Canadian anti-dumping investigations.
Second, many of the anti-dumping initiations in the second and third waves
are immediately preceded by declines in the anti-dumping stock, suggest-
ing that industries sought to replace recently revoked protection. Examples
include base metals, vegetable products and wood products in 1998 and
footwear, plastics and machinery in 2009.
Finally, the two most active sectors, footwear and base metals, exhibit high
stocks of anti-dumping protection throughout the period.
Footwear
Canada’s footwear industry has been in steady decline since the 1950s. In
1950 the industry employed over 20,000 workers. By 1985 this was down
to 14,000, and in 2008 there were only 2,700 employees (Canadian Industry
Statistics 2010). Most footwear produced in Canada is in the form of winter
boots.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that the footwear industry petitioned for the ini-
tiation of anti-dumping cases in 1989, 1992, 2000–2002 and 2009, resulting
in substantial count rates of anti-dumping protection for all years after 1989,
except 2008. For some reason, the footwear industry allowed its protection
to lapse in 2008 but quickly reapplied and was awarded a preliminary duty in
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Figure 4.6: Canada’s count measure (stock and ﬂow) by HS section and by year
(anti-dumping only).
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Figure 4.6: Continued.
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Figure 4.6: Continued.
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Figure 4.6: Continued.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
2009. The 2008 drop in anti-dumping stock on footwear helps to explain the
dip in overall anti-dumping stock that occurred that year.
Steel
The Canadian steel industry is a frequent user of anti-dumping. Figure 4.6
illustrates that in only 3 of the past 20 years has the industry not initiated an
anti-dumping case. The most active periods of anti-dumping initiation were
1992 and 1998–2001. These time periods correspond to historic low points
in world steel prices. Low world steel prices make it easier for the industry to
qualify for anti-dumping protection, both because positive dumping margins,
based on the gap between average cost and price, and material injury, based
on the ‘price suppression’ argument, become easier to establish. It should
also be noted that 2001 saw the initiation of a major steel safeguard case in
the USA. While Canadian exports were exempt from the safeguard duties by
virtue of the NAFTA, it may be that ﬁrms sought to protect themselves from
the trade deﬂection that protection of the US steel industry would cause (see
Bown and Crowley (2007) for discussion and evidence on trade deﬂection).
During the 2009 recession, Canadian anti-dumping initiations on steel rose
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Figure 4.7: Canada’s value measure (stock and ﬂow) by HS section and by year
(anti-dumping only).
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Figure 4.7: Continued.
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Figure 4.7: Continued.
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Figure 4.7: Continued.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010)
and Comtrade.
again, despite the fact that world steel prices had rebounded strongly from
the 2001 lows and did not fall appreciably in the downturn.
The stock of anti-dumping remedies in the steel sector has been mostly
rising throughout the sample period. It reached a peak in 2005 according
to the count measure, though the 2005 peak was slightly lower than 2001 in
value terms. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of anti-dumping remedies in the
steel sector runs counter to the pattern observed in the aggregate. Whereas
aggregate TTBs dropped oﬀ sharply after 2001, steel protection has remained
high.
1.3 Uruguay Round Tariﬀ Cuts
The sectoral trends in Canadian anti-dumping must be seen in light of other
changes taking place in the structure of Canadian trade policy at the same
time. For example, it is worth noting that the rise of anti-dumping stocks in
the late 1990s coincides with the implementation of the tariﬀ cuts negotiated
in the Uruguay Round.
The connection between tariﬀ cuts and the growth of anti-dumping is the-
oretically ambiguous. On the one hand, sectors that are politically powerful
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Figure 4.8: Canada’s tariﬀ cuts versus growth in anti-dumping stocks by sector,
1989–2009.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010),
Comtrade and TRAINS.
to prevent tariﬀ reductions may also be able to expand, or prevent reductions
in, anti-dumping protection. This suggests a negative relationship between
tariﬀ cuts and anti-dumping growth. On the other hand, it may be that tariﬀ
cuts themselves cause producers to seek anti-dumping remedies as a replace-
ment, suggesting a positive relationship between tariﬀ cuts and anti-dumping
growth.
Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between Uruguay Round tariﬀ cuts and
changesinaverageannualanti-dumpingstocks(inlogs)beforeandafter1995,
for each sector with positive anti-dumping activity. The change in stock is
measured by count; however, the value measure produces a qualitatively sim-
ilar picture. The tariﬀ cuts are measured as the trade-weighted average of
absolute cuts of MFN applied tariﬀs between 1993 and 2000, and the trade
weights are from 1993. There is a negative correlation of −0.54 between the
two measures that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that while there
may be cases in which anti-dumping remedies replace MFN tariﬀs, the tar-
iﬀ replacement eﬀect is swamped by the ability of certain sectors to sustain
both tariﬀ and anti-dumping protection. The machinery sector was liberalised
through both tariﬀ cuts and a retreat of anti-dumping stocks. Meanwhile,
food and beverages, footwear, arms, stone and plaster were spared signiﬁ-
cant tariﬀ cuts and were increasingly protected by anti-dumping duties. That
the sectors with the greatest anti-dumping growth tend to be those with the
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of Canadian anti-dumping remedies by target exporter for
1989–2009 (percentage of product–target-country–year combinations).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
smallest Uruguay Round tariﬀ cuts points to a growing divergence in total
import protection between protected and liberalising sectors.
1.4 Targets of Canadian TTBs
Which exporting countries have been most targeted by Canadian anti-dump-
ing remedies? Here we measure the distribution of anti-dumping remedies
across exporting countries by counting the number of products from each
exporting country that are subject to a Canadian anti-dumping remedy in each
year. Summing over all years and dividing by the total number of product–
year–target-country combinations produces an overall share of Canadian anti-
dumping remedies by country. It turns out that the most frequently targeted
country is the USA with 10% of the total, followed by China (8%), Brazil (7%),
Germany (6%) and Taiwan (5%). Figure 4.9 illustrates the worldwide distri-
bution of targets by grouping countries into regions. Europe and Asia are
the most frequently targeted regions. Moreover, anti-dumping protection is
roughly evenly distributed between developing and developed regions.
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Moving Targets
Figure 4.10 shows the evolution of Canadian anti-dumping targeting by region
over time. Here there are several striking patterns. First, anti-dumping stocks
against the USA, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand peaked in the
mid-1990s and continued to fall through 2009. Second, anti-dumping protec-
tion against all other regions surged in 2001. For most regions, this surge
was short-lived and protection returned to levels comparable with the early
1990s. For China and South Africa, however, this reversal did not occur, and
for Asian less developed countries the reversal was only partial.6 Finally, the
2009 surge in anti-dumping stocks was directed entirely at China and less
developed countries in Asia.
Figure 4.11 documents more clearly the shift in targeting of anti-dumping
protection from developed to developing countries and from west to east.
This ﬁgure compares the number of product-years of protection across the
two decades of the sample for all major target countries (ie target countries
with more than 100 total product years of protection). Those countries above
the 45-degree line are the ones against which anti-dumping protection has
increased in frequency, while those below the line experienced a decrease. The
vast majority of countries above the line are developing countries (indicated
with a black diamond), while only two developing countries are below, though
one of those two (Brazil) is virtually unchanged. Looking at the very largest
targets, there is a major shift away from the USA and towards China.
Figure 4.12 shows the degree to which Canadian anti-dumping remedies are
concentrated across diﬀerent target exporters. The measure of concentration
used is a Herﬁndahl index: the sum of squared shares of anti-dumping reme-
dies by country. The ﬁgure shows that, from 1989 to 2003, Canada became
steadily more diversiﬁed in its use of anti-dumping remedies, while this trend
is sharply reversed from 2003 onwards. Although the total stock of anti-
dumping remedies has not dramatically risen during the crisis, this suggests
the imposed remedies are targeting an increasingly small group of (developing
country) exporters. Combined with our earlier ﬁndings of the narrowing of the
product scope of anti-dumping initiations and the coincidence between small
tariﬀ cuts and large anti-dumping increases across sectors, these ﬁndings
point to a much more focused trade policy for Canada. Canada has increas-
ingly turned away from protecting its manufacturing sector from imports
from the USA and Europe. Instead, it is protecting itself from developing Asia
and especially in those sectors where it is losing comparative advantage to
China.
6‘Less developed countries’ refers to non-high-income countries according to the World
Bank deﬁnition.
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of Canadian anti-dumping remedies by target exporter for the
period 1989–2009 (number of product–target-country combinations).
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Figure 4.10: Continued.
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Figure 4.10: Continued.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
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Figure 4.11: The shift in Canadian targets of anti-dumping remedies.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
Developing countries are shown in black while developed countries are shown in grey.
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Figure 4.12: Concentration of Canadian anti-dumping remedies across exporters.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
The NAFTA Eﬀect
While USA was the biggest target of Canadian anti-dumping remedies, this
should come as no surprise considering that USA accounts for the majority
of Canadian imports. In 2007, for example, 55% of Canadian imports were
from the USA, China was second with 9%, Germany was third with 3%, while
Brazil and Taiwan accounted for less than 1% each.7 Seen in this context, anti-
dumping action against USA is in fact disproportionately low.
7Statistics Canada.
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Bown (2007) argues that this feature of Canadian TTBs serves to reinforce
the discrimination inherent in Canada’s external trade policy, because of the
tariﬀ preferences already granted to the USA and Mexico through NAFTA.
Whether this apparent NAFTA bias in Canadian anti-dumping is in fact a result
of NAFTA or some other factor is unknown.
There are not suﬃcient data on Canada’s use of anti-dumping towards the
USA prior to the Canada–USA trade agreement in 1987, but it is likely that
it was never commensurate with USA–Canada trade volumes. One possible
explanation for this is the fear of retaliation. Being highly dependent on trade
with the USA, Canada may restrain its anti-dumping against the US industries
to avoid US retaliatory anti-dumping against Canadian exports. Blonigen and
Bown (2003) provide empirical support for this mechanism.
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) were among the ﬁrst to express concern
about the selective use of anti-dumping as a means of reinforcing discrimi-
nation in free trade agreements (FTAs). Their hypothesis is conﬁrmed by the
empirical work of Prusa and Teh (2010). They estimate that anti-dumping pro-
visions in PTAs decrease initiations of anti-dumping cases between partners
by 33–55%, while increasing initiations of anti-dumping cases against non-PTA
members by 10–30%.
In addition to NAFTA, which took eﬀect in 1994, Canada entered into FTAs
with Chile and Israel in 1997, Costa Rica in 2002, and several more countries
in 2007–9 (European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Peru, Colombia, Jordan
and Panama).
1.5 Duration of Canadian Anti-Dumping Remedies
Anti-dumping remedies generally do not last forever. Although there are
extreme cases, such as whole potatoes from the USA, which have faced a
32% anti-dumping duty for the past 25 years, the average duration of Cana-
dian anti-dumping is 7.5 years. The median duration is just under 6 years.
These duration ﬁgures are measured from the initiation date, which typically
precedes the imposition of ﬁnal duties by several months. Looking at ﬁnal
duties only, the median duration is 5 years. This is consistent with the WTO’s
mandatory ‘sunset’ rule, which speciﬁes that ﬁnal duties should last no more
than 5 years, unless an investigation prior to that date establishes that revo-
cation would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and
injury. An anti-dumping remedy may also be reviewed before or after the 5-
year review at the request of an ‘interested party’ (eg an exporter), though the
information an interested party must submit in support of such a review is
considerable and costly.
Figure 4.13 shows the duration of anti-dumping remedies for cases initiated
during three time periods (1989–1995, 1996–2001 and 2002–9) encompassing
the three waves of initiations described in Section 1.1. The ﬁgure shows the
percentage of cases on which anti-dumping remedies remained in eﬀect after
so many months from the date the case was initiated.
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Figure 4.13: Duration of Canadian anti-dumping remedies in three waves (in months).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
In each of the three periods, there is a clear drop between ﬁve and six
years. Interestingly, however, the decline is more gradual for cases initiated
during 1989–1995. In particular, during this period there were a number of
cases being revoked before the mandatory sunset review, whereas in the sec-
ond and third periods almost all duties survived at least ﬁve years. While it
is tempting to attribute this to the WTO sunset rule, which went into eﬀect
in 1995, Canada had already adopted a ﬁve-year sunset rule in 1984. It is
possible that this is a spillover eﬀect from the USA, which had no sunset pro-
vision prior to 1995. Before 1995, exporters subject to US duties requested
reviews idiosyncratically. If these same exporters were also subject to Cana-
dian duties, they may have chosen to synchronise their review requests to
economise on legal costs. Alternatively, the gradualism of the 1989–1995
period may just be a function of the products (a wide variety) and countries
(predominantly Western-developed countries) that were targeted.
The more striking aspect of Figure 4.13 is that the three periods feature
verydiﬀerentsurvivalratesbeyondtheﬁve-yearreview.Comparedwith1989–
1995, initiations during 1996–2001 had fewer cases lasting beyond the review,
whereas cases initiated after 2002 had more. The relatively short duration of
1996–2001 cases, combined with the relatively low success rate of cases ini-
tiated after 2000, probably accounts for the over-prediction of anti-dumping
stocks emerging from our stock model of Section 1.1.
Figure 4.14 shows the duration of anti-dumping remedies from a target-
country perspective. There is very little diﬀerence in patterns between devel-
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Figure 4.14: Duration of Canadian anti-dumping remedies by target (in months).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
oped and other developing countries, other than the tendency for revocation
prior to the ﬁve-year review for developed countries. Measures imposed on
China, on the other hand, displays consistently greater duration. This is not
simply the result of China emerging as the prominent target in the 2000s.
Anti-dumping remedies against China lasted longer than average in all three
waves.8
The general picture that emerges from both the target and duration analy-
ses is that Canadian import-competing industries regard China as their num-
ber one threat. The Canadian government has responded by implementing
more anti-dumping duties against China and keeping them in force for longer.
1.6 Canada in the WTO
Although macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, TTB persistence and shifting compar-
ative advantage go a long way towards explaining the behaviour of Canadian
TTBs, the picture would not be complete without factoring in Canada’s WTO
membership. We have already discussed the eﬀects of the tariﬀ cuts and sun-
set provision introduced following the Uruguay Round. However, Canada con-
tinues to be involved in ongoing multilateral negotiations over anti-dumping
rules and has been aﬀected by WTO dispute settlement rulings.
8It is also not the case that China alone drives the higher duration seen in 2002–9 cases;
Figure 4.13 changes very little when China is removed.
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The Doha Round negotiations commenced in 2001 with reform of the
anti-dumping agreement on the agenda. While calls for reform had long
been resisted by the traditional users of anti-dumping, the rapid spread
of anti-dumping use by non-traditional users after 1995 led to widespread
support for including anti-dumping on the Doha agenda (though the USA
remained reluctant). While not a member of the reform-minded ‘Friends of
Anti-Dumping’ group, Canada became actively involved in the negotiations,
accounting for nearly a third of the speciﬁc reform proposals tendered in
2002 and 2003 (Finger and Zlate 2005).9 In half of its proposals, Canada has
been joined by the Friends of Anti-Dumping group. The most notable recom-
mendations among Canada’s proposals are to ‘avoid the unwarranted perma-
nence of trade restrictions under the disguise of anti-dumping duties’ and to
‘take the broader public interest into account’ when determining remedies. In
2005, it also proposed extensive revisions to the process of sunset reviews
(WTO Negotiating Group on Rules 2005). While it is diﬃcult to prove, it seems
plausible that Canadian anti-dumping authorities chose to exercise a degree
of self-restraint during the time Canada was making these proposals at the
WTO. This may help to explain the high rate of revocations and the low rate
of new duties in this period.
Further evidence of Canada’s willingness to restrain its behaviour in light
of the WTO is found in the 2005 decision by the Canadian Border Services
Agency (CBSA) to discontinue the practice of ‘zeroing’ in the determination
of dumping margins.
A dumping margin is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the ‘fair’ or ‘nor-
mal’ value of a product and the actual price charged by a foreign ﬁrm in
the domestic market of the complaining industry. If prices vary over time or
across diﬀerent varieties of the product, then the dumping margins may vary
as well and, in particular, they may be positive in some cases and negative
in others. To establish a single dumping margin for the purposes of apply-
ing anti-dumping remedy, it is common practice to take the average of the
margins over varieties and time periods. Zeroing is the practice of ﬁrst con-
verting all of the negative dumping margins to zero before taking the average.
Its eﬀect is to inﬂate the average dumping margin, thus providing higher pro-
tection to the complaining industry.
Zeroing is standard practice in the USA, but it has been challenged in sev-
eral disputes in the WTO. The WTO Appellate Body has ruled that zeroing is
contrary to member countries’ commitments under the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement, Article 2.4.2, on the grounds that it fails to take into account ‘all
comparable export transactions’ in the calculation of dumping margins. It is
likely that the CBSA discontinued zeroing to avoid being targeted in future
9The Friends of Anti-Dumping group consists of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand
and Turkey.
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disputes. It is interesting to note that the decision was announced one month
after Canada joined the EU in sanctioning the USA over another WTO-illegal
practice, known as the ‘Byrd Amendment’.
The proximate eﬀect of the CBSA rule change was the termination of an
anti-dumping case on laminate ﬂooring from Austria, Belgium, Germany and
Poland. In its reasons for termination, the CBSA concluded that margins of
dumping for these countries were insigniﬁcant. Two other countries, China
and France, were ultimately hit with duties, and thus zeroing decision had
no direct aﬀect on our count measure of anti-dumping stocks. However, it
did aﬀect the value measure, reducing it by about 5% on average from 2005
onwards.
The long-term impact is more diﬃcult to discern. While no further cases
since 2005 have been terminated for insigniﬁcant dumping margins, the
change could have deterred cases with small margins from being initiated.
It also may have reduced dumping margins, and thus the anti-dumping duty
rates, imposed in most cases.
1.7 Conclusions
Despite the retreat in Canadian TTB stocks in the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s,
there are signs of a rebound. New anti-dumping cases have surged during the
2008–9 crisis, which portends a rise in anti-dumping stocks that could last for
several years. There is also evidence of a major structural shift underway in
terms of the products and countries upon which Canadian TTBs are applied.
The product scope of anti-dumping protection has narrowed, and increases
in anti-dumping protection have coincided with relatively small reductions
of MFN tariﬀs. China and, to a lesser extent, other developing countries are
being targeted with far greater intensity by 2009 than they were at earlier
points in the sample. The duration of Canadian anti-dumping remedies fell
during the ﬁrst half of the 2000s though this seems to have been reversed
in the later half of the decade. While Canada has shown some willingness to
reign in its anti-dumping policy during the Doha negotiations, whether this is
temporary or permanent is diﬃcult to discern. Its intense targeting of China
and its lengthening of anti-dumping duty duration since 2002 raises doubts
about its permanence.
Rodney D. Ludema is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service and the Department of Economics at Georgetown University.
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Foreign Service and the Department of Economics at Georgetown University,
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South Korea: Temporary Trade Barriers
Before and During the Crisis
MOONSUNG KANG AND SOONCHAN PARK1
1 INTRODUCTION
International trade has severely declined alongside the global economic and
ﬁnancial crisis that originated in the USA in 2008. As described by the OECD
(2010) and WTO (2010), world merchandise exports fell by 12% in 2009, and
world GDP fell by 2.5%. Korea was no exception to this trend, exhibiting a
13.9% reduction in its exports, and a 25.8% reduction in its imports in 2009.2
The Korean version of the trade collapse appears to be based in part on its pro-
found dependence on exports to the markets of the USA and Europe.3 Having
adopted export promotion as part of its industrialisation strategy beginning
in the 1960s, Korea has principally exported its commodities to the USA and
Europe. Hence, the economic and ﬁnancial crisis in the USA and Europe signif-
icantly reduced the demand for Korean products, thereby negatively aﬀecting
Korea’s export performance. As shown in Figure 5.1, the real GDP growth rate
in the fourth quarter of 2008 plummeted to −4.5%, the largest drop since the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–8, as both exports and domestic sales shrank
dramatically.
According to the OECD (2010), the global trade collapse occurring along-
side the global economic and ﬁnancial crisis can be explained by three main
1Moonsung Kang: Division of International Studies, Korea University, 5–1 Anam-dong,
Sungbuk-gu, Seoul, 136–701, Republic of Korea. Email: mkang@korea.ac.kr. Soonchan
Park: Department of International Trade and Commerce, Kongju National University, 182
Shinkwan-Dong, Kongju, Chungnam, Republic of Korea. Email: spark@kongju.ac.kr.
2In this chapter, ‘Korea’ refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
3In particular, the US share of Korea’s total exports was over 40% during the 1970s and
it decreased in the 1990s. In 2009, the shares of USA and Europe were 10.4% and 15.4%,
respectively, even though China was the top destination for Korea’s exports. Additionally,
global and regional production networks in East Asia have been regarded as additional
channels of the trade collapse in Korea. For more information, see OECD (2010).
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Figure 5.1: Korea’s macroeconomic indicators, 2000–2010 (quarterly).
Source: Bank of Korea (2010).
factors: a collapse in demand, the drying up of short-term trade ﬁnance, and
structural factors associated with the global production network. The OECD
also points out that there has been no evidence thus far to suggest that pro-
tectionism has been a major factor underlying the trade collapse. However,
this does not imply that the risk of protectionism is of little concern.
Having established this background, this chapter attempts to elucidate the
manner through which the global economic and ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected eco-
nomic and political determinants of Korea’s TTBs such as anti-dumping, coun-
tervailing measures, and safeguards. It also explores a Korea-speciﬁc institu-
tional framework for the implementation of TTBs, including their coverage
of imports, relevant policies towards regional trade agreement partners, and
use of discretionary practices.
The Korea Trade Commission (KTC) is a quasi-judicial agency responsible
for trade remedy measures against unfair trade practices, including dumping,
illegally subsidised imports and a sudden increase in imports.4 The KTC’s
most frequently implemented TTB is anti-dumping measures, as opposed to
CVDs or safeguards. As shown in Table 5.1, the KTC has imposed safeguards
4Temporary trade barriers or trade remedy measures are used interchangeably in this
chapter. Unlike most countries in the world, Korea includes any piracy of intellectual prop-
erty rights in its trade remedy measures as well. However, this chapter focuses primarily
on anti-dumping measures.
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Table 5.1: Korea’s anti-dumping and safeguard initiations and outcomes: 1986–2010
(number of cases).
Terminated
Preliminary Final No No or
Initiations measures measures dumping injury withdrawn Missing
(a) Anti-dumping
1986 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1990 5 0 0 3 3 0 0
1991 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
1992 5 6 0 0 0 3 0
1993 6 2 4 0 0 0 0
1994 8 8 3 5 5 0 0
1995 1 4 0 4 4 1 0
1996 12 9 9 0 0 0 0
1997 15 6 4 1 1 5 0
1998 3 5 8 0 0 0 0
1999 7 1 2 0 0 3 0
2000 2 4 3 1 1 1 0
2001 4 1 0 0 0 5 0
2002 10 1 1 1 1 0 0
2003 18 3 4 1 1 4 0
2004 3 14 10 0 0 8 0
2005 4 2 3 0 0 0 0
2006 7 7 8 0 0 0 0
2007 15 5 0 0 3 3 0
2008 5 2 12 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 4 2 2 0 0
2010 3 1 1 0 1 0 1
Total 136 81 78 16 21 34 3
relatively less frequently and has never imposed CVDs. As the number of
countervailing measures and safeguards is negligible in terms of Korea’s TTB
experience, this chapter limits the scope of its analysis and discussion to anti-
dumping.
2 KOREA’S UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALISATION AND
ANTI-DUMPING INSTITUTIONS
2.1 Industrialisation Strategy and Unilateral Trade Liberalisation in Korea
Historically, Korea has used active industrial policy to develop its own strate-
gic industries, and its trade policy was designed to fulﬁll this objective.
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Table 5.1: Continued.
Terminated
Final No or
Initiations measures injury withdrawn
(b) Safeguards
1986 0 0 0 0
1987 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0
1995 1 0 0 0
1996 2 0 0 1
1997 0 1 0 1
1998 0 0 0 0
1999 1 0 0 0
2000 0 1 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0
Total 4 2 0 2
The Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) identiﬁed 144 cases, but we excluded 3 cases for
having neither information nor documentation from the KTC, and 5 cases for having no information
on the date of investigation. Information on preliminary and ﬁnal decisions for some of the anti-
dumping initiations in 2010 is still not available.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) and KTC (2010).
Since the 1960s, Korea has transformed from an agrarian economy with very
low productivity into one of the world’s most rapidly growing industrialised
economies.5 While earning more foreign currency was crucial to foreign pay-
5During the period between the liberation from the Japanese colonial regime in 1910–45
and the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Korean economy, one of the poorest in the
world, experienced extreme devastation, severe dislocation and poverty. Additionally, the
Korean War destroyed roughly 42–44% of the production facilities in South Korea, but the
Korean population has rapidly expanded since the Korean War. For more information, see
Amsden (1989, pp 27–54).
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ments in the 1960s, owing to a gradual decrease in US aid, the size and pur-
chasing power of Korea’s domestic market proved insuﬃcient for sustainable
growth.6 In 1962, in the middle of the ﬁrst Five-Year Economic Development
Plan in 1962–66, the Park Administration abandoned its import substitution
strategy and shifted its policy focus to an export-orientated growth strategy,
even though some features of its import substitution strategy, ie setting high
trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers, had been in force for
a very long time. Korea’s export promotion strategy was designed to use its
comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods for exports
such as textiles, apparel, clothing and footwear.
Korea initiated a variety of incentive programs for export promotion in the
mid-1960s, which it maintained until the early 1980s. Among these programs
were three key policies for export promotion: automatic export ﬁnancing and
tax breaks, tariﬀ deductions on inputs for export manufacturing, and target-
ing the exchange rate at a stable level.7
In the 1970s, the Korean economy climbed the economic development lad-
der by promoting the chemical and heavy industries. After announcing the
Heavy and Chemicals Industry (HCI) Development Plan, the Korean govern-
ment designated speciﬁc industries and companies that would receive gov-
ernment ﬁnancial support, and it directed commercial banks to ﬁnancially
support selected companies. During the early period of the HCI, there was a
great deal of strong criticism from economists and the public, who believed
that the development of the HCI would prove too diﬃcult and too expensive.
However, the Korean government strongly pushed its strategy and based it on
security issues, the Japanese experience and theories of development, protec-
tionism in developed countries, and current account deﬁcits.8
6The annual ﬂow of US aid accumulated to $2,537 million during 1945–61 before
decreasing to $132 million in 1965.
7In automatic export ﬁnancing and tax breaks, the government automatically granted
bank loans at a very low interest rate when exporters submitted their export letter of credit.
The preferential interest rate for exporters was roughly 20%, which is much lower than the
market interest rate of the 1960s. The total amount of the interest support increased dra-
matically and reached a level of 139.5 billion Korean won ($288.2 million) in 1978. The
Korean government deducted tariﬀs on raw material imports for export promotion and
exempted tariﬀs on capital equipment for export production. The tariﬀ deduction contin-
ued to be applied to most products of heavy industries throughout the 1970s, with the
deducted amount recorded at over 20% of the tariﬀ revenue. The exchange-rate system was
also changed from the multiple-rate system to the unitary ﬂoating exchange-rate system.
As discussed above, it was designed to ameliorate the complexity and uncertainty of the
multiple-rate system and to enhance policy credibility in international ﬁnancial markets.
8First, security issues were the most prominent reason for the sudden shift in Korea’s
industrial strategy. In 1969, US President Richard Nixon formulated the Nixon Doctrine,
also known as the Guam Doctrine, stating that the USA henceforth expected its allies to
take care of their own military defence, but that the USA would aid in defence as requested.
In line with this doctrine but facing the militant army of North Korea, the US government
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Figure 5.2: Korea’s simple average tariﬀ rates: manufactured goods.
Source: UNCTAD. All manufactured goods include 5, 6, 7, 8, 27 and 28 of Standard
International Trade Classiﬁcation (revision 3).
The Korean government began to liberalise its economy in the 1980s by
adopting a more market-orientated system. In particular, Korea gradually
opened its domestic markets to selective agricultural products, expecting
that liberalisation would enhance the global competitiveness and economic
eﬃciency of its domestic ﬁrms. As a component of its liberalisation policy,
the Korean government altered its export support system from direct export
subsidisation to indirect export incentive programs. While the export support
system was predicated mainly on policy loan and tax beneﬁt programs estab-
lished in the 1970s, the Korean government designed a more advanced export
support system that relied on duty drawbacks and export insurance.
attempted to reduce its troops in South Korea by 30%. Korea’s sudden shift to HCI devel-
opment from light manufacturing was motivated by the urgent need to improve national
defence capabilities and to build up Korea’s own defence industry. Second, the Korean gov-
ernment was motivated by the successful Japanese development experience. As such, the
Korean government shifted its development strategy and upgraded its industrial structure
ahead of newly emerging competitors such as Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Third,
some developed economies—such as the USA and Europe, where the textile and apparel
industries were politically sensitive—raised their trade barriers in the 1970s, speciﬁcally
targeting labour-intensive goods from developing countries. The Korean government had
a vital need to identify new export industries. Finally, in the 1960s, textile machinery was
one of the top goods imported by Korea, because the textile industry was a key export
industry but Korea’s own machinery industry was not advanced. The Korean economy
sought to develop its machinery industry in order to help solve its continued current
account deﬁcits.
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After the formal launch of the WTO in 1995, open and fair competition
became a new directional watchword in the formulation of Korea’s industrial
and trade policies. The Korean government felt new pressure to comply with
the WTO rules and disciplines and to commit to liberalising the Korean trading
regime. Korea has continued to aggressively reduce tariﬀ rates since its acces-
sion to the multilateral trading system and the Uruguay Round.9 As shown in
Figure 5.2, the MFN and applied tariﬀ rates were over 18% in 1988, but they
were reduced to less than 8% by 2009. Nevertheless, Korea also suﬀers from
tariﬀ escalation, the phenomenon by which tariﬀs rise with increasing trans-
formation of a product (eg in the production stages of basic metal products
and non-metallic mineral products). However, Korea had phased out govern-
ment intervention programs that sought to achieve the intended industrial
structure, and export subsidies became prohibited under the WTO’s Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Additionally, and so as to
comply with WTO disciplines on anti-dumping measures, the Korean govern-
ment established a more systemic institutional framework to impose anti-
dumping duties.
2.2 Institutional Perspectives of Anti-Dumping Measures in Korea
The KTC is responsible for the implementation and administration of trade
remedy measures. The KTC was founded in July 1987, in accordance with the
Article of the Foreign Trade Act, which was enacted in December 1986. Ini-
tially, the KTC played an advisory role in reviewing and clarifying the impacts
of imports on domestic industry, while the Ministry of Finance and Economy
took care of anti-dumping initiations, conducted investigations, and made
preliminary and ﬁnal decisions. However, in December 1989, along with the
revision of the Foreign Trade Act, the KTC changed its institutional identity
into a consultative administration organisation. Its functions expanded so
that it was put in charge of determining whether to initiate investigations,
making determinations of ‘injury’ to domestic industries, and instituting anti-
dumping measures. This responsibility was formally transferred from the
Ministry of Finance to the KTC under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
(currently the Ministry of Knowledge Economy) in December 1993. Since the
inception of the WTO, the laws and regulations related to the KTC and trade
remedy measures had been revised to comply with WTO disciplines.
Temporary trade barriers have been a critical component of Korea’s trade
policy since the late 1980s. Not only was Korea a primary target of such a
policy tool by its major trading partners in the 1980s and 1990s, but Korea
has become increasingly active in imposing anti-dumping measures itself.
9Korea signed the GATT in 1967, incorporating its economy into the multilateral trading
system.
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Table 5.2: Korea’s Anti-dumping investigations and outcomes (number of cases).
Aﬃrmative Negative
    
Initiation AVD PU AVD/PU Subtotal N W T Subtotal Other
1986 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1990 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
1991 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
1992 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0
1993 6 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
1994 8 3 0 0 3 5 0 0 5 0
1995 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 5 0
1996 12 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0
1997 15 4 0 0 4 1 2 3 6 0
1998 3 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
1999 7 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0
2000 2 2 1 0 3 1 0 1 2 0
2001 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 0
2002 10 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
2003 18 3 0 1 4 1 0 4 5 0
2004 3 9 1 0 10 0 7 1 8 0
2005 4 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
2006 7 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
2007 15 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 6 0
2008 5 11 0 1 12 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 4 0 0 4 2 0 0 2 0
2010 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Total 136 71 4 3 78 22 23 11 56 2
‘AVD’ stands for ad valorem duty; ‘PU’ stands for price undertaking; ‘N’ stands for negative; ‘W’
stands for withdrawn; ‘T’ stands for terminated.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) and KTC (2010).
3 DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA’S TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
3.1 Flow and Stock of TTBs
Table 5.2 documents annual data on Korea’s new anti-dumping cases between
1986 and 2010 by providing detailed information on their outcomes.10 The
Temporary Trade Barriers Database of Bown (2010) identiﬁed 139 anti-
dumping cases, but we excluded 3 cases from our analysis that were miss-
ing information from the KTC. Therefore, this chapter explores these 136
cases to analyse Korea’s use of TTBs. Korea’s ﬁrst anti-dumping investigation
was carried out in 1986, and it only imposed its ﬁrst anti-dumping duties in
10We updated the TTB database of Bown (2010) using information from the KTC and the
Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
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1991, targeting polyoxymethylene from Japan and the USA. Table 5.2 illus-
trates that Korea’s anti-dumping initiations and ﬁnal measures have been
counter-cyclical; they increased dramatically during the Asian ﬁnancial cri-
sis of 1997–8 and immediately after the recession of 2000–2001. During the
global economic crisis, there were only 5 new initiations in 2008 and none in
2009, but the KTC rendered an aﬃrmative decision in 12 cases in 2008 that
had been initiated earlier.11
Korea initiated 136 investigations during 1986–2009; 78 (57.4%) resulted in
the imposition of new deﬁnitive trade barriers and 56 (41.2%) were withdrawn,
terminated, or resulted in a negative determination.12 Korea’s 78 imposed
anti-dumping measures consisted of 71 (91.0%) ad valorem duties, 4 (5.1%)
price undertakings, and 3 (3.8%) ad valorem/price undertaking duties. The
remaining cases did not result in ﬁnal measures; 23 (41.1%) of these were
withdrawn prior to rulings by the petitioning industry, 22 (39.3%) were nega-
tive in terms of anti-dumping practices or injury to domestic producers and
11 (19.6%) were terminated.
One implication of Table 5.2 is that Korea’s anti-dumping initiations and
ﬁnal decisions have been counter-cyclical in nature. However, during the
2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis, despite there being a relatively small number of ini-
tiations, the KTC actively engaged in other important anti-dumping-related
activities. For example, Korea had 11 reviews of previously imposed anti-
dumping measures come up in 2009. The KTC decided to continue imposing
its anti-dumping duties in 9 of these 11 cases (81.8%) and price undertaking
in 2 cases (18.2%) during the crisis, even though 5 previously imposed Korean
anti-dumping measures were expired without review in this period.
Next we adopt the approach developed in Chapter 1 and Bown (2011b) to
analyse the stock of imports subject to anti-dumping duties in Korea rather
thantheﬂow ofimports.Wemeasurecounts ofHS-06productssubjecttoanti-
dumping duties between 1991 and 2009. As shown in Figure 5.3, the share
of imported products subject to anti-dumping duties in Korea has increased
moderately over time. In 1991, only one HS-06 product (polyoxymethylene)
was subject to anti-dumping duties. However, during the 1997–8 Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis, the count of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping duties rose to
24 (by 1998), representing 0.51% of all tariﬀ lines. Although Table 5.2 indicates
a relatively small number of initiations during 1998–2001, Figure 5.3 shows
how the share of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping duties remained
11This may be attributable to the Declaration of Summit on Financial Markets and the
World Economy in the G20 summit meeting in Washington DC on 15 November 2008 (G20
2008). According to this declaration, the leaders of the G20 countries agreed to ‘refrain
from raising new barriers…to trade in goods and services’ (paragraph 13). In Korea, it
was known that President Lee Myung-Bak proposed this idea during the summit meet-
ing. Hence, domestic producers in Korea would be reluctant to petition against dumping
practices.
12The two remaining cases have no information on their outcomes.
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Figure 5.3: Korea’s use of anti-dumping measures: share of imported products, based
on counts of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping measures.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
constant at around 0.5%. Korea’s anti-dumping duties imposed during the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis thus persisted for 3 or 4 years.13 During the 2008–9
crisis, the count of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping duties jumped
to 38 in 2008 and 37 in 2009—more than double the average of 18.2 during
the 1991–2007 period. Korea’s share of anti-dumping-aﬀected products in its
total tariﬀ lines rose to over 0.8% during the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis.
Figure 5.4 shows the share of import products, based on values of HS-06
products subject to anti-dumping measures, including counterfactual imports
calculated using the method described by Equation (1.2) of Chapter 1. The
share increased moderately between 1992–2004, but it increased sharply
beginning in 2005 and reached a peak of 0.37% in 2008. The sudden increase
since 2005 could be explained by a cumulative eﬀect of the stock of anti-
dumping measures. As the number of products subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures continues to increase, the import values subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures continues to accumulate, causing their share to increase.
3.2 Tariﬀs and TTBs
Figure 5.2 illustrates how Korea has continued to aggressively reduce its tariﬀ
rates since its accession to the multilateral trading system and as a result of
the Uruguay Round. Since 1999, Korea’s average MFN and applied tariﬀ rates
have fallen to and remained lower than 8%. However, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show
that Korea’s use of anti-dumping increased rapidly in the 2000s. Considering
13The duration of TTBs is discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 5.4: Korea’s use of anti-dumping measures: share of value of imports subject to
anti-dumping measures.
Source: authors’ calculations using Bown (2011b, Equation (1.2)) and Temporary Trade
Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
these ﬁgures together suggests that Korea’s anti-dumping measures could be
a substitute for tariﬀ protection.
We begin to address this issue by using Figure 5.5 to compare tariﬀ rates
for anti-dumping-protected products with products not aﬀected by anti-
dumping. The simple and weighted tariﬀ rates for non-anti-dumping products
are higher than those for products protected by anti-dumping measures, ie
domestic producers are more likely to ﬁle anti-dumping petitions over prod-
ucts receiving low tariﬀ rates. This interpretation suggests that anti-dumping
measures are likely to be a substitute for tariﬀ protection in Korea.
Motivated by Bown and Tovar (2011), we next analyse the relationship
between Korea’s anti-dumping measures and ‘tariﬀ overhang’, deﬁned as the
bound tariﬀ level minus the applied tariﬀ level. We consider only products
that are subject to ﬁnal anti-dumping measures and we focus on the 2002–9
period, since data on applied tariﬀs at the HS-08 level of disaggregation are
only available from 2002 onwards. Since anti-dumping margins are generally
reported as a range, Table 5.3 compares the tariﬀ overhang with both the low-
est and the highest anti-dumping margins. The lowest anti-dumping margins
are greater than the tariﬀ overhang in 98.5% (133 out of 135) of observa-
tions, and the highest anti-dumping margins are greater in 100% of observa-
tions. Table 5.3 also breaks down the period into two subperiods—2002–5
and 2006–9—and demonstrates no change in the trend; for almost all obser-
vations, Korea’s anti-dumping margins are greater than the tariﬀ overhang.
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Figure 5.5: Korea’s tariﬀs for anti-dumping-protected and non-anti-dumping HS-06
products.
Source: authors’ calculations using WITS and Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010).
Figure 5.6: Duration of anti-dumping duties in Korea (in years).
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
3.3 Duration of TTBs
In this subsection, we explore the duration of Korea’s anti-dumping duties. We
ignore those products currently subject to anti-dumping duties and those with
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Table 5.3: Korea’s anti-dumping measures and WTO tariﬀ bindings: 2002–9.
2002–9 2002–5 2006–9
      
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest
ﬁrm- ﬁrm- ﬁrm- ﬁrm- ﬁrm- ﬁrm-
speciﬁc speciﬁc speciﬁc speciﬁc speciﬁc speciﬁc
anti- anti- anti- anti- anti- anti-
dumping dumping dumping dumping dumping dumping
margin margin margin margin margin margin
Total number of 135 135 87 87 48 48
HS-06 product
observations
Number of 133 135 87 87 46 48
observations with (98.5) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (95.8) (100.0)
anti-dumping
margin greater
than tariﬀ
overhang (share)
Number of 2 0 0 0 2 0
observations with (1.5) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (4.1) (0.0)
anti-dumping
margin less
than tariﬀ
overhang (share)
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
missing information. Figure 5.6 shows the 42 cases during the sample in which
anti-dumping measures were imposed and later revoked. Korea revoked 81.0%
of its anti-dumping measures within 5 years, but 8 cases have been subject to
anti-dumping duties for more than 5 years. The most frequent duration was
3 years (16 cases) followed by 5 years (10 cases), 2 years (4 cases), and 7 years
(3 cases). The 8 cases that lasted more than 5 years include glass, chemicals,
paper, iron and steel, and machinery. The glass industry had only 3 cases, but
in each instance the anti-dumping duties persisted longer than 5 years.
As pointed out in the previous section, the KTC reviewed 11 anti-dumping
cases in 2009. The KTC continued imposing its anti-dumping duties on 72.7%
of the cases and price undertaking on 27.3%. None were terminated in the
review process during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9, even though ﬁve mea-
sures were expired without review.
3.4 Sectoral Imposition of TTBs
Table 5.4 documents the industries that the Korean authorities targeted with
anti-dumping during 1989–2009, using data on cases subject to anti-dumping
initiations as reported by Bown (2011b).14 Chemicals was the dominant focus
14We excluded 19 out of 136 cases because they lack information on HS codes and/or
dates.
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Figure 5.7: Share of Korea’s import value aﬀected by anti-dumping measures, by sec-
tor, 1991–2009.
of anti-dumping investigations with 24 cases (20.5%). Other frequent users
were machinery (22 cases, 18.8%), pulp and paper (12 cases, 10.3%), base met-
als (12 cases, 10.3%), mineral products (11 cases, 9.4%), and plastics and rub-
ber (10 cases, 8.5%). During the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis, only 7 cases were under
investigation, mainly in wood (3 cases), textiles (2 cases), chemicals (1 case),
and base metals (1 case).
Next we consider the sectoral coverage of imports based on the value of
each sector subject to anti-dumping duties rather than anti-dumping initia-
tions. Here we focus on cases with ﬁnal aﬃrmative decisions, and we measure
the value of HS-06 products of each case subject to anti-dumping duties. Fig-
ure 5.7 plots the shares of Korea’s import value aﬀected by anti-dumping
measures relative to the total imports by sector. The machinery industry
faced the largest share of its imports becoming subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures, reaching a peak of 0.23% in 2007. Prepared foodstuﬀs, textiles, and
plastics and rubber exhibit an increasing trend in the stock of import value
aﬀected by anti-dumping measures during 2008–9. The wood and paper and
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Figure 5.7: Continued.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
metal industries had been protected heavily during the mid-2000s, while the
chemical industry had the longest period of anti-dumping protection during
1993–2005.
Figure 5.8 reports each sector’s share of total Korean imports subject to
anti-dumping measures. Plastics and rubber was the only sector to be sub-
jected to anti-dumping duties in 1991, showing a 100% share of the total
value of imports subject to anti-dumping duties. Korean ﬁrms continued to
target imports (mainly of plastics and rubber, machinery and chemicals) with
anti-dumping duties in the early 1990s. However, by the mid-1990s, stone and
glass also became key target sectors. Korea began targeting wood, pulp and
paper in the early 2000s, and the share of stone and glass fell. Interestingly,
during the global crisis of 2008–9, Korea targeted a wider set of sectors even
though plastics and rubber as well as stone and glass had large shares of
the total value of Korea’s imports subject to anti-dumping duties. Four sec-
tors had more than 8% of imports in 2008 and ﬁve sectors had more than 8%
by 2009. Korea thus applied its anti-dumping use over a broader number of
sectors during 2008–9.
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Figure 5.8: Sectoral share of the total value of imports subject to anti-dumping mea-
sures, 1991–2009: (a) chemicals, plastics and rubber, wood, and pulp and paper; (b) tex-
tiles, stone and glass, base metals, and machinery.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
3.5 Target Countries
Table 5.5 decomposes Korea’s anti-dumping investigations during the period
1986–2010 by target country. China was the most frequently targeted coun-
try with 27 cases (19.4%), followed by Japan (20 cases, 14.4%) and the USA
(17 cases, 12.2%). As a number of other chapters in this volume have doc-
umented, Korea is not the only country that is particularly active in impos-
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ing anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports. Nevertheless, Korea has
also used anti-dumping to target many high-income countries, with 65 cases
brought against OECD members and 12 cases brought against non-OECD high-
income countries.15 One interpretation of these data is that Korea’s domestic
industries use anti-dumping to address competition from producers in high-
income countries. Upper-middle-income countries were targeted in 14 (10.1%)
cases and lower-middle-income countries (not including China) were targeted
in only 21 cases (15.1%).
Table 5.6 documents Korea’s 5 FTAs currently in force with 16 countries. As
of December 2010, Korea had also completed negotiations of 3 FTAs with 29
countries; it was negotiating 7 FTAs with 12 countries, and it was considering
9 additional FTAs with 21 other countries.
Table 5.7 shows Korea’s use of anti-dumping measures against prefer-
ential trading partners. There are mixed results regarding Korea’s use of
anti-dumping measures prior to and after each FTA enters into force. Korea
never targeted Chile and the EFTA countries with anti-dumping measures
even before their FTAs. However, Korea’s anti-dumping against imports from
Singapore and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) increased after the implementation of their bilateral FTAs. Korea’s
anti-dumping measures among its FTA partners were concentrated on ASEAN
countries; anti-dumping measures increased from coverage of 13 products in
2006 to 16 products by 2009. Additionally, Table 5.7 shows a slight increase
in Korea’s anti-dumping measures against its FTA partners, once again prin-
cipally against Singapore and ASEAN countries, during the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008–9.16 Among ASEAN members, Korea’s anti-dumping measures have con-
centrated on Indonesia (ten products each in 2008, 2009 and 2010), Malaysia
(one, two and three products in 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively), and Thai-
land (one product each in 2009 and 2010). With regard to its sectoral division,
Korea’s anti-dumping measures against its FTA partners during the 2008–9
crisis have focused primarily on the wood and paper industry, including craft
paper, particle board and plywood. This trend is consistent with its use of anti-
dumping measures against all trading partners, as is shown in Section 3.4.
One potential contributing explanation to Korea’s diﬀerential anti-dumping
use across its PTA partners may be found in the country’s PTA rules. Table 5.8
documents legal disciplines on anti-dumping measures in Korea’s FTAs. Even
though all of Korea’s FTAs allow members to maintain rights and obligations
15According to the World Bank’s country classiﬁcations, Taiwan was not classiﬁed into
any group due to its political status; however, we classiﬁed it into the group of non-OECD
high-income countries.
16We calculated its share of total imports, using counterfactual estimates of the import
value of products subject to anti-dumping measures, according to the approach described
by Equation (1.1) of Chapter 1. However, this share is very low (0.01%), exhibiting few
ﬂuctuations and no signiﬁcant changes during the 2008–9 crisis.
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Table 5.6: Korea’s current and potential FTA partners.
Status Countries
FTAs in force Chile (April 2004); Singapore (March 2006);
EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; September 2006);
ASEAN (Goods: June 2007, Services: May 2009,
Investment: September 2009); and India (January 2010)
Talks completed USA (December 2010); EU (October 2009); and
Peru (January 2010)
Talks ongoing Canada (since July 2005); Mexico (since February 2006);
GCC (since July 2008); Australia (since May 2009);
New Zealand (since June 2009); Columbia (since December 2009); and
Turkey (since April 2010)
Consideration Japan; China; Japan–China–Korea (trilateral); Mercosur; Russia;
Israel; SACU; Vietnam; and Central America (SICA)
Korea had negotiated a bilateral FTA with Japan since December 2003, but the negotiation had been
stalled since November 2004 due to conﬂicting views of agricultural market access in Japan. ‘GCC’ is
the Gulf Cooperation Council including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and
Bahrain; Mercosur is a common market encompassing Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay; SACU
(South African Customs Union) is a customs union including the Republic of South Africa, Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia; and SICA (Central American Integration System) is an economic,
cultural and political organisation convened among Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Panama, Belize and Dominican Republic.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade (2010).
under the WTO Agreement on Anti-Dumping, the FTA legal texts contain dif-
ferent rules. For example, Korea’s bilateral FTA with the EFTA stipulates that
the two parties shall review whether there is a need to maintain the possi-
bility of carrying out anti-dumping measures between them (Article 2.10.2),
with an eye towards deeper economic integration. With regard to the matter
of zeroing, bilateral FTAs with Singapore and India prohibit zeroing practices,
indicating that ‘when anti-dumping margins are established on the weighted
average basis, all individual margins, whether positive or negative, should be
counted toward the average’.17
In addition, FTAs with Singapore, EFTA, India, the EU and Peru require mem-
bers to ‘apply a duty less than the margin of dumping where such lesser
duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry’ (the
so-called ‘lesser duty rule’).18 Moreover, FTAs with India and the EU require
17See Article 6.2.3(a) of the Korea–Singapore FTA and, similarly, Article 2.18 in the Korea–
India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. Zeroing is a methodology used
principally by the USA for calculating dumping margins by setting the negative diﬀerences
to zero, which occurs whenever the imported product’s price is higher than the price in
the USA.
18See Article 6.2.3(b) in the Korea–Singapore FTA, Article 2.10.1(b) in the Korea–EFTA
FTA, Article 2.17 in the Korea–India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement,
Article 3.14 in the Korea–EU FTA, and Article 8.9.3 in the Korea–Peru FTA.
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Table 5.7: Korea’s use of anti-dumping measures by preferential trading partner: stock
of partner–HS-06 product combinations subject to anti-dumping duties.
Year Chile Singapore EFTA ASEAN India
1992 0 0 0 1 0
1993 0 0 0 1 0
1994 0 0 0 1 0
1995 0 0 0 1 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 1 0 2 0
1999 0 1 0 2 0
2000 0 1 0 2 0
2001 0 1 0 2 0
2002 0 0 0 1 0
2003 0 0 0 11 0
2004 0 0 0 11 4
2005 0 0 0 10 4
2006 020 13 4
2007 020 1 1 4
2008 030 1 4 6
2009 030 1 6 6
2010 010 1 6 6
The bold values represent the count of PTA partner–HS-06 product combinations subject to anti-
dumping investigations after each PTA entered into force. Since Singapore is also a member of ASEAN,
the count for ASEAN includes Singaporean imports.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
members not to initiate an investigation when anti-dumping measures are
terminated as a result of the review process, unless the circumstances have
changed.19
Overall, Korea’s FTAs with India, EFTA, the EU and Singapore have been
progressive in terms of the design of disciplines that limit the opportunity for
governments to misuse anti-dumping measures. On the other hand, Korea’s
FTAs with Chile, the USA and ASEAN provide more freedom for participants to
use anti-dumping measures. It is especially interesting that Korea’s bilateral
FTA with India appears relatively more aggressive in its attempts to limit the
overuse of anti-dumping given that India is one of the most frequent users of
anti-dumping in the world (Tovar, this volume).
Although all Korean FTAs have maintained and upheld all the rights and
obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, modiﬁed models of
anti-dumping administration in Korea’s FTAs have begun to emerge. Ahn
(2008) describes this ‘rule diversiﬁcation’ in the anti-dumping disciplines as
19See Article 2.19 in the Korea–India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
and Article 3.11 in the Korea–EU FTA.
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Table 5.8: Rules on anti-dumping measures of Korea’s FTAs.
Maintaining
rights and Future Exemption
obligations possibility of from
under Lesser elimination of investigation
the WTO Prohibition duty anti-dumping after
FTA Agreement of zeroing rule measures termination
Korea–Chile Yes No rules No rules No rules No rules
Korea–Singapore Yes Prohibited Yes No rules No rules
Korea–EFTA Yes No rules Yes Yes No rules
Korea–ASEAN Yes No rules No rules No rules No rules
Korea–India Yes Prohibited Yes No rules Yes
Korea–USA Yes No rules No rules No rules No rules
Korea–EU Yes No rules Yes No rules Yes
Korea–Peru Yes No rules Yes No rules No rules
Source: legal texts of each agreement from Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade (2010).
a phenomena that is likely linked to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ eﬀect of preferential
trade liberalisation.
4 DOMESTIC POLITICS OF KOREA’S TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
4.1 Background and Econometric Model
To what extent are Korea’s anti-dumping duties a function of its domestic
political–economic considerations? To address this question, we apply the
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of trade protection to the Korean man-
ufacturing industries, and we attempt to determine whether Korea uses anti-
dumping to protect politically organised industries. In particular, we explore
the impacts of political interest groups on the Korean use of anti-dumping
measures in 2005 and in 2009, both before and during the global ﬁnancial
crisis, using import data at the HS-06 product level.
Based on Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model, Bown and Tovar (2011)
formulate the following equation for the determinants of trade policy:
τi =
Ii − αL
a + αL
zi
εi
, (5.1)
where τi is the ad valorem tariﬀ in sector i, where Ii is an indicator variable
that takes a value of 1 if sector i is politically organised, and 0 otherwise.
Additionally, αL is the fraction of the population organised into lobbies, a is
the weight placed on welfare by the government, zi is the inverse of the import
penetration ratio, and εi is a measure of the absolute value of the elasticity of
import demand. In accordance with Bown and Tovar (2011), we establish the
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following estimation equation:
τit = β0 + β1

Ii
zi
εi

+ β2

zi
εi

+ µit, (5.2)
where µit is the regression error term.
4.2 Data
Import data at the HS-06 level in 2005 and 2009 are available from UNC-
TAD/TRAINS. Data regarding import demand elasticities at the HS-06 level
were obtained from Kee et al (2008). Data on production, total value added,
employment, capital, and the number of ﬁrms at the Korean Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation (KSIC) four-digit level were obtained from the Korean Stat-
istical Information Service (The Statistics Korea 2010). We use Nicita and Olar-
reaga (2007) to concord the import data at the HS-06 product level to Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) industries, matching data from
the KSIC (revision 9).
One diﬃculty in the estimation approach involves the construction of accu-
rate data on political campaign contributions by Korean industries. Previous
work for other countries, including Bown and Tovar (2011), Murrell (1984),
Bischoﬀ (2003) and Coates et al (2007) used data on the number of groups
listed in the World Trade Associations publication as a measure of interest
group activities. For the case of Korea, these data are somewhat outdated as
they report a very small number of politically organised industries, which is
inconsistent with increasing political contribution activity by Korean indus-
tries. Therefore, as an alternative approach, we searched websites to identify
each Korean industry’s own industrial associations at the HS-02 level. When an
industry had more than one industrial association, we considered the industry
to be politically organised.20
4.3 Empirical Results
Applied tariﬀ rates in Korea between 2005 and 2009 have hardly changed,
except for a small number of commodities such as crude oil. Thus, we did not
employ applied tariﬀ rates for the dependent variable. Rather, we employed
anti-dumping duties at the HS-06 level in force in 2005 and 2009.
We adopt the methodology of Bown and Tovar (2011) by using an IV–Tobit
estimation approach, as proposed by Kelejian (1971). We calculate two anti-
dumping duties, measuring the duties weighted by the import share of the
targeted countries in the total imports of the product at the HS-06 level. The
variables used in the instrument for political organisation include the value
added per ﬁrm, the number of employees by establishment, the capital–labour
20Using this methodology, we identiﬁed the following as politically organised industries:
HS 17–23, 27–31, 33, 44, 48–49, 51–55, 62, 64, 68, 70, 72–73, 84–85, 87–90 and 94.
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Table 5.9: Estimation of Grossman and Helpman model’s determinants of Korean use
of anti-dumping duties in 2005 and 2009.
1 234
2005 2009
Dependent     
variables ADmin ADmax ADmin ADmax
I
z
ε
0.003 0.005 0.054 0.101
(0.022) (0.035) (0.022)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗
z
ε
−0.024 −0.039 −0.027 −0.050
(0.014)* (0.022)∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗
αL — — 0.50 0.49
a — — 1,852 990
Observations 2,860 2,860 3,488 3,488
Standard errors of the Tobit model’s estimates are in parentheses with ‘*’ and ‘**’ indicating statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
ratio, the capital–output ratio, and the output share of ﬁrms with over 500
employees (as a proxy variable for the industry concentration ratio).
We do not report results from the ﬁrst-stage empirical analysis that esti-
mates endogenous variables and their non-linear transformation since they
are not our focus in this chapter. Rather, we concentrate on the second-stage
analysis described above. We include the residuals from the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion in the basic empirical Equation (1.2). The results demonstrate that the
residual from the regression of the dependent variable of I × z/ε is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, but the residual from the regression of z/ε is insigniﬁcant.
These results indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the variable
of I × z/ε is exogenous, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
variable of z/ε is exogenous. Therefore, we treat the variable of I × z/ε as
endogenous.
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model predicts that β1 (the coeﬃcient
on I × z/ε) is positive, that β2 (the coeﬃcient on z/ε) is negative, and that
β1 + β2 is positive. Table 5.9 reports our estimates for the model of deter-
minants of Korea’s anti-dumping: the β1 values are positive but not signiﬁ-
cant in 2005, while they are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in 2009.
Furthermore, the β2 values are negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in
2005 and 5% level in 2009. These results suggest that the Korean use of
anti-dumping measures is consistent with the Grossman and Helpman (1994)
theory that, during the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9, politically organised
sectors receive more protection using anti-dumping duties than unorganised
ones. From Equation (1.1) and the coeﬃcients β1 and β2, we derive the fraction
of the population owning a speciﬁc factor (αL) and the weight that the govern-
ment places on aggregate welfare relative to aggregate lobbying spending (a).
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The fractions of the population owning a speciﬁc factor were around 0.5 and
the social welfare weights were 1,852, much higher than in other studies, such
as Bown and Tovar (2011), Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000), Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) and Mitra (1999). These results provide evidence that Korean
industries and the government employed anti-dumping measures to protect
the commercial interests of domestic producers during the global ﬁnancial
crisis.
5 PRACTICAL USE OF SOUTH KOREA’S TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
5.1 Previous Literature on Discretionary Practices
This section analyses potential changes in Korea’s use of anti-dumping mea-
sures during the global crisis of 2008–9. In particular, we evaluate the impacts
of the KTC’s practices on ﬁrm-speciﬁc dumping margins. A number of previ-
ous studies have assessed the determination of the magnitude of US dump-
ing margins. Baldwin and Moore (1991, pp 253–280) evaluated US dumping
margin determinations in the 1980s and found that the US Department of
Commerce’s (USDOC) use of ‘facts available’ raised dumping margins to 38
percentage points higher than the average margin. However, they did not eval-
uate other discretionary practices. Lindsay (1999) evaluated USDOC’s calcula-
tions of dumping margins from 1995 through 1998 and determined that the
average dumping margin of ‘facts available’ was 95.58%, while the overall sam-
ple average amounted to 44.68%.21 Blonigen (2006) examined the evolution
of discretionary practices during 1980–2000 and found that USDOC discre-
tionary practices such as ‘facts available’, ‘adverse facts available’ and cost
tests signiﬁcantly raised dumping margins.22
5.2 Background on Discretionary Practices
The extent of dumping is referred to as the ‘dumping margin’, which is cal-
culated by subtracting the export price from the normal value and dividing
the diﬀerence by the export price. According to Article 2 of the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement, normal value can be deﬁned as the price of the imported
21Lindsay (1999) also showed that dumping margins—primarily those using the foreign
ﬁrm’s prices in its domestic market or in another country’s market to construct a normal
value—were much lower than those generated using a constructed value, methods of non-
market-economy status, or ‘facts available’.
22In an eﬀort to quantify the eﬀects of methodological and practical distortions in spe-
ciﬁc cases, Ikenson and Lindsay (2002) analysed data on actual prices and costs used by
USDOC to calculate dumping margins for foreign ﬁrms under investigation in 18 anti-
dumping cases. They determined that many discretionary practices, including the use of
zeroing, constructed value and sales below cost, resulted in substantial increases in dump-
ing margins.
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product in the ordinary course of trade in the country of origin. However, nor-
mal value can be calculated in various ways, as put forth in Article 2 of the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
To calculate Korea’s dumping margins, the KTC sends a questionnaire on
the pricing and costs to the foreign exporter whose product is under investi-
gation.23 When the exporter’s replies are deemed reliable, the KTC determines
the normal value on the product by considering the home market price of the
exporter, and costs associated with the production and sale of the relevant
product including the respective shipping and transportation costs. However,
there are many instances in which the KTC uses discretionary practices other
than the home market price. In the process of determining normal values
during 2000–2010, the KTC used three other discretionary practices: ‘facts
available’, ‘sales below costs’ and ‘non-market-economy status’.
When the exporter does not reply to the questionnaire or its replies are
deemed unreliable, the KTC employs information provided by the domestic
producer(s) or ‘facts available’ in order to determine the normal value.24
Theseconddiscretionarypracticeisatestofsalesbelowcosts.Althoughthe
normal value is calculated using the exporter’s home market price, the KTC
also assesses whether there are sales below production costs in its home mar-
ket. If sales below production costs are more than 20%, then the KTC excludes
these sales when determining the normal value.25 This practice results in
increases to the normal value and, thus, a higher dumping margin.
The ﬁnal practice relies on the exporter’s potential non-market-economy
status and can be employed when the exporting ﬁrms are from countries
such as China, Russia or Vietnam. The KTC frequently used the non-market-
economy practice prior to 2000, considering the price in the domestic mar-
ket of Indonesia as a third (reference) country for products from China, for
example. In 2005, the Korean government ultimately decided to grant market-
economy status to China.
Table 5.10 illustrates that the KTC has most frequently employed the ‘facts
available’ clause when determining normal value, followed by the test of sales
below costs, the home market price and non-market economy during 2000–
2007. The use of ‘facts available’ increased in particular during the global
ﬁnancial crisis, resulting in declines in the shares of other practices. We
develop an econometric analysis to assess whether the more frequent use
of the ‘facts available’ approach leads to an increase in dumping margins.
23A questionnaire is sent to the domestic producer(s), importer and distributor(s) as well.
24Article 1 of Annex II of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement holds that if information is
not supplied within a period of reasonable time, the authorities will be free to make deter-
minations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in the application
for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.
25This regulation is based on Article 2.2.1 and footnote 5 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
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Table 5.10: The KTC’s practices in determining normal prices (2000–2010).
Home Sales Non-
market Facts below market
price available costs economy Total
2000–2007
Product 11 46 37 2 96
Share (%) 11.5 47.9 38.5 2.1 100.0
2008–10
Product 4 46 10 0 60
Share (%) 6.7 76.7 16.7 0.0 100.0
Source: authors’ calculations using KTC (2010).
Table 5.11: Summary statistics.
Number of Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Anti-dumping duty 156 29.39 21.65 2.80 129.84
Facts available 156 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Test of sales below costs 156 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Non-market economy 156 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
China 156 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
USA 156 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Japan 156 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Taiwan 156 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Malaysia 156 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Singapore 156 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
India 156 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Indonesia 156 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
Source: authors’ calculations using KTC (2010).
5.3 Estimation Strategy and Data
To estimate the impact of the KTC’s discretionary practices in determin-
ing the normal price on dumping margins, we adopt an econometric model
and regress ﬁrm-speciﬁc dumping margins on indicators for Korea’s discre-
tionary practices, including facts available, sales below costs, and non-market-
economy approaches, in accordance with the work of Blonigen (2006). We
consider whether the eﬀects of these practices diﬀer prior to and during the
global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9.
We constructed data on ﬁrm-speciﬁc dumping margins from the KTC’s pre-
liminary decisions during 2000–2010, using data available from the KTC. We
include all cases, including those in which the ﬁnal decision was negative, even
though the preliminary decision was positive. We also include data regarding
the KTC’s discretionary practices, including facts available, the test of sales
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below costs, and the non-market-economy approaches. Each of these vari-
ables is a binary variable which takes the value 1 when dumping margins are
calculated by that practice, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, in order to con-
trol for country-speciﬁc eﬀects, we include country ﬁxed eﬀects for China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan and the USA.26 Table 5.11 shows
the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
5.4 Empirical Results
Table 5.12 shows our empirical results. Column 1 indicates that ‘facts avail-
able’, ‘test of sales below costs’ and ‘non-market economy’ have signiﬁcant
impacts on dumping margins. The ‘non-market economy’ practice increases
dumping margins by 35.3 percentage points, ‘facts available’ increases dump-
ing margins by 34.5 percentage points, and ‘test of sales below costs’ increases
dumping margins by 12.1 percentage points.
Column 2 of Table 5.12 provides the results after imposing additional
controls for country-speciﬁc eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of Japan, Taiwan and
Malaysia are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The KTC’s anti-dumping
duties on Japanese exporters were 18.6 percentage points higher than those
for the rest of the world, whereas those on Taiwanese and Malaysian exporters
were lower, on average.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.12 show the additional impact of these dis-
cretionary practices on dumping margins during the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Here, we introduce a binary variable of ‘crisis’ representing the 2008–10
period and construct interaction terms of discretionary practices and the cri-
sis. The coeﬃcients of these interaction terms show the additional eﬀect of
discretionary practices after the global ﬁnancial crisis. Since the non-market-
economy approach was not used by the KTC during the 2008–10 period, we
exclude the interaction term of ‘non-market economy’ and ‘crisis’.
The results shown in column 3 and 4 of Table 5.12 demonstrate that the
coeﬃcients of ‘facts available’ and ‘non-market economy’ are still statistically
signiﬁcant, whereas the interaction terms of ‘crisis’ and both ‘facts available’
and ‘non-market economy’ are not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, we have
no evidence to suggest that the discretionary practices of the KTC exerted an
additional impact on dumping margins during the global ﬁnancial crisis.
As indicated by Blonigen (2006), the speciﬁcation model in Table 5.12 does
not control for case-speciﬁc factors that may aﬀect the calculation of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc dumping margins. Additionally, certain macroeconomic variables,
including the unemployment rate and exchange rates, may aﬀect dumping
margins as well. Furthermore, Kang et al (2010) determined that anti-dumping
measures do not exert country-speciﬁc impacts but do exert industry-speciﬁc
26These countries were selected because they have more than 7 products out of the 156
total.
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Table 5.12: Impacts of anti-dumping practices and country characteristics on Korea’s
anti-dumping margins.
1234
Facts available 34.47 26.84 39.28 29.39
(5.24)∗∗∗ (3.90)∗∗∗ (7.27)∗∗∗ (5.27)∗∗∗
Test of sales below costs 12.10 4.00 15.08 6.66
(5.24)∗∗ (4.57) (6.90)∗∗ (5.87)
Non-market economy 35.31 35.31 38.95 37.49
(10.76)∗∗∗ (10.25)∗∗∗ (11.47)∗∗∗ (10.67)∗∗∗
Crisis — — −41.21 −36.67
— — (14.73)∗∗∗ (12.03)∗∗∗
Facts available × Crisis — — −14.75 −8.51
— — (7.85)∗ (6.91)
Sales below costs × Crisis — — −10.03 −9.97
— — (7.66) (7.17)
China — −3.19 — −3.18
— (3.44) — (3.48)
USA — 4.84 — 4.60
— (6.02) — (6.00)
Japan — 18.58 — 17.97
— (5.90)∗∗∗ — (5.88)∗∗∗
Taiwan — −14.67 — −14.90
— (4.00)∗∗∗ — (4.18)∗∗∗
Malaysia — −14.88 — −16.02
— (5.20)∗∗∗ — (5.23)∗∗∗
Singapore — −8.39 — −9.65
— (6.61) — (6.51)
India — 5.66 — 5.68
— (4.94) — (4.87)
Indonesia — −8.13 — −7.86
— (5.79) — (5.97)
Observations 156 156 156 156
R2 0.58 0.71 0.59 0.71
In all speciﬁcations, year dummies were included. The constant term was included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicating statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
eﬀects. If industry-speciﬁc impacts are important for determining dumping
margins, the omission of case-speciﬁc factors may introduce severe bias into
the estimation.
A standard methodology used to control for case-speciﬁc factors is to
include case-speciﬁc dummies. Since anti-dumping cases are product- and
country-speciﬁc, one can no longer include country variables due to mul-
ticollinearity, as discussed by Blonigen (2006). Table 5.13 shows the case-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and suggests that they are not profoundly diﬀerent from
those in Table 5.12, even though the R2 is improved. From Table 5.10, it is
clear that the KTC has more frequently used ‘facts available’ than other discre-
tionary practices during the global ﬁnancial crisis. Nevertheless, Tables 5.12
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Table 5.13: Impacts of anti-dumping practices and country characteristics on Korea’s
anti-dumping margins: case-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
12
Facts available 22.63 21.96
(2.84)∗∗∗ (4.47)∗∗∗
Test of sales below costs −2.58 −3.12
(3.15) (4.58)
Non-market economy 37.06 36.63
(11.13)∗∗∗ (10.93)∗∗∗
Crisis — 3.27
— (2.44)
Facts available × Crisis — 1.70
— (5.08)
Sales below costs × Crisis — 1.36
— (5.23)
Observations 156 156
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.81
In all speciﬁcations, year dummies were included. The constant term was included, but not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses with ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ indicating statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: Bank of Korea (2010).
and 5.13 give no evidence to suggest that this discretionary practice increased
dumping margins during the 2008–10 period.
6 CONCLUSION
This chapter examines Korea’s use of TTBs, mainly anti-dumping measures,
before and during the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9. Using the Tempo-
rary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010), we determined that the stock
of imported products subject to anti-dumping duties in Korea has increased
moderately over time.
Korea’s initiations and ﬁnal decisions in anti-dumping cases have been
counter-cyclical, with evidence of a dramatic increase during the Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis of 1997–8 and immediately before the recession of 2000. During
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9, there was a relatively small number of initia-
tions; however, we conclude that the KTC was active in imposing anti-dumping
duties during the ﬁnancial crisis. Additionally, it turns out that, among the
products under the review process for possible removal during the 2008–9
crisis, no products were terminated and each product continued to be sub-
jecttoanti-dumpingmeasures(excludingtheﬁveanti-dumpingmeasuresthat
were expired without review). The stock of imports subject to anti-dumping
measures also increased to 38 in 2008 and 37 in 2009, which is more than
double their average during 1991–2007.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 195 — #215






South Korea: Temporary Trade Barriers Before and During the Crisis 195
We conclude that anti-dumping measures have functioned as a substitute
for tariﬀ protection measures in Korea during this period, ie the continuing
reduction of tariﬀ rates has been accompanied by an increase in anti-dumping
petitions and ﬁnal measures. Furthermore, Korea exhibits a very high per-
centage of observations in which the anti-dumping margins exceed the tariﬀ
overhang.
We also conclude that anti-dumping duties imposed during the Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis persisted for three or four years. The stock of import value subject
to anti-dumping measures increased moderately, but it increased dramatically
beginning in 2005, reaching a peak level of 0.37% in 2008. The sudden increase
in this share since 2005 can be attributed primarily to a cumulative eﬀect of
the stock of anti-dumping measures. As the number of tariﬀ lines subject to
anti-dumping measures continues to increase, the import values subject to
anti-dumping measures continue to accumulate, resulting in an increase in
the share.
Prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9, Korea’s dominant user of anti-
dumping measures was the wood and paper industry. Other frequent users
of anti-dumping included the chemicals, machinery, metal, stone and glass,
prepared food, and plastics and rubber industries. During the crisis of 2008–9,
the most frequent user was again the wood and paper industry, and its relative
share increased sharply.
Korea’s use of anti-dumping has most frequently targeted China, with 50
products (24.4%) subject to anti-dumping, followed by Japan and the USA.
Nevertheless, Korea’s principal target has been high-income countries as a
group—the OECD countries account for 91 products and the non-OECD high-
income countries account for 19 products, for a total of 110 products (53.7%).
This suggests that the majority of domestic producers in Korea that use anti-
dumping compete with producers from high-income countries. We also ﬁnd
mixed results in terms of practical changes to Korea’s use of anti-dumping
before and after an FTA enters into force. Chile and the EFTA countries have
never been targeted by Korean anti-dumping, but anti-dumping measures in
Korea against imports from Singapore and ASEAN members have increased.
We also note a slight increase in Korea’s use of anti-dumping measures against
its FTA partners during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9.
Moreover, Korean use of anti-dumping measures is consistent with the
theory put forth by Grossman and Helpman (1994) that politically organised
sectors tended to receive more protection than unorganised ones, especially
in terms of anti-dumping duty use, during the global crisis of 2008–9. There-
fore, taking into consideration the empirical analysis, we conclude that Korean
industries and government did indeed use anti-dumping measures to protect
domestic producers’ commercial interests during the global crisis.
Finally, our analysis of the practical uses of Korea’s determinants of dump-
ing margins suggests that the KTC has more frequently used ‘facts available’
than any other discretionary practice during the global ﬁnancial crisis. Nev-
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ertheless, we found no evidence to suggest that the use of facts available
increased dumping margins during the 2008–10 period.
Moonsung Kang is an Associate Professor at Korea University.
Soonchan Park is an Associate Professor at Kongju National University.
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6
China: A Sleeping Giant of Temporary
Trade Barriers?
PIYUSH CHANDRA1
1 INTRODUCTION
While tariﬀ rates around the world have decreased during the last ﬁve
decades, there has been an increase in other instruments of protectionism—
in particular, anti-dumping, CVDs and global safeguards (collectively, TTBs).
In this chapter, we examine China’s use of these TTBs both before and dur-
ing the 2008–9 crisis in order to identify underlying historical trends and to
explore potential changes in their use over time.
It is important to understand China’s use of TTBs given that it is one of
the leading importers in the world. Figure 6.1(a) illustrates that, not only has
China’s economy been growing, its imports have also been expanding rapidly.
China’s real exports fell slightly during the 2008–9 crisis; however, its real
imports continued to increase even during this period.2 By the end of 2009,
China was the world’s third largest importer with merchandise imports of
more than $1 trillion, following only the EU and USA with imports of $1.7 tril-
lion and $1.6 trillion, respectively (WTO 2010). The scale of imports at stake
is reason enough to study the frequency with which China uses these TTBs.
The 2008–9 crisis had much smaller macroeconomic eﬀects on China than
it did on many other countries. China’s economy continued to grow and its
unemployment rate has remained stable; however, Figure 6.1(b) illustrates
how its growth rate did decrease during this period. China’s real GDP growth
rate had increased from 7.5% in 1998 to above 13% by 2007, only to fall to 9%
in 2008.
1Department of Economics, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346, USA.
Email: pchandra@colgate.edu. I am grateful to Chad Bown for several helpful suggestions
and guidance. Thanks to Rod Ludema, Anna Maria Mayda and Tom Prusa for comments
and suggestions and to Aksel Erbahar for help in collecting the data. Any remaining errors
and omissions are my own.
2Later, we show that China’s non-oil merchandise imports, measured in nominal terms,
fell during 2008–9. Throughout the rest of the chapter any discussion of imports refers
to the non-oil nominal value unless otherwise noted.
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Figure 6.1: Macroeconomic conditions in China, 1993–2009: (a) exports, imports and
average tariﬀs; (b) growth rate of GDP, exchange rate and unemployment rate.
Source: author’s calculations using World Development Indicators (2010). In panel (a),
the ad valorem tariﬀ rate is deﬁned as a simple average of applied MFN tariﬀs for all
products. In panel (b), the exchange rate is the period average oﬃcial exchange rate
deﬁned as yuan/$. The unemployment rate is a percentage of total employment.
Figure 6.1(a) also documents how a rapid reduction in China’s average tar-
iﬀs coincided with the dramatic increase in China’s imports during 1995–
2009. China’s average applied MFN tariﬀ decreased from roughly 40% in 1993
to 17% in 2000. China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 was associ-
ated with a further tariﬀ reduction of roughly 6 percentage points. By the end
of 2008, its average applied MFN tariﬀ had decreased to 9.6%.
China began to use TTBs as an alternative form of protection while its tariﬀs
were falling during this period (Messerlin 2004). China enacted its ﬁrst anti-
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dumping law in March 1997, and it was investigating 20–30 cases per year
in each of the ﬁrst few years following its WTO accession (Bown 2010a). In
this chapter, we extend the analysis of previous studies by examining China’s
use of all TTB policies up to 2009, examining both new initiations of investi-
gations and instances in which China imposed new measures. Furthermore,
as China’s TTB use is dominated by anti-dumping, we explore China’s use of
anti-dumping in further detail. We examine its composition across sectors, the
groups of foreign countries that China has targeted, and the time duration of
the measures imposed.3
Our results indicate interesting patterns to China’s anti-dumping investi-
gations prior to and during the 2008–9 crisis. China initiated a large number
of new anti-dumping investigations in 2002, immediately after its December
2001 entry to the WTO. Except in 2004, the number of new Chinese anti-
dumping investigations decreased in each year during 2003–7. However, dur-
ing 2008–9 the number of new anti-dumping investigations began to increase
again. This pattern holds under a number of diﬀerent metrics, whether we
consider the number of anti-dumping cases, the share of HS-06 products
involved in anti-dumping investigations, or the share of China’s import value
aﬀected by anti-dumping investigations.
Despite this increase in the ﬂow of new anti-dumping investigations during
the 2008–9 crisis, the total stock of products under Chinese anti-dumping
measures actually decreased during this period due to the removal of several
previously imposed anti-dumping measures. For instance, 0.3% and 0.4% of
China’s HS-06 products were involved in new anti-dumping investigations in
2008 and 2009, respectively. However, during the same period, China’s total
stock of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping measures decreased from
1.1% to 1.0%.
In terms of China’s industries, chemicals, paper and pulp, plastics and
rubber, steel, and textiles have been the main sectors petitioning for anti-
dumping investigations during 1997–2009. The chemicals sector has domi-
nated China’s anti-dumping use with 104 of the 172 (60%) anti-dumping cases
investigated during 1997–2009. However, in terms of the share of import
value, only 8.6% of the imports in the chemicals sector were subject to anti-
dumping measures at its within-period peak in 2008. Perhaps surprisingly,
this ﬁgure is comparable to other sectors with many fewer investigations such
as paper and pulp, plastics and rubber and steel, each of which had a stock
of roughly 8% of industry imports subject to anti-dumping measures at their
respective peaks.
Since the increase in the number of new Chinese anti-dumping investiga-
tions during the crisis coincided with a period that also saw a large number of
3We use the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010b) for data
on China’s use of TTBs. In addition, we use imports data from Comtrade and tariﬀ data
from TRAINS via WITS. Further details on the data can be found in Chapter 1.
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measures being removed, we also investigate whether the new investigations
were ﬁled largely in order to replace those being removed. The data quickly
rule out such an explanation. While, in the years prior to the crisis, China’s
anti-dumping activity was dominated by relatively few sectors, a number of
‘new’ sectors that had never previously used anti-dumping sought initiations
in 2008–9. At the same time, other traditional users of anti-dumping in China,
such as paper and pulp and textiles, did not ﬁle any new anti-dumping inves-
tigations, even though several previously imposed anti-dumping measures on
products from these sectors were removed.
Next, we provide evidence that China uses anti-dumping to target both
developing and developed trading partners. The EU, Japan, South Korea and
USA are four of the largest targets of China’s anti-dumping activity, together
accounting for 111 of the 172 (65%) anti-dumping cases that China ﬁled during
1997–2009. These four economies also accounted for 62% of the total stock of
HS-06 product–country combinations subject to Chinese anti-dumping mea-
sures by 2009. China’s anti-dumping use exhibits other important diﬀerences
depending on whether the anti-dumping targeted a developed or developing
trading partner. For instance, while the total stock of HS-06 product–country
combinations aﬀected by anti-dumping measures decreased in 2009 com-
pared with 2008 for both groups, the decline was much greater for developing
economy exporters than the developed economy exporters.
An important question regarding China’s anti-dumping use during the
2008–9 crisis is the extent to which it is motivated by retaliation. For example,
China initiated anti-dumping investigations on imports of chicken parts and
autos from the USA almost immediately after the USA imposed a safeguard
on imports of Chinese tyres in September 2009.4 Many interpreted the tim-
ing of the new Chinese investigations as a direct response to the US actions
and raised the concern of a potential ‘trade war’. Other Chinese anti-dumping
cases with potential retaliatory motives include China imposing its own anti-
dumping duty on steel fasteners from the EU within months of the EU ini-
tiating an anti-dumping investigation on steel fasteners from China (Bown
2010b).5
While these examples are suggestive of retaliation being a contributing
motive to China’s anti-dumping use, this evidence is merely anecdotal. Fur-
thermore, while Bown (2011b) has found that a higher share of China’s exports
to developing countries are aﬀected by their anti-dumping than its exports to
4China eventually imposed anti-dumping duties as high as 105% on chicken parts in
September 2010. China also initiated and imposed CVD measures on chicken parts.
5EU producers initiated an anti-dumping investigation against imports of steel fasten-
ers from China in November 2007. China responded by initiating an anti-dumping inves-
tigation against steel fasteners from the EU in December 2008. Both economies targeted
imports of identical HS-06 products from each other’s market (the most disaggregated
level at which the classiﬁcation is comparable across countries), though the varieties of
the product produced by each country are likely to be diﬀerent.
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developed countries, we nevertheless ﬁnd that the majority of China’s anti-
dumping measures targeted imports from developed countries. Even among
the set of developed countries, one of China’s main anti-dumping targets is
Japan, a country that has not used anti-dumping actively against China.
We examine other features of China’s anti-dumping use during 1997–2009,
including the size of duties imposed, the relationship to changes in its applied
tariﬀs, and the duration of imposed measures. China’s average ad valorem
anti-dumping duty in 2009 was roughly 20%, as opposed to the within-period
peak of more than 95% in 2005. Furthermore, products that experienced a
larger reduction in China’s applied tariﬀ during its WTO accession were more
likely to be involved in a subsequent anti-dumping investigation. Finally, even
though the modal duration of Chinese anti-dumping measures is ﬁve years
(excluding anti-dumping measures in force as of end-2009), there are a num-
ber of products for which the ongoing anti-dumping measures have been
in place for much longer. In fact, China’s record in removing anti-dumping
orders after the mandated sunset review within ﬁve years is very poor. Only
40% of the anti-dumping measures that China imposed during 1999–2004
were removed by the end of 2009.
The last issue that we explore is the Chinese ﬁrm-level involvement in anti-
dumping investigations as petitioners, ﬁnding only a small number of partic-
ipating ﬁrms. Excluding the 9 instances in which an industry association ﬁled
the anti-dumping petition, only 141 ﬁrms participated as petitioners in inves-
tigations during 1997–2009. Furthermore, many of the ﬁrms participated in
only 1 anti-dumping case.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 constructs count- and
value-based measures described in Chapter 1 by Bown and documents broad
trends in China’s use of TTBs. Section 3 investigates the sectoral composition
of China’s anti-dumping use, and Section 4 examines China’s anti-dumping
use across diﬀerent groups of targeted countries. Section 5 highlights the rela-
tionship between China’s tariﬀ liberalisation and its subsequent anti-dumping
use, trends in anti-dumping duties, and the average duration of Chinese anti-
dumping measures. Section 6 illustrates the participation of Chinese ﬁrms as
petitioners in anti-dumping investigations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 CHINA’S USE OF TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
2.1 Broad Trends in China’s TTBs
Given that anti-dumping duty laws have been around for over a century, China
is one of the more recent users of anti-dumping. While China established the
principles of anti-dumping in its Foreign Trade Law of 1994, it only enacted
its ﬁrst anti-dumping law—the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulation—
in 1997 (Yu 2005). China initiated its ﬁrst anti-dumping investigation in 1997,
and by the end of 2009 it had investigated 172 separate anti-dumping cases.
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Figure 6.2: China’s anti-dumping investigations and aggregate imports, 1997–2009:
(a) China’s anti-dumping investigations; (b) China’s total import value by major trading
partners; (c) China’s total import value by main sectors involved in anti-dumping.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b) and Comtrade. The EU is
treated throughout as the set of 27 member countries. An anti-dumping case refers to
the product–country pair from a given anti-dumping petition. Imports refer to China’s
non-oil imports.
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Figure 6.2(a) shows the total number of China’s anti-dumping investigations
during this period by year.6 While China initiated only three anti-dumping
investigations in 1997, it gradually started increasing the number of anti-
dumping investigations until 2002. China initiated 30 new anti-dumping cases
in the year immediately following its entry into the WTO, twice as many as in
2001.
There could be several explanations for this increase in the number of anti-
dumping cases in 2002. The ﬁrst is the timing related to China’s December
2001 WTO entry. Prior to 2001, China was free to use other measures of trade
policy and thus there was no need to use anti-dumping. Because China’s WTO
accession was associated with a decrease in its applied import tariﬀs, this
could have triggered an increase in demand for non-tariﬀ barriers such as
anti-dumping. A second contributing explanation could be China’s adoption
of a new set of anti-dumping regulations. China’s ﬁrst anti-dumping law in
1997 was far from complete, and a number of its administrative procedures
led to confusion. For instance, the basis for calculating dumping margins for a
preliminary aﬃrmative determination was not disclosed to interested parties,
and the determination of injury and causation was not based on an objective
examination of suﬃcient evidence (Choi and Gao 2006). As part of its acces-
sion to the WTO, China enacted a more comprehensive and WTO-consistent
set of rules guiding anti-dumping and CVDs.7 Finally, a third possible expla-
nation could be a potential slowdown in the growth rate of China’s economy
during 2001–2 (see again Figure 6.1(b)).
After the increase in China’s anti-dumping ﬁlings in 2002, the number
of new anti-dumping cases decreased each year until 2008 when the trend
reversed.8 That the increase in new anti-dumping cases coincided with the
onset of the crisis is not necessarily evidence of a causal link. In fact, the
6In Figure 6.2, we treat the EU as a single economy and drop the duplicate cases in
which two or more EU members are investigated. For instance, in December 2000, China
initiated an anti-dumping investigation for dichloromethane (methylene chloride) against
four members of the EU: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. We count this as
one case against the EU. For consistency, we deﬁne ‘EU’ as all 27 countries for the entire
period even though some countries became members only midway through the period.
7The revision in 2002 was one of the main reforms to China’s anti-dumping regula-
tions, though a number of other smaller changes have taken place since. For instance, in
July 2004, China revised its anti-dumping rules to make the newly constructed Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) take anti-dumping responsibilities
away from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and The State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission. Another change during June 2004 was to include a clause
directing MOFCOM to consider public interest in anti-dumping determinations.
8The only exception to the steady decline over the period 2003–7 was in 2004 when the
total number of new anti-dumping cases increased to 26 after decreasing to 21 in 2003.
Note that one might expect to see a decline in the following year given the large number
of anti-dumping cases investigated in 2002. However, in 2003 the total number of cases
was still higher than the 1997–2009 average.
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average number of 14 investigations per year during the 2008–9 crisis period
is similar to that of the pre-crisis period (1997–2007).
Figure 6.2(a) also illustrates that a large share of China’s anti-dumping
investigations targeted developed trading partners. Of the 172 anti-dumping
cases initiated by China during 1997–2009, 138 (80%) were directed at devel-
oped economies. This is not surprising, since developed economies account
for a large fraction of China’s total imports. Figure 6.2(b) shows China’s non-
oil imports during this period broken down by developed and developing
trading partners. Even in 2009, China’s imports from developed countries
totalled $612 billion as opposed to approximately $200 billion from develop-
ing countries.
Table 6.1 gives more details on Chinese anti-dumping investigations and
their outcomes. Of the 166 anti-dumping cases that China initiated during
1997–2009 in which a ﬁnal decision has been made, 135 (81%) cases ultimately
resulted in the imposition of a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure.9 Furthermore,
almost all Chinese anti-dumping measures were in the form of ad valorem
duties; only eight cases resulted in a price undertaking. Moreover, each of the
price undertakings resulted from anti-dumping cases initiated prior to the
2008–9 crisis and were directed at developed economies.
Table 6.1 also documents outcome variation both across years and targeted
countries. China imposed a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure in only 13 of the 24
anti-dumping cases (54%) ﬁled in 2005, much lower than the period average of
81%. Of the 134 anti-dumping cases that China ﬁled against developed coun-
tries, 110 (82%) resulted in the imposition of a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure,
compared with 25 out of 32 cases (78%) ﬁled against developing countries.
Finally, cases targeting developed countries had a higher average ad valorem
anti-dumping duty rate during 1997–2009.
China has used other TTBs such as CVDs and global safeguards in addition
to anti-dumping. However, it has used anti-dumping much more frequently
than the other two policies. China initiated its ﬁrst CVD case in June 2009,
and by the end of 2009 it had already initiated three investigations over steel
products, chicken parts and autos. All three CVD cases targeted US exporters
and all three had a corresponding anti-dumping case.
China has been more restrained in its use of safeguards, having used this
TTB only once since its WTO accession. China imposed a safeguard in 2002
over imports of a number of steel products, coinciding with similar safeguards
that USA, the EU and a number of other countries imposed. China withdrew
the safeguards in 2003 in response to a similar removal by the USA and the EU.
9Six of the 17 cases initiated during 2009 are still being investigated. Of the 31 cases
initiated during 1997–2009 that did not result in the imposition of a ﬁnal anti-dumping
measure, 17 led to a negative injury determination, 5 were terminated and 9 were with-
drawn.
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Table 6.1: China’s anti-dumping initiations and outcomes: overall and by income
group, 1997–2009.
Number of
cases that
resulted Average Average
in ﬁnal minimum maximum
Number of anti-dumping ad valorem ad valorem
anti-dumping measures (%) anti-dumping anti-dumping
Year initiations    duty duty
(a) All cases
1997 3 3 (100) 48.0 70.3
1998 0 0 — — —
1999 7 7 (100) 25.8 58.3
2000 3 3 (100) 26.7 46.7
2001 15 9 (60) 8.6 32.1
2002 30 26 (86) 11.6 47.1
2003 21 20 (95) 63.5 105.5
2004 26 18 (69) 32.5 83.8
2005 24 13 (54) 13.8 42.7
2006 10 10 (100) 11.6 37.0
2007 4 4 (100) 6.3 51.6
2008 12 11 (91) 12.4 22.6
2009 11 11 (100) 11.9 39.4
Total 166 135 (81) 22.7 55.9
(b) Developed countries
1997 3 3 (100) 48.0 70.3
1998 0 0 — — —
1999 6 6 (100) 29.8 57.6
2000 3 3 (100) 26.7 46.7
2001 10 6 (66) 9.2 35.2
2002 24 20 (83) 10.5 50.0
2003 17 16 (94) 66.6 114.6
2004 22 15 (68) 37.5 80.8
2005 19 12 (63) 14.0 44.6
2006 9 9 (100) 11.8 37.0
2007 4 4 (100) 6.3 51.6
2008 11 10 (90) 13.1 22.6
2009 6 6 (100) 16.9 51.0
Total 134 110 (82) 24.4 58.7
2.2 The Share of China’s Imports Subject to Anti-Dumping
We start the analysis by constructing stock and ﬂow measures of the rele-
vant TTBs based on Bown (2011b). In particular, we follow Equation (1.1) and
Equation (1.2) of Chapter 1 and construct two separate measures of the use
of TTBs: the ﬁrst is based on the count of the HS-06 products aﬀected by the
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Table 6.1: Continued.
Number of
cases that
resulted Average Average
in ﬁnal minimum maximum
Number of anti-dumping ad valorem ad valorem
anti-dumping measures (%) anti-dumping anti-dumping
Year initiations    duty duty
(c) Developing countries
1997 0 0 — — —
1998 0 0 — — —
1999 1 1 (100) 6.0 62.0
2000 0 0 — — —
2001 5 3 (60) 7.3 26.0
2002 6 6 (100) 15.2 37.3
2003 4 4 (100) 51.3 69.0
2004 4 3 (75) 7.2 98.6
2005 5 1 (20) 12.2 20.4
2006 1 1 (100) 10.1 37.7
2007 0 0 — — —
2008 1 1 (100) 5.4 21.8
2009 5 5 (100) 5.9 25.5
Total 32 25 (78) 15.0 46.5
The table does not include the six additional anti-dumping cases initiated in 2009 that are still
ongoing.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b).
TTBs as a share of the total number of products imported, and the second is
a value-based measure that takes into account the share of China’s value of
imports aﬀected by TTBs.
Prior to 2006, China used the HS-06 product classiﬁcation to describe the
products involved in TTB investigations.10 Since 2006, China has started using
the more disaggregated HS-08 classiﬁcation.11 Since a majority of cases (72%)
are reported using the HS-06 classiﬁcation, we conduct our analysis at that
level. One caveat is that this approach can overstate the total share of imports
subject to TTBs for cases initiated after 2006 if only a fraction of the HS-08
products within an HS-06 category is subject to the TTB investigation. In our
case, all the underlying HS-08 products were involved in the investigations
in only 55% of the HS-06 products investigated during 2006–9. However, in
10The only exception is the safeguard case initiated in 2002 in which China used the
HS-08 classiﬁcation.
11In two anti-dumping cases involving paper and catechol, originally investigated in
2002, China reclassiﬁed the products involved in a subsequent review using a ﬁner HS-08
classiﬁcation rather than the original HS-06 classiﬁcation.
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order for our comparison across years to be meaningful, we rely on the HS-06
classiﬁcation.12
Figure 6.3 summarises our main results. Panels (a) and (b) refer to China’s
use of all TTB policies, while panels (c) and (d) report its use of anti-dumping
only. We report the count measure in panels (a) and (c) and the value mea-
sure in panels (b) and (d). The count- and value-based measures have similar
time series patterns over 1997–2009. The main diﬀerence is that the count
measure provides a lower estimate of the share of imports aﬀected by TTBs.
For instance, at its within-period peak in 2003, around 2% of HS-06 products
in China were under a TTB measure. However, these TTB measures aﬀected
4% of the value of China’s imports. This implies that China’s TTBs dispropor-
tionately target relatively high import value products.
One of the most striking observations from panels (a) and (b) of Figure 6.3
is a spike in 2002. A large part of this increase is due to China’s imposition of
the previously mentioned global safeguard on steel products. With the with-
drawal of the safeguard measure, China’s total stock of products subject to
TTB measures decreased to roughly 0.9% in 2004, less than half its level in
2003. Since 2004, the stock of products aﬀected by TTBs remained roughly
constant at 1.1% until it fell to 1.0% in 2009.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 6.3 focus on anti-dumping only and illustrate an
upward trend in China’s aﬀected imports until 2005. Under the count mea-
sure, the stock of HS-06 products under anti-dumping more than tripled from
0.3% before China’s accession to the WTO to 1.1% in 2005. The increase is even
larger under the import-value measure, where the share of imports aﬀected
by anti-dumping more than quadrupled from 0.5% in 2001 to 2.2% in 2005.
The stock of products under anti-dumping measures remained roughly sta-
ble from 2005 until the beginning of the crisis in 2008, before falling in 2009.
The decrease in the total stock of products under anti-dumping is especially
notable given that a large number of new anti-dumping cases were initiated
during 2008–9. The reduction in the stock is driven by the removal of several
existing anti-dumping measures during this period. The new anti-dumping
measures that were imposed during this period covered fewer HS-06 prod-
ucts and accounted for a smaller share of imports by value relative to the
anti-dumping measures being removed.
The ﬂow of new anti-dumping investigations reveals a similar pattern over
1997–2009 using either the count or the value of imports. The share of
importsaﬀectedbynewanti-dumpinginvestigationsincreasedin2002,reach-
ing the within-period peak. However, since the 2002 peak, the ﬂow of new
12While using the HS-06 classiﬁcation might overstate the share of imports aﬀected
by anti-dumping in terms of the value of imports, the direction of bias in terms of the
share of products aﬀected by anti-dumping could be the opposite. In fact, China initiated
anti-dumping investigations in 0.8% of the HS-08 products with non-zero imports during
2006–9. When we use the HS-06 classiﬁcation for the same period, the share of products
aﬀected by anti-dumping investigations was only 0.6%.
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Figure 6.3: China’s TTB imports using count and value measures for the period
1997–2009: (a) all TTBs (count); (b) all TTBs (value); (c) anti-dumping only (count).
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Figure 6.3: Continued: (d) Anti-dumping only (value).
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b) and Comtrade. The mea-
sures are based on Equations (1.1) and (1.2) from Chapter 1. The count measures
report the percentage of HS-06 digit products aﬀected by the relevant barrier. The
value measures report the share of the imports aﬀected by the corresponding mea-
sure. The stock measure corresponds to all measures currently in force (even if pre-
liminary) and the ﬂow measure corresponds to all new initiations.
anti-dumping investigations decreased steadily until 2007. With the onset of
the crisis in 2008, the share of products subject to new anti-dumping inves-
tigations reversed trend and again started to increase.
3 SECTORAL TARGETS OF CHINA’S ANTI-DUMPING
The chemicals sector ﬁled 104 (60%) of the 172 anti-dumping cases that China
initiated during 1997–2009.13 The other sectors that China targeted most
heavily in its anti-dumping investigations are plastics and rubber (32 cases),
paper and pulp (14 cases), steel (10 cases) and textiles (7 cases). Together
these ﬁve sectors account for 97% of China’s anti-dumping cases.
Nevertheless, there is no obvious trend in the value of industry-level
imports to explain this anti-dumping pattern. Figure 6.2(c) shows China’s
total non-oil merchandise imports between 1997–2009 for chemicals, paper
and pulp, plastics and rubber, and steel.14 These sectors combined accounted
for between 26-31% of China’s total imports each year during 1997–2009, and
China’stotalnon-oilimportsincreasedatanaverageannualrateof14%during
1997–2009. However, except for the paper and pulp industry, where imports
grew annually at only 10%, imports in each of the other three leading users
13The sectors are deﬁned according to the 21 HS sections.
14Textiles imports are included in the ‘others’ category in Figure 6.2(c). Textiles imports
decreased as a share of total imports from around 13% in 1996 to around 2% by 2009.
Moreover, textiles imports grew only at an annual average rate of 0.8% during 1997–2009.
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Figure 6.4: Share of China’s imports aﬀected by anti-dumping by sector, 1997–2009.
of anti-dumping (steel, chemicals, and plastics and rubber) grew at an annual
rate of 13–15%.
Figure 6.4 presents the time series pattern of the share of imports aﬀected
by China’s anti-dumping in each sector. The ﬁgure uses a slightly modiﬁed
version of Equation (1.2) from Chapter 1; here we restrict analysis to only
the sector in question. Despite accounting for the majority of China’s anti-
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Figure 6.4: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b) and Comtrade. These
measures are based on Equation (1.2) from Chapter 1. The ﬁgure shows the share of
import value in each sector aﬀected by anti-dumping.
dumping cases, the share of products aﬀected by anti-dumping in chemicals
is comparable to the other leading sectors that initiated many fewer cases. At
its within-period peak in 2008, about 8.6% of the total stock of imports in the
chemicals sector were aﬀected by China’s anti-dumping. This is similar to the
paper and pulp and plastics and rubber industries. And while the steel sector
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was involved in 10 times fewer anti-dumping cases (10 cases) than chemicals
(104 cases), China’s anti-dumping cases over steel products targeted almost
as large a share of industry imports, with a peak of 7.4% in 2003.
There are substantial diﬀerences across sectors in the time series patterns
of anti-dumping protection. China’s accession to the WTO was accompanied
by a ﬂow of new anti-dumping investigations in 2002 that accounted for
between 2% and 7% of the total imports in each sector. However, since 2002,
sectorshavehadverydiﬀerentpatternstotheﬂowofnewanti-dumpinginves-
tigations. China did not initiate any new anti-dumping investigation in the
steel sector until the beginning of the crisis in 2008. On the other hand, China
initiated new investigations in the chemicals sector each year since 2001. In
2009 alone, the chemicals sector had as much as 4.8% of imports under new
anti-dumpinginvestigations.Moreover,exceptforpaperandpulpandtextiles,
the ﬂow of new anti-dumping investigations increased during the 2008–9 cri-
sis in all of China’s leading sectoral users of anti-dumping.
Table 6.2 and 6.3 summarise and provide additional information on China’s
anti-dumping use across sectors. The second column of Table 6.2 reports
the share of HS-06 products in a given sector that were involved in an anti-
dumping investigation during 1997–2009. The next column reports a similar
measure but only refers to those products in which an anti-dumping measure
was imposed. Thus, diﬀerences between these two columns arise when an
investigation results in termination or withdrawal or if the investigation is
still pending. The fourth column reports the share of China’s imports by value
of the HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping measures at any point during
1997–2009.
Table 6.2 reveals that not all sectors in China have been involved in anti-
dumping activity; in fact, some sectors that account for a large share of
imports (eg machinery and electrical) had very little anti-dumping activity
during 1997–2009. Nevertheless, some sectors that are heavy users of anti-
dumping also account for a large share of China’s total imports. Steel and
chemicals accounted for 10% and 9% of China’s total merchandise imports
during this period, respectively. The products subject to China’s anti-dumping
also accounted for 12% and 13% of the value of steel and chemicals imports,
respectively.
Table 6.3 further breaks down this information into the period before and
during 2008–9. Though it is not reported in the table, China’s imports fell in
16 of the 21 sectors during the crisis.15 Some sectors that were heavy users
of anti-dumping before the crisis did not start new anti-dumping investiga-
tions during 2008–9 (see again Figure 6.4). Table 6.3 identiﬁes new sectors, ie
those that initiated anti-dumping investigations during the crisis period, and
reports the shares of HS-06 products under investigation. For example, China
15The ﬁve sectors in which imports continued to increase during this period were food
and beverages, steel, transport equipment, arms and ammunition, and miscellaneous.
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initiated new anti-dumping investigations on more than 4% of its HS-06 prod-
ucts in the transport equipment sector (autos). Other sectors such as animal
products (chicken parts) and other instruments started new investigations
covering 3.1% and 2% of each industry’s imports, respectively.
4 THE COUNTRY TARGETS OF CHINA’S ANTI-DUMPING
4.1 Countries: Overall Trends
China initiated anti-dumping investigations against 19 diﬀerent trading part-
ners between 1997 and 2009. South Korea was targeted with 32 anti-dumping
cases, followed by Japan (31), USA (28), the EU (20) and Taiwan (16). Combined,
these ﬁve countries accounted for 74% of China’s anti-dumping investigations.
Figure 6.5(a) shows the cumulative annual stock of HS-06 product–country
combinations subject to China’s anti-dumping measures by the targeted
exporting economy.16 Japan and South Korea together account for approxi-
mately 40% of China’s annual stock of product–country combinations aﬀected
by anti-dumping measures. On average, 64–71% of China’s stock of anti-
dumping measures were targeted at developed countries in each year during
2003–8. While the stock of products subject to China’s anti-dumping mea-
sures fell for both developed and developing trading partners in 2009, the
decline was much greater for anti-dumping measures targeting developing
countries.
The leading target countries are also among the major sources of China’s
imports. Panel (b) of Figure 6.2 shows the trend in the value of China’s imports
from its leading trade partners. Imports from the EU, Japan, South Korea and
USA together accounted for 53–60% of China’s total non-oil imports in each
year during 1997–2009. During this period, imports from South Korea and the
EU increased at an average annual rate of 16% and 15%, respectively, whereas
imports from Japan and USA grew at an annual rate of 11% and 12%, respec-
tively.
While the top ﬁve economies targeted by China are developed economies,
China has also frequently targeted developing economies such as India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Russia.17 Although a much smaller share of
China’s imports during 1997–2009 were from developing countries, imports
from developing countries grew at a faster rate (17.5%) than imports from
developed economies (13%).
16Figure 6.5(a) uses a slightly modiﬁed version of the count measure, where we only
use the numerator of Equation (1.2) of Chapter 1. Moreover, following Bown (2011b), we
construct the measure using the count of combinations of HS-06 products and the target
economy.
17We refer to all high-income countries according to the World Bank deﬁnition based
on gross national income per capita as ‘developed economies’ and the rest as ‘developing
economies’.
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(a)
(b)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1996 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Percent
AD stock
AD flow
Figure 6.5: China’s imports aﬀected by anti-dumping, by targeted trading partner,
1997–2009: (a) stock of products aﬀected by anti-dumping measure, by trading partner;
(b) share of imports from developed countries aﬀected by anti-dumping.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 6.5 focus on the share of China’s imports subject
to anti-dumping measures using the value measure. The ﬁgures rely on sep-
arately constructed measures for developed and developing trading partners
using the stock and ﬂow indicators based on Equation (1.2) of Chapter 1.18
The pattern in China’s ﬂow of anti-dumping investigations is similar for both
18The denominator in each case refers to the imports from that group only. Therefore,
if China imported very little from developing countries but all of its imports were subject
to anti-dumping measures, the import share aﬀected by anti-dumping would be 100%.
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Figure 6.5: Continued: (c) Share of imports from developing countries aﬀected by anti-
dumping.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b) and Comtrade. The mea-
sures in panel (a) are based on a slightly modiﬁed version of Equation (1.1) from Intro-
duction (Bown, this volume) in which we drop the denominator. The measures illus-
trate the annual stock of product-exporting–target-country combinations aﬀected by
anti-dumping measures. The measures in panels (b) and (c) are based on Equation (1.2)
from Chapter 1.
groups of countries; a large share of China’s imports were aﬀected by new
anti-dumping investigations during 2002, followed by a gradual decline until
2007, with a reversal in trend during the crisis years. Despite the similar-
ity in the pattern across both groups, the shares of imports aﬀected by new
anti-dumping investigations are very diﬀerent. For instance, in 2009, 1.2% of
China’s imports from developed economies were subject to new anti-dumping
investigations—almost as high as its within-period peak of 1.4% in 2002. On
the other hand, roughly 0.4% of imports from developing countries were
aﬀected by new anti-dumping investigations in 2009, which was only one-
fourth as much as the within-period peak of 1.6% in 2002. Thus, the ﬂow of
China’s anti-dumping investigations during 2008–9 against developing coun-
tries was much smaller than the new cases against developed economies. Sec-
ond, even within the set of developing country targets, the share of imports
aﬀected by new Chinese anti-dumping investigations during the crisis was
much smaller than previous years.
Between 1997 and 2003, the total stock of Chinese imports subject to anti-
dumping measures increased steadily, eventually aﬀecting 1.8% of China’s
imports from developing countries and 2.2% of China’s imports from devel-
oped countries. However, the two groups of countries show very diﬀerent
trends since 2003. While China’s total stock of imports from developed
economies subject to anti-dumping measures continued to increase until

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 222 — #242






222 The Great Recession and Import Protection
2007, there was a dramatic decrease in its stock of imports from develop-
ing countries subject to anti-dumping measures.
4.2 Countries: Sectoral Composition of Anti-Dumping
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 explore potential sectoral diﬀerences in China’s imports
aﬀected by anti-dumping depending on whether the targets were developed or
developing economies. Table 6.4 examines the pre-crisis period (1997–2007)
and Table 6.5 refers to 2008–9.
First consider Table 6.4. China has only targeted imports from developed
countries in the textiles sector, whereas in each of the other leading anti-
dumping sectors (chemicals, paper and pulp, plastics and rubber, and steel),
China targeted imports from both groups of countries. Moreover, in each sec-
tor in which China has used anti-dumping, the products involved in the anti-
dumping investigations form a much lower share of imports from developing
trading partners than the share of imports from developed trading partners.
For example, while 6.6% of the imported products from developed economies
in the paper and pulp sector were involved in anti-dumping investigations,
only 3.3% of paper and pulp products imported from developing countries
were involved.
Two striking features arise when comparing the pre-crisis period with
2008–9. First, China initiated several new anti-dumping investigations against
developed economies in sectors that had not previously participated in anti-
dumping investigations prior to the crisis. For the developing economy tar-
gets, the entire increase during 2008–9 was due to increased product coverage
in some of the traditional anti-dumping-using sectors. Second, the products
involved in anti-dumping investigations in new sectors accounted for a much
larger share of the value of imports. In the pre-crisis period, the largest share
of imports for products involved in anti-dumping investigations accounted
for only 14% of imports (plastics and rubber). During 2008–9, 35% of imports
in the transport equipment sector became subject to China’s anti-dumping
investigations.
5 TARIFFS, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AND THE
DURATION OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
5.1 China’s Anti-Dumping Duties
This section examines the magnitude of China’s anti-dumping duties and
explores whether China’s anti-dumping has become more or less prohibitive
over time. One of the features of anti-dumping is that it can be used to dis-
criminate between diﬀerent countries as well as between ﬁrms from the same
target country. We focus on the ad valorem anti-dumping duty rates in Bown
(2010b), which report the minimum and maximum ﬁrm-speciﬁc duties. We
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use these minimum and maximum rates to construct averages. Figure 6.6(a)
reports the average over all HS-06 products subject to an anti-dumping mea-
sure imposed that year across all targeted countries.19 The solid line in the
ﬁgure is the average of the maximum ad valorem rate for a given product
across all targeted countries, and the dashed line depicts the average of the
corresponding minimum rate. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that China’s average ad val-
orem anti-dumping duty fell over the sample. At the end of 2009, the maxi-
mum rate for products with new anti-dumping measures was only 20%, which
was signiﬁcantly lower than 70% in 1999 when China ﬁrst imposed an anti-
dumping duty. This trend is particularly evident in the ﬁve years following
the 2004 peak of the average rate.
Figure 6.6(b) reports the average maximum and minimum rates for the
stock of products with an anti-dumping duty in place that year.20 The aver-
age anti-dumping duty rate decreased over the sample period because of the
addition of new anti-dumping measures that had lower average ad valorem
anti-dumping rates than the existing measures. Nevertheless, the maximum
ad valorem anti-dumping duty was 60% even as late as 2009. Average anti-
dumping duties did not decrease at a faster rate despite the removal of pre-
viously imposed measures in 2008–9 because the measures being eliminated
had lower ad valorem rates.
5.2 The Relationship between Average Tariﬀ Rates and Anti-Dumping
There are a number of potential theories of the relationship between tariﬀs
and anti-dumping. Sectors with more political power may be successful in
both getting an anti-dumping measure imposed and lobbying for tariﬀ pro-
tection in the ﬁrst place. Alternatively, the prospect that protection through
anti-dumping might act as an ‘escape valve’ for tariﬀ liberalisation (Bagwell
and Staiger 1990; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001) suggests a positive relation-
ship between the extent of tariﬀ liberalisation and subsequent anti-dumping
use (see Bown and Tovar (2011) for evidence of this relationship in the case
of India).
While we do not attempt a systematic exploration of these competing
hypotheses, we explore potential diﬀerences between the average applied
19Figure 6.6 reports the average ad valorem rates based on HS-06 product–country com-
binations, whereas Table 6.1 reports average ad valorem anti-dumping duties at the anti-
dumping case level. Figure 6.6 takes the average over all products in which the duty was
imposed in that year, whereas Table 6.1 takes the average over all cases initiated in that
year.
20In later years, the anti-dumping duty faced by a given ﬁrm could be higher or lower
than the duty originally imposed because of administrative or interim reviews. However,
constructing a measure based on data collected from interim reviews is beyond the scope
of this study. Hence, for simplicity, we assume that the size of the anti-dumping duty rate
remained unchanged over the duration of the measure.
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Figure 6.6: China’s average anti-dumping duties conditional on a ﬁnal anti-dumping
measurebeingimposed:(a)productswithnewanti-dumpingmeasuresonly(ﬂow);(b)all
products with a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure in force (stock).
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b). Panel (a) reports the aver-
age ad valorem duty rate for all new measures conditional on a ﬁnal anti-dumping
measure being imposed. Panel (b) reports the same measure for all products that
have a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure in place.
tariﬀ rates for products that were involved in anti-dumping investigations
in China in comparison to products that were not. Figure 6.7 illustrates aver-
age tariﬀs for both groups of products during 1999–2009. The dashed line in
the ﬁgure refers to the average applied MFN tariﬀ rates for all HS-06 prod-
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ucts involved in an anti-dumping investigation at any point during the period
after China’s WTO accession (2002–9). The solid line represents the average
applied MFN tariﬀ rates for all other HS-06 products that were never involved
in Chinese anti-dumping investigations. Panel (a) of Figure 6.7 refers to all
imported products; the other graphs report the same analysis for China’s ﬁve
leading anti-dumping sectors: chemicals, paper and pulp, plastics and rubber,
steel, and textiles.21
The ﬁgure suggests a similar trend in the average tariﬀ across all of China’s
leading anti-dumping users. China’s average applied tariﬀ decreased signif-
icantly during 2001–3 for both groups of products (those involved in anti-
dumping investigations at any point during 2002–9 and those that were not).
Furthermore, for many of the leading sectors, the average tariﬀ for products
that were subsequently involved in an anti-dumping investigation decreased
at a faster rate and experienced a larger cut in absolute terms.22 The larger
decrease in absolute terms is noteworthy considering that, even prior to
China’s WTO accession, the average tariﬀ for products subsequently involved
in anti-dumping investigations was lower than the average tariﬀ for other
products. This suggests that products that experienced a larger tariﬀ reduc-
tion during China’s WTO accession were more likely to be involved in an anti-
dumping investigation subsequently.
5.3 The Duration of China’s Anti-Dumping Measures
According to WTO rules, members are required to conduct sunset reviews
of all anti-dumping orders at the end of ﬁve years to determine whether the
anti-dumping measure is still necessary. While WTO rules call for a manda-
tory sunset review, the members can extend the duration of the anti-dumping
measure if they ﬁnd a likely recurrence of dumping and injury.
As noted in Table 6.1, 135 of the 166 anti-dumping cases that China inves-
tigated during 1997–2009 resulted in the imposition of an anti-dumping mea-
sure.23 Of these 135 measures, 105 (78%) were still ‘in force’ as of end 2009,
ie China removed only 30 anti-dumping measures during 1999–2009. China
21We use data on China’s applied MFN ad valorem tariﬀ at the HS-06 level from TRAINS
through WITS. There is no tariﬀ data for China for 2002.
22The only exceptions to this were plastics and rubber and steel in which average tariﬀs
decreased at a similar rate. The average tariﬀ in the steel sector decreased from 9.6% in
2000 to 7.9% in 2003 for the products that were never investigated with anti-dumping,
and the average tariﬀ for the products involved in anti-dumping decreased from 8.5% in
2001 to 6.9% in 2003—a decrease of 18% in each case. Similarly, the average tariﬀs for the
plastics and rubber sector decreased by 33% and 36% during 2001–3, for products that
were in subsequent anti-dumping investigations and those that were not, respectively.
23Six additional anti-dumping investigations in 2009 are still ongoing.
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Figure 6.7: China’s average applied tariﬀs for products aﬀected by anti-dumping, over-
all and by sector (1999–2009).
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Figure 6.7: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b) and TRAINS using WITS.
Applied tariﬀ rates are simple averages with data from TRAINS at the HS-06 level.
Products are classiﬁed as anti-dumping if they were involved in an anti-dumping
investigation in China at any time during 2002–9, ie the period after China’s WTO
accession.
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removed 20 of these 30 anti-dumping measures during the 2008–9 crisis.
On the one hand, it is not surprising that China removed so many anti-
dumping measures during the crisis given that a large number of cases had
been imposed in 2002–3; ie many cases were scheduled for a sunset review
in 2008. Nevertheless, this is not meant to suggest that China is successful at
removing its anti-dumping measures ‘on time’, ie after ﬁve years. In 2008–9,
China removed only 11 of the 34 (32%) anti-dumping measures imposed dur-
ing 2002–3.
Figure 6.8(a) shows the duration (in years) of all Chinese anti-dumping mea-
sures imposed during 1997–2009 categorised by whether the anti-dumping
measure has been removed. First focus on the anti-dumping measures that
have been removed by 2009. Of the 30 removed measures, 15 (50%) were
removed after ﬁve years. Adding the number of measures that were removed
in the fourth and sixth years, and given that we are using annual ﬁgures
rather than the exact date at which the anti-dumping measure was imposed or
removed,thisnumberincreasesto22cases(73%).24 Thus,alargeshareofanti-
dumping measures that have been removed were removed around the sunset
review period of ﬁve years. However, if we include the measures that have
not yet been removed as of end 2009, a very diﬀerent picture emerges. Many
Chinese anti-dumping measures that were in force as of 2009 were imposed
more than ﬁve years earlier.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 6.8 focus on the Chinese anti-dumping measures
that were imposed prior to 2005 and that already completed the ﬁve-year
period required for the initial sunset review. Figure 6.8(b) shows the number
of anti-dumping measures based on whether they have been removed, further
subdividing the removed cases according to whether they were removed at,
before, or after the expected ﬁve-year term. With the exception of 1999, a
large share of the measures imposed before China’s accession to the WTO
have been removed on time. However, this is not the case for anti-dumping
measures that China imposed after it entered the WTO.
Figure 6.8(c) provides data by year that examine the percentage of anti-
dumping measures imposed more than ﬁve years earlier that have not been
removed. Between 2005 and 2009, the share of anti-dumping measures that
were not removed but that were imposed ﬁve or more years earlier varied
between 40% to 60%. The exception is 2004, when none of the three anti-
dumping measures (originally imposed in 1999) were removed. Figure 6.8(c)
also shows that the share of anti-dumping measures not removed on time
increased slightly during the crisis.
24The sunset review investigations could also last for several months, thus the measures
removed in six years were presumably removed after the completion of the sunset review.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.8: Duration of China’s anti-dumping measures: (a) all anti-dumping cases
conditional on a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure being imposed, 1999–2009; (b) all
anti-dumping cases conditional on a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure being imposed,
1999–2004; (c) percentage of anti-dumping measures imposed ﬁve or more years ear-
lier that have not been removed.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b).
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6 THE PARTICIPATION OF CHINESE FIRMS
IN ANTI-DUMPING CASES AS PETITIONERS
According to China’s anti-dumping regulations, the government can initiate
an anti-dumping investigation after a petition is submitted by or on behalf of
the domestic industry. While the government authority concerned (Ministry
of Commerce People’s Republic of China) could also self-initiate a petition, a
group of ﬁrms representing the industry has initiated almost all of the anti-
dumping cases in China until 2009.25
We pause at this stage to make three clariﬁcations. First, anti-dumping peti-
tions ﬁled against the imports of a given product may be directed towards
more than one country. Thus, here we refer to each product–country com-
bination as a separate anti-dumping case. Second, there are nine instances
during 1997–2009 in which an industry association (and not individual ﬁrms)
ﬁled the anti-dumping petition. We drop these cases from our analysis since
the number of ﬁrms within the association that support the petition is
unknown.26 Third, on occasion, subsidiaries of the same corporation par-
ticipate in ﬁling the petition. For example, in 2007 China initiated an anti-
dumping investigation on imports of acetone from Japan, South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan. Two of the petitioners were Beijing Yanshan Branch Sinopec
and Shanghai Gaoqiao Branch Sinopec. In our analysis, we treat these as two
distinct ﬁrms even though both are subsidiaries of the same corporation. We
justify this under the assumption that subsidiaries of the same corporation
may engage in very diﬀerent operations.
During 1997–2009, only 141 Chinese ﬁrms participated in the anti-dump-
ing proceedings as petitioners. Furthermore, the average number of ﬁrms
involved in a given anti-dumping case is also very small. Figure 6.9(a) shows
the distribution of Chinese ﬁrms involved in an anti-dumping case as petition-
ers during 1997–2009. Three or fewer petitioning ﬁrms were involved in 128
of the 163 anti-dumping cases (80%). While 14 ﬁrms were listed as petitioners
in 1 case, 37 anti-dumping cases (23%) listed only 1 petitioning ﬁrm.
Table 6.6 shows the average number of ﬁrms participating as petitioners
for each year during 1997–2009. There is little diﬀerence in how many ﬁrms
25According to Chinese anti-dumping regulations, the domestic industry constitutes the
ﬁrms producing like products. In addition, for the government authority to initiate the
anti-dumping case, the anti-dumping petition should be supported by a majority of the
industry, ie ﬁrms representing at least 50% of the output (Wang and Yu 2002).
26Through 2009, only ﬁve ‘associations’ were petitioners in anti-dumping investiga-
tions: China’s Industrial Association of Mechanical General Parts, China Methanol Associ-
ation, China Animal Agricultural Association, China Association of Automobile Manufac-
turers, and Chemical Fiber Industry Association of China. Together, these ﬁve associations
accounted for nine separate anti-dumping cases.
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Figure 6.9: Chinese anti-dumping petitioning ﬁrms, 1997–2009: (a) Chinese ﬁrms
involved in an anti-dumping case as petitioners; (b) anti-dumping cases ﬁled by peti-
tioning Chinese ﬁrms.
Source: author’s calculation. Each unique petitioner identiﬁed separately in the anti-
dumping petition is deﬁned as a separate ﬁrm even if they are subsidiaries of a single
corporation. We exclude cases where the petition was ﬁled by an industry associa-
tion. Each anti-dumping case is deﬁned as a separate product–country anti-dumping
investigation.
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Table 6.6: Participation of Chinese ﬁrms as petitioners in anti-dumping cases between
1997 and 2009: number of ﬁrms.
Average Average
number number
of ﬁrms of ﬁrms
listed as listed as
petitioners Total petitioners Total
in an number of in an number of
anti-dumping anti-dumping anti-dumping anti-dumping
Year case cases petition petitions
1997 9.0 3 9.0 1
1998 — 0 — 0
1999 3.0 7 3.0 4
2000 2.0 3 2.0 1
2001 3.2 13 3.3 4
2002 3.8 30 3.6 9
2003 2.6 21 4.0 6
2004 2.0 26 2.0 8
2005 2.3 24 1.9 7
2006 2.5 10 2.8 5
2007 3.0 4 3.0 1
2008 1.2 11 1.2 5
2009 3.7 11 2.8 5
Total 2.8 163 2.8 56
A single anti-dumping petition for a product may be directed against more than one country. We
treat each product–country combination as a separate anti-dumping case. In addition, we drop the
nine cases where the anti-dumping petition was ﬁled by an industry association during this period.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010b).
participated in an anti-dumping investigation before and during the 2008–9
crisis. Except for 1997, the average number of petitioners varied between two
and four until 2007. Though the anti-dumping cases ﬁled during 2008 had
relatively fewer ﬁrms listed as petitioners, it increased again in 2009.
We next explore the average number of anti-dumping cases in which
each ﬁrm participates. Figure 6.9(b) reports that the modal number of anti-
dumping cases in which a ﬁrm participates is three, with more than 50 ﬁrms
participating in three anti-dumping cases during 1997–2009. One ﬁrm, Jilin
Chemical Co. Ltd., was involved in 14 separate anti-dumping cases and was
listed as a petitioner in 4 separate anti-dumping petitions during 1997–2009
(Table 6.7). Of the 141 ﬁrms that have participated in Chinese anti-dumping
investigations, 128 (91%) were involved in only one anti-dumping petition each
up until 2009.
Although a number of ﬁrms participated in multiple anti-dumping cases,
Figure 6.9(b) shows that, of the 141 ﬁrms, 29 (21%) participated in just one
anti-dumping case. These ﬁrms were involved in anti-dumping petitions that
targeted imports from only one trading partner.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examines the underlying trends in China’s use of a particular set
of non-tariﬀ barriers (collectively referred to as TTBs). We focus on historical
patterns in China’s use of TTBs and examine whether this pattern changed
during the 2008–9 crisis. The share of China’s imports subject to TTB mea-
sures during 2008–9 was not very diﬀerent from previous years, and in fact
had declined compared with 2007. Nevertheless, a more detailed exploration
of the data reveals a number of potential changes to this trend.
Although China’s total stock of imports subject to anti-dumping measures
decreased during the crisis, China initiated a number of new investigations.
This increase in new anti-dumping investigations was a reversal of the existing
pattern, as the ﬂow of China’s anti-dumping investigations had generally been
decreasing since 2003. Furthermore, a number of Chinese anti-dumping inves-
tigations over sizeable amounts of imports are still pending. Finally, another
notable feature of 2008–9 was the new industries for which China initiated an
anti-dumping investigation for the ﬁrst time, including transport equipment
and animal products.
Furthermore, although China removed a number of anti-dumping measures
during the crisis period, there were many cases in which the duration of previ-
ously imposed anti-dumping measures surpassed ﬁve years without removal.
Turning TTBs into quasi-permanent protection is potentially troubling.
Our analysis also revealed a number of other interesting patterns in China’s
use of TTBs. We ﬁnd that, during 1997–2009, a much larger share of China’s
TTBs targeted developed countries than developing countries. Even at its
peak, only 1.5% of China’s total imports from developing countries were sub-
ject to anti-dumping measures, much lower than the respective within-period
peak of 2.5% for the developed countries. Moreover, during the crisis, China’s
stockofimportssubjecttoanti-dumpingmeasuresdecreasedatamuchfaster
rate for developing countries as compared with developed countries. This
stands in contrast to many other developing countries in which the pattern
of anti-dumping has increasingly become more ‘south–south’.
We also explore participation by Chinese ﬁrms as petitioners in the anti-
dumping proceedings and ﬁnd it to be surprisingly small. Only 141 Chinese
ﬁrms were involved in anti-dumping activities as petitioners during 1997–
2009, and 128 (91%) of these ﬁrms have ﬁled only one petition. In a large
number of anti-dumping cases, the anti-dumping petitions were ﬁled by only
one Chinese ﬁrm.
We conclude with one ﬁnal caveat. While this chapter focused on instru-
ments of contingent protection (anti-dumping, CVDs and global safeguards),
these TTBs are not the only instruments of import protection. During the cri-
sis, many countries, including China, resorted to protectionism through indi-
rect and often disguised means such as bailouts, local content requirements,
and subsidies (Global Trade Alert 2009). For instance, in June 2009, the Chi-
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nese government made more stringent ‘buy Chinese’ provisions in its new
stimulus program. Similarly, in May 2009, China’s National Development and
Reform Commission and a number of Chinese Ministries signed a notiﬁcation
to give priority to the local content in government contracts. A more com-
plete picture of the policy responses during the crisis would therefore require
accounting for many other instruments of protectionism beyond TTBs.
Piyush Chandra is Assistant Professor of Economics at Colgate University.
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India: The Use of Temporary Trade Barriers
PATRICIA TOVAR1
1 INTRODUCTION
India implemented a signiﬁcant unilateral trade liberalisation reform as part
of an arrangement requested from the IMF in 1991 following a balance-
of-payments crisis. With the reform, the import-weighted average tariﬀ
decreased from 87.0% in 1990–1 to 24.6% in 1996–7. The sharpest tariﬀ reduc-
tions took place from 1991 to 1992, and while India had not used the WTO-
permitted ‘contingent’ forms of import protection such as anti-dumping, safe-
guards or countervailing measures before, it initiated its ﬁrst anti-dumping
investigation in 1992 and went on to become the WTO system’s foremost
user of anti-dumping policies by 2001. India also initiated its ﬁrst safeguard
investigation in 1997.
In this chapter we examine India’s use of anti-dumping, safeguards and
countervailing measures—collectively referred to as TTBs—from 1992 to
2009, making use of detailed product-level data from the World Bank’s Tem-
porary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a). We also study the use of such
policies during the global recession years of 2008–9 and compare it with
trends from previous years. We focus on whether there have been important
changes not only regarding India’s aggregate use of TTBs, but also their inci-
dence across products, sectors and targeted countries, the amount of time
that these ‘temporary’ measures stay in place, and the relationship between
their use and India’s WTO commitments regarding applied tariﬀs.
Although India’s ﬁnancial sector was not overexposed to subprime lend-
ing and was thus able to avoid the direct eﬀects of the global ﬁnancial crisis,
its economy was severely aﬀected by the worldwide recession (see, for exam-
ple, Bajpai 2010). As shown in Figure 7.1, India’s growth in GDP per capita
decreased from 8.2% in 2007 to 3.7% in 2008. Moreover, exports and imports
1Department of Economics, MS021, Brandeis University, PO Box 549110, Waltham,
MA 02454- 9110, USA. Email: tovar@brandeis.edu. I would like to thank Chad Bown, Bay-
bars Karacaovali, Michael Moore and Raymond Robertson for helpful comments. I also
thank Aksel Erbahar for his help with providing the data.
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Figure 7.1: India’s exports, imports and growth in GDP per capita, 1995–2009.
Source: World Bank (2010).
decreased sharply in 2009, in contrast to previous periods of economic con-
traction such as 1997 and the early 2000s. During the recent recession there
was also considerable discussion in the media about a potential trade war with
China due to India’s extension of its ban on imports of Chinese dairy products
and the imposition of a temporary ban on imports of Chinese toys in 2009,
as well as the large number of anti-dumping investigations initiated against
China over a variety of products (including steel and textiles) in 2008–9 (see,
for example, Times of India 2009a,b; Hindustan Times 2009). This raises the
question of whether India’s ‘protectionism’ changed during the global eco-
nomic crisis.
We ﬁrst provide information on the behaviour of India’s aggregate and
product-level use of anti-dumping—both the ‘ﬂow’ of new investigations as
well as the ‘stock’ of measures in place—over time. While the ﬂow data indi-
cate that the annual share of eight-digit Harmonized System (HS) products
subject to a new anti-dumping investigation reached a peak of 2.10% in 2007,
the stock measure in particular allows us to infer that the product coverage
of anti-dumping policies increased from 1992 through 2009. Moreover, the
percentage of products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures as well as the per-
centage of India’s import value with anti-dumping measures in place experi-
enced a sizeable increase during the recession years of 2008 and 2009. Using
data at the tariﬀ line (eight-digit HS) product level, we ﬁnd that the percentage
of products subject to anti-dumping measures increased from 1.82% in 2007
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to 4.03% in 2009, and that this increase is larger than what the pre-crisis trend
would predict.
Our next contribution is to examine the use of anti-dumping policy by sec-
tor. Almost half of India’s anti-dumping investigations were initiated by the
chemicals sector, and the other main users of anti-dumping have been plas-
tics/rubber, machinery/electrical, metals and textiles. Those sectors also have
the largest number of anti-dumping initiations worldwide. Furthermore, those
sectors were the top ﬁve users of anti-dumping in India during the global
recession of 2008–9, and most of them have displayed an increasing trend in
the percentage of sectoral import value aﬀected by anti-dumping measures
since 1992. Finally, those main users of anti-dumping also account for an
important fraction of India’s import value—37% for the 1992–2009 period—
which indicates that anti-dumping policy may have economically important
eﬀects in India.
We then study the countries that are aﬀected by India’s anti-dumping poli-
cies. China was the most frequent target of Indian anti-dumping (in terms
of both investigations and measures imposed), and the average size of the
anti-dumping import restriction against China is also the highest of any tar-
geted country. This bias in the incidence of anti-dumping policy against China
accelerated during 2008–9. More broadly, the share of investigations target-
ing developing countries increased from 48% in 1992–2007 to 71% in 2008–9,
while the share of imports from those countries remained fairly stable.2 The
shift in incidence towards China and other developing countries over time
is also observed with regard to the stock of product–exporter combinations
that are aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure. In 1997, 53% of India’s stock
of anti-dumping measures aﬀected developed countries, 22% aﬀected China,
and 24% aﬀected other developing countries. In contrast, by 2009, only 25%
of the stock of measures was imposed against developed countries, while 39%
was imposed against China and 36% was imposed against other developing
countries. This result is consistent with Bown’s (2011b) argument that anti-
dumping is increasingly a ‘south–south’ phenomenon.3
We also ﬁnd that there are several instances in which, having imposed an
anti-dumping measure in a previous year, India imposed new anti-dumping
measuresagainstdiﬀerentexportersofthesameproductinsubsequentyears.
We also provide some evidence (subject to the available data) that, in an impor-
tant number of those cases, the newly aﬀected exporting countries had not
exported the product to India in the years preceding the initial investigation.
These results suggest that trade diversion has played an important role lead-
ing to additional use of anti-dumping policy. The results might also mean
2The share of imports from China did exhibit a substantial increase, as we detail in
Section 3.3.
3Bown (2011b) performs a cross-country examination of the use of TTBs over time and
uses product data at the six-digit HS level. We use more disaggregated tariﬀ-line data at
the eight-digit HS product level for India.
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that India is using anti-dumping policy as a form of import protection not
conditional on the actual presence of dumping.
We then examine the actual duration of India’s anti-dumping measures.
According to the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement, a ‘sunset review’ process
should take place after ﬁve years of the imposition of a measure, and the
measure should be removed unless it is determined that its removal would be
likely to generate injury due to renewed dumping. We ﬁnd that 60% of the mea-
sures imposed were removed after no more than ﬁve years. Moreover, anti-
dumping measures in the chemical sector and measures against China both
tend to last longer than the average. In addition, we ﬁnd that another dimen-
sion through which anti-dumping protection increased during the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008–9 was the failure to remove policies imposed prior to
the crisis that were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the
ﬁve-year limit.
Another issue that we consider is potential evidence that India used anti-
dumping to increase import restrictions to levels that would otherwise violate
the rules of the WTO system. For example, if India were to have increased its
applied tariﬀ rate instead, how often would that result in a violation of its
WTO commitments? We ﬁnd some evidence consistent with that argument,
and we also provide additional evidence of a shift in India’s anti-dumping
protection towards developing countries during the recent global recession.
Although anti-dumping has been the dominant TTB in India, we also exam-
ine other relatively substitutable forms of temporary import protection. We
begin by characterising India’s use of global safeguards over time and ﬁnd
that, although the largest number of safeguard investigations was initiated
during the global economic crisis of 2008–9, most of them did not result
in the imposition of a ﬁnal safeguard measure. We also provide information
regarding the sectors with higher safeguard activity as well as the number of
products aﬀected. The chemical sector is, again, the main user of safeguard
measures in India. Next, we describe India’s use of China-speciﬁc safeguards
as well as countervailing measures. There was an increase in the use of China-
speciﬁc safeguards during the recent global economic crisis that aﬀected var-
ious imported products. India has only initiated one countervailing measure
investigation so far, which took place in 2009 and also targeted China.
Our ﬁnal contribution is to study whether the alternative forms of TTBs
have been used across similar products and/or sectors. Overall, we ﬁnd that,
while there is not much overlap of diﬀerent TTBs over the same (eight-digit
HS) products, there is substantial overlap regarding the sectors that use those
policies. Furthermore, those features of the use of TTBs have not changed
much during the global recession years. We also examine the interaction
between the use of TTBs and applied import tariﬀs. Moreover, we relate our
results to those of Bown and Tovar (2011), who study the link between India’s
tariﬀ liberalisation reform and its subsequent use of anti-dumping and safe-
guard policies in 2000–2002.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we pro-
vide an overview of India’s trade liberalisation experience. Section 3 exam-
ines India’s use of anti-dumping. Section 4 describes the use of other TTBs
by India, including global safeguards, China-speciﬁc safeguards and counter-
vailing measures. In Section 5 we examine the interaction among alternative
TTBs, as well as their interaction with MFN applied tariﬀs. We conclude in
Section 6.
2 INDIA’S UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALISATION
India was one of the initial 23 contracting parties to the 1947 General Agree-
ment on Tariﬀs and Trade that laid the groundwork for the post-World War II,
rules-based trading system (Irwin et al 2008). India was one of the main pro-
tagonists in the eﬀort to obtain major exceptions to basic WTO rules that
limited the use of quantitative restrictions and tariﬀs.
Between 1947 and the late 1980s, India followed an inwards-orientated
development strategy. It was characterised by import protection, complex
industrial licensing requirements, signiﬁcant intervention in ﬁnancial mar-
kets, and government ownership of heavy industry (Cerra and Saxena 2002).
International trade was signiﬁcantly restricted by high tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ
barriers, which included import licensing, state monopoly of some imports
and exports (‘canalisation’), government purchases that favoured domestic
producers, and restrictions on imports by intermediaries.
A combination of external shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s led
to larger macroeconomic imbalances. Increased import costs due to high oil
prices, a decrease in remittances from Indian workers because of the conﬂict
in the Middle East, weak demand in export markets, a deterioration of the
ﬁscal position and the current account deﬁcit, high external debt, and ris-
ing political uncertainty led to a loss of conﬁdence by investors and capital
outﬂows. The loss of international reserves continued and ended in a severe
balance-of-payments crisis (see Cerra and Saxena (2002) for a discussion of
the factors that led to the crisis).
In August 1991, India requested a standby arrangement from the IMF. One
of the conditions for the arrangement was that India had to implement major
structural reforms, including trade liberalisation, ﬁnancial sector reform and
tax reform.
Before the reform, in 1990–1, the import-weighted average of tariﬀs was
87%, the simple average was 128% and some tariﬀs were over 300%. More-
over, non-tariﬀ barriers (especially quantitative restrictions) aﬀected imports
of 65% of all products and 90% of manufactures (Srinivasan 2001). The sub-
sequent reform package included a signiﬁcant reduction in the average level
as well as the dispersion of tariﬀs. The maximum tariﬀ fell from 355% in
1990–1 to 150% in 1991–2, and to 30.8% by 2002–3. The weighted average
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tariﬀ decreased from 87% in 1990–1 to 24.6% in 1996–7, although it then
gradually increased to 38.5% in 2001–2. The increase coincided with a signif-
icant lifting of quantitative restrictions (Narayanan 2006) and was possible
because India’s tariﬀ bindings from the Uruguay Round were set at much
higher levels than the applied rates (Srinivasan 2001).4 The simple average
tariﬀ rate fell from 128% in 1990–1 to 34.4% in 1997–8. It then increased to
40.2% in 1998–9 but continued to decrease after that. In 2002–3, the simple
and weighted averages of tariﬀs were 29% (Narayanan 2006).
AsreportedbyTopalova(2004),therewasasharpdecreaseintariﬀsinmost
industries from 1991 to 1992—the sharpest reduction in average tariﬀs and
their dispersion took place from 1991 to 1992. Quantitative restrictions on
most imports have been eliminated. In 1991, most quantitative restrictions on
intermediate and capital goods were removed and the list of goods subject to
quantitative restrictions was reduced signiﬁcantly (although it was still long)
to include mainly consumer goods and agricultural products.5 The Uruguay
Round agreement, signed in 1994, required the elimination of quantitative
restrictions and India’s quantitative restrictions expired on 1 April 2001.6
As a result of the reforms, total trade as a percentage of GDP increased
from an average of 13% in the 1980s to almost 19% in 1999–2000. The vol-
ume of exports and imports has also increased signiﬁcantly since the early
1990s (Topalova 2004). Lastly, and importantly, the ﬁrst anti-dumping case
was initiated in 1992.
3 INDIA’S USE OF ANTI-DUMPING
India introduced legislation on anti-dumping in 1985, and it was subse-
quently reformed to conform with obligations after 1995. In 1998, a separate
division—the Directorate-General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties—was
created within the Department of Commerce, which had more staﬀ and ded-
icated resources to manage anti-dumping complaints and recommend anti-
dumping duties. Narayanan (2006) also reports that, in the 1990s, the gov-
ernment frequently and publicly informed the domestic industries about the
4India imposed bindings on 62% of the tariﬀ lines of industrial products. Before the
Uruguay Round, only 3% of tariﬀ lines had bindings (National Board of Trade 2005).
5According to estimates by the World Bank, the share of imports from all sectors
included in their study and covered by non-tariﬀ barriers decreased from 95% in 1988–9
to 62% in 1998–9, and to 24% in 1999–2000 (Srinivasan 2001).
6A small number of quantitative restrictions permitted under Articles XX and XXI of the
GATT remain on grounds of health, safety and moral conduct (Narayanan 2006).
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availability of anti-dumping (and safeguard) measures. Duties are levied by
the Ministry of Finance.7
3.1 Anti-Dumping Investigations and Measures
Table 7.1 documents the year-by-year data on India’s anti-dumping use
between its ﬁrst case, initiated in 1992 just after the 1991 commencement
of the trade liberalisation reforms, through 2009.8 As India started the pro-
cess of trade liberalisation, the use of anti-dumping took oﬀ, and presented
an increasing trend until 2002. There is a decrease in the number of initia-
tions in 2003 and 2004, but an increase thereafter until 2008. In conjunction
with the spread of the global economic crisis, India initiated 54 anti-dumping
cases in 2008 and another 32 during 2009.9
In addition to the data on new industry demands for anti-dumping protec-
tion, Table 7.1 also presents a breakdown over time of the number of investi-
gations begun each year that resulted in the imposition of new import restric-
tions. Of the 588 investigations started in the period 1992–2009, 420, or 71%,
have resulted in the imposition of new deﬁnitive trade barriers. Excluding
2009, for which some data on ﬁnal measures are not yet available, that share
increases to 74%. A lack of evidence of dumping was found in only 26 cases
and no injury was found in 42 cases. Only 16 cases were withdrawn or termi-
nated. The main implication of these ﬁgures is that not only is the number of
Indian anti-dumping initiations high, but the vast majority of cases result in
the imposition of new trade barriers.
The combined information on the large number of Indian anti-dumping
cases and the high frequency with which they result in new and deﬁnitive
import restrictions raises a number of basic questions about the economic
scale of this particular form of import protection. For example, despite the
2003–6 relative drop in frequency of newly initiated investigations, by other
measures the scope of anti-dumping protection steadily increased through-
out the entire 1992–2009 period. Consider Figure 7.2(a), which, instead of
7On the requirements to initiate an investigation as well as a timeline for the ﬁndings
and imposition of duties, see, for example, Aggarwal (2002) and National Board of Trade
(2005).
8Indian anti-dumping data are taken from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010a). The working paper accompanying the database describes the detailed data,
but, in short, the data for India were taken directly from what the Directorate General of
Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce publicly reported in Gazette
of India (http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm).
9During the period between 1995 and 2009, India was the top initiator of anti-dumping
cases, followed by the USA, the EU, Argentina and South Africa. India also had the highest
number of anti-dumping measures imposed. As we discuss in more detail below, in 2009
India started to use more aggressively other substitutable forms of contingent protection
aside from anti-dumping, including global safeguards (see also Table 7.1), China-speciﬁc
safeguards and even countervailing (‘anti-subsidy’) measures.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 250 — #270






250 The Great Recession and Import Protection
T
a
b
l
e
7
.
1
:
I
n
d
i
a
’
s
a
n
t
i
-
d
u
m
p
i
n
g
a
n
d
g
l
o
b
a
l
s
a
f
e
g
u
a
r
d
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
,
1
9
9
2
–
2
0
0
9
.
A
n
t
i
-
d
u
m
p
i
n
g
G
l
o
b
a
l
s
a
f
e
g
u
a
r
d
s








T
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
P
r
e
l
i
m
.
F
i
n
a
l
N
o
N
o
o
r
F
i
n
a
l
N
o
o
r
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
u
m
p
i
n
g
i
n
j
u
r
y
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
n
M
i
s
s
i
n
g
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
i
n
j
u
r
y
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
n
1
9
9
2
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
4
7
1
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
5
6
6
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
6
2
1
2
1
1
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
7
1
3
1
2
1
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
9
9
8
2
8
1
9
1
8
3
5
2
1
5
3
0
1
1
9
9
9
6
3
5
1
4
9
9
9
2
3
3
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
4
1
2
9
3
2
0
0
0
4
2
1
0
0
2
0
0
1
7
7
6
2
6
2
4
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
7
7
6
7
5
6
3
4
1
8
2
1
1
0
2
0
0
3
4
5
1
2
2
6
7
1
4
4
1
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
2
0
9
9
0
4
1
4
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
5
1
8
1
9
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
6
3
0
1
5
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
7
4
4
2
3
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
8
5
4
3
3
3
2
0
0
3
0
2
1
0
0
2
0
0
9
∗
3
2
3
1
7
0
0
0
2
4
9
1
0
4
T
o
t
a
l
5
8
8
4
1
4
4
2
0
2
6
4
2
1
6
5
0
2
6
1
1
1
5
∗
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
ﬁ
n
a
l
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
f
o
r
s
o
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
n
t
i
-
d
u
m
p
i
n
g
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
o
n
e
g
l
o
b
a
l
s
a
f
e
g
u
a
r
d
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
2
0
0
9
i
s
s
t
i
l
l
n
o
t
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
a
u
t
h
o
r
’
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
u
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
B
o
w
n
(
2
0
1
0
a
)
.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 251 — #271






India: The Use of Temporary Trade Barriers 251
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7.2: India’s use of anti-dumping: (a) percentage of imported six-digit HS prod-
ucts with new anti-dumping initiations and measures; (b) percentage of import value
with new anti-dumping initiations and measures (using data at the six-digit HS level);
(c) percentage of imported eight-digit HS products with new anti-dumping initiations
and measures.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a).
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252 The Great Recession and Import Protection
simply using the number of investigations as its unit of observations, mea-
sures anti-dumping use by the percentage of imported six-digit HS products
aﬀected. Figure 7.2(a) uses this share of imported six-digit HS products sub-
ject to anti-dumping to plot the ﬂow of new investigations over time and the
stock of imposed anti-dumping measures.10 It is clear that, even though there
was a decline in the number of new investigations over the 2003–6 period, a
likely contributor to this was the stock of anti-dumping measures already
in place resulting from earlier (pre-2003) investigations, which continued to
climb through 2009. If imports are already being restricted by trade barriers,
there is a reduced need for new anti-dumping investigations.
The ﬁgure also shows a signiﬁcant increase in the percentage of six-digit HS
products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures in the recession years of 2008
and 2009, which almost doubled from 3.10% in 2007 to 5.91% in 2009. We
can ask whether this observed increase could have been predicted by the
trend observed in previous years. Consistent with the results of Bown (2011b),
we ﬁnd that if we regress the 1992–2007 data on the percentage of six-digit
products aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure on a linear time trend and use
the estimated coeﬃcient to predict such a percentage for 2009, the diﬀerence
between the actual and predicted values (5.91% versus 5.00%) is not large
enough to conclude that there was a substantial shift away from the previous
trend in 2008–9.
Since the eﬀect of anti-dumping protection on a given product depends on
the level of Indian imports that are aﬀected by it, we also use another measure
that exploits data at the bilateral level on whether imports of a given product
from a certain exporting country are aﬀected by anti-dumping. Figure 7.2(b)
thus shows the percentage of non-oil import value with new anti-dumping ini-
tiations and anti-dumping measures in force. This measure is based on Equa-
tion (1.2) of the Introduction (Bown, this volume). Again, there is an increas-
ing trend in the stock of products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures, which
reaches its peak covering 3.24% of India’s import value in 2009. In this case
we also ﬁnd that the predicted share for 2009 based on a linear time trend
(3.66) does not diﬀer much from the observed one (3.24).
In Figure 7.2(c) we exploit import data at the tariﬀ-line level (available since
2000) to report the percentage of imported eight-digit HS products subject to
new anti-dumping initiations and measures in force from 2000 to 2009. The
pattern is very similar to that shown in Figure 7.2(a): in both cases the ﬂow of
initiations reaches its peak in 2007 but the stock of products aﬀected by mea-
sures continues to increase through 2009. In 2009, 4.03% of India’s eight-digit
HS imported products were aﬀected by anti-dumping measures.11 Moreover,
10We use the year in which the ﬁrst measure was imposed, even if it was a preliminary
measure.
11India has imported approximately 10,000 products at the eight-digit HS level annually
in the last ﬁve years of our data (2005–9).
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we ﬁnd that the percentage of eight-digit HS products aﬀected by an anti-
dumping measure in 2009 predicted by the linear time trend is substantially
lower than the actual one (2.46% versus 4.03%, respectively). Thus, using the
more disaggregated data we do ﬁnd some evidence that India’s observed pat-
tern of protectionism in 2009 was larger than predicted by historical trends.12
The diﬀerence in the results relative to those using the data at the six-digit
HS product level is likely to be due to the increase over time in the number
of eight-digit HS products within a six-digit HS product that are aﬀected by
anti-dumping.13
3.2 The Use of Anti-Dumping by Sector
Table 7.2 details the incidence of India’s anti-dumping use by taking a diﬀer-
ent approach, reporting the number of initiations by each two-digit HS sector.
The most frequent user of anti-dumping has been the chemicals industry,
with almost half of all Indian initiations during this time period. Put diﬀer-
ently, India’s chemicals sector alone initiated more anti-dumping cases during
this period than the combined sectors of any other individual WTO mem-
ber apart from the USA, the EU and Argentina. Not surprisingly, the decline
in new anti-dumping initiations in India during the period 2003–6 is partly
explained by a decrease in the number of initiations by the chemicals sec-
tor, which fell by more than 60%, from an average of 31 new cases per year
between 1999 and 2002 to an average of only 12 new cases per year between
2003 and 2006. Other sizeable users of Indian anti-dumping include plas-
tics/rubbers, machinery/electrical, metals and textiles; combined with chem-
icals, they are also the ﬁve sectors with most anti-dumping initiations world-
wide (WTO 2010a). (This is also true if Indian initiations are excluded from
the world total.) Textiles had 13 initiations in 2005 alone, coinciding with a
restructuring of the global textile and apparel market with a phase-out of the
Multi Fibre Arrangement and the end of textile quotas under the WTO’s tran-
sitional Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The 24 initiations in the metals
sector in 2008 (after almost no new anti-dumping activity in the previous ﬁve
years) correspond to steel products and took place in November and Decem-
ber, coinciding with the heightening of the global recession. Finally, we note
12This also holds if we increase the number of observations by using the average ratio
of the percentage of eight-digit HS products aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure to the
corresponding percentage of six-digit HS products aﬀected (from 2000 to 2007) as a proxy
for the percentage of eight-digit HS products aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure from
1992–9 (by applying such a ratio to the corresponding percentage at the six-digit HS level).
In that case, the predicted percentage for 2009 is 2.36.
13We do not report the analogue of Figure 7.2(b) at the eight-digit HS level since import
data at that level are only available since 2000, which implies that we do not have the
value of imports before the earliest initiation aﬀecting each product, and we would have
to use import values that have already been aﬀected by anti-dumping and would therefore
provide a less accurate assessment.
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that the top users of anti-dumping during the global economic crisis of 2008–9
are also the same ﬁve sectors that constitute the main anti-dumping users in
India since 1992. Bown and Tovar (2011) provide evidence that the variation
in India’s use of anti-dumping across sectors (in the early 2000s) is related to
the tariﬀ liberalisation reform that India implemented in the 1990s, and that
it also responds to motives of political economy according to the predictions
of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model.
How sizeable are imports in these manufacturing sectors that populate
India’s use of anti-dumping? Over the period 1992–2009, the dominant anti-
dumping user, chemicals, accounted for 10% of all Indian imports, reach-
ing almost 15% in some years. Other major users of anti-dumping are also
large importers, including machinery (17%) and metals (7%). Note that the
importance to the Indian economy of imports in these sectors is likely to
be underestimated if the level of imports in those sectors is lower than it
would be under the counterfactual that India had not used anti-dumping. Fig-
ure 7.3 shows the number of initiations by year for each of the ﬁve main
anti-dumping-user sectors, as well as the value of imports and the percentage
of India’s imports that they represent in 2000–2009. Some of those sectors
(chemicals, textiles and metals) experienced a decrease in imports in 2009
(Figure 7.3(b)), and India’s total imports also fell due to the recession. Fig-
ure 7.3(c) shows that the percentage of imports of metal products increased
signiﬁcantly from 2003 to 2007 (from 4.7% to 7.8%) despite the use of anti-
dumping in the preceding years, which may also help to explain the large
number of initiations in this sector in 2008 that we mentioned previously.
We also examine the share of four-digit HS products that were aﬀected
by an anti-dumping initiation within each of the two-digit HS sectors that
are the main anti-dumping users. Between 1992 and 2009, 34% of the four-
digit HS products in the chemical sector were aﬀected by an anti-dumping
initiation at some point. Similarly, 30% of the four-digit HS products in the
plastics/rubbers sector and 14% of the four-digit HS products in the machin-
ery/electrical sector were aﬀected. Metals and textiles exhibit smaller shares—
8% and 6%, respectively—of aﬀected products. This pattern in terms of the
two-digit HS sectors with more/fewer four-digit products aﬀected by anti-
dumping is broadly similar during the 2008–9 recession period.
To examine the potential impact of anti-dumping protection across sec-
tors in more detail, Figure 7.4 shows the percentage of India’s non-oil import
value aﬀected by anti-dumping in each of the ﬁve main-user sectors, includ-
ing both the ﬂow of new investigations over time and the stock of imposed
anti-dumping measures, computed using bilateral import data at the six-digit
HS level as described in the previous section. Each sector presents an increas-
ing trend in the stock of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping protection, except
metals. As already mentioned, metals experienced a decrease in anti-dumping
initiations from 2003 to 2007, but due to the spike in initiations in 2008, there
was a subsequent large increase in the stock of aﬀected imports of metal prod-
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7.3: India’s use of anti-dumping and imports by sector for the period 2000–2009:
(a)anti-dumpinginitiationsbysector;(b)importvaluebysector;(c)percentageofimport
value by sector.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a) and WITS.
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Figure 7.4: Percentage of India’s import value aﬀected by anti-dumping by sector,
1992–2009.
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Figure 7.4: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a) and WITS. This ﬁgure uses
data at the six-digit HS level.
ucts in 2009. The other sectors—with the exception of chemicals—also show
a sizeable increase in the percentage of aﬀected imports in 2009, which may
be related to the global recession.
3.3 Countries Aﬀected by India’s Use of Anti-Dumping
In this section we study how India’s use of anti-dumping varies across its
trading partners. Are some exporting countries more likely to be targeted
with anti-dumping than others? Table 7.3 illustrates the Indian use of anti-
dumping by its 20 most frequently named foreign targets, with these targets
broken down into developing versus developed country categories. The table
also breaks down the sample period into two subperiods: 1992–2007 and
2008–9.
India has named 40 countries (counting all of the EU members as only one
country).AsshowninTable7.3,thecountrymostfrequentlynamedwasChina
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(130 times), followed by the EU (88 times), South Korea (45 times), Taiwan (42
times) and Thailand and Japan (32 times each).
The investigations against China represented more than one-ﬁfth of the
total number of India’s anti-dumping investigations, and China was also the
country targeted with the highest number of measures (109). In addition, in
almost all (89%) of the investigations against China, a measure was imposed.
Furthermore, in 50% of the investigations against China, it was the only coun-
try named in the investigation. That share is much larger than for the other
main targeted countries. Put diﬀerently, although this is not shown in the
table, in 53% of all product-level investigations, one of the named countries
was China. These trends of targeting China in particular during the post-
2001 period especially are quite typical to almost all of the countries using
anti-dumping in the WTO system (Bown 2010b; Prusa 2010).14 In addition,
the last column in Table 7.3 shows the mean anti-dumping margin by coun-
try, which suggests that the mean size of the anti-dumping import restric-
tion is highest against China as well.15 Moreover, the share of investigations
against China increased from 21% in 1992–2007 to 30% in the global recession
yearsof2008–9.Theshareofproduct-levelinvestigationsinvolvingChinaalso
increased, from 50% in 1992–2007 to 76% in 2008–9.
Among the main targeted countries, the share of investigations against
China, Thailand, Malaysia and Japan show a particularly important increase
in 2008–9. The share of measures imposed against Thailand and Taiwan
also increased during those two years. Are these increases associated with
increases in imports coming from those countries in particular? Table 7.3
shows that the share of imports from China almost doubled in 2008–9 rel-
ative to the previous period; however, the share of imports from the other
countries mentioned remained stable or even fell. In addition, the share of
investigations targeting developing countries increased from 48% in 1992–
2007 to 71% in 2008–9, while the share of imports from those countries stayed
roughly the same.
Figure7.5(a)showsthenumberofeight-digitHSproduct–exportercombina-
tions that are aﬀected by an anti-dumping initiation over time. We divide the
14Although India considers China to be a non-market-economy country, it has adopted
a policy whereby if it is shown that market conditions prevail for some ﬁrms subject to
an investigation, the authorities are able to grant market-economy treatment. However,
Kumaran (2005) notes that only in very few cases was such market-economy treatment
granted to individual exporters from China.
15The computation of the mean anti-dumping margin uses data on the ﬁnal dumping
margin calculations, which are reported in ad valorem terms. The mean is taken over
the minimum and maximum ﬁnal dumping margin levels that are reported and corre-
spond to diﬀerent targeted exporting ﬁrms of a given product (and country). We describe
this in more detail in Section 3.5. Although there is a requirement that the anti-dumping
duty should not exceed the dumping margin, Kumaran (2005) explains how, under certain
circumstances, the anti-dumping duty may end up being higher than the dumping margin
in India.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 266 — #286






266 The Great Recession and Import Protection
(a)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1992 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Count
China
Other 
developing
Developed
(b)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Percent
China Other 
developing
Developed
Figure 7.5: India’s anti-dumping investigations by targeted country: (a) number of
eight-digit HS product–exporter combinations with anti-dumping initiations; (b) per-
centage of imported eight-digit HS product–exporter combinations with anti-dumping
initiations.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a) and WITS.
aﬀected exporting countries into three groups: developed countries, China,
and other developing countries. As shown, the number of product–exporter
combinations targeted by new Indian anti-dumping initiations more than
tripled in 2008 relative to 2007 in the case of other developing countries—
while it fell in the case of China and developed countries—and although it
decreased in 2009, it was still higher than in 2007.
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In Figure 7.5(b), we show the percentage of eight-digit HS product–exporter
combinations imported from developed countries, China, and other develop-
ing countries that are aﬀected by a new anti-dumping initiation over time.16
The increase in the number of combinations of eight-digit HS products and
other developing country exporters targeted by new anti-dumping initiations
in 2008 from Figure 7.5(a) was associated with an increase in the percentage of
product–exporter combinations imported from the same group of countries
that are aﬀected by Indian anti-dumping in the same year.
It is also important to examine the stock of eight-digit HS product–exporter
combinations that are aﬀected by an Indian anti-dumping measure for each
exporting country category. Figure 7.6(a) presents the number of such com-
binations while Figure 7.6(b) displays the percentage of imported combina-
tions from each country category subject to Indian anti-dumping protection.
Regarding the former, there has been a shift in the incidence of anti-dumping
protection towards China and other developing countries in recent years.
In 2006, the number of products imported from China and aﬀected by an
anti-dumping measure started to exceed the number of product–exporter
combinations that are imported from anti-dumping-aﬀected developed coun-
tries. Analogously, in 2002, the number of product–exporter combinations
imported from other developing countries and aﬀected by an anti-dumping
measure began exceeding the corresponding number of combinations with
a developed exporter source. In 1997, for example, 53% of India’s stock of
anti-dumping measures aﬀected developed countries, 22% aﬀected China,
and 24% aﬀected other developing countries. By 2009, only 25% of India’s
stock of anti-dumping measures was imposed against developed countries,
whereas 39% was imposed against China and 36% against other developing
countries.
A similar trend can be observed regarding the percentage of the stock of
product–exporter combinations subject to an anti-dumping measure aﬀecting
each country category in Figure 7.6(b). In particular, the percentage of prod-
ucts imported from China subject to an anti-dumping measure presents a sig-
niﬁcant increase in 2008–9.17 While, in 2007, 3.65% of products imported from
China were aﬀected by an Indian anti-dumping measure, by 2009 that had
risen to 7.45%. The percentage of combinations of products and other devel-
oping country exporters aﬀected reached a peak of 3.21% in 2009. Although
the percentage of analogous combinations with a developed exporter source
also reached its peak in 2009, it remained below 1%.
16When counting the total number of eight-digit HS product–exporter combinations, we
exclude suppliers that account for less than 1% of a given eight-digit HS product’s imports
per year.
17A sizeable increase is also found by comparing the prediction for that percentage based
on a linear time-trend regression with the observed one, either at the six-digit or eight-digit
HS product level.
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Figure 7.6: India’s anti-dumping measures by targeted country: (a) total number of
eight-digit HS product–exporter combinations with anti-dumping measures in force; (b)
percentage of imported eight-digit HS product–exporter combinations with anti-dump-
ing measures in force.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a) and WITS.
Using the information from Table 7.3 we can calculate the percentage of
Indian imports coming from each of the previous country categories. From
1992–2007, 54% of India’s imports came from developed countries, 6% came
from China and 39% came from other developing countries. In 2008–9, 53%
of India’s imports were exported by developed countries, 11% by China and
37% by other developing countries. Therefore, while an increase in the share
of imports from China is associated with the increasing incidence of anti-
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dumping protection against that country, the share of imports from other
developing countries actually decreased slightly, whereas the incidence of
Indian anti-dumping increasingly concentrated on those countries.
The economic issue of trade diversion is another issue that arises because
of India’s use of anti-dumping and non-MFN treatment. Can it help us to
understand the multitude of occasions in which India has imposed new anti-
dumping measures against diﬀerent sources of the same product, year after
year? There are 129 diﬀerent eight-digit HS products for which, having initi-
ated an anti-dumping investigation in a previous year, India initiated a new
investigation in the same product against diﬀerent exporting countries. These
products represent 14% of the total number of products with anti-dumping
initiations. Moreover, in 84 (65%) of those cases a ﬁnal measure was imposed.
Since import data at the eight-digit HS product level are only available for the
period since 2000, we cannot determine which exporting countries were new
entrants into India’s market for a given aﬀected product. We can only say that,
in 72 out of those 129 (eight-digit HS) products for which India initiated a sub-
sequent anti-dumping investigation in the same product against a diﬀerent
exporting country, the newly aﬀected exporting country had not previously
exported to India since 2000.18 Gulati et al (2005) study anti-dumping pol-
icy in the vitamin-C industry in India and ﬁnd that, although anti-dumping
eﬀectively restricted imports from the countries named to be dumping, new
countries started exporting the product to India after the petition was ﬁled,
and this trade diversion in turn led to new anti-dumping investigations and
measures. Our results also suggest that trade diversion has played an impor-
tant role leading to additional use of anti-dumping policies.
This result suggests that anti-dumping measures may be used as a form of
protectionregardlessofwhetherdumpingisactuallytakingplace,anditcould
help to explain the large-scale use of anti-dumping by India. It also raises the
question of why India did not use global safeguards that could be imposed
on an MFN basis instead of anti-dumping in those cases, since safeguards can
apply to all countries and thus would help to prevent surges in imports from
new exporters. On the other hand, this could help to explain why India has
begun to increase its use of global safeguard measures in 2008–9, which we
discuss in Section 4.
3.4 The Duration of Anti-Dumping Measures
In this section we examine the actual duration of Indian anti-dumping policy’s
temporary acts of import protection. The WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement
mandates a ‘sunset review’ process under which countries are supposed to
investigate whether removal of the anti-dumping measures after ﬁve years
18We cannot rule out that the country could potentially have exported that product to
India before 2000.
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will be likely to lead to a recurrence of injury caused by renewed dumping; if
not, the imposed anti-dumping measures should then be removed.
Consider how India’s actions relate to the spirit of the WTO rules in this
area. We focus on anti-dumping measures imposed prior to 2005, so that the
ﬁve-year period has elapsed suﬃciently for the ‘sunset review’ process to be
potentially meaningful. First, we ﬁnd that 60% of the imposed measures had
their import restrictions removed within the basic ﬁve-year limit stipulated
by the ‘sunset review’ process. For all measures that have subsequently had
the import restrictions removed, the average period for which measures stay
in force is 4.3 years.
As Figure 7.7(a) illustrates, the most common (modal) duration period is ﬁve
years (with 58 cases), followed by four years (56 cases), three years (24 cases)
and six years (17 cases). Overall, 98 cases had measures revoked before ﬁve
years, while in 21 cases with measures already revoked they lasted more than
ﬁve years. The minimum duration of measures was one year (4 cases) and
the maximum for cases that have been removed is 12 years. In addition to
the cases included in Figure 7.7(a), there are 83 cases with measures imposed
before 2005 that have not yet been removed, and thus have lasted more than
ﬁve years but for which we do not know exactly how many years they will be
in place.19
Figure 7.7(a) also allows us to break out the typical duration of measures
imposed in the chemicals sector, the most frequent user of anti-dumping in
India. There we ﬁnd that 52% of all measures are removed within ﬁve years,
lower than the corresponding percentage over all measures. Moreover, for
the measures imposed before 2005 that have subsequently been removed,
the mean duration of measures in that sector is 4.4 years, which is slightly
above the average over all measures. There were 26 measures lasting ﬁve
years, 37 measures stayed in place for less than ﬁve years, and 13 measures
lasted more than ﬁve years. There have been 45 measures imposed before
2005 that have lasted longer than ﬁve years and that have yet to be removed.
These are not pictured. Combined, this evidence indicates that anti-dumping
measures in the chemicals sector are more likely to become ‘quasi-permanent’
protection.
While not pictured in Figure 7.7(a), we can also examine whether there is
a diﬀerential treatment with respect to measures imposed against China, the
country most targeted by India’s anti-dumping. Here we ﬁnd that the aver-
age duration of measures is 4.9 years, which is also higher than the overall
average. Of the measures imposed prior to 2005 that have subsequently been
removed, there were 12 measures against China that stayed in force less than
ﬁve years, 15 lasted ﬁve years, and 4 remained in force more than ﬁve years.
In addition, 21 measures were imposed before 2005 that have lasted longer
19We measure the duration for all cases in years; that is, we do not consider in which
month of a given year a measure was revoked. In that sense our ﬁgures are approximations.
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Figure 7.7: Duration of anti-dumping measures in India: (a) duration of measures (in
years); (b) percentage of measures imposed ﬁve or more years ago that have not yet
been removed.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010a).
than ﬁve years and have yet to be removed. Overall, there is some evidence
that Indian anti-dumping measures imposed against China tend to last longer.
Next, we examine whether, over time, the measures that were imposed
ﬁve or more years ago have been removed. Figure 7.7(b) displays the yearly
behaviour of the percentage of measures imposed ﬁve or more years ago that
are not removed even though the ﬁve-year limit of the ‘sunset review’ process
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has elapsed. Interestingly, after a decrease in this percentage taking place
each year between 2003 and 2007, there was an increase in 2008 and 2009.
This suggests that another dimension through which anti-dumping protection
increased during the global recession is via the failure to remove policies that
were imposed prior to the crisis and were supposed to be terminated during
the crisis under the ﬁve-year-period limit.
We also calculated the percentage of measures that were imposed exactly
ﬁve years ago (and thus came up for sunset review) and were removed each
year. 20 This percentage actually shows a decreasing trend since 2005, and
although it increased in 2008, it fell again in 2009. Therefore, even though
India was less likely to remove previously imposed anti-dumping measures
that came up for sunset review in 2009, this seems consistent with previous
trends and might not be directly related to the global economic crisis.
3.5 Imposed Anti-Dumping Measures and WTO Tariﬀ Bindings
For most economists, anti-dumping is not a policy that is well grounded in
economic theory. Because the main legal deﬁnitions of dumping—whether
it be international price discriminatory or pricing below average costs, even
temporarily—can be rational, proﬁt-maximising behaviour for a ﬁrm without
necessarily having any predatory intent (and there is no required evidence
for predation found in anti-dumping laws), the policy itself may be viewed as
little more than import protection that governments oﬀer to industries on a
contingent basis. Therefore, suppose that we adopt the view of treating anti-
dumping as merely one of many potential forms of import protection. Then, a
basic question is, do governments use anti-dumping to raise import barriers
to levels that would not otherwise be possible under the rules of the WTO
system? More precisely, if India did not implement the new protection in the
form of anti-dumping measures but instead simply raised its applied tariﬀ
rate by the same amount, how frequently would doing so result in a violation
of its commitments?21 The counterfactual that we adopt in this particular
application of examining whether India is complying with WTO rules is to
imagine that it would otherwise impose the same level of protection that it is
currently imposing via anti-dumping, but simply by raising its applied tariﬀ
by that amount instead of using an anti-dumping measure.
20Cadot et al (2008) provide a rigorous analysis of the eﬀect that the introduction of
sunset reviews into the WTO system has had on the duration of anti-dumping measures
in several countries.
21An alternative and more legalistic approach to evaluating whether a country is fol-
lowing the basic rules on anti-dumping would be to evaluate whether there was suﬃcient
economic evidence of injury caused by dumping, and whether the size of the imposed
measures was based on the size of evidence of the dumping margin. Such an approach
requires access to data well beyond the scope of this study.
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Since it is best to use data at the tariﬀ-line (eight-digit HS) level to exam-
ine this question, we focus on the 2004–9 period, given that data on applied
tariﬀs at such level of disaggregation are only available for the period since
2004. Although most Indian anti-dumping measures are imposed as speciﬁc
duties while applied tariﬀs and tariﬀ bindings are ad valorem, we have data
on the ﬁnal dumping margin calculations, which are reported in ad valorem
terms. In some cases the margin is reported at the level of the exporting ﬁrm
within an investigated country, but in other cases it is only reported as a
range of values of new trade barriers facing the exporters of that product in a
given investigated country. Therefore, for each anti-dumping case we report
both the lowest and highest ﬁrm-speciﬁc anti-dumping margins correspond-
ing to a given targeted country. While this is admittedly a very facile approach,
when viewed from the perspective of this particular counterfactual, there is
some evidence that India is indeed following the rules of the WTO system. As
Table 7.4 indicates, if we use the highest anti-dumping margin, then in 420 of
the 529 instances (79%) in which India imposed anti-dumping measures on a
foreign ﬁrm’s exports of a given product, the size of the new import restric-
tion was larger than the diﬀerence between the product’s applied tariﬀ and
the product’s tariﬀ binding—also referred to as the ‘tariﬀ overhang’. A tariﬀ
binding is the limit over which India has agreed under the WTO not to raise
its tariﬀ. If we use the lowest anti-dumping margin, the number of instances
in which the imposed anti-dumping measure was larger than the tariﬀ over-
hang is lower but still sizeable.22 The table breaks this down further into two
subperiods, 2004–7 and 2008–9, and shows that there has been a decrease
in the percentage of cases in which the anti-dumping measure exceeds the
tariﬀ overhang. However, considering the highest anti-dumping margins, the
percentage of cases in which the imposition of a tariﬀ of equal size would
have led to a violation of India’s WTO commitments is still high in the later
subperiod.
Table 7.4 also shows similar information for the subset of anti-dumping
measures imposed against developing countries only. During 2004–9, in 93%
of the cases in which India imposed anti-dumping measures on a develop-
ing country’s exports of a given product, the size of the new import restric-
tion was larger than the tariﬀ overhang corresponding to the same product
(using the highest anti-dumping margin), which is higher than for the whole
sample over the same period. Moreover, while this percentage between 2004
and 2007 was similar to the percentage for the whole sample (90% in both
cases), in 2008–9 the percentage of cases in which the anti-dumping measure
exceeded the tariﬀ overhang was much larger for developing countries (97%)
22Of course, this is conditional on the size of the Indian anti-dumping measure being
exogenous, and it also ignores the fact that the anti-dumping measure can be foreign-ﬁrm
speciﬁc and thus is not equivalent to raising an applied tariﬀ, which must be done on an
MFN basis.
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than for all countries combined (70%). This is consistent with the ﬁnding in
Section 3.3 that the incidence of India’s anti-dumping protection has shifted
towards developing countries during the 2008–9 global recession. Although
we do not report similar information corresponding to anti-dumping mea-
sures applied against imports from China only, we ﬁnd that, in essentially all
instances, the highest anti-dumping margin exceeded the tariﬀ overhang in
both 2004–7 and 2008–9.23
Finally, Table 7.4 also reports equivalent information for the chemicals sec-
tor. In 2004–7, the percentage of cases in which the anti-dumping margin
on chemical products was larger than the corresponding tariﬀ overhang was
higherthanthetotalforallsectors;nonetheless,thatpercentagefellin2008–9
and became fairly similar to the one for the whole sample of products. Thus,
along this dimension there does not seem to be a shift in the incidence of
anti-dumping protection towards chemicals in the latter period.
4 INDIA’S USE OF SAFEGUARDS AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
While anti-dumping is India’s most frequently utilised TTB, there are other
relatively substitutable forms of import protection in use. In this section we
examine three other examples that India has resorted to, including global safe-
guards, transitional China-speciﬁc safeguards associated with China’s 2001
WTO accession, and countervailing measures for anti-subsidy policies.
4.1 Global Safeguards
India’s domestic law concerning the implementation of the Agreement of Safe-
guards was enacted under Section 8B and Section 8C of the Customs Tariﬀ
Act, 1975. The procedures were outlined in the Customs Tariﬀ (Identiﬁcation
and Assessment of Safeguard Duty) Rules, 1997, and Customs Tariﬀ (Transi-
tional Products Speciﬁc Safeguard Duty) Rules, 2002.24 A director-general of
Safeguards under the Department of Revenue of the Ministry of Finance was
appointed to receive the petitions and conduct the investigations required for
the imposition of a safeguard duty. The director-general of Safeguards should
then submit the ﬁndings to the central government.25
23The percentage of cases in which the lowest anti-dumping margin imposed against
Chinese ﬁrms exceeded India’s tariﬀ overhang decreased in 2008–9 relative to 2004–7,
however.
24Section 8C regulates the imposition of safeguard duties on any product imported from
China for which increased imports are causing or threatening to cause ‘market disruption’
to the domestic industry.
25For more details about the applications, investigations and timelines, see the website
of the Directorate General of Safeguards: http://dgsafeguards.gov.in.
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India initiated its ﬁrst safeguard investigation in 1997. Between 1995 and
31 October 2010, India initiated the most (26) safeguard investigations of
the entire WTO membership.26 As Table 7.1 again illustrates, 11 of the 26
investigations taking place between 1997 and 2009 resulted in the imposition
of deﬁnitive safeguard import restrictions. No injury was found in only 1 case
during that period, and 5 cases were terminated. Interestingly, 11 out of the
26 investigations were initiated between 2008 and 2009 in the midst of the
global economic crisis (2 in 2008 and 9 in 2009), but 8 of those did not result
in the imposition of a ﬁnal safeguard measure. Furthermore, in 5 out of the
26 cases, most or all developing countries were exempt from the application
of safeguards.
The most frequent sectoral user of safeguards has been chemicals, with
14 initiations. As noted before, the chemicals sector was also India’s most
frequent user of anti-dumping. Moreover, the WTO reports that, since 1995,
chemical products were the most frequent subject of safeguards (investiga-
tions and measures) in the world (WTO 2010b). The second most active sec-
tor in India was wood and wood products (4 safeguard initiations), and a
handful of other industries have also initiated investigations, including veg-
etable products, foodstuﬀs, plastics/rubbers, textiles and metals. Each of
these industries, with the exception of vegetable products, also initiated anti-
dumping cases. Overall, 198 diﬀerent eight-digit HS codes have been investi-
gated under India’s global safeguard activity between 1997 and 2009.
4.2 China-Speciﬁc Safeguards
As part of China’s terms of accession to the WTO in 2001, the existing mem-
bers of the WTO were granted access to an additional ‘Chinese safeguard’
policy instrument that could be used to implement new and discriminatory
import restrictions against China without any evidence of unfair trade (dump-
ing or illegal subsidies), but only a surge in Chinese imports, and would last
during a transitional period until 2014.
Before 2009, India initiated an investigation under this policy only once—a
2002 investigation of ‘industrial sewing machine needles’ that did not result in
the imposition of ﬁnal import restrictions. Amidst the global economic crisis,
however, as Table 7.5 illustrates, India initiated ﬁve China-speciﬁc safeguard
investigations in 2009 over a variety of imported products. In two cases a
ﬁnal measure was imposed, in one case no injury was found, and two cases
were withdrawn. Overall, 35 diﬀerent eight-digit HS products have been the
subject of a China-speciﬁc safeguard investigation by India.
26It was followed by Jordan (15), Turkey (15), Chile (12), Indonesia (12) and the USA (10).
Moreover, India imposed the most safeguard measures during the same period (along with
Turkey).
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4.3 Countervailing Measures
In January 2009, India initiated its ﬁrst (and only, as of December 2010) coun-
tervailing measure investigation to deal with foreign use of WTO-inconsistent
subsidies. As Table 7.5 illustrates, somewhat unsurprisingly, it was a case
initiated against China and over a product in the chemicals sector (sodium
nitrite). The case was withdrawn.
5 THE INTERACTION OF TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
In this section we describe whether and how the alternative TTBs interact,
both with one another and with India’s applied tariﬀs.
We begin by asking whether the products that were the subject of safe-
guard initiations between 1992 and 2009 were also subject to anti-dumping
investigations at some point during the same period. We ﬁnd that 39% of
the eight-digit HS products that initiated a safeguard investigation had also
been subject to an initiated anti-dumping investigation at some point. Thus,
although there is some degree of overlap between both types of policies across
products, there is also a substantial percentage (61%) of cases in which safe-
guard investigations were used in products never aﬀected by anti-dumping.
Are there instances in which a product is subject to both an anti-dumping and
a safeguard measure at the same time? This turns out to be very uncommon.
There was only one eight-digit HS product subject to both types of measures
in 1999 and one in 2000, as well as four products aﬀected by both measures
in 2004. These ﬁndings would seem more consistent with a relationship of
‘substitutability’ between both types of policies.
Regarding China-speciﬁc safeguards, the product with the investigation ini-
tiated in 2002 was also subject to an anti-dumping investigation initiated in
1998 against China and three other countries, but after a preliminary anti-
dumping measure was imposed, the ﬁnal decision was negative. Six out of the
34 (8-digit HS) products that were subject to a China-speciﬁc safeguard inves-
tigation in 2009 also had anti-dumping initiations, and anti-dumping mea-
sures were imposed against China (and two other countries) in 2004 and 2008.
These cases suggest some examples of industries attempting to obtain addi-
tional protection on the same products; however, in each of those instances,
the China-speciﬁc safeguard investigation was either withdrawn or there was
a negative decision.
Finally, the product subject to the (subsequently withdrawn) countervailing
measure investigation was not subject to any anti-dumping or global safe-
guard initiation. Overall, and particularly on the basis of India’s actual impo-
sition of measures, these ﬁndings again seem consistent with the previous
statement that the TTBs exhibit more of a relationship of substitutability,
and that they are typically not used on the same products.
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280 The Great Recession and Import Protection
Although there does not seem to be substantial overlap of diﬀerent TTBs
over the same eight-digit HS products, we can also examine whether there is
overlap over the same sectors. Are the same sectors the main users of all types
of policies (with diﬀerent products within a sector generally using diﬀerent
policies as previously found)? Table 7.6 presents information on the use of
the most commonly utilised policies—anti-dumping, global safeguards and
tariﬀs—across two-digit HS sectors.
First consider the use of anti-dumping and safeguards. There is substantial
overlap in terms of the sectors that use those policies. For example, there are
12 sectors that initiated an anti-dumping investigation at some point between
1992 and 2009, and 7 sectors with a safeguard investigation over the same
period. Of the 7 safeguard-user sectors, 6 also used anti-dumping. We also ﬁnd
that this relationship has not changed much during the global recession years.
In 2008–9, 8 sectors initiated an anti-dumping investigation and 4 sectors
initiated a safeguard investigation. All of those 4 sectors were also users of
anti-dumping over the same period. In addition, overall, the chemicals sector
was the main user of both policies.
The last two columns of Table 7.6 show the average applied tariﬀs at the
eight-digit HS level (available since 2004, as noted earlier) by sector, with the
mean applied tariﬀ over all products reported at the bottom of the table.27
As shown, the ﬁve sectors that were the main users of anti-dumping and safe-
guards (chemicals, plastics/rubbers, textiles, metals, and machinery/electric)
did not have tariﬀs higher than the overall mean across all products. This is
true across the whole sample period (1992–2009) as well as during the global
economic crisis (2008–9). Similarly, the sectors with average tariﬀs above the
overall mean were not major anti-dumping users and did not use safeguards
at all. In order to interpret these ﬁndings it is important to take into account
India’s tariﬀ liberalisation reform. Bown and Tovar (2011) study the relation-
ship between India’s reductions in applied tariﬀs associated with its unilat-
eral trade liberalisation (described in Section 2) and the subsequent reapplica-
tion of anti-dumping (and safeguard) import restrictions. They show that the
products that Indian industries demanded and received new anti-dumping
import restrictions on during the period 2000–2002 were those that had (pre-
1991 liberalisation) higher tariﬀs and that had undergone larger tariﬀ reduc-
tions (see Bown and Tovar (2011, Figure 2)). They also provide a formal set of
regression-based approaches and present signiﬁcant, product-level evidence
that the tariﬀ reform itself is associated with subsequent resort to Indian use
of anti-dumping.28 Finally, Table 7.6 also shows that the lower average tariﬀs
27Since tariﬀ data are not available for 2006, we use the average of the applied tariﬀs in
2005 and 2007 for that year.
28Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) estimate a gravity model for a group of countries
and ﬁnd that the trade decrease resulting from India’s anti-dumping policy is of the same
magnitude as the trade increase that resulted from its earlier trade liberalisation.
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282 The Great Recession and Import Protection
for 2008–9 relative to the previous years suggest that India was able to con-
tinue with its process of tariﬀ liberalisation even in the midst of the global
economic crisis.29 It is possible that the use of TTBs may have helped India
to continue along such a path.30
We therefore conclude that the alternative forms of import restrictions were
mostly used by similar sectors, with some substitutability across the policies
(formally examined by Bown and Tovar (2011)) and with diﬀerent products
within a sector generally making use of diﬀerent TTBs.
6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we ﬁrst examine the behaviour of India’s use of TTBs (anti-
dumping, safeguards and countervailing measures) over time. We then study
any changes regarding their use that may have occurred during the global
economic crisis of 2008–9. We rely on detailed product-level data from 1992
to 2009 from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010a).
We ﬁnd that the stock of products subject to an anti-dumping measure
increased from 1992 through 2009. Furthermore, the percentage of tariﬀ-line
(eight-digit HS) level products subject to an anti-dumping measure increased
signiﬁcantly during the crisis, from 1.82% in 2007 to 4.03% by 2009, and such
an increase exceeds what would be predicted based on the observed trends
from previous (pre-crisis) years.
We also ﬁnd that the sectors that are the main users of anti-dumping
policy in India—chemicals, plastics/rubber, machinery/electrical, metals and
textiles—are also the major anti-dumping user sectors worldwide. This pat-
tern regarding the sectoral use of anti-dumping also prevailed during the
global recession of 2008–9. Moreover, those sectors account for an impor-
tant share of India’s import value, which suggests that the eﬀects of the use
of anti-dumping protection in India may be economically important.
Regarding the exporter incidence of the use of anti-dumping by India, China
was the most frequent target of Indian anti-dumping as well as the recipient
of the highest average anti-dumping barriers. During 2008–9, this bias in the
incidence of anti-dumping policy against China increased. The share of inves-
tigations aﬀecting developing countries more generally also increased from
48% in 1992–2007 to 71% in 2008–9, even though the share of imports from
those countries stayed roughly the same. This increasing incidence in India’s
anti-dumping use against China and other developing countries over time is
also seen with respect to the stock of product–exporter combinations that are
29The tariﬀs also fell relative to 2007.
30However, there are other possible explanations for those ﬁndings as well that we do
not rule out here, and further research would be needed to distinguish among them.
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aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure. These results are consistent with the
ﬁndings of Bown (2011b) and suggest a pattern of substantial discrimination
that may be important to examine further in light of the WTO’s MFN principle.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that an additional dimension through which India’s
anti-dumping protectionism increased during the global economic crisis of
2008–9 was via the failure to remove policies imposed in the years preceding
the crisis that were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the
ﬁve-year ‘sunset review’ limit.
We also provide some evidence consistent with the possibility that India
may have used anti-dumping policy to increase import restrictions to levels
that would otherwise violate the rules of the WTO system, and consistent
with the possibility that the use of TTBs might have helped India continue
its process of tariﬀ liberalisation in the midst of the global economic crisis.
However, those are only a few of a number of possible alternative explana-
tions behind the observed patterns, and further research is needed to draw
deﬁnitive conclusions.
Although anti-dumping is the major TTB used by India, we also examine
India’s use of other forms of temporary import protection. We ﬁnd an increase
in the number of global safeguard investigations initiated during the 2008–9
global economic crisis, as well as in India’s use of China-speciﬁc safeguards.
Finally,weﬁndthat,althoughthereisnotmuchoverlapintermsofdiﬀerent
TTBs being used over the same (eight-digit HS) products, there is substantial
overlap regarding the sectors that use such barriers, both before and during
the global recession years of 2008–9.
Even though our focus in this chapter has been on TTBs, it is possible
that India may have used other forms of trade barriers during the global
economic crisis. For example, in November 2008, some steel products were
placed into the ‘restricted’ list of imported goods, and in 2009 the government
imposed a licensing requirement on imports of electrical energy as well as an
increase in the minimum support prices for several cereals. There were also
some increases in applied tariﬀs (although the average applied tariﬀs fell, as
reported earlier). For instance, in November 2008, a 20% tariﬀ was imposed on
imports of soybean oils, as well as a 5% tariﬀ on several iron and steel prod-
ucts (see Global Trade Alert (2010)).31 Therefore, further research is needed in
order to examine the use of other forms of import restrictions in more detail
and to establish any changes that may have occurred in the crisis years.
Patricia Tovar is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics and
International Business School at Brandeis University.
31The restrictions on imports of steel products were lifted in January 2010 and the tariﬀ
on soybean oils was removed in April 2009.
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Brazil: Micro- and Macrodeterminants of
Temporary Trade Barriers
MARCELO OLARREAGA AND MARCEL VAILLANT1
1 INTRODUCTION
Temporary trade barriers such as anti-dumping, CVDs and global safeguards
aﬀect an increasingly large share of emerging-economy imports. Bown (2011a)
ﬁnds that, in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Turkey,
1.5% to 4.5% of their (non-oil) annual imports are aﬀected by TTBs.2 Perhaps
surprisingly, the increase in the use of TTBs occurred while most of these
emerging countries were engaging in a process of broad trade reforms. Brazil
is an interesting illustration. At the end of the 1980s, Brazil had a simple
average tariﬀ of 45%, but there were no TTBs. By 2010, the simple average
tariﬀ had fallen to 14%, but more than 100 products at the six-digit HS (HS-06)
level were aﬀected by some form of TTB with a simple ad valorem average of
60%.3
The objective of this chapter is to provide a description of the evolution
in Brazil’s use of TTBs. What types of TTBs are most frequently used: anti-
dumping duties, safeguards or countervailing measures? Which sectors are
1Marcelo Olarreaga: Department of Economics, University of Geneva, 40 Blv. du Pont
d’Arve, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland. Email: marcelo.olarreaga@unige.ch. Marcel Vaillant:
Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Constituyente 1502 6to Piso,
Montevideo CP11200, Uruguay. Email: marcel@decon.edu.uy. We are grateful to Chad
Bown, Lawrence Edwards and Hylke Vandenbussche for their comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft, to Honorio Kume for many fruitful discussions on Brazil’s trade policy
and Aksel Erbahar for providing us with most of the data used.
2In more developed economies (eg the USA and the EU), the share of imports aﬀected by
TTBs has been declining over the last decade. While 3.5–5% of more developed countries’
imports were aﬀected by TTBs during the 1997–2005 period, this has fallen to 1.5–3% of
their annual imports during the 2006–9 period (Bown 2011a).
3Note that the average TTB duty cannot be readily compared with the MFN tariﬀ that
is imposed (in principle) on all import sources, whereas the most common TTB (eg anti-
dumping) is often only imposed on a few exporters from a few exporting countries.
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TTBs most likely to be imposed upon, and which partners are more likely to
be aﬀected by Brazil’s TTBs?
Brazil experienced a signiﬁcant degree of macroeconomic volatility over the
1990–2009 period. Figure 8.1 illustrates the evolution over the period 1995–
2009 of Brazil’s imports to GDP ratio, GNP per capita, real exchange rate and
the number of new TTB measures imposed each year. The values of the four
variables are set at 100 in 1995. Interestingly, the number of TTBs imposed
each year seems to follow the ups and downs of Brazil’s economic activity
and the real exchange rate. However, contrary to what might be expected,
the correlation between the number of TTBs imposed each year and GNP per
capita is positive, suggesting that more TTBs are imposed when Brazil’s econ-
omy is booming. This is somewhat counterintuitive and contradicts some of
the early literature on macroeconomic determinants of TTBs, which tended
to suggest that TTBs were more likely to be used in the presence of domestic
macroeconomic weakness (Takacs 1981). See also Feigenbaum et al (1985),
Feigenbaum and Willett (1985), Salvatore (1987), Coughlin et al (1989) and
Leidy (1997).
As is also illustrated in Figure 8.1, Brazil’s real exchange rate shows a neg-
ative correlation with the number of new TTB measures. While there exists a
small amount of literature on exchange-rate determinants of TTB use, there
is no consensus on the impact that exchange-rate changes have on TTBs.4
As explained by Knetter and Prusa (2003), an appreciation of the domestic
currency makes it less likely to be able to ﬁnd sales below the price at which
partners sell to other markets, but it makes it much easier to ﬁnd injury to
domestic ﬁrms. Whether the ﬁrst or the second eﬀect is more important in
Brazil is an open question.
Results reported in Section 3 suggest that Brazil’s TTBs aﬀect a relatively
small share of its imports (around 5%), but within sensitive sectors, 18% of
imports are aﬀected by some form of a TTB, and this ﬁgure reached 100%
of imports in the footwear sector in 2009. Brazil’s main TTB instrument is
anti-dumping, which is responsible for 94% of the total value of imports
aﬀected by some form of Brazilian TTB. The main targets of Brazil’s TTBs
are high-income and upper-middle-income countries. However, the share tar-
geted towards imports from China and lower-middle-income countries has
been growing over the 2000s. Sectors aﬀected by TTB investigations have con-
sistently higher MFN tariﬀs than sectors where there have been no TTB inves-
tigations. Furthermore, sectors where the investigations end up with imposed
measures have even higher MFN tariﬀs. This may suggest that MFN tariﬀs and
4A very interesting discussion on exchange rates and TTBs can be found in Leidy and
Hoekman (1990). They do not focus on the determinants of TTBs, but rather their impact
on trade in the presence of exchange-rate risk. They consider an exporting ﬁrm facing
random exchange-rate shocks. The ﬁrm must decide how much to export to an importing
country that can impose anti-dumping duties as a reaction to an important exchange-rate
shock. They ﬁnd that the mere presence of an anti-dumping mechanism reduces exports.
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Figure 8.1: Macroeconomic variables and TTBs in Brazil, 1995–2009.
Source: authors’ calculations from World Bank World Development Indicators (2010)
and Bown (2010).
TTBs are complements, but it can also simply signal that these are sectors
that are politically strong. Finally, even though there is a signiﬁcant amount
of ‘water’ (protection in excess) in Brazil’s MFN tariﬀ structure, the levels of
protection reached through TTBs are twice as large as that which would be
permitted by the water in the existing tariﬀ structure.
Interestingly, any acceleration of Brazilian TTBs during the international
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9 appears unrelated to the performance of Brazilian
real economy. Although GDP per capita growth slowed during the crisis, Brazil
continued to grow quite signiﬁcantly. It is likely that an important force driv-
ing the increase in Brazil’s TTB activity the appreciation of the Brazilian cur-
rency (real) with respect to the currency of Brazil’s trading partners. Indeed,
Brazil experienced a signiﬁcant strengthening of its currency that has reduced
the international competitiveness of its ﬁrms. There were numerous calls for
trade policy to limit the rapid increase in imports, and one of the mechanisms
employed were TTBs, in particular anti-dumping procedures.5
5By early 2011, protectionist pressure had strengthened with demands to generalise
the use of import licences and some arguing for the re-establishment of a mechanism of
import controls. These recent calls led Jose Tavares, a well-known Brazilian economist
from CINDES (Rio de Janeiro) with academic and governmental background, to write in
the press that it is not feasible to re-establish imports control in Brazil, partly because of
its international commitments (Tavares 2011). See Barral and Brogini (2010) for similar
arguments.
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Thus, one response from Brazil’s policymakers to a strong and wide
increase in protectionist demands caused by the strong appreciation of the
Brazilian currency has been an increase in the use of TTBs. Nevertheless,
the import coverage of these TTBs remained limited. Furthermore, TTBs are
arguably more consistent than other forms of import protection under the
rules of Brazil’s international obligations within Mercosur, the WTO and other
trade agreements. Seen through this light, the rapid increase in the use of
TTBs may be a very moderate response to a very large increase in protection-
ist demand during this period.
2 TRADE LIBERALISATION IN BRAZIL
Like many other Latin American countries, Brazil adopted import substitu-
tion policies in the 1960s and had a very restrictive trade policy regime for
the following two decades. At the end of the 1980s, there was a gradual move
towards a more open trade policy regime that was triggered by two comple-
mentary factors: the presence of very large economic distortions that required
reform, and, more importantly, exogenous changes in the political economy
preferences of policymakers away from a view that development could ﬂour-
ish under import substitution policies.
This change in policy preferences led to two reforms during the Sarney
Administration. These reforms were later extended during the 1990s by the
Collor de Mello government through four scheduled stages (1991–3).6 The Sar-
ney Administration’s reforms focused mainly on liberalising imports of inter-
mediate goods. The Collor de Mello Administration then pursued an impor-
tant media campaign in favour of trade openness that led to an erosion of
public support for protectionist policies. It also extended the Sarney Admin-
istration reforms to include capital goods. The economic rationale for these
reformswasbasedontheideathatBrazilwaslaggingbehindthetechnological
frontier due to the high rate of protection in intermediate and capital goods.
Brazil’s unilateral tariﬀ reforms led to drastic reductions in protection lev-
els, as illustrated in Table 8.1. The nominal average MFN tariﬀ was reduced
6The Sarney Administration implemented two reforms, in June 1988 and September
1989. The ﬁrst was a generalised reduction of import tariﬀs and the second was concen-
trated on intermediate and capital goods. Both reforms reduced redundant protection. The
average tariﬀ fell by 26 percentage points between 1987 and 1989, but the structure of
protection did not change signiﬁcantly; the correlation between the tariﬀ structure across
sectors was 0.72 between 1987 and 1989. The government of Collor de Mello staged four
tariﬀ reductions: February 1992, January 1992, January 1993 and January 1994. After the
ﬁrst reduction, superﬂuous protection persisted. This was almost completely absent after
the second adjustment, though with the exception of some consumption goods. The pro-
jected targets were fully achieved. Between 1990 and 1993, the average tariﬀ declined from
27.2% to 12.5%, the standard deviation fell from 14.9% to 6.7%, the minimum value from
3.3% to 0% and the maximum from 78.7% to 34% (Kume et al 2003).
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292 The Great Recession and Import Protection
from 32% in 1990 to 11% in 1994, and the eﬀective rate of protection also fell
from 45% to 14% during that period (Kume et al 2003).
Nevertheless, Brazil’s large tariﬀ reductions did not lead to a substantial
increase in imports. Imports did not respond to these tariﬀ cuts because most
of the very high levels of protection had already been eroded by the end of the
1980s through the existence of a multitude of special regimes that allowed
producers to import at much lower levels of protection. The ‘apparent’ drastic
liberalisation was therefore not one that had a real impact on the costs faced
by importers. The unilateral reduction of these MFN tariﬀs was combined with
a simpliﬁcation or elimination of many special trade regimes. The redundancy
of the MFN tariﬀs also explains why the private sector did not oppose the
trade reforms. The reforms simply led to a consolidation of trade legislation
towards a similar level of protection within a much simpler regime. Thus,
what seems to be a very large reduction in protection levels (66% reduction
in nominal tariﬀs, 69% reduction in eﬀective rates) during 1990–1994 was, in
fact, less dramatic due to the large number of special regimes in existence
prior to the reforms.
With the implementation of the Real Plan during the Itamar Franco Adminis-
tration, Brazil’s policy of trade openness was deepened, though it later experi-
enced a setback.7 During this period there was both a misalignment of relative
prices and a resurgence of domestic demand that led to a large increase in
imports. By 1994, Mexico’s peso crisis had triggered a reduction in foreign
ﬁnancing, and in 1995 trade policy was used to help this adjustment, leading
to a reversal of the movement towards lower tariﬀs.8 However, this reversal
was not large enough to counteract the earlier tariﬀ reductions so that aver-
age tariﬀs at the end of the 1990s were much lower than in the late 1980s.
Figure 8.2 indicates that there was not much change in average tariﬀ protec-
tion after 1993; ie the trend is a slow but relatively permanent reduction in
the average MFN tariﬀ. The exception is the small increase in average MFN
tariﬀs observed during the crisis period of 2008–9.
2.1 Mercosur and the South–South Reciprocal Liberalisation Strategy
From the late 1990s, Brazil’s trade reforms were undertaken through a series
of discriminatory ‘south–south’ trade agreements. The most important objec-
tive of these agreements was to facilitate the access to foreign markets for
Brazilian producers, but contrary to the reforms of the early 1990s, they were
less likely to increase the competitive pressure on import-competing and inef-
ﬁcient Brazilian producers. Of all the PTAs that Brazil signed, Mercosur, which
7In July 1994, during the Itamar Franco Administration and under the framework of the
stabilisation plan known as Plan Real, all tariﬀs above 20% were reduced to this level.
8In 1995, Brazil increased tariﬀs for some sectors: cars, consumption goods, etc.I n
1996, non-automatic import licences were reactivated, and there was limitation for the
long-run ﬁnancing of imports.
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Figure 8.2: Brazil’s MFN ad valorem tariﬀ, 1989–2009.
Source: authors’ calculations with data from TRAINS at the six-digit HS level.
was signed in 1991, is by far the most important, both politically and eco-
nomically. This bloc stands out as an ambitious agreement by four develop-
ing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) aiming towards deep
economic integration.
The integration agreement was formulated around two major timelines: the
Trade Liberalisation Program (TLP) and the Regime of Adaptation to Merco-
sur (RAM). These two instruments governed the process of trade integration
and formed the linchpin of the agreement. The TLP dates back to the ini-
tial treaty of 1991 and was the basis for creating a ‘free-trade area’ (FTA).
Intra-regional tariﬀs were gradually eliminated using a linear and automatic
reduction scheme. This liberalisation scheme was announced in advance by
the member countries’ governments and then carried out twice a year on a
regular basis, as envisaged at the outset.
The second instrument, the RAM, emerged from the Ouro Preto summit of
December 1994. It was established to ﬁnalise the FTA as the TLP was reach-
ing completion. However, this new instrument broadened the terms of liber-
alisation, slowed down the construction process of the ‘free-trade zone’ and
deﬁned a new list of products excluded from intra-regional free trade. After
the schedule laid down for these RAM lists had been fulﬁlled, the integration
agreement could be described as a universal, non-tariﬀ, ‘free-trade zone’ with
some harmonisation of external trade policies vis-à-vis third parties.
Despite Brazil’s broad regional trade agenda, just a few PTAs are actually
in force (see Table A8.1 in the Statistical Appendix). Most of these agreements
were signed by the four Mercosur members. Since only the agreements with
Chile and Bolivia are to be harmonised with the other three Mercosur mem-
bers, this presents a challenge to a common external trade policy. With the
Andean countries, each Mercosur member follows its own bilateral frame-
work. Most of Brazil’s trade agreements have the objective of reaching free-
trade area status within ten years; the exceptions are the agreements with
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Mexico and Cuba. As a result, the existing degree of trade liberalisation varies
across agreements. Mercosur is the oldest agreement and the one with the
highest preference given and obtained by Brazil. Another interesting charac-
teristic of Mercosur is that the four members share a common external tariﬀ
(CET), and the level of preference is therefore partly determined jointly by the
four members as they have to agree on the CET.9
The evidence from the 2000s suggests that trade policy preferences of both
the private sector and the government in Brasília are moving towards a more
open trade regime once again. For example, the position adopted by the Brazil-
ian government in the non-agricultural market access negotiations held in
Geneva within the Doha Round is aligned with a clear pro-trade orientation.10
Traditionally, Brazil has maintained a protectionist position in favour of its
own industry in its trade agreements, partly owing to its strong import sub-
stitution policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Since 2008, Brazil has adopted a
diﬀerent strategy in the most important forum for international trade nego-
tiations.11
3 TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS IN BRAZIL
When Brazil began its process of trade liberalisation at the end of the 1980s, it
simultaneously introduced a domestic law for the use of TTBs. As the country
engaged in a deep process of trade liberalisation, Brazil put a buﬀer mecha-
nism in place to subsequently manage strong economic and political reactions
to these policy changes.12
9Note that there are limits to this type of argument for Mercosur as the CET is not
always ‘common’, given its numerous exceptions. There are sector exceptions (investment
goods, informatics and telecommunications, automotive sector, and sensitive goods), and
national exceptions lists. Also, countries’ trade regimes and trade preferences have not
been fully harmonised. The CET is the same as the collected tariﬀs (tariﬀ revenues over
imports) in a third of Mercosur imports from third parties. However, two-thirds of these
imports are subject to a zero CET.
10AswasestablishedinaChairmanStephensondocument(WTONAMAnegotiations,July
2008), the key element in non-agricultural market access is the well-known Swiss formula
of tariﬀ reductions. This trade liberalisation schedule has very important properties in
terms of the way it aﬀects the tariﬀ structure. It reduces tariﬀ escalation, eliminates tariﬀ
peaks, and has a consequent reduction in tariﬀ dispersion.
11Brazil announced another important change in early 2011 by initiating bilateral nego-
tiations with Mexico with the objective of signing an FTA.
12Nelson (2006) points out that the academic literature on anti-dumping recognises that
anti-dumping law is often adopted as part of a strategy of tariﬀ reduction or to resist
protectionist pressures. Such policies may also serve as insurance for uncertain trade
policy negotiators that allow them to take on deeper commitments in a trade agreement
than they might otherwise undertake without access to such ‘exceptions’ (Fischer and
Prusa 2003).
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Table 8.2: 2009 imports of Brazil’s sensitive industries with TTB investigations, 1989–
2009.
Imports Imports
Total covered by covered by Anti-
imports TTBs anti-dumping dumping/ TTB/
Three-digit (millions (millions only (millions TTB total
ISIC industry of dollars) of dollars) of dollars) (%) (%)
Footwear 157 157 157 100.0 100.0
Plastic 1,307 550 550 100.0 42.1
Other manufacturing 1,138 324 56 17.2 28.5
Rubber 1,521 527 511 96.9 34.7
Food 2,678 168 168 100.0 6.3
Chemicals 18,600 3,927 3,927 100.0 21.1
Textiles 2,516 574 472 82.1 22.8
Agriculture 3,861 144 125 86.4 3.7
Steel 3,357 251 226 90.3 7.5
Glass 423 47 47 100.0 11.0
Metal products 2,630 308 308 100.0 11.7
Paper 1,355 81 63 78.2 6.0
Sensitive sectors (a) 39,545 7,058 6,610 93.6 17.8
Total (b) 127,348 7,637 7,189 94.1 6.0
Percentage share 31.1 92.4 91.9
(a)/(b) × 100
Note: columns 2, 3 and 4 deﬁned in (8.4), (8.5) and (8.6), respectively. Anti-dumping/TTB deﬁned as
column 4/column 3 × 100. TTB/total deﬁned as column 3/column 2 × 100.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
As expected, Brazil’s trade liberalisation was accompanied by an increase in
the use of TTBs. We begin with a discussion of TTB use by focusing on Brazil’s
sensitive industries and targeted markets. We then distinguish between dif-
ferent types of TTBs, starting with anti-dumping, which is by far the most
frequently used TTB in Brazil. We then turn to CVDs and safeguard measures.
3.1 Sensitive Industries and Target Markets
Some sectors and some origins of Brazil’s imports are more likely to be
aﬀected by Brazil’s use of TTBs. In this section we use diﬀerent indica-
tors to measure how likely TTB measures are to be imposed on certain sec-
tors and countries. The formal deﬁnitions of the indicators are described in
Appendix 5.
Temporary trade barriers are concentrated in 12 industries: footwear, plas-
tics, rubber, food, other manufactures, chemicals, textiles, agriculture, steel,
glass, metal products and paper.13 In these sectors, an average of 18% of
imports were covered by at least one investigation. The equivalent ﬁgure for
13These sectors have a share of imports aﬀected by TTBs greater than the global average
for 1989–2009.
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Figure 8.3: Brazil’s coverage of imports with TTB investigations, 1989–2009.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of both variables in (8.1) and (8.3).
overall imports is around 6% (see Table 8.2 and Figure 8.3). The evolution of
this magnitude for sensitive sectors increases during the ﬁrst episode of uni-
lateral trade liberalisation (1989–1993). The trend then begins to decline until
2003 when it slowly and permanently increases until the end of the period.
Table 8.2 reports that only 6% of Brazil’s imports are aﬀected by some form
of TTB. However, for these most sensitive sectors, ie deﬁned as a sector with
an above average share of imports aﬀected by TTBs, 18% of of sectoral imports
are aﬀected by some form of TTB. These sensitive sectors are also listed in
Table 8.2. sensitive sectors represent 31% of Brazil’s imports, they represent
92% of imports aﬀected by some form of TTB. TTB. Thus, these sectors are
by far the main drivers of the 6% ﬁgure reported at the end of Table 8.2. The
sectors with more exposure to TTB measures are: footwear, plastics, other
manufactures and rubber, where the share of imports aﬀected by some form
of TTB reaches 100%, 42%, 29% and 35%, respectively (see the last column of
Table 8.2).
The most commonly used TTB in Brazil is anti-dumping, as 94% of imports
aﬀected by some form of TTB are subject to anti-dumping (see the fourth
column in Table 8.2). In six sectors (footwear, plastics, food, chemicals, glass
and metal products) this share reaches 100%. Take, for example, the case
of footwear. In 2009 the amount of imports was $157 million, all the HS-06
products imported in 2009 had some type of TTB investigations during 1989–
2009, and each of the TTB investigations took place under anti-dumping.
Among sensitive sectors, the sector where anti-dumping seems to aﬀect
the smallest share of imports is ‘other manufacturing’, indicating that CVDs
and safeguard measures play a more important role in this sector. Taken
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together, these sensitive sectors represent 92% of Brazil’s imports aﬀected by
some form of TTB.
Trading partners aﬀected by Brazil’s TTBs tend to be high-income or upper-
middle-income countries, as well as China. Figure 8.4 shows the value of
imports from diﬀerent types of countries aﬀected by a TTB during 1989–
2009. Countries are divided into the four World Bank categories: high income,
upper-middle income, lower-middle income and low income. We consider
China separately from the lower-middle-income group given its importance as
a source of imports aﬀected by Brazil’s TTBs. The share of high-income coun-
tries and upper-middle-income countries slowly decreases during the period,
while lower-middle-income countries, in particular China, have an increasing
share of Brazil’s imports that are aﬀected by TTBs. This phenomenon is mag-
niﬁed as we shift towards a more restrictive deﬁnition of products aﬀected
by TTBs from panel (a) to panel (c) of Figure 8.4.
Products that have been under a TTB investigation tend to be highly pro-
tected goods. Figure 8.5 illustrates that the average MFN tariﬀ for products
under TTB investigations is always greater than the average MFN tariﬀ. Also,
among the products subject to TTB investigations, those with an imposed
measure tend to have a higher MFN average tariﬀ than the set of products for
which there has been a TTB investigation, but no measure imposed. Interest-
ingly, in 2009, for the set of products that have been investigated but which
have no TTB in place, the increase in MFN tariﬀs has been stronger than for
other products. This suggests that there exists some degree of substitution
between trade protection obtained through MFN tariﬀs and trade protection
obtained through TTBs.
It is important to distinguish products with TTB investigations and prod-
ucts where a TTB measure is in place. There are 212 products (at the six-digit
HS level) where some type of TTB investigation has taken place, which we
refer to as products with TTB investigations.14 Brazil imposed a TTB in 48%
of these products (102) during 1989–2009. Figure 8.6 presents the evolution
of new products with TTB measures in Brazil. The last year of the series estab-
lished a record with the largest number of new products aﬀected by a TTB
measure (19).
Figure 8.7(a) illustrates the number of products aﬀected by a TTB measure
in any given year and the average ad valorem duty associated with these TTBs.
As a share of total imports or the total number of products, TTBs have been
relatively stable since the end of the 1990s, but there has been a sharp increase
in their importance since the beginning of the international crisis in 2008–9.
Figure 8.7 shows an increase in the proportion of the number of products
and the share of total imports aﬀected by TTBs, which is additional evidence
of acceleration during the international crisis. However, whether in terms of
14In terms of cases, the number is larger because some products appear in several cases.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 8.4: Brazil’s imports aﬀected by TTB investigations in 1989–2009, by country
type: (a) entire sample, products under investigation during the period; (b) imports of
products with TTB measure during the period; (c) imports of products with measure in
the current year.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of variables in (8.7), (8.8) and (8.9).
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Figure 8.5: Brazil’s MFN tariﬀs in products with TTB investigation (with and without
measures) and without TTBs, 1989–2009.
Source: authors’ calculations using TRAINS and Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010). See deﬁnition of variables in (8.10)–(8.12).
total imports or total number of products, TTBs only represent around 1% of
the total by 2009.
According to Global Trade Alert project (Evenett 2009), Brazil implemented
other adjustments in trade protection during the crisis through changes in
MFN tariﬀs—both increases and reductions. In fact, MFN tariﬀ changes repre-
sent 55% of the total number of policy changes that Global Trade Alert reports
for Brazil. Temporary trade barriers are the second most frequent type of pol-
icy change, representing around one-third of the total number.
The frequent increases in MFN tariﬀs to respond to stronger demands for
protectionism are consistent with Brazil’s obligations in the WTO due to the
large amount of ‘water’ in its tariﬀ structure.15 According to estimates by
Foletti et al (2011), on average, Brazil could double its MFN tariﬀs without vio-
lating its WTO commitments.16 Half of this potential increase is what is called
‘smoke’ in the tariﬀ water, as it would be impossible for Brazil to raise tar-
iﬀs by that amount due to its preferential tariﬀ commitments, notably within
Mercosur, or due to the fact that the WTO tariﬀ binding is above the pro-
hibitive level and therefore irrelevant.17 Nevertheless, their results imply that
15Tariﬀ water refers to the fact that WTO bound tariﬀs are above the MFN applied tariﬀs
in Brazil, and therefore provide (in principle) some policy space for tariﬀ increases.
16The fact that MFN tariﬀs could be doubled before reaching the level of bound tariﬀs
corresponds to what is observed, on average, across all countries in Foletti et al (2011).
17The average share of smoke in the tariﬀ water across countries is 28%, so Brazil is a
country with a signiﬁcant share of smoke in its tariﬀ structure.
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Figure 8.6: New HS-06 products with TTB measures, 1989–2009: (a) new products with
TTB measures by year; (b) accumulated series of new products.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of variables (8.13) and (8.14).
Brazil could increase its average MFN tariﬀ by 50% without violating its WTO
commitments.
Table 8.3 illustrates how similar increases in MFN tariﬀs are possible for
products that have been under a TTB investigation, regardless of whether a
measure was applied. MFN tariﬀs on these products could almost double on
average without violating the average WTO commitment. However, a doubling
of MFN tariﬀs may not be enough in some sensitive sectors, where the ad val-
orem duty imposed through TTBs reaches on average 60%, ie four times the
MFN level.
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Figure 8.7: TTB with measure, ad valorem tariﬀ, products and imports coverage,
1989–2009: (a) ad valorem TTB measure (%) and number of products (HS-06); (b) shares
of imports subject to TTBs.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of variables (8.15)–(8.18).
3.2 Anti-Dumping, CVDs and Safeguards
There are two stages in an anti-dumping procedure: preliminary and ﬁnal. In
each stage it is necessary to establish evidence of dumping and injury to the
domestic sector. It is also necessary to establish causality from dumping to
injury to be able to apply anti-dumping measures. In the preliminary stage,
the observed values of the decisions (dumping and injury) are the following:
accepted (A), bypassed to the ﬁnal decision (B) or denied (N). In the ﬁnal stage,
the observed values for the ﬁnal decisions are the following: accepted (A),
interrupted (withdrawn by private sector (W) or terminated by public authori-
ties(T))ordenied(N).Table8.4presentsresultsforBrazil(seealsoTableA8.2).
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Table 8.3: MFN tariﬀs and WTO bindings for products with TTB investigations, 2006–9.
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Type of TTB product Average tariﬀ (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
WTO binding 31.8 31.7 31.6 31.7 31.7 With measures MFN applied 16.2 15.7 16.8 16.7 16.3
WTO binding 30.5 30.3 30.3 30.6 30.4 Without measures MFN applied 14.1 14.1 14.4 16.7 14.9
WTO binding 31.3 31.3 31.1 31.0 31.2 All products MFN applied 15.3 15.0 15.7 16.7 15.7
Source: authors’ calculations using TRAINS, WTO and Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010).
Table 8.4: Typology of anti-dumping cases in Brazil, 1988–2010 (cases and products
at HS-06 level).
Cases Products
Without anti-dumping measures 90 147
With anti-dumping measure 140 273
– in preliminary stage 11 56
– in ﬁnal stage 75 98
– in two stages 54 119
Anti-dumping in process 13 21
Total 243 441
Source: authors’ calculations using Table A8.2.
The cases are divided in three main categories: without anti-dumping mea-
sures, with anti-dumping measures, and in process.
Approximately 58% of Brazil’s 243 cases during 1988–2010 ended up with
anti-dumping measures. Almost half of those cases had an anti-dumping duty
imposed in the preliminary stage. In terms of products, there were 441 HS-06
products aﬀected, of which 63% ended up with an anti-dumping measure.
More than 60% of those had an anti-dumping duty imposed in the preliminary
stage.
Figure 8.8 presents the evolution in the number of anti-dumping cases ini-
tiated over 1988–2010. The ﬁgure distinguishes between cases that resulted
in the imposition of an anti-dumping duty and those without anti-dumping
duties, similarly to Table 8.4 (see also Tables A8.2 and A8.3).
An important observation is that the number of anti-dumping measures,
whether measured in terms of cases or products, tends to spike in the early
1990s, then the late 1990s, as well as the late 2000s. This coincides with
periods when Brazil’s real exchange rate was undergoing a signiﬁcant appre-
ciation. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Knetter and Prusa (2003) that
exchange-rate appreciation leads to increases in the number of anti-dumping
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Figure 8.8: Evolution of anti-dumping initiated cases and anti-dumping measures in
Brazil, 1988–2010.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
For the last two years the cases in process are divided between ‘failed’ and ‘not failed’
using the average success of the last three years with complete information (2006–8).
See deﬁnition of variables (8.19)–(8.22).
cases. While the number of cases initiated each year oscillates, the number of
anti-dumping cases in force in any given year has been systematically increas-
ing throughout the period, except during the late 1990s. The rapid increase
in the number of measures in place corresponds to the peaks in the number
of cases initiated.
In terms of sector coverage there are clearly some industries that are more
likely to beneﬁt from anti-dumping duties than others. Table 8.5 shows the
number of anti-dumping cases initiated by sector, and it disaggregates into
those with and without anti-dumping duties, by case and by HS-06 product.
Chemicals, textiles, and iron and steel represent more than 50% of cases initi-
ated (or products covered in those cases) during 1988–2010. The footwear and
food sectors follow. Agriculture and sectors intensive in natural resources,
such as minerals or wood, are less likely to be subject to anti-dumping. Fig-
ure 8.9 presents imports aﬀected by anti-dumping investigations and applied
measures. Chemicals, plastics and textiles covered more than the 60% of
imports with imposed measures by 2009. These results partly reﬂect the com-
parative advantage of Brazil but also the relative political strength of these
sectors in Brazil’s internal politics.
The average duration of Brazil’s imposed anti-dumping measures is not nec-
essarily correlated with the number of cases brought by a sector. This is partly
natural, because a sector may bring a large number of cases without much of
a legal base to intimidate foreign exporters in order to reduce their share of
the domestic market (see Leidy and Hoekman (1990)). As shown in Table 8.6,
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(a)
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Figure 8.9: Evolution of the structure of imports in products aﬀected by Brazil’s
anti-dumping by industry for the period 1989–2009: (a) whole sample products under
anti-dumping investigation; (b) structure of imports of products with anti-dumping mea-
sure; (c) imports of products with anti-dumping measure in the current year.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of variables in (8.23)–(8.25).
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Table 8.5: Stock of anti-dumping initiated cases, with and without anti-dumping mea-
sures in Brazil by industry using ISIC 3, 1988–2010 (cases and products at HS-06 level).
Cases HS-06 products
    
Sectors Without With Without With
   anti- anti- anti- anti-
Name ISIC3 dumping dumping Total dumping dumping Total
Agriculture 111 0 5 5 0 6 6
Agriculture 111–311/12 0 1 1 0 2 2
Minerals 200 1 0 1 1 0 1
Food 311/12 1 7 8 6 30 36
Textiles 321 7 13 20 13 48 61
Footwear 324–356 1 1 2 23 23 46
Wood 331 1 0 1 1 0 1
Paper 341 4 3 7 4 5 9
Chemicals 351 45 46 91 61 56 117
Other 352 2 4 6 2 6 8
chemicals
Rubber 355 1 6 7 1 6 7
Plastics 356 2 0 2 2 0 2
Glass 362 4 1 5 4 1 5
Glass 362–351 0 1 1 0 2 2
Glass 362–351–356 5 2 7 15 6 21
Other 369 2 4 6 2 6 8
non-metallic
Iron and steel 371 9 19 28 15 37 52
Nonferrous 372 10 1 11 10 1 11
metal
Metal products 381 2 11 13 2 11 13
Metal products 381–371 0 2 2 0 5 5
Machinery 382 0 2 2 0 3 3
Electric 383 0 3 3 0 5 5
machinery
Electric 383–351 0 1 1 0 2 2
machinery
Transport 384 0 2 2 0 2 2
Professional/ 385 2 2 4 2 7 9
scientiﬁc
Other 390 4 3 7 4 3 7
manufactured
Total 103 140 243 168 273 441
Some sectors appear twice because some cases cover several sectors simultaneously.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
sectors with the largest average duration of measures are the machinery and
electric machinery sector and the glass sector. Chemicals and footwear, which
were the sectors with the largest number of cases, have an average duration
that tends to be below the mean.
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(a)
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Figure 8.10: Imports in products aﬀected by Brazil’s anti-dumping investigations, by
partner, 1989–2009: (a) whole sample products under anti-dumping investigation dur-
ing the period; (b) imports of products with anti-dumping measure during the period;
(c) imports of products with anti-dumping measure in the current year.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
See deﬁnition of variables in (8.26)–(8.28).
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Table 8.6: Average duration of anti-dumping measures in Brazil by industry using
ISIC 3, 1988–2010.
Average duration (years)
Sectors   
   With anti-
Name ISIC3 dumping Total
Agriculture 111 4.6 4.6
Agriculture 111–311/12 2.0 2.0
Minerals 200 N/A N/A
Food 311/12 7.6 6.6
Textiles 321 4.0 2.6
Footwear 324–356 1.0 0.5
Wood 331 0.0 0.0
Paper 341 7.6 3.3
Chemicals 351 5.2 2.6
Chemicals 352 5.3 3.5
Rubber 355 5.8 5.0
Plastics 356 0.0 0.0
Glass 362 30.0 6.0
Glass 362–351 5.3 5.3
Glass 362–351–356 5.0 1.4
Other non-metallic 369 7.5 5.0
Iron and steel 371 7.1 4.8
Nonferrous metal 372 6.0 0.5
Metal products 381 7.7 6.5
Metal products 381–371 5.0 5.0
Machinery 382 7.5 7.5
Electric machinery 383 7.7 7.7
Electric machinery 383–351 1.0 1.0
Transport 384 3.5 3.5
Professional and 385 2.0 1.0
scientiﬁc equipment
Other manufactured 390 6.0 2.6
products
Total 5.9 3.4
‘N/A’ means that no data were available.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
Figure 8.10 illustrates the value of imports and the share in the total value of
imports by trading partner aﬀected by Brazil’s anti-dumping cases. The USA,
the EU and Argentina are the principal targets of Brazil’s anti-dumping mea-
sures. They jointly represent around 75% of Brazil’s aﬀected imports. They
are followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Colombia and Russia, but these four
countries only represent around 10% of the value of imports aﬀected by anti-
dumping duties.
Brazil has used countervailing measures much less frequently than anti-
dumping. Brazil had 16 CVD cases during the period 1989–2010, and it
applied measures in only 10 of the 16 cases. These measures generally took
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the form of ad valorem tariﬀs. For one of these ten cases (‘latex yarn’ from
Malaysia), we have no information regarding the type of duty applied. In the
Statistical Appendix, Table A8.4 summarises the number of cases and prod-
ucts aﬀected by countervailing measures with and without duties.
Safeguard measures are even less commonly used in Brazil. During the
period 1989–2010, Brazil initiated three safeguard investigations: one each
in 1996, 2001 and 2008. In two of these cases (toys and coconuts), Brazil
applied measures. For toys, Brazil applied the same ad valorem measures
from 1997 until 2003 in 15 HS-06 products. For coconuts, which started in
2002 and lasted until 2006, Brazil imposed quantitative restrictions. The last
case resulted in a negative ﬁnding in 2009.
4 CONCLUSION
As Brazil’s trade liberalisation intensiﬁed in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
it put in place a regime of temporary trade protection. This chapter describes
the Brazilian authority’s use of TTBs in the period 1990–2009. Brazil’s TTBs
have been highly concentrated in a few sectors (chemicals, plastics and tex-
tiles). When the whole set of TTB investigations are considered, Brazilian TTBs
mainly target high-income and middle-income trading partners. If the sam-
ple of imports is restricted to products where TTBs are imposed, the likeli-
hood of observing a middle-and-low-income country being aﬀected by Brazil’s
TTB increases considerably, with China becoming more important in the late
2000s.
The vast majority of Brazil’s TTBs are in anti-dumping. Over the period
between 1990 and 2009, Brazil had only 3 safeguard cases and 16 counter-
vailing cases, compared with 243 anti-dumping cases. The number of imposed
anti-dumping measures accelerated in the early 1990s, again in the late 1990s
and once more in the late 2000s. This coincides with periods when Brazil’s
real exchange rate was signiﬁcantly appreciating. This is consistent with the
ﬁnding of Knetter and Prusa (2003) that exchange-rate appreciations lead to
increases in the number of anti-dumping cases when it becomes easier to ﬁnd
evidence of injury.
Brazil’s use of TTBs is consistent with its concern regarding changes in
international competitiveness and it is in reaction to some of the constraints
imposed on Brazil by its multilateral and regional commitments. One eco-
nomic concern with using TTBs to address such concerns is that it is highly
ineﬃcient and it does not target the source of the problem.
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5 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
In Figure 8.3 we deﬁne coverage of imports using the following deﬁnitions:
coTTB
t =

i bi vmit 
i vmit
, (8.1)
with bi = 1i fi has a TTB investigation in t ∈ [1989,2009], and bi = 0 other-
wise; vmit denotes the value of imports of product i (HS-06) in period t, i ∈ I
such that vmit > 0 in some t ∈ [1989,2009].
By analogy, we deﬁne import coverage by sector as follows:
coTTB
st =

is bis vmist 
is vmist
. (8.2)
We choose the set of products in sectors where coverage of imports under
investigation is higher than average coverage. If coTTB
st > coTTB
t , then, for s ∈ ¯ S
(sensitive sectors),
coTTB
¯ St =

i∈¯ S bi vmit 
i∈¯ S vmit
. (8.3)
In column 1 of Table 8.2 we compute
vmst =

is
vmist if s ∈ ¯ S, (8.4)
in column 2 of Table 8.2 we have
vmTTB
st =

is
bis vmist if s ∈ ¯ S, (8.5)
and in column 3 of Table 8.2 we have
vm
anti-dumping
st =

is
ais vmist if s ∈ ¯ S, (8.6)
with ai = 1i fi has an anti-dumping investigation in t ∈ [1989,2009], and
ai = 0 otherwise.
In Figure 8.4 the magnitudes computed are
vmTTB
jt =

i
bi vmijt, (8.7)
vmTTBm
jt =

i
bm
i vmijt, (8.8)
vmTTBmf
jt =

i
bmf
i vmijt, (8.9)
where j denotes high income, lower income, lower middle income, China
and upper middle income; where bm
i = 1i fi has a TTB measure in t ∈
[1989,2009], and bm
i = 0 otherwise; and where bmf
it = 1i fi has a TTB measure
in force in the current period, and bm
it = 0 otherwise.
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In Figure 8.5, three diﬀerent averages of MFN tariﬀ are presented:
t
mfn,NOTTB
it =

i(1 − bi)tmfn
it 
i(1 − bi)
, (8.10)
t
mfn,TTBwm
it =

i bwm
i tmfn
it 
i bwm
i
, (8.11)
t
mfn,TTBm
it =

i bm
i tmfn
it 
i bm
i
, (8.12)
where bwm
i = 1i fi has a TTB investigation but without a measure in t ∈
[1989,2009], and bwm
i = 0 otherwise. Note that bwm
i = bi − bm
i .
In Figure 8.6 the evolution of the number of new products with TTB mea-
sures are computed as
nTTBnm
t =

i
bnm
it , (8.13)
anTTBnm
t =
t 
z=0

i
bnm
iz , (8.14)
where bnm
it = 1i fi has a TTB measure in the current period t and not in any
period t − z, and bnm
it = 0 otherwise.
In Figure 8.7(a) products with TTB measure and the average level of the
measure by year are computed as
nTTBmf
t =

i
bmf
it , (8.15)
ttbt =

i bmf
it ttbit

i bmf
it
, (8.16)
where ttbit is the TTB measure in ad valorem terms.
In Figure 8.7(b) the shares of the count of products and imports with mea-
sures in the current year are computed as
sh
pro
t =

i bm
it
It
, (8.17)
sh
vm
t =

i bm
it vmit 
i vmit
, (8.18)
where It is the number of products such that imports are greater than zero
in the current year t.
These last two measures are similar to those computed in Bown (2011b); see
equations (1.1) and (1.2). In the shares of imports we did not correct for the
eﬀect of the TTB measure on the level of imports as it is done in Equation (1.2).
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In Figure 8.8 the ﬂow of cases and products with anti-dumping initiated
investigations and measures by year are computed as
nc
anti-dumping
t =

c
b
anti-dumping
ct , (8.19)
np
anti-dumping
t =

i
b
anti-dumping
it , (8.20)
nc
anti-dumpingm
t =

c
b
anti-dumpingm
ct , (8.21)
np
anti-dumpingm
t =

i
b
anti-dumpingm
it , (8.22)
where b
anti-dumping
ct = 1 if the case c has initiated an anti-dumping investiga-
tion in the current period, and b
anti-dumping
ct = 0 otherwise; with b
anti-dumping
it = 1
if the product i is in an anti-dumping investigation initiated in the current
period, and b
anti-dumping
it = 0 otherwise; with b
anti-dumpingm
ct = 1 if the case c has
an anti-dumping measure in the current period, and b
anti-dumpingm
ct = 0 other-
wise; with b
anti-dumpingm
it = 1 if the product i has an anti-dumping measure in
the current period, and b
anti-dumpingm
it = 0 otherwise.
In Figure 8.9 the structure of imports by sector with some anti-dumping
investigations during the period is presented:
vm
anti-dumping
st =

is
b
anti-dumping
i vmist, (8.23)
vm
anti-dumpingm
st =

is
b
anti-dumpingm
i vmist, (8.24)
vm
anti-dumpingmf
st =

is
b
anti-dumpingmf
is vmist, (8.25)
where deﬁnitions of dummies are similar to (8.7)–(8.9), but restricted to anti-
dumping.
In Figure 8.10 the structure of imports by country with some anti-dumping
investigations during the period is presented:
vm
anti-dumping
jt =

i
b
anti-dumping
i vmijt, (8.26)
vm
anti-dumpingm
jt =

i
b
anti-dumpingm
i vmijt, (8.27)
vm
anti-dumpingmf
jt =

i
b
anti-dumpingmf
i vmijt, (8.28)
where deﬁnitions of dummies are similar to (8.7)–(8.9) but restricted to anti-
dumping.
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6 STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table A8.1: Brazil’s PTAs in force with third countries, 1991–2008.
Type of agreement
Partner Year   
Argentina, Paraguay 1991 Plurilateral FTA (2001) and CU
and Uruguay (ACE, 18) (in construction)
Chile (ACE, 35) 1996 Common with Mercosur FTA in goods
countries
Bolivia 1997 Common with Mercosur FTA in goods
countries
Mexico (ACE 53 and 55) 2003 Bilateral Trade rules and
automotive sector
Cuba 2000 Bilateral Partial preference
Peru (ACE, 58) 2005 Common with Mercosur FTA in goods (2014)
but diﬀerent
bilateral preference
Ecuador, Colombia 2005 Common with Mercosur FTA in goods (2018)
and Venezuela (ACE, 59) but diﬀerent
bilateral preference
‘ACE’ stands for Acuerdo de Complementación Económica (Economic Complementation Agreement).
Source: Moncarz et al (2010).
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Table A8.2: Typology of anti-dumping cases in Brazil for 1988–2010, combinations of
decisions at the preliminary and ﬁnal stages of the procedure (cases and products at
HS-06).
Calculation of
interval period of Average
anti-dumping interval
Cases Products measures (years)
Without anti-dumping 90 147 — 0.0
··-·· 1 23 — 0.0
AA-·N 1 1 — 0.0
BB-·N 1 1 — 0.0
BB-AN 19 25 — 0.0
BB-NN 49 63 — 0.0
BB-TT 10 16 Revoke–Final 0.8∗
BB-WW 8 12 — 0.0
NN-NN 1 6 — 0.0
Anti-dumping in 13 21 — 0.0
process of study
MIMI-MIMI 13 21 — 0.0
Anti-dumping in 11 56 ——
preliminary stage
AA-NN 8 46 Final–Preliminary 1.5
AA-TT 2 9 Final–Preliminary 8.5
AA-WW 1 1 Final–Preliminary 1.0
Anti-dumping in 75 98 ——
ﬁnal stage
BB-AA 66 89 Revoke–Final 5.3∗∗
BB-OTHOTH 2 2 Revoke–Final 5.0
MIMI-AA 5 5 Revoke–Final 6.2
NN-AA 2 2 Revoke–Final 1.0
Anti-dumping in 54 119 Revoke–Preliminary —
two stages
AA-AA 54 119 Revoke–Preliminary 6.4
Total 243 441 — 3.4
A denotes ‘accepted’; N denotes ‘denied’; B denotes ‘bypassed’; T denotes ‘terminated’; W denotes
‘withdrawn’; MI denotes ‘missing’; and OTH denotes ‘other’. Thus, an investigation with bypassed
preliminary stage and ﬁnal aﬃrmative dumping but ﬁnal negative injury ﬁnding will show up as
BB-AN. ‘∗’ denotes cases where the ﬁnal decisions are T but the revoke year is not immediate. ‘∗∗’
denotes cases where we do not have information about the revoke year and thus we use the average
to perform calculations.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 315 — #335






Brazil: Micro- and Macrodeterminants of Temporary Trade Barriers 315
Table A8.3: Brazil’s anti-dumping initiations with and without anti-dumping measures,
1988–2010.
Cases Products (HS-06)
    
Without With Without With
Total anti-dumping anti-dumping Total anti-dumping anti-dumping
1988 2 0 2 2 0 2
1989 2 0 2 2 0 2
1990 2 0 2 2 0 2
1991 13 8 5 13 8 5
1992 8 0 8 9 0 9
1993 27 16 11 62 16 46
1994 10 6 4 11 6 5
1995 5 0 5 5 0 5
1996 16 10 6 18 12 6
1997 9 2 7 15 4 11
1998 20 5 15 46 10 36
1999 15 4 11 42 9 33
2000 8 5 3 19 13 6
2001 17 12 5 20 13 7
2002 8 5 3 22 17 5
2003 4 1 3 4 1 3
2004 8 5 3 8 5 3
2005 6 6 0 6 6 0
2006 12 3 9 20 3 17
2007 13 1 12 23 1 22
2008 24 1 23 70 23 47
2009 9 1 8 17 4 13
2010 5 1 4 5 1 4
Stock 243 91 152 441 152 289
In 2009 and 2010, cases and products with anti-dumping measures are estimated due to lack of
information. The observed ﬁgures for both cases and products with anti-dumping measure in 2009
are 1 and 0 in 2010.
Source: authors’ calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
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Argentina: There and Back Again?
MICHAEL O. MOORE1
1 INTRODUCTION
Argentina’s economy came under considerable stress in 2008 as the global
ﬁnancial crisis swept the world. Argentine economic growth stumbled as
exports fell dramatically and credit markets dried up worldwide. This eco-
nomic distress raised the spectre of a renewed inward protectionist approach
that Argentina has followed so frequently in times of severe downturn. In the
event, there is evidence that the Argentine government began to use TTBs
more intensely from 2008 until the ﬁrst half of 2010. One estimate suggests
that, taking into account the suppression of trade associated with the import
restrictions, over 5% of Argentine imports were aﬀected by such contingent
protection measures in 2009, which is far in excess of any earlier period. Tem-
porary trade barriers have been particularly commonly used against Chinese
exports to Argentina. However, there is less evidence of a systematically more
protectionist approach by Argentina in the post-crisis period using transpar-
ent trade restrictions such as increased MFN tariﬀs. There has been a greater
use of opaque measures such as non-automatic import licences and reference
prices, though the broader impact of such policies remains unclear.
Argentina’s experience can provide important insights into the use of WTO-
consistent trade restrictions in times of turmoil. Argentina has a long and
complicated relationship with trade protection and with the use of contingent
protection measures from the early 1990s until the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s.
In the last 25 years, Argentina has whipsawed back and forth from a highly
protected economy with a reliance on import substitution through the early
1980s to a dramatically more open model in the late 1980s due to unilateral
trade liberalisation, and then back again to a more inwards-focused approach
1Department of Economics, Elliott School of International Aﬀairs, and Institute for Inter-
national Economic Policy, George Washington University, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20052, USA. Email: mom@gwu.edu. I would like to thank Maggie Chen, Maurizio Zanardi
and Aksel Erbahar for their help on this project as well as Sungil Kwak and Urvi Thanki
for their excellent research assistance. The project, of course, would have been impossible
without the hard work and vision of Chad Bown.
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in the early years of the 2000s. During that time, it has faced economic shocks
from both international and domestic sources. This includes a severe balance-
of-payments crisis and subsequent devaluation of the peso in the 2001–2
period as well as the consequences of the international crisis that began in
2008.
In the post-2008 crisis period, economic disruptions grew in Argentina, as
was the case across the rest of the world. Annual Argentine GDP growth fell
signiﬁcantly from 6.8% in 2008 to 0.9% in 2009 as the crisis that began in devel-
oped countries moved towards developing countries.2 Oﬃcial unemployment
rose from 7.3% in 2008 to 8.4% in 2009. The pressures on the trade side were
evident as well. Argentine merchandise exports fell 20% from $70 billion in
2008 to $55.7 billion in 2009. Slower Argentine economic growth resulted in
an even more dramatic 29% drop in imports from $54.3 billion in 2008 to
$38.3 billion in 2009. Given the sharp drop in economic growth and the con-
temporaneous Argentine government’s scepticism towards laissez-faire poli-
cies, one might expect a strong reaction in trade policy.
The following analysis will show two important features. The ﬁrst is that the
total amount of trade aﬀected by ongoing TTBs in Argentina rose signiﬁcantly
in the post-crisis period. Second, Argentine TTBs have become less and less
about industries traditionally targeted by such measures (such as steel) and
moreandmoreaboutrestrictionsonChineseexportsinavarietyofindustries.
Such data patterns mean that it is diﬃcult to know with certainty whether
this increased use of contingent protection is a move against China or a more
general reaction to the broader economic crisis.
This chapter includes a section on the broad trade policy context in
Argentina in Section 2, followed by a discussion in Section 3 of basic descrip-
tive statistics on anti-dumping and safeguard use.3 Section 4 includes a more
detailed analysis of the amount of trade aﬀected by the measures, Section 5
has a more detailed discussion of Argentina’s experience with China, and Sec-
tion 6 contains a brief discussion of other trade policy measures such as
import licences and adjustments of applied tariﬀs. Section 7 contains some
concluding remarks.
2World Bank World Development Indicators are the source for all macroeconomic data
while the United Nations Comtrade is the source for trade data.
3Argentina has also intervened frequently in its export markets, primarily through
export taxes and quotas, in order to moderate domestic price increases. This tendency
has been particularly acute in agricultural markets such as beef and wine. While impor-
tant in understanding the broader story about trade policy, this chapter is focused on
interventions in the import side alone. See Rossi et al (2009) for an analysis of Argentine
export policies and Global Trade Alert (2010a,b) for a catalogue of actions in the crisis
period.
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2 BROAD TRADE OVERVIEW
Argentina was one of the most consistent practitioners of import substitu-
tion policies in Latin America during the mid-1980s. For example, Nogues
and Baracat (2006) report that average Argentine applied ad valorem tariﬀs
reached 39% in 1987, with about 50% of tariﬀ lines subject to import licences.
Starting in 1988, Argentina began a remarkable unilateral trade liberalisation
package that subsequently resulted in average applied tariﬀs of only 12% with
no products being subject to import licences.
Argentina has long had a system of TTBs, even prior to the liberalisation
period of the 1980s. It adopted an anti-dumping system in 1972 (Zanardi
2004) that would allow for individual industries to ﬁle for temporary protec-
tion through this administered protection system. It also instituted systems
that allow CVDs in the event of subsidised exports for narrowly deﬁned prod-
uct areas as well as broad industry-level restrictions from all sources in the
event of import surges that result in ‘serious’ injury (safeguards).4 The Argen-
tine system included a central role by Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterio
(CNCE), which is the administrative body responsible for investigating dump-
ing and injury allegations ﬁled by domestic industries.
Argentina certainly has one of the longest histories of intense use of
potentially WTO-consistent contingent protection measures among develop-
ing countries. This has been primarily through the use of anti-dumping. Prusa
(2001) shows that Argentina was the second most frequent new user of anti-
dumping in the 1990s. On the other hand, Argentina’s authorities used safe-
guards and CVD actions against importers very infrequently. Thus, while this
chapter will include an analysis of safeguard actions, the focus will be on
anti-dumping as the primary example of Argentina’s TTBs.5
Based on what took place after the peso crisis of 2001–2, one might have
expected there to be a marked increase in protectionist measures in Argentina
after the economic crisis that began in late 2008. There was indeed an uptick
in the use of new contingent protection measures during the global economic
crisis, though there were no new CVDs or safeguard actions. There is strong
evidence that the overall impact of anti-dumping actions, measured by the
share of trade aﬀected by ongoing anti-dumping orders, grew substantially in
Argentina in 2008 and 2009. As discussed below, this shows that Argentine
4See Nogues and Baracat (2006) for details on the anti-dumping, CVD and safeguard
systems in Argentina.
5Argentina, like the vast majority of WTO members, has initiated only a handful of CVD
investigations (ie actions taken against potentially injurious imports that have received
subsidies from a government). In particular, there have been a total of only six CVD inves-
tigations undertaken by the Argentine government, all but one of which involved agri-
cultural goods. These cases also represent a very small percentage of trade aﬀected by
TTBs; the greatest percentage was in 1997 when only 6% of trade aﬀected by contingent
protection, or only 0.02% of total trade, involved CVD measures.
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Table 9.1: Argentina’s economy, 1991–2009.
GDP Current
growth Unemployment Exchange account Anti-dumping
Year (annual %) rate rate (% of GDP) initiations
1991 12.7 6.5 1.43 −0.2 1
1992 11.9 7.1 1.36 −2.8 14
1993 5.9 11.7 1.37 −3.4 28
1994 5.8 14.4 1.46 −4.3 18
1995 −2.8 18.9 1.49 −2.0 25
1996 5.5 19.1 1.44 −2.5 24
1997 8.1 15.9 1.35 −4.0 13
1998 3.9 14.7 1.41 −4.8 6
1999 −3.4 16.2 1.37 −4.2 21
2000 −0.8 17.4 1.30 −3.1 26
2001 −4.4 20.7 1.26 −1.4 33
2002 −10.9 20.8 4.51 8.5 10
2003 8.8 14.5 4.32 6.3 1
2004 9.0 12.1 4.60 1.7 12
2005 9.2 10.1 4.31 2.6 8
2006 8.5 8.7 4.58 3.2 10
2007 8.7 7.5 4.94 2.3 8
2008 6.8 7.3 5.29 1.5 20
2009 0.9 8.4 5.93 2.0 28
Exchange rate (nominal)=peso per IMF special drawing right. Anti-dumping initiations are at inves-
tigation level (eg footwear from China).
Source: GDP growth and exchange rate taken from World Development Indicators; unemployment
rate and current account taken from IMF World Economic Outlook; and anti-dumping initiations
taken from Bown (2010) and Moore and Zanardi (2009).
authorities have become much more likely to impose an anti-dumping order
after an initiation and are far less likely to remove them after the ﬁve-year
period as envisioned by international anti-dumping agreements negotiated in
the Uruguay Round.
However, there was relatively little broad new retrenchment against imports
during the 2008–9 period, including only a modest increase in applied tariﬀs
that Argentina could have raised signiﬁcantly given its tariﬀ overhang. This,
of course, reﬂects Argentina’s membership in Mercosur, which makes unilat-
eral increases in applied MFN tariﬀs potentially problematic.6 There has been
an increase of other types of tariﬀ barriers, including non-automatic import
licences. However, one diﬃculty with import licences is their opaque nature—
they have uncertain eﬀects on trade ﬂows since they vary depending on how
bureaucracies implement the restrictions.
6Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are the members of Mercosur, a customs
union that in principle requires common tariﬀs on non-members and zero tariﬀs among
member nations.
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Table 9.1 displays some basic information about the Argentine economy
from 1991 to 2009, including data on the annual GDP growth rate, the
exchange rate (pesos per IMF ‘special drawing rights’), and the current account
as a share of GDP. Argentina’s economic growth has been highly volatile dur-
ing the period. Economic growth was quite strong during the early 1990s
as the country embarked on its remarkable economic liberalisation program.
This was followed by a sharp contraction in 1999 during the aftermath of the
Brazilian and Russian crises, and an even greater decline in 2001 and 2002
during the peso crisis. The nominal exchange rate reﬂects this currency tur-
moil with a dramatic devaluation in 2002 followed by a slowly depreciating
peso thereafter. The current account as a percentage of GDP has been in sur-
plus for the entire period subsequent to the devaluation. The 2008–9 global
ﬁnancial crisis period reﬂects a sharp slowdown in growth (from 6.8% in 2008
to 0.9% in 2009) but with a retained current account surplus and a depreciat-
ing exchange rate.
Table 9.1 also includes the number of newly initiated anti-dumping inves-
tigations in each year, ie the number of country–product petitions ﬁled by
the Argentine industry. Thus, an anti-dumping petition against Swiss ‘lami-
nated ﬂoors’, which might involve myriad individual tariﬀ lines, is counted as
one ‘investigation’, which is the standard method of counting anti-dumping
activity in the literature.
There are two clear patterns for anti-dumping activity. The ﬁrst is the
increased use of anti-dumping in the years immediately prior to the balance-
of-payments crisis in 2001–2. The Argentine peso became signiﬁcantly over-
valued in the late 1990s and early 2000s as Argentina experienced a large
and persistent current account deﬁcit. Argentine use of anti-dumping rose
to its highest rate (measured by the number of investigations initiated) in
this period; industries eﬀectively used the anti-dumping system to decrease
imports. Anti-dumping initiations fell dramatically in 2002 to fewer than half
of the 2000 total, which coincided with a massive 10.9% contraction of the
economy.
The experience in the post-devaluation period shows that a sharp slowdown
in macroeconomic growth has not been enough to trigger anti-dumping use
in Argentina. The main mitigating factor was the dramatic 56% fall in imports
that occurred in the post-devaluation period, which normally makes proving
that imports have caused material injury more diﬃcult for petitioning domes-
tic industries.
The post-2007 period provides a slightly diﬀerent lesson. Anti-dumping
use rose three-fold from 2007 and 2009 in terms of initiated investigations,
even as the peso continued to depreciate and imports fell. During this period,
and in contrast to the years immediately following the peso devaluation, the
dramatic reduction in economic activity coincided with a rise in anti-dumping
use (the data for 1991–1994 come from Moore and Zanardi (2009); the balance
is from Bown (2010)). Table 9.2 includes a list of initiated anti-dumping inves-
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Table 9.2: Argentina’s initiated anti-dumping investigations, January 2008–March
2010.
Initiation
Target country Product date
Thailand Air conditioners 1/10/2008
Brazil, Indonesia Acrylic yarns 25/3/2008
Brazil, China Stainless steel cutlery 25/4/2008
China Large chains 28/4/2008
China, Peru, Taiwan Zippers 5/5/2008
China, Romania Oil rigs 22/5/2008
China Cooling liquid or water 28/7/2008
for engines
China, India Dyes 29/7/2008
China Dishware 31/7/2008
China Steel pipe accessories 23/10/2008
China, India, Indonesia, Taiwan Polyester ﬁbre and yarn 17/11/2008
Brazil, China Certain taﬀeta ligament weft 6/1/2009
and warp fabrics
Brazil, China Electric food processors 14/1/2009
China, Germany, Switzerland Laminated ﬂoors 23/1/2009
China Footwear 2/3/2009
China Steel wheels 9/3/2009
Brazil, China Stainless steel knives 20/3/2009
with plastic handles
China Denim 25/3/2009
Paraguay Recordable compact discs 25/3/2009
Brazil, China Iron pipe accessories 14/5/2009
China Elevator and forklift engines 29/5/2009
China Lighters used in kitchens 7/7/2009
Brazil Printing ink 14/7/2009
India Connectors for metal conductors 16/7/2009
Brazil Gas compressors (except air) 9/9/2009
China Electric centrifugal pump 9/9/2009
China Syringes 9/9/2009
China Methane chloride 24/9/2009
China Electric heaters 19/10/2009
China Starting and regulator devices 29/10/2009
for motorcycles
China Steel tubes 2/11/2009
China Electric fans 24/11/2009
China Rubber tyres 17/12/2009
Brazil Polypropylene fabric 11/2/2010
China Suits and jackets 13/2/2010
Korea, Malaysia, Air conditioners 13/2/2010
Thailand, Vietnam
China Chain saw blades 3/3/2010
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
tigations from January 2008 to March 2010. As illustrated by the table, China
was clearly the prominent target, a pattern discussed in more detail below.
It will be useful to consider how applied tariﬀs in sectors aﬀected by all
types of TTBs compare with tariﬀs in sectors that are free from these types of
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Figure 9.1: Argentina’s unweighted average applied MFN tariﬀs.
Source: TRAINS database.
restrictions. Figure 9.1 shows that the average (unweighted) applied MFN tar-
iﬀs in sectors that were subject to TTBs in any year of the sample always
exceed the average tariﬀs of all sectors for 1995–2009.7 In other words,
those sectors that use contingent protection already have higher-than-average
tariﬀs for all years in the data. This suggests that sectors that have been
subject to less dramatic tariﬀ reductions have also been the most active in
seeking additional protection. One interpretation of these data is that, in
Argentina, TTBs and MFN tariﬀs could be considered complements rather
than substitutes.
Another important trade policy change was Argentina’s 1991 decision to
join Mercosur, a customs union, along with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Membership of Mercosur entailed a common external tariﬀ that was com-
pleted by the end of 1994. Four aspects of this agreement are particularly
important. First, the customs union means that imports from other Mercosur
countries would normally enter Argentina without restrictions.8 Second, the
common external tariﬀ means that Argentina would be limited in its ability
to increase its MFN tariﬀs on non-Mercosur countries. While Argentina might
have other methods (eg non-automatic import licences, regulatory practices,
internaltaxationandcontingentprotectionmeasures)toreduceimports,their
impact would be more limited than what Argentina might otherwise impose.
Third, the Treaty of Asunción and the subsequent trade policy arrangement
among Mercosur countries had important implications for the use of con-
tingent measures such as TTBs. For example, the treaty did not allow for a
7Note that the average tariﬀs in TTB sectors do not reﬂect any additional trade restric-
tions from contingent protection.
8The applied MFN tariﬀs in Figure 9.1 do not reﬂect lower tariﬀs for Mercosur countries
or other countries with which Argentina now has preferential tariﬀs such as Colombia.
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safeguard for intra-Mercosur trade, unlike the ‘snapback’ provisions of the
NAFTA. The treaty also permitted the continued use of anti-dumping and
CVD actions against Mercosur partners. Finally, all three contingent protec-
tion measures are administered by Argentina alone for its imports—there are
no formal Mercosur-level anti-dumping, CVD or safeguard measures.
3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON TEMPORARY
TRADE BARRIERS (1991–2010)
Table9.3showsthesimplecountofanti-dumpingactions(boththoseinitiated
and those resulting in measures) for the period from 1991 to 2010.9 Note that
since anti-dumping authorities may take more than a year to complete an anti-
dumping investigation, most of the investigations initiated in 2009 and 2010
had not been ﬁnalised by the time this study was completed. The unit of
observation for these counts is the number of cases at the HS-08 level.10
Counting anti-dumping frequency is complicated. Each instance involves
a speciﬁc exporting country and a ‘product’ under investigation. However,
each ‘product’ may include literally dozens of HS-08 tariﬀ-line codes for each
target country’s exporters under investigation. Going forward, ‘investigation’
will refer to a particular country and group of products investigated by the
authorities, eg ‘hot-rolled steel products’ from Slovakia. A ‘case’ will refer
to each country–tariﬀ-line combination, eg 7208.27.10 and 7208.27.90 from
Slovakia will be considered as two cases even if they are part of the same
investigation. Since anti-dumping analysis has traditionally taken place at the
‘investigation’ level but most of the analysis in this chapter will be at the
‘case’ level, one should be careful when making comparisons of anti-dumping
statistics across this and other studies. The current data set, for example, has
317 initiated investigations with 933 individual exporter–HS-08 code pairs.
Table 9.1 includes investigation-level data, while Table 9.3 is at the case level.
Table 9.3 shows jurisdictions most involved in Argentina’s anti-dumping
actions in the data set. China, Brazil and the European Union alone are the
targets in 435 out of 933 cases. Exports from China have been the single
most frequent target of anti-dumping actions, with 188 individual products
facing anti-dumping actions, or 20% of all cases. Exports from Brazil are just
behind, with 167 cases. The EU15 countries as a group have the third largest
number of anti-dumping cases with 80 anti-dumping cases initiated by Argen-
tine authorities.11 More disaggregated data show that Argentina has focused
9Information about TTB actions used in this study end in July 2010, when the database
developed by Bown (2010) was updated as of January 2011.
10HS refers to the harmonized tariﬀ classiﬁcation system. ‘HS-02’ and ‘HS-08’ refer to
the two-digit and eight-digit categories.
11EU15 nations are used instead of the current 27 member states of the EU for consis-
tency across the years analysed in the study.
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Table 9.3: Argentina’s anti-dumping initiations and measures imposed.
1991–2010
1991–1994 1995–2001 2002–2007 2008–2010 total
(a) Initiations
China 7 46 23 112 188
Brazil 56 82 12 17 167
Other Mercosur 3 12 3 1 19
EU15 19 44 8 9 80
USA 5 10 1 0 16
Japan 34007
South Africa 0 46 8 0 54
Korea 6 26 13 3 48
Russia 0 33 8 0 41
Kazakhstan 0 37 0 0 37
Others 54 127 58 37 276
Total 153 467 134 179 933
(b) Final measures imposed
China 7 38 20 57 122
Brazil 24 59 9 6 98
Other Mercosur 3930 1 5
EU15 4 23 6 0 33
U S A 26008
Japan 34007
South Africa 0 42 8 0 50
Korea 5 17 12 0 34
Russia 0 33 0 0 33
Kazakhstan 0 37 0 0 37
Others 37 107 44 17 205
Total 85 375 102 80 642
Data taken at the case level (HS-08–country pairs). Note that many cases ﬁled in 2009–10 were not
yet ﬁnalised as of July 2010.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
primarily on developing country exports for the entire period: only 151 of
the 940 cases involve exports from high-income countries such as the EU15,
Australia, the USA, Switzerland, Japan, Canada and New Zealand.
Panel (b) of Table 9.3 contains the outcomes for cases adjudicated to the
ﬁnal stage. Almost 69% of initiated petitions (642 out of 933) have ended
with a ﬁnal measure imposed. Clearly, most Argentine anti-dumping cases
end in ﬁnal ‘orders’ (ie anti-dumping measures restricting imports). The rest
have been concluded without ﬁnal measures—either by the withdrawal of
the petitioning industry, the termination by the anti-dumping authorities, or
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decisions not yet rendered. Note that the totals for 2008–10 should be treated
with caution since many cases ﬁled in 2009 and 2010 were not yet ﬁnalised at
the time this study was completed. For these cases, there is strong evidence
to suggest that nearly all petitions will likely result in ﬁnal measures, in large
part because Argentina has begun to impose restrictions on essentially all
anti-dumping cases that involve imports from China.
The simple count of anti-dumping petitions and actions does not take into
account the ‘intensity’ of anti-dumping use. In particular, it is useful to com-
pare the percentage of anti-dumping petitions with the share of total imports
from particular jurisdictions. For example, US products represented an aver-
age of 18.3% of total Argentine imports for 1991–2009 but only 1.6% of the
total number of anti-dumping petitions at the case level (16 out of 933).12
EU15 trade was also targeted less (8.5% of total anti-dumping petitions) than
expected given its overall import share (22.5%). Brazil is slightly unrepre-
sented as well, with 17.9% of anti-dumping petitions compared with an aver-
age of 27.3% of annual total imports for the period. China stands out as its
annual average import share was only 5.4% for the entire period, but it faced
20% of the anti-dumping complaints. However, Chinese exports to Argentina
were increasing dramatically during this time period.
3.1 Argentine Anti-Dumping Use Over Time: Country Patterns
One striking aspect of Argentina’s use of anti-dumping shown in Table 9.3
is how the pattern of countries targeted evolves over time. During 1991–4,
Argentina initiated 153 cases on HS-08 product lines, and 85 of those cases
ended in ﬁnal anti-dumping orders. In other words, during this period of eco-
nomic and trade liberalisation, Argentine authorities were quite stringent in
their administration of the anti-dumping laws, with high standards before a
ﬁnal anti-dumping order would be imposed.
Brazil was by far the single most frequent target with 56 total cases, rep-
resenting one-third of all initiations in 1991–4. US exports, in contrast, were
involved in only 5 cases. The EU15 countries lag far behind as well with only
19 cases. East Asian imports were only lightly touched: the numbers for Japan
(3), South Korea (6), and Taiwan (2) are much smaller than in traditional anti-
dumping users such as the USA during the 1990s. Strikingly, China only had 7
HS-08 codes involved in the Argentine anti-dumping system during this early
period. Argentine authorities targeted developing countries with just over
one-third of anti-dumping petitions in this period, with the balance focused
on high-income countries.
Argentina’s use of anti-dumping surged in the next period (1995–2001). A
combination of Argentina’s liberal economic regime and integration within
12Trade data for 2010 were not available at the time this study was completed.
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WTO bound tariﬀs, Mercosur membership, a ﬁxed peg to the US dollar, and
the Brazilian devaluation put enormous pressure on import-competing indus-
tries, as reﬂected in the current account deﬁcits displayed in Table 9.1. As
Nogues and Baracat (2006) point out, these industries turned frequently to
anti-dumping as a means of limiting foreign sales, since their traditional
means of protection (eg import licence regimes and high MFN tariﬀs) were
unavailable. In particular, there were 467 individual HS-08 codes from var-
ious countries involved in the anti-dumping cases that Argentina initiated
during this period, and ﬁnal anti-dumping orders covered 377 of these
products.
Argentina’s anti-dumping cases became even more focused on developing
countries during the 1995–2001 period, with twice as many initiated against
this group than against high-income countries. This period also saw particular
pressures on Brazilian exports that faced 82 initiated cases. The period also
begins the intense focus on China with 46 petitions. The emergence of China
as a target for Argentina is consistent with other case studies in this volume,
though the focus on Brazil is far more unusual. US exporters continue to
be rare targets of anti-dumping in Argentina, despite the large share of its
imports in the Argentine market.
There was another dramatic change in anti-dumping use during 2002–7
(after the peso crisis and before the international ﬁnancial crisis that begin
in 2008). Even though the Argentine government took a number of steps to
reduce its integration into the world economy during this period, the num-
ber of Argentine anti-dumping case initiations dropped from an average of
almost 60 HS-08 products per year in 1995–2001 to just over 20 products per
year in 2002–7. Cases brought against its Mercosur partner Brazil, an upper-
middle-income country, dropped from 82 in the earlier period to only 12 in
the latter period. Cases brought against China fell by a much smaller mar-
gin from 46 to 23 in the latter period. Actions taken against higher-income-
country exports faded into insigniﬁcance; only 1 case was brought against the
USA (which did not result in a ﬁnal measure) and only 8 against all EU15 coun-
tries. On the other hand, developing countries were now targeted in 60% of all
Argentine anti-dumping actions. In short, Argentine anti-dumping activities
in this period increasingly turned against developing and emerging market
economies, with special attention to China.
Recall from Table 9.1 that the 2002–7 period was one of signiﬁcant eco-
nomic volatility for Argentina. Imports and economic growth fell dramati-
cally in 2002 while anti-dumping activity was reduced to a near standstill. In
other words, an economic slowdown, even a dramatic one, was not a suﬃ-
cient condition for anti-dumping use to increase. Perhaps most importantly,
the relieved pressure on importers due to the devaluation of the peso meant
that Argentina’s import-competing industries did not turn to administered
protection methods such as anti-dumping to deal with their economic prob-
lems. Of course, the concurrent convulsions related to Argentina’s domestic
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economic problems meant that ﬁrms had few resources with which to take
on the legal costs of ﬁling an anti-dumping case, regardless of the likelihood
of ﬁnal success, and ﬁrms were often ﬁghting for mere survival during the
crisis.
Does Argentina’s experience with the earlier 2001–2 economic crisis serve
as a useful predictor of anti-dumping use in the post-2007 period? There was
a marked increase in anti-dumping during the pre-peso crisis period and then
a sharp decline afterwards, even as the economy contracted and imports fell.
In general, the period of the recent global ﬁnancial crisis suggests broad eco-
nomic patterns similar to the peso crisis period, but on a much less dramatic
scale. There was a signiﬁcant slowdown in Argentina’s GDP growth from 2008
(6.8%)to2009(0.9%)anda30%fallinimportsfrom2008($54.3billion)to2009
($38.3 billion).
Nevertheless, the pattern of reduced anti-dumping activity observed in the
post-2002 period is not matched by the post-2007 period. Argentina initiated
179 cases from 2008 to July 2010. This translates into just under 72 cases
per year (counting 2010 as half a year). This is greater than the pre-peso cri-
sis period of 1995–2001 and far above the rate of initiation that Argentina
experienced after the 2002 devaluation.
There are, however, two important diﬀerences between these two periods of
economic contraction. First, the position of the Argentine currency was quite
diﬀerent in the two recessions. The spectacular devaluation in 2002 was not
repeated in the 2008–9 period. Moreover, the real exchange-rate appreciation
that was so disruptive in the lead-up to 2002 is absent in the 2008–9 crisis.
In fact, Table 9.1 shows that there was an increase in the Argentine current
account surplus in 2008 and 2009, indicating that broad import pressures
were falling. Second, the rise of China as a major source of Argentine imports
does not have an analogue in the earlier period.
There is also a continued tendency for Argentina to focus less of its anti-
dumping activities on high-income countries. In fact, there were only nine
cases brought against a member of the EU15 and only three cases brought
against South Korea for 2008 until the middle of 2010. There have been no
cases ﬁled against the USA in the 2008–10 period and only one since 2002,
and that particular case did not result in a ﬁnal anti-dumping order. Simi-
larly, Japan has escaped attention from Argentine anti-dumping authorities
after 2002. Instead, Argentina has continued to concentrate on other develop-
ing countries in 2008–10, with 90% of total initiations directed against such
countries and 72% against China and Brazil alone.
Chinese exports to Argentina, as in so many other countries, rose dramat-
ically in the 2000s. China’s sales in Argentina became more than 38 times
greater from 1991 to its historic high in 2008, compared with a 12-fold
increase for Brazil and 7-fold increase in imports overall (all in nominal terms).
This alone explains some of the newfound focus on China within the Argen-
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Figure 9.2: Argentine anti-dumping actions: (a) initiations, by target-country group;
(b) orders in place (count of country–HS-08 pairs).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
tine anti-dumping system.13 The increased competition has almost certainly
resulted in increased focus on using administered protection to limit Chinese
imports.
Figure 9.2(a) shows the count of anti-dumping initiations at the HS-08-
country level for diﬀerent country groups, including developed countries,
13Even during the 2008–9 crisis, Chinese exports fell 24% compared with a 30% overall
reduction from all sources.
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Brazil, China, and developing countries (excluding China and Brazil).14 Devel-
oped countries played a more important role earlier in the data, including
spikes in 1997 and the 2000–2002 periods. After this time, there was lit-
tle Argentine anti-dumping activity that targeted developed country exports.
Developing countries excluding Brazil and China were targeted especially in
2000, which reﬂects a handful of steel cases involving numerous HS-08 tariﬀ
lines (discussed in more detail below). The most striking feature of the ﬁg-
ure, of course, is the dramatic increase in cases involving China in 2008 and
2009. This focus on China is also clear in Table 9.2; the overwhelming majority
of Argentina’s anti-dumping initiations from January 2008 until March 2010
targeted Chinese imports.
Figure 9.2(b) shows the count of anti-dumping orders in place based on the
same country breakdown. There have been a very steady number of continued
orders against developed countries beginning in 2003. The number of anti-
dumping orders against developing countries (excluding China and Brazil) is
also fairly steady. Most notable is the rapid growth of orders against China
that begins in 2007. Not only have there been more investigations targeting
Chinese exports, but they also represent a much larger share of orders that
continue to restrict trade.
3.2 Targeted Product Sectors
Table 9.4 contains information about the most important sectors targeted
under Argentine anti-dumping procedures. We include only the new petitions
ﬁled at the case level; success rates for petitions do not vary signiﬁcantly
across sectors. These sectors represent 67% of all Argentine anti-dumping
cases for the 1991–2010 period.
The dominant sectoral users of Argentine anti-dumping in the 1991–2010
period are basic iron and steel (HS-02 sector 72) and articles of iron and steel
(HS-02 sector 73). Over 44% of all Argentine cases were in these two sectors,
with the vast majority in HS-02 sector 72. The next largest sector is electrical
machinery (HS-02 sector 85) with only 75 product–country pairs.
Argentina is not unusual in that the steel industry (both basic steel and
articles of steel) has traditionally been the single biggest category targeted in
anti-dumping. However, there is very little Argentine targeting of chemicals
(organic and inorganic) industry imports, which has traditionally been the
second largest category worldwide (Moore and Zanardi 2009).
There is a dramatic change in Argentina’s sectoral focus over time. The
focus on iron and steel occurs in two periods. The ﬁrst is the 1992–3 period,
in which there was a global steel crisis. This spike in cases took place in
spite of the booming Argentine economy during that period. The second is
in the late 1990s, subsequent to the steel sector turmoil in Asia, Russia and
14Developed and developing country categories are based on World Bank deﬁnitions.
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Brazil. This relatively large number of cases should be interpreted with care.
Steel cases typically involve many individual HS-08 categories. Domestic steel
industries often ﬁle these cases against multiple steel-exporting countries
simultaneously. For example, almost all of the 109 anti-dumping cases initi-
ated in 2000 represent only four countries (Kazakhstan, Romania, Slovakia
and South Africa) for only one product (‘hot-rolled steel products’) with 20
individual HS-08 codes. While 20 separate HS-08 lines certainly represents a
wide range of steel products, this can have very diﬀerent eﬀects from cases
against 40 diﬀerent products from 2 diﬀerent countries (these trade eﬀects
will be taken into account in Sections 4 and 5).
The number of separate HS-02 sectors involved in anti-dumping has
increased in the 2003–9 period. Basic iron and steel has dropped out of the
picture completely in Argentina, with no petitions ﬁled since 2002. Not only
have the number of new anti-dumping orders in the Argentine steel sector
fallen dramatically in recent years, but the orders put in place during the late
1990s and early 2000s have largely lapsed. Instead, there is a wide variety of
diﬀerent HS categories now aﬀected by Argentina’s anti-dumping, including
footwear and electrical and mechanical machinery. This sectoral broadening
also reﬂects the increasing range of products imported from China.
3.3 Argentine Administration of Anti-Dumping
Argentine Injury and Dumping Decisions
Broadly speaking, Argentina is like many other countries—the vast major-
ity of investigations end with a positive dumping margin while a slightly
lower majority results in a positive determination on injury.15 Nevertheless,
there has been a dramatic change in the administration of anti-dumping in
Argentina over time.
In the early 1990s, Argentine authorities were quite strict in their applica-
tion of anti-dumping, which is consistent with the open economy approach
adopted by Argentina during this period. As noted above, Nogues and Bara-
cat (2006) argue that Argentina’s trade policymakers were able to use the
anti-dumping system to eﬀectively diﬀuse the pressures for broader protec-
tion in the early years of liberalisation.16 For example, about one-third of all
anti-dumping initiations from 1991 to 1994 resulted in a ﬁnal anti-dumping
duty.17
15Note that this discussion necessarily takes place at the investigation level, ie all HS-08
subject to the petition from the particular country.
16Miranda (2007) argues instead that the ability of Argentina to withstand pressures to
use TTBs, especially anti-dumping, for protectionist purposes has been much more limited.
17Author’s calculations based on Argentine anti-dumping authorities’ annual reports.
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Table 9.5: Argentina’s dumping and material injury decisions.
Aﬃrmative
Positive Aﬃrmative Positive material
Year of Initiated dumping dumping injury injury
initiation investigations decision decisions (%) decision decision (%)
1995 25 15 60 10 40
1996 23 14 61 7 30
1997 13 12 92 10 77
1998 6 5 83 5 83
1999 21 20 95 20 95
2000 33 28 85 23 70
2001 26 24 92 21 81
2002 10 9 90 7 70
2003 1 1 100 1 100
2004 12 12 100 9 75
2005 8 8 100 7 88
2006 10 10 100 6 60
2007 7 7 100 7 100
2008 19 19 100 18 95
1995–2008 214 184 86 151 71
Dumping and injury decisions are usually rendered in a year subsequent to the initiation. All decisions
are at the investigation level (eg footwear from China); withdrawn and terminated investigations are
not included.
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
Table 9.5 shows a breakdown of the decisions for the 1995–2008 sample.18
The table includes the number of initiations in each year as well as the num-
ber that ended in either a positive dumping or material injury decision in a
subsequent year. Note that these are based on the investigation level (eg hot-
rolled steel sheet from Kazakhstan) rather than the individual HS-08 product
level (eg 20 diﬀerent tariﬀ lines for each hot-rolled steel investigation for
Kazakhstan) used in many of the tables above. This level of aggregation is
appropriate because the decisions about injury and dumping are made at the
investigation level.
Argentina’s authorities exhibited a continued reluctance to approve anti-
dumping petitions ﬁled in 1995 and 1996, as only 60% and 61% of investi-
gations, respectively, resulted in a positive dumping decision. Positive injury
decisions were even less likely with only a 40% and 30% aﬃrmative rate for
investigations ﬁled in these two years. Argentine ﬁrms could certainly not
presume that they would win an anti-dumping case during this period.
18The 1991–4 investigation data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) do not include a break-
down of dumping and injury investigations, so this information is not reported here. Any
investigations for which there is not yet a ﬁnal decision by the time this study was com-
pleted are not included.
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This trend changes in subsequent years as Argentine authorities became
increasingly likely to approve petitions. Argentine authorities made a posi-
tive determination of dumping in 86% of all investigations initiated between
1995 and 2008. Almost 72% also resulted in a ﬁnal positive injury decision.
There is clearly a very high probability that dumping orders will be imposed.
Moreover, there is an upward trend. For investigations begun in 2000, 85%
resulted in a positive dumping margin and 70% in a positive injury decision.
By 2003, these percentages rose to 100% for dumping and remained so for the
rest of the sample. A ﬁnding of injury became much more likely as well; 85%
of investigations resulted in an aﬃrmative injury decision for investigations
initiated in the 2003–8 period, with some year-to-year variation. It is too early
to ascertain what the patterns are in the post-crisis stage. However, there is
little reason to expect that the percentage of aﬃrmative investigations would
decrease relative to the pre-crisis experience.
It is also necessary to take into account how long an anti-dumping measure
stays in place, not simply the counts of new investigations. This is examined in
more detail, especially with regard to the percentage of trade aﬀected through
ongoing TTB measures. Figure 9.3(a) depicts the duration of Argentina’s anti-
dumping orders at the investigation level, measured from the year in which
the order was ﬁrst imposed to the date it was revoked. Note that the duration
for orders that remain in place as of June 2010 is included; for those instances,
duration is measured up to 2010. The mean duration for the entire sample is
4.7 years, ie just below the 5 years suggested by the sunset review procedures
in the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement. There are, however, many
cases that extend far beyond the 5 years, including three steel orders of 11
years and two others of 12 years.
Once again, there is strong evidence of important changes in the admin-
istration of Argentina’s anti-dumping system over time. For cases that were
initiated in 1995, the average duration for imposed measures was 2.6 years.
No order from that year remained in place after 2001. Thus, anti-dumping was
very much a short-term trade restriction in the early days of Argentina’s inten-
sive anti-dumping use. This also means that Argentine anti-dumping cases
did not generally last long enough even to be subject to a ﬁve-year sunset
review process mandated by the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement.
This places early Argentine anti-dumping use into sharp contrast with the US
experience; Moore (2006) demonstrates that the USA almost always renewed
its anti-dumping orders after ﬁve years during this period.
The duration of Argentina’s anti-dumping orders has changed signiﬁcantly
during the 2000s. Only 6 of the cases initiated in 2001 that resulted in ﬁnal
dumping orders had been terminated as of June 2010; 13 remained in place 9
years later. Only 5 investigations that were initiated after 2001 were revoked
by June 2010. In other words, it is not only more likely in the ﬁrst decade
of the 2000s that an anti-dumping investigation will result in an imposed
restriction in place, but anti-dumping orders are also more likely to remain
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Figure 9.3: Duration of Argentine anti-dumping orders (in years): (a) number of
anti-dumping orders in eﬀect by length of years; (b) share of anti-dumping orders
removed in ﬁve years.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
In (a), duration is the diﬀerence between the year when the measure is imposed and the
year when it is revoked. For orders remaining in place in 2010, duration is measured by
2010 minus the year when the measure is invoked. In (b), year is ﬁve years subsequent
to the imposition of the original anti-dumping order.
in place for longer periods of time. Argentina has become much more like
the USA and other countries regarding the ongoing nature of anti-dumping
import protection (see Cadot et al (2008) for a systematic analysis of many
countries’ experience with anti-dumping duration for the 1979–2005 period).
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Figure 9.3(b) shows this dynamic. One hundred percent of orders that came
into force in 1997 were terminated within ﬁve years (denoted by the year
‘2002’). Subsequent to 2005, there has been a steady decrease in the number
of Argentine anti-dumping orders removed within ﬁve years of their initial
imposition. By 2009 (ie cases put in place in 2004), all orders exceed the ﬁve-
year sunset review threshold.
In short, there is strong evidence that Argentine anti-dumping orders in
the 2000s last longer than ﬁve years; nevertheless, this tendency preceded
the 2008–9 international economic crisis.
Anti-Dumping Duty Level
The basis for the level of restrictions in anti-dumping actions is the dumping
margin calculated as part of the investigation. Under the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, this represents the upper bound of anti-dumping duties. Calculating the
average dumping margin is diﬃcult because this margin varies across ﬁrms
within an investigation, ie it might diﬀer across individual Chinese footwear
exporters involved in the same investigation. In order to get some sense of the
average margin calculated by Argentine authorities, the average of the high
and low margins within an investigation as reported in Bown (2010) is used.
The average maximum dumping margin on this basis for Argentina’s anti-
dumping cases is 167% for the entire available data set, compared with a min-
imum of 96%. This means that individual foreign ﬁrms faced minimum pos-
sible anti-dumping duties of almost 100% on average, with much higher rates
possible. The average maximum dumping margin for Chinese ﬁrms is much
higher at 456%, with two notably high calculations: playing cards (2550%) and
stainless steel cutlery (1450%).
Assessing the level of anti-dumping duty in place is even more complicated
for Argentina. First, Argentina uses a ‘lesser duty’ rule, which means the anti-
dumping margin may not exceed the amount that is necessary to eliminate
injury to the domestic industry. This assessment is further obscured by an
unusual aspect of the Argentine anti-dumping process, ie the frequent use of
minimum prices for imported goods subject to an anti-dumping order instead
of ad valorem duties as is more typical across countries. If the ‘freight on
board’ price of imports is above this reference price, then no duty is imposed;
if it is below the reference price, then a tariﬀ (often a speciﬁc tariﬀ) is imposed
to eliminate this gap (Nogues and Baracat 2006, p 64).
The data at the investigation level include information on the type of ﬁnal
dumping measure in 152 instances. Just fewer than 60% (91 out of 152) of
those investigations concluded with a minimum price target. An additional 8
cases were covered by a ‘price undertaking’, which is a similar means by which
foreign ﬁrms agree to a target price in order to avoid duties. Only 53 cases
had measures imposed as anti-dumping duties; 46 were ad valorem duties
and 7 were speciﬁc duties.
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Table 9.6: Argentina’s countervailing duty and safeguard actions (since 1995).
Initiation Revocation
Targeted country Measure year year
CVD measures
Peaches in syrup European Union Yes 1995 N/A
Vital wheat gluten European Union Yes 1996 2006
Virgin and reﬁned olive oil European Union Yes 1997 2006
Safeguard measures
Footwear N/A Yes 1997 2000
Toys N/A Terminated 1998 N/A
Footwear N/A Yes 2000 2003
Motorcycles N/A Yes 2000 2004
Peaches N/A Yes 2001 2004
Coloured television sets N/A Yes 2004 2007
Recordable compact discs N/A Yes 2006 2010
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
This pattern has changed somewhat over time. In the pre-2008 period, the
percentage of price undertakings and minimum prices reached almost 70%
(90 out of 129 investigations). In 2008–9, only 9 investigations resulted in
minimum prices while 14 were standard anti-dumping duties. This change
could reﬂect a more aggressive stance towards imports; foreign ﬁrms will face
duties regardless of their own pricing behaviour as long as the anti-dumping
order remains in place. In addition, a minimum price has eﬀects similar to a
quota; foreign ﬁrms are allowed to raise the price with the potential to beneﬁt
from an increase in quota rents.19
3.4 Safeguard Actions
World Trade Organization member countries can also restrict broad cate-
gories of imports, including those deemed traded ‘fairly’, under the safeguard
provisions. Safeguards can be directed at a broad industry category (eg ‘steel’)
from all import sources rather than a particular product as in anti-dumping or
CVD cases (eg ‘hot-rolled steel’ of certain dimensions) from particular ﬁrms
within a speciﬁc country. Safeguards therefore have the potential to aﬀect a
much wider range of imports than anti-dumping or CVD actions.
For various reasons, including the high standards for WTO compliance as
determined by the Dispute Settlement Body especially with regard to ‘seri-
ous injury’ and the possible need for compensation to exporting countries,
safeguard use has been very infrequent relative to anti-dumping. Argentina is
19Moore (2005) argues however that minimum price regimes may increase the ability of
domestic and foreign oligopolists to raise prices at the expense of domestic consumers.
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no exception to this characterisation. From 1995 to 2010, Argentina investi-
gated only seven petitions for relief under its safeguard system, a list of which
appears in Table 9.6. The list includes footwear (an original case initiated in
1997 plus an additional revised petition initiated in 2000), toys, motorcycles
and mopeds, peaches, colour television sets and recordable compact discs. All
but the safeguard investigation on toys resulted in import restrictions on the
broad category named in the petition. This table also lists the small number
of Argentine CVD cases since 1995.
Argentina does not follow the pattern sometimes seen in other nations
whereby an industry ﬁles a safeguard and anti-dumping in the same indus-
try category. For example, a common occurrence in the USA is for the steel
industry to ﬁle many anti-dumping petitions simultaneously with a safeguard
and/or CVD action. In Argentina, there is only one instance (footwear) where
the same product is targeted across multiple TTB procedures, and even in this
instance the overlap in HS-08 codes is not complete. The Argentine industry
ﬁled safeguard cases in 1997 and 2000 in seriatum and then followed up with
an anti-dumping investigation against Chinese footwear covering many of the
same product lines in 2009. Nevertheless, the anti-dumping investigation was
initiated six years after the last footwear safeguard was terminated.
One particularly striking aspect of Argentina’s safeguard use is that there
were no such petitions ﬁled in the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis period, contrary
to what would be expected from a period of economic distress and increased
anti-dumping activity. Overall, imports fell quite markedly from 2008 to 2009,
and one result is that it may have become diﬃcult to ﬁnd suﬃcient evidence
to win a safeguard case. Also, Argentina did not initiate a China-speciﬁc safe-
guard, which is permitted under the provisions of China’s WTO accession.
Instead, China’s exports have been aﬀected almost exclusively by the use of
anti-dumping measures during 2008–10. The bottom line is that Argentina’s
use of traditional administered protection (ie anti-dumping, CVD and safe-
guards) is dominated by the use of anti-dumping. This was true before the
crisis and has continued through the global economic crisis that started in
2008.
4 VALUE OF TRADE AFFECTED BY ARGENTINA’S
TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
The discussion thus far examines the simple counts of cases (initiations and
measures imposed). This has the distinct disadvantage that one case involving
millions of dollars of imports is counted similarly to one with only very limited
trade value. We turn, therefore, to a trade-weighted version of these measures
in order to get a sense of the broader economic impact of TTBs. These are
‘temporary’ barriers and, consequently, are removed at a later date, at least in
principle. Thus, we use an alternative measure that takes import values into
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account when assessing the ‘stock’ of measures that varies over time as new
measures are imposed and older measures are removed.
4.1 Methodology
We adopt a modiﬁed version of the technique discussed in the Introduction
(Bown, this volume) to measure the ongoing impact of contingent protec-
tion in Argentina. One version, presented below, contains the observed val-
ues of trade under an anti-dumping or safeguard measure as a share of total
observed Argentine imports. The other version attempts to account for ‘pre-
dicted’ values in the absence of the restriction.20 This analysis will take place
at the HS-06 level rather than HS-08 because of data limitations.
As Bown (2011b) points out, the suppression of imports by trade restric-
tions means that using observed values of imports as a weight can be mislead-
ing, especially given the high level of restrictions found in many anti-dumping
petitions. Thus, it is necessary to calculate an appropriate ‘counterfactual’
to approximate what imports might have been in the absence of any import
restriction. In an ideal world, one would calculate the ‘normal’ level of imports
for each individual product by considering past import levels, world supply
and demand elasticities, and Argentina’s domestic economic conditions, ie
when no TTB is in place. However, this is a very problematic undertaking at
the detailed HS-06 level used in this study.
In what follows, we calculate a ‘predicted’ import value for each year in
which a TTB is in place using a simplistic rule. The counterfactual for the
ﬁrst year t in which a TTB is in place is based on the previous year’s level
of unrestricted imports. In particular, imports at the HS-06 level subject to
a TTB in year t − 1 are multiplied by git, the percentage change in overall
‘normal’ import growth from year t − 1t ot. The predicted level of HS-06
level imports for each industry is the maximum of the observed level in year
t or the previous year, scaled up by the overall import growth rate. Using
the maximum of the two ensures that the realities of the market take prece-
dence over any prediction based on overall import growth. In subsequent
years of the restriction’s operation, we once again use the maximum of the
previous year’s predicted imports multiplied by git or the observed import
levels.21
20Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) use a gravity equation approach to try to ascer-
tain the overall trade eﬀects of anti-dumping among intensive (or ‘heavy’) users of anti-
dumping among developing countries.
21This approach may be clearer if we use a simple example. Suppose that observed Chi-
nese imports for a particular HS-06 product subject to a TTB are $100 in 2000, $120 in
2001, $50 in 2002 and $50 in 2003. Import restrictions are in place for 2001 through
2003. Furthermore, suppose that non-restricted import growth rates are 10% for all years.
Consequently, the import level used would be $100 in 2000, $120 in 2001, $132 in 2002
and $145.2 in 2003.
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The ‘normal’ growth rate is calculated based on Bown (2011b). This is the
simple percentage change for each year in ‘non-restricted’ import ﬂows, ie all
HS-06 categories not covered in anti-dumping, CVD or safeguard cases in any
year during 1995–2010 for any country exporting to Argentina. These cate-
gories are ones in which there are no direct eﬀects of TTBs; their growth rate is
taken to reﬂect the ‘normal’ rate at which imports have changed in Argentina.
This growth rate may be higher or lower than what might be expected for an
individual product subject to a TTB. However, it might also be expected that
those sectors faced with extraordinary restrictions might have grown even
more than those for the economy as a whole, so this is probably a conserva-
tive approach.
When calculating the predicted share of imports aﬀected by TTBs, the fol-
lowing procedure is used. The numerator is the predicted value for each year
for all anti-dumping and safeguard measures. The denominator is the sum
of the imports not aﬀected by a TTB in that year plus the predicted value
for those sectors under a TTB for that same year. For the observed values,
we simply use the total value of trade in sectors for which there is an ongo-
ing anti-dumping action, divided by the observed value of trade. Naturally, the
former measure will always exceed the latter measure, since trade restrictions
reduce the ﬂow of goods across borders.
4.2 Aggregate Eﬀects of TTB Use
Figure 9.4 includes the combined import coverage of the stock of Argentina’s
anti-dumping, safeguard and CVD actions. Note that this is not just the eﬀect
of new measures imposed in any particular year, but also reﬂects the contin-
ued presence as well as the eventual revocation of the measure. One series is
the ratio of observed import values of sectors subject to a TTB to the observed
values of imports into Argentina. The other series is the predicted values of
TTB imports as a share of predicted total imports.
The observed values reﬂect some of the patterns noted above using descrip-
tive statistics. In particular, TTBs had very little impact from 1995 to 1999;
only 1.5% of total observed imports were aﬀected by anti-dumping and safe-
guards by 1999. This rose to 2.6% by 2001, ie the year of maximum stress
associated with the overvalued peso. Aﬀected imports remained below 2%
for Argentina up until 2008. Through the global economic crisis period, the
observed share of imports aﬀected by TTBs rose to 2.8% by 2008 and then
2.7% by 2009.
However, there are indications that these simple statistics may signiﬁcantly
underestimate the eﬀect of TTBs because of the suppression of imports. The
counterfactual procedure described above results in a time series that has
broadly similar patterns to the observed values through 2001 but diverges
sharply thereafter. The predicted share of aﬀected imports rises to an early
peak during the disruptions of the peso crisis, then falls, and then rises again
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Figure 9.4: Argentine imports (observed and predicted) aﬀected by anti-dumping, CVD
and safeguards.
Source: author’s calculations using Comtrade and Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010). Share based on stock of restrictions in place.
in the post-global-crisis period. However, the level is much higher than the
observed value. For example, the predicted share of aﬀected imports rises
to 4.0% in 2003 compared with 2.0% in the observed data. After the surge
of contingent protection measures in the 1999–2000 period, the estimated
levels in subsequent years are nearly double the observed values. This growth
reﬂects the eﬀects of the greater likelihood that new petitions will result in
new measures (see Table 9.5) but also that existing measures are more likely
to remain in place (see Figure 9.3(b)).
Perhaps most strikingly, there is a dramatic increase in the share of imports
aﬀected by TTBs in the post-crisis period. In 2008, the predicted share was
4.1% and it had reached 5.0% by 2009. This estimate suggests that Argentina
was imposing TTBs in 2009 that involved almost twice as many imports as
those aﬀected in the immediate run-up to the peso crisis in 2002.
However, note that there are a number of investigations initiated in 2009
that were not yet completed by July 2010. We assumed that all investigations
ﬁled in 2009 in fact resulted in anti-dumping measures.22 This is justiﬁable
for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in Table 9.5, there is a very strong
likelihood that such measures will result in an anti-dumping duty. This is
especially true for investigations involving China, where the aﬃrmative rate
22Recall that the 2010 import data were not available at the time of this study, so the
2010 shares cannot be computed.
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Figure 9.5: Argentine anti-dumping, CVD and safeguard predicted share of total
imports.
Source: author’s calculations using Comtrade and Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010). Share based on stock of restrictions in place. The two lines coincide in
2007–9.
has essentially reached 100% in the crisis years, as detailed below. Second,
there are likely to be trade eﬀects even before the investigation is completed,
as noted by Staiger and Wolak (1994), so that petitions ﬁled in 2009 are likely
to have real trade eﬀects in the short term even if they are not subject to a
ﬁnal anti-dumping restriction.
These results are consistent with the view that Argentina’s use of TTBs may
have begun to play a much larger role through the global economic crisis.
It can be argued that this is clear evidence that Argentina was using anti-
dumping measures to deal with the crisis. However, as noted above and dis-
cussed in more detail below, this change coincided with much more aggressive
action with respect to China, which may have happened even in the absence
of the economic crisis.
Figure 9.5 compares the predicted value of imports aﬀected by anti-
dumping and other TTBs. Anti-dumping has generally dominated the relative
economic importance among TTBs, especially in the late 2000s. There is, how-
ever, a surge of imports aﬀected by safeguards that began in 1997, rose to a
peak in 2002 and subsequently faded. This reﬂects the eﬀects of three safe-
guard actions. The ﬁrst two are temporary restrictions on imports of footwear
described above, and the third is on motorcycles. There is no evidence that
this pattern of safeguards aﬀecting large amounts of imports has continued;
Argentina’s new TTB use through the 2000s has become focused even more on
anti-dumping. Countervailing duty actions had only a trivial eﬀect throughout
the period.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 343 — #363






Argentina: There and Back Again? 343
5 ARGENTINE USE OF ANTI-DUMPING AGAINST CHINA AND BRAZIL
The number of Argentine anti-dumping petitions against China has risen
steadily. This complicates the process of ascertaining how much of the recent
rise in anti-dumping actions is a consequence of the economic crisis and how
muchisduetogrowingconcernaboutincreasedChineseexportstoArgentina.
Table 9.7 includes a simple count of unique HS-08 product line imports from
China aﬀected by Argentina’s anti-dumping actions during 1995–2010. Cases
brought against Brazil, which had earlier been the focus of Argentine anti-
dumping actions, are included for comparison. The table also includes the sec-
tors (with counts aggregated up to the HS-02 level) most frequently involved
in anti-dumping for each country. Brazilian exporters have been involved in
111 total initiations at the case level, compared with 181 for China. However,
there are many more Chinese investigations that had not yet been completed
at the time of this study, compared with Brazil, which reﬂects the rash of
cases brought against China in 2009–10.
Brazilian cases are concentrated in the 1995–2001 period soon after the
implementation of Mercosur obligations. In addition, Argentina focused on
basic iron and steel (HS-02 sector 72), with 35 cases initiated during this
period, 34 of which ended in a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure. The vast major-
ity of these cases were in only two steel sector investigations: ‘hot-rolled
steel’ initiated in 1998 and ‘cold-rolled steel’ initiated in 1999, each of which
involved multiple individual HS lines combined into a single anti-dumping
investigation.Insubsequentperiods,anti-dumpingactionsagainstBrazilwere
scattered across various HS sectors with no particular pattern. Furthermore,
Argentine investigations against its primary Mercosur partner had slowed to
a trickle by the end of the 2000s.
Perhaps most striking is that Argentine authorities imposed anti-dumping
orders on Chinese exporters in 87% of the cases during 2002–7 and 100% of
the cases in 2008–10 for which there is a ﬁnal anti-dumping decision (a hand-
ful of cases were withdrawn by the domestic industry). Some of the cases in
the latter period have not yet reached the ﬁnal stage, but 100% of the pre-
liminary decisions during this time frame have resulted in at least temporary
restrictions. In short, the 2002–10 period shows that Chinese ﬁrms always
lose anti-dumping petitions in Argentina.
Another notable comparison vis-à-vis Brazil is that there is a wide distri-
bution of sectors involved in Chinese anti-dumping cases, and no particular
sector stands out as with Brazilian steel imports. The largest single group of
cases (30) is in footwear but this simply reﬂects the large number of product
lines in one particular anti-dumping investigation in 2009. Moreover, there is
not a single case against Chinese exports of basic iron and steel (HS-02 sector
72) but numerous cases involving electrical and mechanical machinery. The
implication seems clear: Argentine industries and authorities have concerns
about a wide variety of Chinese products.
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Table 9.8: Argentine merchandise imports (billions of dollars).
Low and
High upper
income middle
Year Overall USA Brazil China Japan EU15 OECD income
1995 19.8 4.2 4.2 0.6 0.7 5.7 11.8 6.9
1996 23.3 4.7 5.3 0.7 0.7 6.6 13.4 8.5
1997 29.6 6.1 6.9 1.0 1.1 7.9 16.9 10.9
1998 31.1 6.2 7.1 1.2 1.5 8.5 17.9 11.5
1999 25.3 5.0 5.6 1.0 1.1 7.3 14.9 9.3
2000 24.6 4.8 6.5 1.2 1.0 5.7 12.9 10.4
2001 19.9 3.8 5.3 1.1 0.8 4.5 10.1 8.6
2002 8.7 1.8 2.5 0.3 0.3 2.0 4.5 3.7
2003 13.4 2.3 4.7 0.7 0.4 2.7 6.0 6.7
2004 21.4 3.4 7.6 1.4 0.6 4.0 9.0 11.3
2005 28.4 4.5 10.6 1.5 0.6 5.3 11.3 15.4
2006 32.7 4.3 11.9 3.1 0.9 5.5 12.1 18.8
2007 42.5 5.3 14.7 5.1 1.2 6.9 15.1 24.6
2008 54.3 7.0 18.0 7.1 1.4 8.3 18.8 31.3
2009 38.3 5.4 11.8 5.4 0.9 6.4 14.7 21.3
Source: Comtrade.
The increasingly intense focus on China reﬂects its growing importance in
Argentina’s international trade. Table 9.8 shows that overall manufacturing
imports from China increased nearly 12-fold, from $0.6 billion in 1995 to a
high of $7.1 billion in 2008. This compares with about a three-fold increase in
Argentina’s imports from all sources, from $19.8 billion to $54 billion for the
same time period, which closely matches that sourced from Brazil, Argentina’s
largest import source throughout the period of analysis. In sharp contrast,
US and EU15 exports to Argentina rose only slightly in nominal terms. In
short, China’s share of Argentina’s imports grew dramatically, both in terms
of absolute levels and as a share of overall imports (from 3.1% in 1995 to over
13% in 2009). China was on the radar screen of those in Argentina concerned
about import protection even before the global economic turmoil began in
2008.
Even the increase in Chinese imports described above underestimates
the increased potential importance of Chinese market penetration given
Argentina’s already widespread anti-dumping use against them. The observed
share of Chinese products subject to Argentine anti-dumping actions went
from $3.5 million in 1995 to over $348 million in 2010 (though this latter ﬁg-
ure reﬂects cases for which no ﬁnal decisions have been made). In the absence
of such anti-dumping actions, Chinese exports to Argentina would undoubt-
edly have been larger.
Figure 9.6 shows the dramatic increase in Chinese exports to Argentina as
well as the ramped up use of anti-dumping by Argentine authorities. Total
Argentine imports from China remained relatively ﬂat through most of the
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Figure 9.6: Chinese imports (observed and share subject to anti-dumping).
Source: author’s calculations using Comtrade and Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010).
1990s, with a notable decrease after the economic trauma following the peso
devaluation of 2002. Subsequently, imports from China have risen steadily
before falling again in 2009, though to an even higher level than they had
been in 2007.
The share of Chinese imports subject to Argentine anti-dumping measures
closely follows the overall import pattern, with the notable exception of 2003
when over 18% of Chinese products sold in Argentina involved anti-dumping
actions. While the total percentage fell in the latter part of that decade, Chi-
nese imports subject to anti-dumping orders once again reached over 12%
during the post-ﬁnancial-crisis period.
6 OTHER MEASURES OF RECENT ARGENTINE TRADE POLICY
Argentina may also restrict imports through other means. We ﬁrst brieﬂy
consider the average applied tariﬀs across sectors in Argentina. Naturally,
this gives an indication of how imports are aﬀected through traditional tariﬀs
rather than temporary measures that are the focus of this chapter.
Recall that Figure 9.1 included the annual average (unweighted) applied
MFN tariﬀs for all sectors, which rose from 11.5% in 1995–7 to 13% in 1998–
2001. This corresponds to the pressures associated with real exchange-rate
appreciation during the period in which the peso was pegged to the dollar.
Subsequently, average tariﬀs fell consistently from 2003 (11.8%) until 2008.
There was a small uptick in 2009 when it reached 9%, but this is still lower
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348 The Great Recession and Import Protection
than in any year other than 2008. Thus, the Argentine government may have
increased its imposition of anti-dumping measures in 2007–10, but this has
not been accompanied by broad increases in applied MFN duties. This is
despite the fact that Argentina’s tariﬀs remain far below their bound rates,
so there is signiﬁcant tariﬀ overhang.
However, given the provisions of Mercosur, it is important to note that
Argentina’s tariﬀs are not set in a vacuum. In particular, any changes to
Argentina’sappliedtariﬀsinprincipleshouldbecoordinatedwithmovements
in the CET as laid out by the customs union’s rules. Argentina might have pre-
ferred to have higher tariﬀs than allowed in the CET, or even lower. Thus, an
analysis of the CET only allows for an imperfect interpretation of Argentina’s
particular preferences for MFN tariﬀs. In addition, the increase in the number
of Mercosur PTAs (such as with Colombia) means that the eﬀective average
tariﬀ is below the one calculated here.
Argentina restricted imports during 2008–10 in other ways, though with a
much less certain trade eﬀect. For example, the US Department of Commerce
has compiled a list of Argentina’s public notiﬁcations of new non-automatic
import licences and noted an important increase after October 2008. In 2009,
there were at least 200 such notiﬁcations at the HS-08 level, 93 of which were
in the textiles sector (HS-02 sectors 50 to 63) and in electrical and mechan-
ical machinery sectors (HS-02 sectors 84 and 85). Other opaque measures
catalogued by Global Trade Alert include, for example, reference prices for
imports (see Global Trade Alert (2010a,b)).
Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to ascertain how restrictive these import
licenceregimesandreferencepricesaresincetheydependonthebureaucratic
implementation of each licence. At the very least, this increases the uncer-
tainty under which importers operate in Argentina, which in turn is likely to
decrease trade.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Argentina has gone back and forth in its commitment to having an econ-
omy that is open to international competition. For decades, Argentina pur-
sued import substitution policies. Its government became a star example of
economic liberalisation in the 1990s when it reduced tariﬀs and generally
embraced the strictures of the ‘Washington Consensus’. After the trauma of
the peso crisis in 2001 and 2002, Argentina’s traditional scepticism about
openness to the global economy regained its prominence and the govern-
ment began to undertake strong interventions in the economy. This ulti-
mately shallow commitment to a liberal trade regime raised the question of
how Argentina would respond to the economic pressures associated with the
global economic crisis that began in 2008.
This chapter makes clear that Argentina has relied heavily on anti-dumping
as a means of limiting imports since the mid-1990s, with only very limited
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reliance on CVD and safeguards throughout the period (and no use at all
since 2007). As Nogues and Baracat (2006) point out, the Argentine govern-
ment used anti-dumping only in a very limited fashion during the early 1990s.
Thisabilitytowithstandtheintensepressuresforprotectionhasbrokendown
in the 2000s, as is evidenced by the case of anti-dumping. In particular, anti-
dumping petitions have been approved more frequently by the government
and the imposed measures have longer lives. While roughly 50% of petitions
were ‘approved’ in the 1990s, this rate ratcheted up steadily to 85% in the
2006–8 period. This caused 2.7% of all observed Argentine imports to be
aﬀected by anti-dumping by 2009. Once the suppressed trade that occurs
because of the highly restrictive actions is taken into account, trade in these
sectorsmighthavebeentwiceasmuchintheabsenceofanti-dumpingactions.
The most notable change in Argentina has been the dramatically larger
role that imports from China have played in its application of TTBs. Chinese
exports are far more likely to be subject to Argentine anti-dumping actions
than their overall import share would suggest. In 2007–10, Chinese exporters
targeted by Argentine anti-dumping were virtually guaranteed to face signif-
icant trade barriers as a result. Indeed, the estimate provided here suggests
that, by 2009, over 13% of all Chinese exports to Argentina were aﬀected by
anti-dumping, either by new petitions or the ongoing eﬀects of orders that
were imposed in earlier years.
This increased focus on China has occurred simultaneously with the eco-
nomic crisis. It is therefore diﬃcult to determine whether this more intense
targeting of China would have happened in the absence of the global ﬁnan-
cial meltdown. Because the increased Argentine targeting of China in TTB
cases began before the crisis, there is no reason to believe that it will change
even after the Argentine and world economies have regained their footing.
Nonetheless, there is relatively little evidence that Argentina has responded
to the global ﬁnancial crisis by dramatically increasing import barriers across
the board.
Michael Moore is Professor of Economics and International Aﬀairs at the
Department of Economics, Elliott School of International Aﬀairs, and Institute
for International Economic Policy at George Washington University.
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Mexico: A Liberalisation Leader?
RAYMOND ROBERTSON1
1 INTRODUCTION
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how Mexico’s use of TTBs has evolved
since their inception, with a particular focus on the 2008–10 ﬁnancial cri-
sis. Mexico is an important case to consider for several reasons. First, as an
early liberaliser, Mexico is considered to be a leader among developing coun-
tries. In examining the early development of Mexico’s anti-dumping policies,
Niels and Ten Kate (2004) describe Mexico as an ‘aggressive’ user of anti-
dumping policies and suggest that Mexico may be an indicator of how other
emerging countries may employ anti-dumping policies. Vandenbussche and
Zanardi (2010) include Mexico among the developing countries that signiﬁ-
cantly employed anti-dumping measures (their analysis covered 1980–2003).
Niels and Ten Kate (2006) suggest that the spread of anti-dumping activity to
developing countries, including Mexico, may be an obstacle to free trade.
Second, Mexico holds a unique ‘intermediate’ position in the world econ-
omy. Its GDP per capita in 2009 was $13,200 (down from $14,300 in 2008),
ranking 84th in the world.2 At the same time, Mexico was one of the ﬁrst
to enter into a free-trade agreement with a developed country—the NAFTA
with the USA and Canada—and, as such, experiences the extremely strong
inﬂuence of the USA in many areas (see Weintraub (2010) for a discussion
of key issues of the US–Mexican relationship). In particular, Mexico’s trade is
dominated by the USA.
Although Mexico’s trade is dominated by the USA, the rise of China has
played a particularly important role in shaping Mexico’s TTBs. Several studies
have remarked on the surge of anti-dumping duty initiations against China
in the early 1990s, but few studies have focused on the lingering eﬀect that
these initiations have had—an eﬀect that emerges starkly when studying the
stock of anti-dumping activity.
1Department of Economics; Macalester College, 1600 Grand Ave., St. Paul, MN 55105,
USA. Email: robertson@macalester.edu.
2Data taken from CIA World Factbook.
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The signiﬁcance of the US relationship and the early activity against China
brought Mexico to the attention of many researchers. Several studies analyse
the determinants of Mexico’s anti-dumping initiations, with a particular focus
on macroeconomic determinants. Niels and Ten Kate (2004), Francois and
Niels (2006), and Bianchi and Sanguinetti (2006) suggest that, when macro-
economic conditions, such as GDP, exchange rates, and the current account
balance deteriorate, Mexico is more likely to initiate anti-dumping claims.
The 2008–10 ﬁnancial crisis provides yet another unfortunate opportunity
in which to evaluate the role of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
These and other papers also identify the sectors that have attracted the
most anti-dumping initiations. Francois and Niels (2006), for example, note
that 62.8% of investigations between 1987 and 2000 fall into just three cat-
egories: steel (and steel products), chemicals, and textiles (and textile prod-
ucts). In the last ten years, however, the economic landscape has shifted. Sev-
eral well-known anti-dumping cases have emerged that have changed the mix
of sectors aﬀected by anti-dumping measures. For example, Mexican anti-
dumpings against US beef that were eliminated on 11 August 2010 covered a
signiﬁcant share of Mexican beef imports from the USA for the previous ten
years.
This chapter therefore makes several contributions to the growing litera-
ture on Mexico’s use of TTBs. First, this chapter focuses mostly on the stock,
rather than the ﬂow, of anti-dumping coverage. As with the other chapters in
this volume, this shift in focus gives a more complete and accurate picture of
anti-dumping coverage. Second, we update recent ﬁndings in terms of both
geography (the countries that Mexico targets) and products, revealing impor-
tant shifts in how Mexico has been applying anti-dumping measures over
time. Third, this chapter also employs a probit analysis of determinants of
aﬃrmative decisions that reveals how Mexico’s policy has changed over time.
Together, these three contributions help to explain Mexico’s anti-dumping
behaviour during the 2008–10 economic crisis.
The ﬁndings of this chapter contrast sharply with previous research in sev-
eral ways. First, as noted above, previous work that has looked at the rela-
tionship between macroeconomic variables and Mexico’s anti-dumping initia-
tions might suggest that the 2008 crisis would have been accompanied by an
increase in anti-dumping activity. In practice, the results suggest the oppo-
site. Far from being ‘aggressive’ with its anti-dumping policies, in 2008, 2009
and 2010, Mexico was at or near the bottom of the list of countries initiating
new anti-dumping investigations. The stock of covered industries and covered
trade volume also fell dramatically in 2008, though for reasons that seem
unrelated to the economic crisis. Second, although Mexico has signiﬁcantly
diversiﬁed its trade over the last decade, anti-dumping measures remain con-
centrated on two countries: the USA and China. While other countries are
increasingly involved, their share of trade, and, therefore, their role in Mex-
ico’s larger anti-dumping picture, remains small. Third, the probit results sug-
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gest that the probability of an initial aﬃrmative dumping decision has fallen
overtime.Together,theseresultsmightbeconsistentwithanexplanationthat
Mexico’s use of anti-dumping policies has shifted from political to economic
and, in any case, may signal a move away from an aggressive use of TTBs.
This chapter describes Mexico’s anti-dumping policies in ﬁve additional sec-
tions. The ﬁrst presents an overview of Mexico’s trade policies and trade vol-
umes during the 1990–2010 period to provide context for the evolution of
TTB policies. Section 3 describes the three foundations necessary for under-
standing Mexico’s TTB activity: the birth and development of the TTB regime,
China, and the USA. Section 4 describes Mexico’s implementation and use of
anti-dumping duties. Section 5 discusses CVDs and safeguard measures. The
ﬁnal section concludes by summarising and providing directions for future
research.
2 CONTEXT: TRADE POLICY, TRADE,
AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
The ‘great trade collapse’ that came with the ﬁnancial crisis was especially
acute for Mexico (Robertson 2009). It is almost a cliché to say that Mexico’s
economy is closely tied to the US economy. Nevertheless, context plays an
important part in understanding Mexico’s trade policy response to the crisis,
especially with respect to TTBs. In this section we brieﬂy review the evolu-
tion of Mexico’s trade policy, recent trade patterns, and some of the speciﬁc
implications of the crisis.
2.1 Mexico’s Trade Policy: A Brief Review
For much of the 20th century, Mexico was a leader in the ‘import substitution
industrialisation’ model that was largely characterised by very high tariﬀs and
little emphasis on exports. As is well known to students of the Mexican econ-
omy, Mexico’s debt default in 1982 triggered the beginning of the ‘lost decade’
of low GDP growth and the end of the import substitution industrialisation
era. Mexico began to liberalise in 1983 through revisions to the maquiladora
policies that governed investment and production along Mexico’s US border
region. Possibly the next most important step in liberalisation was the 1985
decision to join the GATT—a move that included signiﬁcant revisions to tar-
iﬀs and import restrictions domestically but also brought Mexico into the
international community and the rules that govern all members of the GATT.
When Mexico joined the GATT in 1986, the drop in tariﬀs was signiﬁcant.
The maximum tariﬀ fell from 100% in 1985 to 20% by 1992.3 At the same
3The drop in tariﬀs was widespread but apparently concentrated in less-skill-intensive
industries, contributing to a rise in the relative price of skill-intensive goods that helps
to explain the subsequent rise in income inequality (see Hanson and Harrison (1999) and
Robertson (2004)).
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Table 10.1: Mexico’s free-trade agreements and tariﬀs.
Date of Tariﬀs Tariﬀs
Partner(s) signature 1991 2008
NAFTA: USA 17/12/1992 13.70 1.32
NAFTA: Canada 17/12/1992 13.85 1.56
Costa Rica 5/4/1994 14.00 1.35
G3: Colombia 13/6/1994 15.49 4.56
Bolivia 10/9/1994 14.60 3.28
Nicaragua 18/12/1997 10.47 1.61
Chile 17/4/1998 15.73 4.34
Israel 10/4/2000 14.56 3.26
El Salvador 29/6/2000 14.12 1.89
Honduras 29/6/2000 14.27 2.62
Guatemala 29/6/2000 14.74 1.72
EFTA: Iceland 27/11/2000 13.49 2.98
EFTA: Norway 27/11/2000 13.55 2.94
EFTA: Switzerland/ 27/11/2000 12.76 2.97
Liechtenstein
Uruguay 15/11/2003 15.62 5.16
Japan 17/9/2004 14.10 8.52
Non-FTA countries
Argentina — 13.98 11.03
Brazil — 13.67 10.56
Panama — 16.02 14.67
Paraguay — 13.09 10.26
Peru — 15.73 12.22
G3 represents Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. In May 2006, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez
announced that Venezuela would withdraw from the agreement. EFTA stands for the European Free
Trade Association, which was established in 1960 and today consists of Iceland, Norway, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein. Tariﬀ data for Switzerland and Liechtenstein are pooled in the tariﬀ database.
Tariﬀ rates are the simple averages of ad valorem taken across all HS-06 products available in the
WITS database.
Source: author’s calculations from Foreign Trade Information System (2011).
time, Mexico ﬁxed the value of the peso and initiated macroeconomic initia-
tives (the pactos) to control inﬂation. In 1991 the government liberalised the
capital accounts and in 1992 it signed the NAFTA. At the time, the domes-
tic manufacturing sector was quite disconcerted about the rate of change
in policies and the loss of protection from import competition (Poitras and
Robertson 1994).
OneofthegoalsoftheNAFTAwastocodifythisrelationshipandtomitigate
the variance that had characterised Mexican trade and economic policy in the
previous 50 years. The agreement’s main goal was to increase both trade and
investment and, while the NAFTA’s inﬂuence has been debated, it is clear that
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both trade and investment increased after the NAFTA was implemented in
1994.
The NAFTA was signiﬁcant because Mexico’s situation in the global econ-
omy is unique. There are few, if any, developing countries that share such
a close economic relationship with a developed country. Not only does Mex-
ico share a 2,000-mile border with the USA, but trade, immigration and capi-
tal ﬂows—factors that often deﬁne globalisation—are overwhelmingly domi-
nated by the relationship with the USA.
Realising the overwhelming inﬂuence of the USA may have been concentrat-
ing risk, Mexico subsequently pursued free-trade agreements with partners
all over the world. Table 10.1 lists Mexico’s free-trade agreements and illus-
trates the change in tariﬀs for countries with and without trade agreements in
1991 and 2008. Mexico started with Latin American countries and then signed
agreements with the European Union, Israel and Japan. While tariﬀs fall for
every country in the table, it is clear that those countries engaged in free-trade
agreements with Mexico had much larger reductions in average tariﬀs fac-
ing their exports. Not surprisingly, these agreements coincided with dramatic
reductions in the overall trade-weighted average tariﬀs. Figure 10.1 shows the
evolution of the trade-weighted average tariﬀ between 1991 and 2008. There
is little evidence to suggest that Mexico has not aggressively embraced trade
liberalisation.
One important note is that these tariﬀ data come from the WITS database,
which is considered to be the most comprehensive and authoritative tariﬀ
database, and yet there is not a single separate tariﬀ entry for China. The
lack of a separate line for China in any year of the database is the result
of at least two possible explanations. First, either the database is missing
tariﬀs that Mexico actually applied against China, or Mexico did not impose
separate tariﬀs against China before China joined the WTO in 2001. While
the ﬁrst explanation is possible, it seems more likely that Mexico did not
impose separate tariﬀs against China before China joined the WTO. The lack
of separate tariﬀs assigned to China plays an important part in understanding
Mexico’s pattern of anti-dumping duties.
2.2 Recent Patterns in Mexican Trade
To describe the changes in Mexico’s imports, we use data from the UN’s Com-
trade database, one of the common sources used in the chapters in this vol-
ume. There are several versions of the trade data. Since the 1990s are par-
ticularly important for the Mexican case, we use data coded by the six-digit
1992 Harmonized System unless noted otherwise. These data include annual
imports from each of Mexico’s trade partners in nominal US dollars. For the
purposes of this chapter, we convert all trade values to real using the US Con-
sumer Price Index, with 2000 as the base year.
Figure 10.2 shows the evolution of the real value of Mexican imports decom-
posed into the contributions of the main trading partners from 1990 to 2009.
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Figure 10.1: Mexican average tariﬀ rates.
Source: trade-weighted tariﬀ calculated using country and HS-06 product trade shares
as weights using available tariﬀ and trade data from WITS and Comtrade.
Figure 10.2: Total Mexican imports.
Source: WITS and Comtrade.
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The combined area (represented by the top border of the data) represents total
imports. Figure 10.2 reveals that Mexico’s trade patterns are quite diﬀerent
in the 2000s when compared with the 1990s. First, real imports increased
by nearly a factor of ﬁve over this period, but not consistently. The drops in
imports coincide with the recession that accompanied the Mexican peso crisis
(at the end of 1994) and the US recessions in 2001 and 2008. Similarly, sharp
increases are evident in both 1995 (following both the NAFTA and Mexico’s
recovery from the peso crisis) and again in 2003 during the recovery of the
US economy after the 2001 recession.
Figure 10.2 also shows that the USA is Mexico’s most important source of
imports by far. One of the most dramatic changes in Mexico’s trade pattern
over the last ten years has been the sharp decline in the share of imports that
come from the USA. This fall is evident in Figure 10.2, as the US share of total
Mexican imports declines from over 70% in 1990 to less than 50% in 2009. The
fall in the US share of Mexican imports is due to a rising contribution from
non-traditional trading partners. Mexico’s traditional second and third most
signiﬁcant sources of imports—Japan and Germany—also fall as a share of
the total.
Figure 10.2 also illustrates that China’s share in total imports rises sig-
niﬁcantly, especially after 2000, but remains a relatively small fraction. The
majority of the loss of US share is made up by increases in the rest of the
world—most of which individually remain very small suppliers to the Mexi-
can market, but, when taken together, represent a signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation
of total imports.4 This diversiﬁcation is probably largely due to the increase
in the number of free-trade agreements Mexico has signed.
Understanding Mexico’s overall changing trade and trade policy is impor-
tant for understanding Mexico’s pattern of anti-dumping for several reasons.
First, the fact that the USA makes up such a large share of Mexican imports
suggests that if anti-dumping measures are applied in proportion to trade,
we would expect a majority of anti-dumping measures to be applied against
the USA, and that this share should be falling over time. Second, following the
same reasoning, the rise of China after 2000 suggests that we might expect
China to become an increasing target of anti-dumping measures, especially
after 2000. Third, the rise in trade shares of the rest of the world suggests
that Mexico might follow the pattern of the rest of the developing world in
increasing the application of anti-dumping measures against other developing
countries. In the next section, we will see that only one of these predictions
holds, and weakly at that.
4Mexico’s Hirschman–Hirﬁndahl Index (HHI), which is a traditional measure of economic
concentration, changed for trade partners from 0.459 in 1990 to 0.260 in 2009. Figures
over 0.180 are considered highly concentrated, but the fall in concentration is signiﬁcant
according to both the HHI and Figure 10.2.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 358 — #378






358 The Great Recession and Import Protection
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2000:2 2001:2 2002:2 2003:2 2004:2 2005:2 2006:2 2007:2 2008:2 2009:2 2010:2
Percent
Mexico City
Border
Figure 10.3: Mexican unemployment.
Source: quarterly unemployment data from INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y
Empleo (ENOE) Indicadores Estratégicos. ‘Border’ represents the state of Baja Califor-
nia Norte, which is the Mexican state that borders California near San Diego, includes
Tijuana, and historically has had the largest number of maquiladora plants. ‘Mexico
City’ is Mexico’s Federal District (the capital of Mexico).
2.3 Macroeconomic Eﬀects of the Crisis
It is clear that the ﬁnancial crisis was accompanied by a sharp drop in trade
ﬂows. As the trade shock spread through the rest of the Mexican economy,
it had macroeconomic implications as well (Kaplan et al 2011). The shock
was clearly transmitted to Mexico from the USA through trade channels.
In an examination of Mexico’s anti-dumping use between 1990 and 2001,
Lederman et al (2005) show that the unemployment rate is one of the few
macroeconomic variables that signiﬁcantly aﬀect anti-dumping ﬁlings. Fig-
ure 10.3 shows the quarterly unemployment rate for two regions of Mexico:
the US–Mexico border region (represented by Baja California Norte) and Cen-
tral Mexico (represented by the Federal District). The border region is the most
integrated with the USA. This integration is characterised by vertical inte-
gration into the North American production chain that has intensiﬁed since
the NAFTA (Robertson 2007). The unemployment rate is generally lower in
the more integrated and dynamic border region than in the interior, but the
eﬀects of the trade shock are immediately apparent as the unemployment for
the border region jumps sharply during the crisis. This is consistent with the
labour markets of the two countries being closely integrated, with the degree
of integration being higher in the border region (Robertson 2000).
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Figure 10.4: Mexican trade balance.
Source: Banco de Información de INEGI.
The fact that the shock was primarily a trade shock and therefore mainly
aﬀected the border region may help to explain the response in terms of
anti-dumping policy. Furthermore, the fact that the Mexican economy is
increasingly integrated with the USA reverses the traditional assumption that
increased imports pose a threat to employment. In fact, Kaplan et al (2011)
ﬁnd that the contrary holds for the border region: imports are positively cor-
related with employment. Therefore, increasing tariﬀs through anti-dumping
measures may not necessarily oﬀer the same kind of protection that might be
possible in an environment in which imports are substitutes for, rather than
complements with, domestic production.
In order to illustrate the possibly unique nature of Mexico’s trade relation-
ships, Figure 10.4 shows Mexico’s aggregate trade balance (total, petroleum,
and non-petroleum products). Mexico is obviously a net oil exporter. Mexico’s
non-oil balance was positive following the peso crisis, but then continued to
fall until the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The crisis represents a nadir for the non-oil
products trade balance, with the trade balance becoming less negative during
and following the crisis. To the extent that anti-dumping activity is tied to a
negative change in the trade balance, the pattern that Mexico exhibits would
suggest that the crisis reduced political pressure for anti-dumping measures.5
5It is also interesting to point out that the total trade balance falls sharply between 1991
and the end of 1992, which may have contributed to Mexico’s anti-dumping policy at the
time. This is discussed in subsequent sections.
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It is also important to mention that the crisis coincided with several other
negative shocks. The H1N1 inﬂuenza virus (also known as the ‘swine ﬂu’) pan-
demic in 2009 started in Veracruz, Mexico. The outbreak adversely aﬀected
tourism, which is one of Mexico’s most signiﬁcant foreign-exchange-earning
sectors. In addition, narcotics-related violence increased sharply, capturing
much of the attention of both the public and policymakers. Remittances
from the USA to Mexico fell 36% between October 2008 and October 2009
as employment opportunities for Mexicans became more diﬃcult to ﬁnd in
the USA (Iliﬀ 2009).
3 FUNDAMENTALS: THE BIRTH OF THE
ANTI-DUMPING REGIME, CHINA AND THE USA
To understand Mexico’s TTB policies, three key elements stand out: the con-
ditions in which the TTB policies were ﬁrst formed, the role of China and the
relationship that Mexico shares with the USA.
3.1 The Birth of Mexico’s Modern Anti-Dumping Policy Structure
Mexico’s anti-dumping policies came of age at the end of the 1980s as part of
Mexico’s liberalising reforms. To address the political concerns about liberal-
isation and to help harmonise its trade policies with the rest of the countries
in the GATT, Mexico felt the need to have viable and credible anti-dumping
mechanisms. Gonzàlez and Reyes de la Torre (2006) present what is possibly
the most thorough description of the birth and early evolution of Mexico’s
anti-dumping policies, suggesting that they were ‘born only to protect the
liberalisation process’.6
Mexico’s anti-dumping legislation was enacted in January 1986 and Mexico
initiated its ﬁrst anti-dumping case in 1987. Mexico signed the Tokyo Round
Anti-Dumping Code in 1988, the year president Carlos Salinas de Gortari was
elected. Over the next several years, Mexico developed an administrative infra-
structure necessary to successfully implement anti-dumping policies. Specif-
ically, Mexico published the new Foreign Trade Law and its Regulations in the
Diario Oﬁcial in July and December of 1993 (Leycegui and Reyes de la Torre
2005). (See also Giesze (1994) for additional legal background of the forma-
tion of Mexico’s anti-dumping policies.) It was also during this period that
Mexico’s anti-dumping initiation activity reached its peak (for more details,
see Gonzàlez and Reyes de la Torre (2006)).
To illustrate the evolution of Mexico’s anti-dumping activity over time,
Table 10.2 contains four variables constructed from the World Bank’s Tem-
porary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010), with data broken down by year:
6Francois and Niels (2004) also explore the political dimensions of Mexico’s anti-dump-
ing regime.
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Table 10.2: Flow and stock of Mexico’s anti-dumping cases.
Flow Stock
   
New HS-08 HS-08
Year cases categories Cases categories
1987 18 23 6 7
1988 11 134 8 9
1989 7 8 12 14
1990 11 13 18 20
1991 9 16 26 34
1992 26 1,156 36 69
1993 60 2,206 54 2,176
1994 9 18 60 2,188
1995 4 5 62 2,191
1996 4 6 65 2,193
1997 6 7 68 2,193
1998 10 20 75 2,209
1999 10 23 79 2,225
2000 5 11 73 2,202
2001 5 9 71 2,193
2002 12 17 67 2,169
2003 13 25 72 2,182
2004 5 6 72 2,178
2005 7 21 71 2,176
2006 6 12 70 2,175
2007 3 6 68 2,173
2008 1 1 66 2,170
2009 2 6 45 85
2010 1 4 39 79
Bown (2010) contains four-digit categories for some cases. For these categories, the number of HS-08
categories included in each four-digit HS category was counted for the HS-08 column. Full data for
2010 were not available at the time of writing.
the number of initiated anti-dumping cases, the number of HS-04 and HS-
08 categories covered by the cases, the number of cases with anti-dumping
measures imposed and the number of HS-08 categories covered by imposed
anti-dumping measures.7
The spike in 1992 and 1993 is immediately obvious in terms of cases. Of
the 245 cases in the anti-dumping database, 10.6% (26/245) were initiated in
1992. Another 25% (60/245) were initiated in 1993. The spike in these two
years (1992 and 1993) is even more stark if we consider the number of HS
products covered by these cases, as shown in the second column. Not only
did the number of HS-08 categories increase, but the average number of HS-08
7Most of the cases have an eight-digit HS category associated with them, but not all. The
rest have four-digit HS categories assigned to them. Columns 2 and 4 follow a modiﬁed
version of counting products as described in the Introduction (this volume, Equation (1.1)).
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categories covered per case increased from 1.14 in 1989 to 36.77 in 1993. That
is, Mexico signiﬁcantly expanded the scope of coverage.
The spike in 1992 and 1993 attracted the most attention in terms of initia-
tions, but the stock of coverage has received much less attention. To describe
the stock, we again rely on the data in Bown (2010) and deﬁne a binary ‘stock’
variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) for initiated cases that had an aﬃr-
mative ﬁnal dumping decision and had not yet been revoked. Summing the
stock variable by year gives us the number of cases with anti-dumping mea-
sures imposed, shown in the third column of data in Table 10.2. The anti-
dumping database also includes the HS-08 categories associated with each
case, and the count of these is shown in the ﬁnal column.
Taking the stock of cases into account is extremely important, as shown in
the fourth column of Table 10.2. The ‘ﬂow’ measure documenting the number
of new cases drops in 1994 and remains relatively low (less than 14) through
2010. Aside from 2002 and 2003 (with 12 and 13 new cases respectively), the
number of new cases never rises above 10 for the entire 1994–2010 period.
One possible explanation for this is shown in column 4: products covered by
anti-dumping measures imposed during the 1992–3 period remained exten-
sive and lasted until 2008. That is, it is possible that the 1992–3 cases provided
a cover that obviated the need for future anti-dumping measures.
Therefore, examining the policies speciﬁc to the 1992 and 1993 period is
very important for understanding the stock and the vast majority of Mexican
anti-dumping coverage. Figure 10.5 breaks down the cases by country over
the entire sample period and shows that the country with the largest share
of anti-dumping-case initiations is the USA. This is fairly consistent with Fig-
ure 10.2 in the sense that the USA is Mexico’s largest source of imports. Fig-
ure 10.5 also shows that China is the second most signiﬁcant target of new
anti-dumping cases. Brazil, Spain, South Korea and Germany make up the next
largest portions. Interestingly, although Japan is one of the largest trade part-
ners by volume, it does not appear as a signiﬁcant target of anti-dumping case
initiations. The remaining cases are divided up in small percentages among
the remaining countries.
Figure 10.5 may give the impression that anti-dumping cases are rela-
tively dispersed among trading partners. In terms of trade covered by the
stock of anti-dumping measures, however, a very diﬀerent picture emerges.
Figure 10.6 shows the composition of the total trade volume covered by
imposed anti-dumping measures (the stock of cases). Two important facts
are immediately obvious from Figure 10.6. First, the total trade volume cov-
ered by imposed anti-dumping measures increases dramatically in the 2000–
2009 period. Second, the composition of the trade covered by imposed anti-
dumping measures changes dramatically. In the 1990s, the vast majority of
the trade volume covered by anti-dumping comes from the USA. Very little is
left for either China or all other countries targeted by anti-dumping measures.
After 2000, however, the picture changes dramatically. The US share falls as
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Figure 10.5: Number of Mexican anti-dumping cases by target country.
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
the Chinese share swells. The most likely explanation for this is implied by
Figure 10.2 and Table 10.3. Chinese trade was covered preemptively. As Chi-
nese trade grew, so did the volume that was covered by active measures. As
a result, recognising the ‘China Package’ of the 1992–3 measures in Mexico
is critical for understanding Mexican anti-dumping activity during the 1990–
2010 period.
3.2 The ‘China Package’
As Gonzàlez and Reyes de la Torre (2006) explain, the 1992–3 spike mainly
(but not entirely) consisted of two components. The ﬁrst was the ‘China Pack-
age’ and the second was a group representing the ‘multiproduct/multicountry
steel cases’. The ‘China Package’ turned out to be especially relevant for
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Figure 10.6: Mexican anti-dumping covered trade by country.
Source: WITS, Comtrade and the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010).
Covered trade calculated at the four-digit HS level using a binary indicator if any of
the HS-08 sectors within a given four-digit sector had an active anti-dumping measure
in place. The sum of China, the USA and the rest of the world represents the total value
of trade aﬀected by all anti-dumping cases in each year across all countries. China’s
value in 2009 appears as zero in the graph because the actual value (in billion constant
US dollars) is 0.094, which excludes the exceptions for ‘sensitive industries’.
Mexico’s stock of anti-dumping measures documented in Table 10.2. Mex-
ico initiated a very wide range of anti-dumping cases brought against China.
Nearly 27% of the cases were against China in 1992, and 21.7% were against
China in 1993, making China the primary target for these measures in these
years. The second most targeted country during these years was the USA, with
23% and 18%, respectively. No other country comes close to these two in terms
of the number of cases.
The number of cases and covered industries is especially curious because
many of them applied to industries in which Mexico had very little, if any,
trade. Rather than being economic, however, these measures seemed to play
an important political function. At the time, the Mexican business commu-
nity was uneasy about the pace and extent of Mexican liberalisation. The anti-
dumping mechanism oﬀered the promise of protection if necessary. Imposing
the measures against China sent the signal to the business community that
these measures would oﬀer protection that might compensate for the loss
of coverage that took place during Mexico’s GATT-focused unilateral liber-
alisation. These cases helped to solidify political support for Mexico’s early
anti-dumping program.
Targeting China and goods with relatively little imports seems to have been
a successful strategy for two reasons. First, targeting industries that had little
trade at the time meant that the measures would impose minimal distortions

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 365 — #385






Mexico: A Liberalisation Leader? 365
Table 10.3: Average anti-dumping duties imposed by Mexico.
Number
of HS-08 Earliest ﬁnal Latest ﬁnal Average
categories dumping dumping ad valorem
Country covered decision date decision date duty
China 1,098 25/5/1992 16/4/2009 212.7
Germany 4 19/12/1995 19/12/1995 185.8
Indonesia 1 4/7/2003 4/7/2003 182.1
India 1 7/12/1995 7/12/1995 116.0
Japan 4 25/5/1996 30/10/2000 97.7
Bulgaria 2 29/6/1999 29/6/1999 88.0
Romania 5 2/4/2004 8/9/2005 62.5
Brazil 30 7/9/1992 24/1/2006 55.2
EU 5 3/6/1994 23/8/1999 50.9
Ukraine 13 13/11/1998 8/9/2005 49.8
Netherlands 5 25/5/1992 19/12/1995 48.4
Canada 6 19/12/1995 28/12/1995 41.2
USA 51 5/6/1991 18/7/2005 40.4
Russia 16 7/6/1996 8/9/2005 39.7
Kazakhstan 2 29/6/1999 29/6/1999 34.0
Spain 2 25/5/1992 8/12/1992 32.0
South Korea 5 19/8/1993 30/5/2001 28.8
Guatemala 2 13/1/2003 13/1/2003 25.9
Denmark 2 28/3/2000 28/3/2000 25.0
Taiwan 3 27/6/1997 30/5/2001 20.7
United Kingdom 1 23/12/2009 23/12/2009 5.9
Ecuador 1 4/7/2003 4/7/2003 3.8
Hong Kong 1 9/9/1991 9/9/1991 0.5
The average duty is calculated as the simple average across all cases for each country. Cases here only
include those that applied an ad valorem dumping duty; 94.60% of the ﬁnal anti-dumping measures
are ad valorem duties.
on the domestic economy. Bown (2011a), for example, notes that the Mexican
tariﬀs covered only 0.8% of Mexico’s total imports in 1992. Second, targeting
China seemed to be either the result of a goal of imposing minimal distor-
tions on Mexico’s new GATT relationships or remarkable foresight (or both).
China was not a member of the GATT at the time, and therefore may have
seemed like a reasonable country to target to demonstrate to the domestic
producers that the authorities were willing and able to impose anti-dumping
measures. As Figures 10.2 and 10.6 show, however, China’s importance in
Mexican imports surged ten years later—both in terms of total trade (Fig-
ure 10.2) and especially in terms of trade covered by anti-dumping measures
(Figure 10.6).
Note that in Figure 10.6 we do not apply Bown’s (2011a) approach of using
the growth rate of imports that are not aﬀected by TTBs to estimate the coun-
terfactual growth rate of imports that might have occurred in the absence of
TTBs (for a discussion, see Bown (2011b, Equation (1.2))). That approach is
appropriate when one expects a strong discouraging eﬀect from TTBs that
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would make the TTB-aﬀected sectors grow more slowly relative to sectors not
covered by TTBs. In the Mexican case, however, using actual imports is per-
haps more accurate for two reasons. First, to the extent that the TTBs slowed
Chinese imports, the import growth would have been even greater, which
makes the rise presented in Figure 10.6 even more dramatic. Second, using the
growth rate of imports from other countries to represent the import growth
that might have occurred without TTBs would understate the true counterfac-
tual growth in Chinese imports, especially in the early 2000s (see Figure 10.6)
if the discouraging eﬀect was greater than the rate of import growth from
other countries (which seems possible given the scope of coverage).
In addition to covering a large number of HS-08 products, Chinese cases
involved much higher average tariﬀs than those imposed in other cases.
Table 10.3 provides information about the tariﬀ levels applied across the
diﬀerent cases. Using the application of a ﬁnal anti-dumping measure as a
selection criterion, Table 10.3 includes the number of HS-08 products, the
dates for the earliest and latest ﬁnal dumping decision, and the simple aver-
age of the ad valorem duties (not including speciﬁc or other duties) applied to
each country across all applicable HS-08 categories and cases. Again, the dom-
inance of China is immediately apparent—not only in terms of the number of
covered HS-08 products, which has already been discussed, but by the span
of time covered by ﬁnal anti-dumping decisions (1992–2009) and the average
applied ad valorem duty (212.7%). Germany spans a similar length of time,
but has many fewer covered HS-08 products (ﬁve) and an average ad valorem
tariﬀ about 14% below China. (the log diﬀerence is 0.136). The country with
the next highest applied tariﬀ—Indonesia—includes only one HS-08 product
and one date.
As is evident from Figure 10.6, the anti-dumping provisions against China
were removed nearly as suddenly as they were imposed. When China joined
the WTO in 2001, its accession protocol speciﬁed that measures against China
that were not consistent with WTO regulations were to be phased out, but
the ‘Peace Clause’ allowed a six-year delay before WTO principles would be
applied to the provisions (Bravo et al 2010).
In late December 2007, Mexico attempted to extend the delay, but on 1
June 2008, Mexico and China signed the ‘Transitional Agreement on Trade
Remedies’ that resulted in the dramatic drop in the number of anti-dumping-
covered industries. This agreement was published on 14 October 2008 in the
Diaro Oﬁcial and explains that Mexico agreed to eliminate duties on 749 tariﬀ-
line (HS-08) items and phase out protection for another 204. The reductions
would begin on 15 October 2008 and the rest would be eliminated by 11
December 2011. The agreement allows Mexico to employ transitional mea-
sures for the duties scheduled to be removed in 2011, although these tran-
sitional measures may also be challenged by China and Mexican importers
(Bravo et al 2010).
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One could reasonably argue that the June 2008 agreement with China was
expected, possibly even before China entered the WTO. If countries success-
fully rely on anti-dumping protection during periods of recession or economic
crisis, then the timing of the agreement was simply unfortunate for Mexico to
the extent that the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis was unexpected. In terms of empirical
analysis, therefore, it is clearly inaccurate to attribute the signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in Mexico’s anti-dumping coverage to macroeconomic conditions.
3.3 The United States of America
As Weintraub (2010) argues, understanding Mexican economics in general or
trade policy in particular requires signiﬁcant attention to be devoted to Mex-
ico’s relationship with the USA. In terms of anti-dumping, it is important to
examine the NAFTA, Mexican tariﬀ preferences granted towards the USA, and
the product areas that are most aﬀected by Mexican anti-dumping activity
directed towards the USA.
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA addresses anti-dumping duties and was modelled
on Chapter 19 of the Canadian–US Free Trade Agreement. One critical provi-
sion of Chapter 19 was the creation of binational review panels. Lederman et al
(2005) suggest that, while imports surged following the NAFTA, the beneﬁts
to Mexico from the provisions of Chapter 19 were not immediately apparent
and, in fact, the review panels had no way to enforce their decisions. Esquivel
and Solis (2002) argue that the NAFTA reduced US vulnerability to Mexican
anti-dumping provisions, even though the USA remained a signiﬁcant target
(which might be driven by the signiﬁcant share the USA commands of total
Mexican trade). Interestingly, they also suggest that the NAFTA did not reduce
Mexican vulnerability to US anti-dumping action, raising the possibility that
at least Mexican anti-dumping activity might be responsive to US action in the
sense of Blonigen and Bown (2003).
The NAFTA also included an eventual elimination of Mexican tariﬀs against
Canada and the USA. Figure 10.7 shows the pattern of average (non-anti-
dumping) Mexican tariﬀs (both simple average and trade-weighted average)
imposed against the USA versus those imposed against all other countries
that had matching data for trade volumes (from the trade database) and tar-
iﬀs (from the tariﬀ database). The top line represents Mexico’s simple average
tariﬀ for all non-US countries and contrasts sharply with the trade-weighted
average tariﬀ for non-US countries. The time series pattern of these two lines,
however, is similar in that they both show a falling trend over the entire sam-
ple period. The non-trade-weighted average tariﬀ rises in the late 1990s, but
then continues to fall through 2009.
The trade-weighted and unweighted Mexican tariﬀs towards the USA are
very similar because most of the trade observed in both data sets is with
the USA. The eﬀect of the NAFTA is immediately apparent in that, in 1994,
the simple average tariﬀ rate for the USA was very similar to the rest of the
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Figure 10.7: Mexico’s tariﬀs after the NAFTA.
Source: WITS and TRAINS database.
world. Following the NAFTA, however, Mexican tariﬀs towards the USA drop
sharply. They continue to drop in a stepwise fashion as the NAFTA provisions
are phased in and approach zero by the end of the sample period.
Figure 10.7 shows that there was a beneﬁt to the USA in terms of tariﬀ
reduction. While overall tariﬀs were falling in Mexico, the USA did receive
preferential treatment after the NAFTA, which is not surprising. What might
be surprising is that Mexico continued to diversify its trade away from the
USA even while giving the USA lower and lower tariﬀs. Furthermore, the falling
tariﬀs eventually covered all goods. The pattern for the ﬁve product groups
mainly targeted by anti-dumping measures is very similar to the other goods
that had fewer anti-dumping cases. Tariﬀ levels were comparable prior to
NAFTA but dropped sharply for the USA relative to others. One possibility is
that these were particularly sensitive and that sensitivity was revealed post-
NAFTA, resulting in anti-dumping duties.
Mexican anti-dumping measures tend to cover a small fraction of total trade
with the USA and the initiations tend to be concentrated in relatively few prod-
uct categories. Figure 10.8 shows the HS-02 categories with more than 5% of
the total anti-dumping cases (not HS categories covered) initiated against the
USA. Measures against the USA include both areas that have received media
attention (eg beef and steel) and those that are economically important but
may have received less attention (eg plastics and inorganic chemicals).
The trade volume covered by the stock of anti-dumping cases follows a
somewhat diﬀerent pattern. Figure 10.9 shows the time series of the volume
of trade covered by some anti-dumping measures within each HS-02 sector.
The cases brought against US beef (shown in the ‘meat’ category in Figure 10.9)
arise in the late 1990s, while the other main sectors fell in signiﬁcance. Com-
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Figure 10.8: Mexico’s case initiations against the USA by sector.
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010). The ‘Other’ category con-
tains all two-digit sectors with less than 5% of total ﬁlings.
pared with the late 1990s, there is much less trade covered by Mexican anti-
dumping measures. Interestingly, however, Figure 10.9 also shows that there
is a general increase in the share of anti-dumping-covered trade following
2004. This increase is most likely explained by an increase in trade during
the recovery from the 2001 recession. The drop in trade following the 2008–9
trade collapse shows again that there was a decrease, rather than an increase,
in trade covered by anti-dumping measures during the crisis.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we examine four key features of Mexico’s implementation of
anti-dumping measures: duration, products, tariﬀs and aﬃrmative decisions.
Each subsection reveals important patterns about Mexico’s anti-dumping poli-
cies in light of the crisis.
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Figure 10.9: Mexico’s anti-dumping covered trade volume (US trade only).
Source: WITS, Comtrade and Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010). The
sum of trade in these industries is equal to the US trade shown in Figure 10.6.
4.1 Duration
One potential reason that the stock of anti-dumping measures remains high
is that measures are not revoked within the ﬁve-year timeframe suggested by
the Uruguay Round’s sunset review provisions. The China case clearly ran con-
trary to those provisions, but, considering the duration of measures applied
to other countries, it is also informative.
Table 10.4 presents the average duration of anti-dumping provisions by
country. Several interesting points are immediately evident from Table 10.4.8
First, China is not the country with the longest duration of anti-dumping mea-
sures. That distinction goes to France, whose anti-dumping measure applied
to Sorbitol on 28 September 1990 is listed as still in force in the anti-dumping
database with an applied speciﬁc duty of $0.24/kg. Nineteen of the 27 coun-
tries listed in Table 10.4 have average durations greater than ﬁve years.9 The
USA falls above the ﬁve-year mark with an average duration of 6.81 years.
There is no clear relationship between provisions that were implemented
more recently and their duration other than the obvious frontier issue
imposed by treating in-force provisions as having a revocation date of 1 Jan-
8Here we assume that all ‘in force’ measures are revoked on 1/1/2011 to calculate
length. Such a strategy grants a lower bound for duration.
9In Table 6, the European Union enters as a single country.
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Table 10.4: Average duration of anti-dumping measures by country (years).
Standard
Country Mean deviation Frequency
France 20.3 0.0 1
Hong Kong 19.3 0.0 1
South Korea 14.9 5.5 5
China 13.8 1.2 1,108
Bulgaria 11.5 0.0 2
Kazakhstan 11.5 0.0 2
Russia 10.7 3.6 12
Japan 10.2 0.0 3
Ukraine 9.0 2.9 10
Denmark 8.3 0.0 2
Taiwan 7.7 3.2 4
Netherlands 7.3 5.0 5
USA 6.8 3.3 66
Brazil 6.3 3.4 32
India 6.3 5.3 2
Venezuela 5.8 2.1 12
Germany 5.1 0.0 4
Guatemala 5.0 0.0 2
EU 5.0 0.0 2
Ecuador 5.0 0.0 1
Indonesia 5.0 0.0 1
Romania 5.0 0.0 1
Chile 4.6 0.0 1
Spain 4.3 2.8 4
West Germany 2.0 0.0 1
Canada 1.8 2.5 6
United Kingdom 1.0 0.0 1
Total 12.9 3.0 1,291
Average duration is calculated as the number of days between the ﬁnal anti-dumping date and the
revocation date. For measures still in force (eg the French case), 1/1/2011 was used as the revocation
date.
uary 2011. Therefore, there is no evidence that the duration of anti-dumping
provisions is falling over time.
Table 10.5 shows the cases that were eligible to have been removed during
the crisis. Eligibility is based on having an initiation date after 2000 such that
the ﬁnal anti-dumping decision date fell in 2003 or later (ﬁve years before
the crisis hit). There is little evidence from Table 10.5 that the probability
of being revoked fell during the crisis, given the average durations for other
cases shown in Table 10.4. For example, the Ukraine case remained in force,
although it began in 2003. But this is just one of the ten cases for Ukraine as
shown in Table 10.4, in which the average duration for cases brought against
Ukraine is nearly nine years. For the USA, the duration for most of those
cases falls short of the average duration of cases brought against the USA
in Table 10.5. The one exception seems to be Venezuela, in which the out-
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Table 10.5: Potential crisis-aﬀected anti-dumping cases in Mexico.
Final
anti-
dumping Revocation Duration
date Country date (1/1/2011)
17/7/2003 Ecuador 16/7/2008 5.0
17/7/2003 Indonesia 16/7/2008 5.0
26/9/2003 China In force 7.3
18/7/2003 China In force 7.5
25/9/2003 Ukraine In force 7.3
22/4/2004 Russia 22/4/2009 5.0
22/4/2004 Romania 22/4/2009 5.0
14/5/2004 Venezuela In force 6.6
5/8/2004 China In force 6.4
8/4/2005 USA In force 5.7
9/4/2005 USA In force 5.7
9/4/2005 USA In force 5.7
28/5/2005 USA In force 5.6
28/5/2005 USA In force 5.6
26/1/2006 Brazil In force 4.9
18/5/2006 China In force 4.6
18/5/2006 Chile In force 4.6
13/6/2006 China In force 4.6
21/4/2009 China In force 1.7
6/1/2010 United Kingdom In force 1.0
The duration measure, in years, is calculated by applying 1/1/2011 as the revocation date for all
measures currently in force.
standing case has lasted longer than the average shown in Table 10.4, but
the duration in Table 10.5 is still less than the sum of the average duration
and standard deviation shown in Table 10.4. Therefore, at ﬁrst pass, it does
not seem that Mexico increased its propensity to ‘hold on’ to anti-dumping
measures during the crisis as compared with previous years.
4.2 Products
Much of the previous literature focuses on the speciﬁc industries covered
by anti-dumping measures. In particular, the steel cases stand out. One of the
main diﬀerences between the China package and the steel cases lies in applied
anti-dumping duties. As Gonzàlez and Reyes de la Torre (2006) explain, cases
in the ‘Chinese Package’ were quite likely to have preliminary anti-dumping
duties applied. None of the steel cases, in contrast, applied preliminary anti-
dumping duties. The approach was clearly diﬀerent from the steel cases in
terms of treatment and national coverage, and readers are again referred to
Gonzàlez and Reyes de la Torre (2006) for more details.

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 373 — #393






Mexico: A Liberalisation Leader? 373
Table 10.6: Top ten two-digit HS industries sorted by anti-dumping coverage of total
trade.
Anti-
HS-02 dumping Within
share coverage HS-02
of total of total coverage
HS-02 Description (%) (%) (%)
85 Electrical machinery/equipment/parts, 21.5 1.7 8.0
telecommunications equipment, sound
recorders, television recorders
72 Iron and steel 3.1 0.4 13.3
39 Plastics/plastic articles 6.2 0.4 6.6
02 Meat and edible meat oﬀal 1.9 0.2 12.0
95 Toys 0.6 0.2 31.8
29 Organic chemicals 2.8 0.1 4.9
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 3.2 0.1 2.9
measuring, checking, precision, medical or
surgical instruments and accessories
08 Fruits and nuts 0.3 0.1 22.8
48 Paper and paperboard, articles of 2.3 0.0 2.3
paper pulp
55 Man-made staple ﬁbres, including yarns, etc 0.4 0.0 11.2
Anti-dumping coverage is calculated using a binary indicator for whether or not a given country–HS-
04 industry had any anti-dumping coverage multiplied by the real (in constant 2000 US dollars) trade
value for that country–HS-04 observation and then summing that product over all countries (for each
HS-04 industry) and dividing that sum by the total trade in each HS-04 industry.
Table 10.6 presents the top ten HS-02 industries covered by anti-dumping
measures, sorted by anti-dumping covered trade as a share of total trade
within each HS-04 industry.10 This value (called ‘anti-dumping coverage’ in
Table 10.6) is accompanied by the share of each two-digit industry in total
trade (HS-02 share of total) in the ﬁrst data column and the share of trade
within each HS-02 industry covered by anti-dumping measures in the last
data column. These three measures reveal diﬀerent aspects of Mexico’s anti-
dumping application. For example, the industry with the highest share of
within-HS-02 coverage (HS-02 sector 95, labelled ‘toys’ in Table 10.6) has a
very small share of total trade largely because this sector makes up a very
small share of total trade. On the other hand, electrical machinery (HS-02 sec-
tor 85) has the highest share of total trade covered because this sector makes
up 21.5% of all of Mexico’s imports and achieves this rank in spite of the fact
that it has one of the lowest within-sector coverage ratios.
10Speciﬁcally, this measure (‘anti-dumping coverage’ in Table 10.6) is calculated using a
binary indicator for whether or not a given country–HS-04 industry had any anti-dumping
coverage multiplied by the trade value for that country–HS-04 observation and then sum-
ming that product over all countries (for each HS-02 industry) and dividing that sum by
the total trade in each HS-04 industry.
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Several additional results are evident from Table 10.6. First, the overall
coverage (in terms of trade volume) of anti-dumping measures is relatively
small—less than 2% on average in all cases and less than 0.5% in all but one.
The relatively small share of covered trade has been noted by other authors
(Leycegui and Reyes de la Torre 2005), but the small coverage suggests that
Mexico might not be a good example of a signiﬁcant deterrent eﬀect on trade
such as that found elsewhere (Vandenbussche and Zanardi 2010). Second,
formal tests reveal that the amount of trade covered within an industry and
that industry’s share of total trade are not signiﬁcantly correlated, suggesting
that the industries with the most imports are not disproportionately targeted.
The third data column shows a wide range of within-industry coverage, even
among the top ten industries. Finally, within-industry anti-dumping cover-
age is not greater than one-third, consistent with the usual notion that anti-
dumping cases are generally narrowly focused on speciﬁc products.11 The val-
ues in Table 10.6 are calculated over all years. Separating out the same values
by year for the top four categories listed in Table 10.6 reveals signiﬁcant het-
erogeneity over time. Table 10.7 contains the within-industry anti-dumping
coverage for 1990–2009. The well-known beef dispute emerges in 1998 and
initially covers just over 27% of the two-digit HS sector. But the coverage falls
over time as individual cases get resolved. By 2009, the coverage is less than
half of the 1998 value.
Analysing the stock for other products reveals a similar wave pattern. For
example, plastics (HS-02 39) starts low and gradually rises, cresting at the
end of the 1990s before dropping oﬀ in 2000. A similar pattern emerges for
steel. As part of the steel package in 1992–3, coverage rises signiﬁcantly in
those years but is followed by a gradual decay through the rest of the sam-
ple, reaching less than 0.5% by 2009. Electric machinery, on the other hand,
shows a very diﬀerent pattern of gradually increasing coverage over the sam-
ple period (until 2009, which may be an anomaly due to missing data). Taken
together, these patterns illustrate the importance of focusing on the stock of
anti-dumping coverage rather than new cases. They also seem to suggest a
gradual shift towards a more trade-based criterion of anti-dumping applica-
tion, since the rising share in electric machinery coincides with that industry’s
relative importance in Mexico’s total imports.
4.3 Tariﬀs
Anti-dumping duties may be complements with, substitutes for, or have no
relationship with, other forms of tariﬀs. In particular, it is possible that sec-
tors receive anti-dumping protection with tariﬀs that are otherwise too low
to provide the desired protection. On the other hand, a particularly sensitive
11One concern about Table 10.6 is that it may miss some relatively high-proﬁle cases,
such as sweeteners (see Moss et al (2005) for a discussion of the Mexico’s high fructose
corn syrup dispute with the USA).
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Table 10.7: Within-industry anti-dumping coverage (top four two-digit HS industries).
HS-02
  
02 39 72 85
Iron and Electric
Meat Plastics steel machinery
Year (%) (%) (%) (%)
1990 0.0 3.7 2.1 0.0
1991 0.0 7.9 2.1 3.8
1992 0.0 8.5 40.2 6.3
1993 0.0 9.2 39.9 6.9
1994 0.0 8.6 26.7 6.5
1995 0.0 14.6 27.4 6.4
1996 0.0 14.6 22.2 7.6
1997 0.0 14.0 23.2 8.4
1998 27.2 14.7 25.5 8.4
1999 27.1 14.8 24.0 1.6
2000 22.6 4.6 12.3 1.9
2001 21.4 4.0 4.6 3.1
2002 24.7 1.3 3.2 5.6
2003 21.8 1.3 2.8 8.0
2004 11.7 1.2 4.0 11.5
2005 15.8 1.3 3.5 14.1
2006 17.9 1.4 1.2 18.1
2007 18.4 1.4 0.6 19.9
2008 17.6 1.7 0.7 22.7
2009 13.9 2.4 0.4 N/A
sector may be characterised by high tariﬀs and this underlying sensitivity may
drive aﬀected parties to seek anti-dumping protection.
To investigate the possible correlation between anti-dumping activity and
tariﬀ levels, we turn to the WITS database. The tariﬀ data are not available
every year, so we interpolate missing tariﬀ values when the tariﬀ values are
the same in the most recent available year and in the next available year. When
the values of tariﬀs are diﬀerent on either side of the tariﬀ value, we use the
previous value of tariﬀs. When the tariﬀ data are missing for all earlier years,
we leave the missing values alone.
To compare the average tariﬀs in anti-dumping sectors and non-anti-
dumping sectors, we merge the eight-digit product data from the TTB
database with the eight-digit tariﬀ data from WITS. Comparing the average
values of tariﬀs between these two groups, both by two-digit HS sector or
by year, reveals that the average tariﬀ levels are very similar (with signiﬁcant
overlap of 95% conﬁdence intervals, and with an overall average (standard
deviation) of 9.96% (9.46%) for non-anti-dumping sectors and 9.49% (6.14%)
for anti-dumping sectors). Interesting exceptions seem to be HS-02 categories
34 (soaps, waxes, etc), 29 (organic chemicals), 76 (aluminium), 90 (optical and
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measuring instruments) and 01 (live animals) with log diﬀerences at least 30%
higher for the anti-dumping sectors.
One point that is important to reiterate is that the main source of tariﬀ
data, the WITS database, does not include separate tariﬀ lines for China. As
mentioned earlier, this may be either because the WITS data are incomplete,
or because Mexico did not impose separate tariﬀs against China. The more
likely option seems to be that Mexico did not impose separate tariﬀs against
China at that time because the levels of trade were so low and there were very
few, if any, countries that had separate tariﬀ lines.
4.4 A Probit Analysis of Aﬃrmative Decisions
Leycegui and Reyes de la Torre (2005) describe ten major problems with Mex-
ico’s anti-dumping administration. While recognising that Mexico has set up
‘strong and professional institutions to conduct anti-dumping procedures’,
it is clear that the system has been evolving over time. One area of particu-
lar concern is the determination of dumping and injury. Reynolds (2007) has
indicated the possibility of bias in anti-dumping investigations with regards
to agricultural products, which suggests that understanding anti-dumping
decisions is important.
To analyse the factors aﬀecting these decisions and the evolution of these
decisions over time, we employ a probit analysis of determinants of aﬃr-
mative decisions during the 1990–2009 period. As is well known, there are
at least four key decision points involved in anti-dumping cases: preliminary
dumping, ﬁnal dumping, preliminary injury and ﬁnal injury. The share of aﬃr-
mative decisions for each of these categories, as well as the number of cases,
for the 1987–2010 period are shown in Table 10.8. Table 10.8 shows that the
preliminary and ﬁnal decisions are very similar. This is an artefact of Mexico’s
reporting; it is often diﬃcult to determine exact dates for separate decisions.
It is also diﬃcult to separate the dumping and injury decisions. Table 10.8
does not seem to suggest any clear change or trend over time. The relatively
small number of cases means that each case is highly inﬂuential in the overall
percentages.
When carrying out the probit analysis of the aﬃrmative decisions, we add
trade data (aggregated to the HS-04 level) to the case data, which eﬀectively
expands the case data to include all of the aﬀected four-digit industries. This
allows us to include proxies for trade volumes in the estimation. Other vari-
ables included are those suggested by the discussion above, including a time
trend (or individual year controls), a dummy variable for China, and another
for the USA.
Table 10.9 contains the probit estimation for preliminary (column 1)
and ﬁnal (column 2) aﬃrmative dumping decisions, including a time trend.
Columns 3 and 4 include an interaction between the time trend and China,
the USA, and trade volume variables. All of the probit coeﬃcients have been
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Table 10.8: Share of aﬃrmative decisions by year.
Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Initiation dumping dumping injury injury
year Cases (%) (%) (%) (%)
1987 18 78 33 78 33
1988 11 91 27 91 27
1989 7 71 57 71 57
1990 11 100 55 100 55
1991 9 100 89 100 89
1992 26 69 46 69 46
1993 60 63 43 63 43
1994 9 89 67 89 67
1995 4 100 100 100 100
1996 4 100 100 100 100
1997 6 100 83 100 83
1998 10 100 70 100 70
1999 10 100 70 100 70
2000 5 40 20 40 20
2001 5 100 100 100 100
2002 12 100 83 100 83
2003 13 92 92 92 92
2004 5 80 60 60 60
2005 7 57 57 57 43
2006 6 100 17 100 0
2007 3 67 33 67 33
2008 1 100 100 100 100
2009 2 50 0 100 0
2010 1 0 0 0 0
The share of aﬃrmative decisions is the simple average across cases of a binary variable equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the decision in the case is aﬃrmative. Other decisions (represented by a zero
value of the binary aﬃrmative indicator) include bypassed, withdrawn, terminated, negative, partial,
other, and missing. Full 2010 data were not available at the time of writing.
converted to represent marginal probabilities, and the test statistics are based
on the underlying coeﬃcients.
The estimated negative sign on the year variable suggests that the probabil-
ity of aﬃrmative decisions, controlling for other factors, falls over time. The
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant, but very small. The eﬀect of trade volume
is not statistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the discussion earlier
suggesting that Mexican anti-dumping policies, especially in the early years,
do not seem focused on trade volumes. The fact that China is included and
that anti-dumping measures in the ‘China Package’ were targeted at areas with
very small amounts of trade explain this result. The ‘China Package’ also helps
to explain the very large magnitude (and signiﬁcance) of the China dummy
variable. It is interesting that the USA also has signiﬁcantly higher probability
of aﬃrmative dumping decisions.
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Table 10.9: Probit dumping analysis aﬃrmative decisions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preliminary Final Preliminary Final
Year −1.441×10−4 −1.024×10−4 −1.413×10−4 −9.499×10−5
(10.09)∗∗ (9.06)∗∗ (7.16)∗∗ (5.85)∗∗
Trade (billions) 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.004
(15.74)∗∗ (12.35)∗∗ (4.69)∗∗ (3.25)∗∗
China 0.244 0.231 0.274 0.258
(146.47)∗∗ (143.16)∗∗ (55.49)∗∗ (54.16)∗∗
USA 0.056 0.031 0.044 0.024
(69.80)∗∗ (50.27)∗∗ (24.40)∗∗ (17.49)∗∗
China × Year — — −9.096×10−5 −6.001×10−5
— — (2.69)∗∗ (2.37)∗
USA × year — — 1.149×10−4 7.480×10−5
— — (3.04)∗∗ (2.35)∗
Trade × year — — −9.307×10−5 −2.758×10−5
— — (0.97) (0.37)
Observations 536,267 536,267 536,267 536,267
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Coeﬃcients are transformed to represent marginal
eﬀects, including for dummy variables. ‘*’ denotes signiﬁcance at 5%; ‘**’ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
When the time trends are interacted with the trade and country dummy
variables, the magnitude of the Chinese variable increases signiﬁcantly, but
the time interaction is negative, which is again consistent with the eﬀects of
the ‘China Package’. Over time, the probability of an aﬃrmative action against
China falls. In contrast, the probability of a positive ﬁnding against the USA
rises over time. In neither case is the volume of trade found to be statistically
signiﬁcant.
The eﬀects of time may not be linear. In a separate estimation, we replaced
the continuous time-trend variables with dummy variables for each year and
interacted them with trade, China and USA variables. The sum of the main
country eﬀects and the marginal yearly eﬀects are shown in Figure 10.10. The
diﬀerences through time are statistically signiﬁcant, but very small. Neverthe-
less, the trends seem clear. China starts from a high value and falls. As the
probability of an end to anti-dumping protection against China increased in
the mid-2000s, the probability of an aﬃrmative decision against China also
increases slightly. On the other hand, the USA starts from a relatively low
value and rises—especially after the provisions of the NAFTA are phased in.
There is also a jump in the US value during the ﬁnancial crisis, which is con-
sistent with other studies that suggest more aggressive use of TTBs during
diﬃcult economic periods.
One of the main implications of this section is that Mexico started out as a
‘very aggressive’ user of anti-dumping measures, but then reduced its use over
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Figure 10.10: Annual probit results (China and the US).
Source: author’s calculations. Lines represent the marginal plus main eﬀects from a
probit estimation using an aﬃrmative preliminary dumping decision as the dependent
variable.
time. This is clear from both the number of cases and the falling probability
of aﬃrmative decisions over time. Several other papers (Niels and Ten Kate
2004; Francois and Niels 2006; Bianchi and Sanguinetti 2006) suggest that eco-
nomic crises lead to an increased use of anti-dumping measures. To evaluate
this hypothesis, Figure 10.11 plots the (transformed) annual dummy variable
coeﬃcients from the probit estimation described above for Figure 10.10. Fig-
ure 10.11 marks three key economic downturns in the last 20 years: the Mex-
ican peso crisis (1994–5), the US recession of 2001 and the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008–9. Supporting the hypothesis advanced by these papers, there is a clear
uptick of the probability of preliminary aﬃrmative dumping decisions in each
of these cases when controlling for China, the USA and total (real) trade vol-
ume. Of course, these upticks are temporary and relatively small compared
with the overall declining trend of the line. The results suggest that Mexico
is clearly becoming less ‘aggressive’ over time and the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis
has not had a large enough eﬀect to reverse this trend.
One possibility is that Mexico has moved away from anti-dumping duties as
a form of administrative protection and moved towards CVDs and safeguards.
Nearly every other paper that has analysed Mexico’s anti-dumping policies has
noted that Mexico’s use of these instruments has been quite limited, but we
examine these policies in depth in the next section (papers that examine global
trends, most notably Bown (2011a), also make this point).
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Figure 10.11: Annual probit results (year coeﬃcient estimates).
Source: author’s calculations. Line represents the (transformed) coeﬃcients on the
annual dummy variables in a probit estimation of the preliminary dumping decision
being aﬃrmative. Other controls include total (real) trade volume, a China and US
dummy variable alone, and interacted with annual dummy variables. The unit of obser-
vation was country–HS-04 cells for years 1990–2009. 1990 is the omitted category.
5 COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND SAFEGUARDS
5.1 Countervailing Duties
There are 19 Mexican CVD cases included in Bown (2010), and they are listed
in Table 10.10. Table 10.10 includes the country, product, preliminary injury
decision, ﬁnal injury decision date and ﬁnal injury decision. It is clear from
Table 10.10 that Mexico has not moved to oﬀset its decline in anti-dumping
activity with an increase in CVD activity. If anything, the two have moved
together through time in the sense that both fall. The majority of CVD use was
during the mid-1990s, and nearly all of the cases at that time centred on steel.
There is only one case with a ﬁnal injury decision date after 2000, and that was
the case of olive oil from the European Union (see Bown and Meagher (2010)
for a discussion of Mexico’s olive oil case). Aside from the crest of activity in
1995, which coincides with the peso crisis, there is little evidence that CVD
use increases during recessions. There are no cases during the 2001 recession
and, at least through 2009, there are no cases that correspond to the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008. The papers that discuss Mexico’s past anti-dumping activity
that have also discussed CVD activity (see, for example, González and Reyes
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Table 10.10: Mexican countervailing duty cases.
Final
Preliminary injury Final
injury decision injury
Case Country Product decision date decision
1 Venezuela Aluminum ingots Aﬃrmative 5/9/1991 Negative
2 EU Frozen beef Aﬃrmative 6/3/1994 Aﬃrmative
3 USA Steel Negative — —
4 Brazil Hot-rolled steel — 19/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
5 Venezuela Hot-rolled steel — 19/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
6 Brazil Steel sheets — 29/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
7 USA Steel sheets — 29/12/1995 Negative
8 Brazil Cold-rolled steel — 19/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
9 Venezuela Cold-rolled steel — 19/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
10 USA Cold-rolled steel — 19/12/1995 Negative
11 Brazil Steel plates in rolls Aﬃrmative 28/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
12 Venezuela Steel plates in rolls Aﬃrmative 28/12/1995 Aﬃrmative
13 USA Steel plates in rolls Aﬃrmative 28/12/1995 Negative
14 Indonesia Wood Aﬃrmative 12/7/1995 Negative
15 Canada Wheat Negative — —
16 USA Wheat Negative — —
17 Denmark Pork Aﬃrmative 2/10/1996 Negative
18 Greece Tinned sliced peaches Aﬃrmative 25/11/1998 Negative
in syrup
19 EU Olive oil Aﬃrmative 11/5/2005 Aﬃrmative
Source: trade-weighted tariﬀ calculated using country and HS-06 product trade shares as weights
using available tariﬀ and trade data from WITS and Comtrade.
de la Torre 2006) remain excellent resources given the lack of CVD activity
since their publication.
5.2 Safeguards
Mexico has only had two safeguard petitions between 1995 and 2010. The
ﬁrst involves plywood panels and was initiated on 15 August 2002. It was
subsequently withdrawn on 2 July 2005. The second case involves steel tubes
and was initiated on 3 July 2010. Given that the second investigation is still
pending, there is little information about this case. What is perhaps more
telling is the lack of cases: one observation does not make a trend, so it is
diﬃcult to argue that there has been a clear shift towards using safeguard
protections. It is interesting, of course, that steel remains a sensitive indus-
try and therefore it is a case that certainly merits continued attention (see
Crowley and Howse (2010) for a discussion of the US–Mexican stainless steel
dispute).
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6 CONCLUSIONS
For nearly 30 years, Mexico has been considered a leader among developing
countries with respect to economic policy. Mexico was one of the ﬁrst liberalis-
ers and has been cited as a country that may be a bellwether for international
trade policy in developing countries. In the case of TTBs, Mexico captured the
world’s attention early as an aggressive user of anti-dumping measures.
The analysis in this chapter highlights the importance of focusing on the
stock of anti-dumping protection. Focusing on the stock of anti-dumping cov-
erage reveals a dramatic change in eﬀective anti-dumping coverage in 2008.
Rather than revealing a dramatic change in policy, however, the analysis in
this paper suggests that the dramatic drop in anti-dumping coverage was pri-
marily due to the unsustainability of Mexico’s early aggressive anti-dumping
eﬀorts. Speciﬁcally, Mexico’s imposition of measures against China predated
China’s entrance to the WTO and, upon entering, China was able to success-
fully negotiate the removal of Mexico’s extensive anti-dumping coverage.
It is also interesting that Mexico has not replaced the fall in coverage with a
surge of new anti-dumping duties. In fact, Mexico’s anti-dumping initiations
have been relatively modest—even in the face of the global ﬁnancial crisis. In
addition to fewer initiations, a probit analysis of aﬃrmative decisions shows
a declining probability of aﬃrmative ﬁndings over time, suggesting a modera-
tion of Mexico’s early enthusiasm. Therefore, to the extent that Mexico might
be a bellwether for the developing countries, it may be that the current surge
in anti-dumping activity among other developing countries is also temporary.
Raymond Robertson is Professor of Economics at Macalester College, a non-
resident fellow at the Center for Global Development, and a member of the
Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy at the US State Depart-
ment.
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Turkey: Temporary Trade Barriers as
Resistance to Trade Liberalisation
with the European Union?
BAYBARS KARACAOVALI1
1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines Turkey’s use of TTBs—in the form of anti-dumping,
safeguards and CVDs—from 1990 to 2009. We rely on detailed product-level
data to analyse the structure of Turkey’s TTBs across industries and target
countries over time.
Turkey, as a major emerging economy, started to use anti-dumping poli-
cies in 1989 and has been one of its more active users ever since. It has
adopted other measures of TTBs—namely, global safeguards, China-speciﬁc
safeguards and CVDs—and its total use of TTBs has increased, especially over
the second half of the 2000s.
Turkey went through signiﬁcant trade liberalisation as it fully formed a
customs union with the EU in January 1996. Based on the customs union
decision, Turkey has abolished all trade barriers in the manufacturing sector
vis-à-vis the EU, and it has considerably reduced barriers against third coun-
tries by adopting the EU’s common external tariﬀ. Turkey has also gradually
taken on an array of EU preferential trading relationships, such as the Euro–
Mediterranean partnership and Generalised System of Preferences. Turkey
formed free-trade areas with the EFTA in 1992 and then with the prospec-
tive EU candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe since joining the
customs union.2
1Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Saunders Hall Room 542,
2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA. Email: baybars@hawaii.edu. Website: www2.
hawaii.edu/˜baybars. I gratefully acknowledge Chad Bown for very helpful comments and
Aksel Erbahar for the fact checks and corrections. I also thank Michael Moore, Raymond
Robertson and Patricia Tovar for their comments. The views expressed in this paper and
any errors are solely my own.
2The members of the EFTA in 1992 were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Nor-
way, Sweden and Switzerland. Austria, Finland and Sweden left the EFTA and joined the
EU in 1995.
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Turkey’s predominant use of TTBs took the form of anti-dumping through-
out the 1990–2009 period, with an increasing rate of import coverage. How-
ever, Turkey also started to use global safeguard measures beginning in 2005,
and this policy quickly became a signiﬁcant temporary barrier as a comple-
ment to anti-dumping. Moreover, in addition to an increase in the number
of TTB initiations over the 2000s, the higher rate of initiated investigations
resulting in new imposed measures also contributed to Turkey’s expanding
stock of imported products subject to TTBs. There is also some evidence of
sluggishness in terms of Turkey’s removal of TTBs over time.
Turkey has been signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the 2008–9 global economic cri-
sis, with especially negative eﬀects in 2009. After six years of positive growth,
Turkish real GDP per capita contracted by 0.6% in 2008 and by 6% in 2009 (see
Figure 11.1(a)). The unemployment rate increased to 10.9% in 2008 only to be
surpassed by an increase to 14% in 2009 (see Figure 11.1(a)). The 2008–9 cri-
sis proved to be as severe as Turkey’s two previous major economic crises.
In 1994, real GDP per capita had declined by 6.3%, and in 2001 it fell by
7.1%. However, unlike the earlier crises, both Turkey’s imports and exports
declined in 2009 (Figure 11.1(b)), an experience shared by the rest of the
world (WTO 2010). The 1994 and 2001 crises were ﬁnancial in nature as
the Turkish lira depreciated sharply: by 36% in 1994 and by 31% in 2001 in
real terms (Figure 11.1(b)).3 Consequently, Turkey’s exports kept increasing
while its imports declined during those periods. In 2009, Turkey’s exports
also declined despite the 14% real depreciation of the lira.
During 2008–9, Turkey considerably increased its use of TTBs. Neverthe-
less, apart from the signiﬁcant emergence of global safeguard measures, it is
hard to argue that the 2008–9 increase was not part of a pre-existent upward
trend. However, the full response to the crisis may be felt with a lag; Turkey’s
use of TTBs may continue to expand even after the crisis. The drastic intra-
and extra-group trade liberalisation brought on by the adoption of the EU’s
common external tariﬀ and its preferential agreements seems to have par-
ticularly contributed to the rise in Turkey’s use of TTBs over the 2000s. Due
to various trade policy commitments with the EU, TTBs oﬀer one of the few
channels through which Turkey retains some control over its trade policy.
Turkey’s use of TTBs has become more widespread across sectors over
time. The products that Turkey has covered with TTBs coincide with the list
of goods that were deemed ‘sensitive’ in its initial agreement with the EU.
These products had higher rates of import protection that were phased out
by 2001. Turkey has increasingly targeted textiles with TTBs, especially after
3The real exchange rate is calculated by multiplying Turkish lira per US dollar nominal
exchange rate with the ratio of US to Turkish GDP deﬂators. Therefore, a rise in the real
exchange rate indicates a real depreciation of the Turkish currency.
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Figure 11.1: Turkish macroeconomic indicators, 1990–2009.
Source: author’s calculations using WDI and IMF International Financial Statistics.
Increase in the real exchange rate indicates depreciation of the Turkish lira.
the expiration of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing that allowed
Turkey to use import quotas despite the customs union agreement.4
4Furthermore, under the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, in 2006, Turkey demanded
‘sectoral’ treatment for textiles. Their request that textile tariﬀs should be negotiated sep-
arately was backed by the USA but opposed by the EU, thereby creating some controversy
(Beattie 2006).
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We also ﬁnd that, on average, the products that Turkey subjected to TTBs
had higher tariﬀ rates and preference margins. The political economy forces
that lead to higher tariﬀ protection and more preferential access seem also to
aﬀect Turkey’s use of TTBs. In general, Turkey does not target established EU
members with TTBs, although there is no legal prohibition against doing so.
Turkey mainly targets developing countries, and China especially, at rates that
are disproportionate to their import market shares. On the other hand, apart
from South Korea, the high-income countries are underrepresented relative
to their shares of the Turkish import market.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the measurement strategy, examine the use of diﬀerent kinds of TTBs by
Turkey over time, and discuss the eﬀects of economic crises. In Section 3
we examine the relationship between tariﬀs, imports, PTAs and the use of
TTBs. In Section 4 we analyse the cross-industry variation, and in Section 5
we investigate the foreign-exporter incidence in Turkey’s use of TTBs between
1990 and 2009. Section 6 concludes.
2 THE USE OF TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS OVER TIME
Turkey has been an active user of TTBs, mainly anti-dumping, since the early
1990s. Beginning in the mid-2000s, Turkey has also started to use global safe-
guards, China-speciﬁc safeguards and CVDs. In the next subsection, we intro-
duce the main measurement strategies and brieﬂy discuss the data before
moving on to the analysis.
2.1 Data and Measurement
Detailed TTB data are obtained from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database
(Bown 2010a). The imports at the six-digit Harmonized System level are from
Comtrade, UN Statistics Division, through World Bank’s WITS software.
The Temporary Trade Barriers Database lists the original product names
in the investigations. Furthermore, the database identiﬁes the corresponding
products at various levels of aggregation; investigations range from the HS
4-digit to HS 12-digit levels. Given the lack of import data at the 12-digit level
dating back to the 1990s, the analysis is kept at the 6-digit level. Given the
nature of the products for Turkey, this does not seem to bias the results.5
5For example, for the anti-dumping case against Finland over paper, which was in eﬀect
between 1990 and 2000, the TTB database identiﬁes the following two product codes:
‘480252201000’ and ‘480252801000’. Both are deﬁned as ‘printing and writing paper’ in
the WTO’s consolidated tariﬀ schedules for Turkey. The deﬁnition for the HS six-digit
code we use, ‘480252’ (which covers both products), in the Comtrade imports data is
‘Paper…(excluding mechanical ﬁbres), weighing  [4]’. As illustrated in this example, the
six-digit code is suﬃciently detailed as compared with the 12-digit code and should not
introduce a sizeable bias for the Turkish data.
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We consider both stock and ﬂow measures of TTBs. The stock measure
refers to the TTBs in force in a given year, whereas the ﬂow measure refers to
the newly initiated TTB investigations that may or may not eventually result
in newly imposed barriers. Following Bown (2011b), we employ two basic
approaches to measure both stocks and ﬂows. The ﬁrst approach relies on
counts of products subject to TTBs as a share of all products imported in a
given year and is captured by Equation (1.1) in Bown (2011a).
The second approach introduces trade weights by product and import
source country. In this respect, it takes into account the economic impor-
tance of the product subject to a TTB and also allows for variation across tar-
geted countries. For instance, some of Turkey’s TTBs involve only one country,
while others involve several countries. Furthermore, new TTB measures may
be introduced on the same product before an earlier one expires, potentially
introducing new target countries in a given year. When trade-weighting the
new TTB indicator (which is now target-country speciﬁc), we have to account
for the trade dampening eﬀect of the barrier in the ﬁrst place. In this respect,
imports by source country subject to TTBs are imputed by allowing the pre-
barrier import values to ‘grow’ at the same rate as the non-TTB products in
the economy for as long as the TTB for the target-country–product combina-
tion is in force. This approach also provides consistent ﬁgures across target
countries over time. We calculate the second measure following Equation (1.2)
of Chapter 1. Note that, in the case of global safeguards, the target country
is ‘world’, hence we take into account the total imports from all sources for a
product under safeguards. Finally, in all estimates of Equation (1.2), we only
consider non-oil imports to avoid volatility in oil prices aﬀecting the consis-
tency of the measures over time.
2.2 General Trends in the Use of Diﬀerent Types of TTBs
Turkey has actively used anti-dumping since 1989. Since 2004, it has adopted
other TTB measures as well. In Figure 11.2(a) we present the stock and ﬂow
estimates based on Equation (1.1), and in Figure 11.2(b) we present estimates
based on Equation (1.2) for anti-dumping and combined TTB measures at
the HS-06 product level. Figure 11.2(a) illustrates that Turkey’s anti-dumping
policy use (stock) was relatively steady, covering around 0.7% of the HS-06
imported products between 1992 and 2000. After a rise in coverage in 2001
to 1.5%, the use of anti-dumping measures surged, reaching a 4.4% coverage
rate by 2009.
In Table 11.1 we present the underlying stock and ﬂow numbers used in Fig-
ure 11.2 and further break down the TTBs into four categories: anti-dumping,
safeguards, China-speciﬁc safeguards and CVDs. We also show counts of
products subject to TTB measures, and thus employ the numerator of Equa-
tion (1.1) only.
In 2004, Turkey initiated safeguard investigations for the ﬁrst time. These
covered 13 diﬀerent HS-06 products, and 2 resulted in imposed safeguards in
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Stock: Products subject to a TTB (AD, SG, CSG, CVD)
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Flow: Products under a new TTB (AD, SG, CSG, CVD) investigation
Flow: Products under a new AD investigation
Figure 11.2: Turkey’s use of TTBs, 1990–2009: (a) share of TTB-impacted HS-06 prod-
ucts by count; (b) share of TTB-impacted HS-06 products by import value.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade (UN Statistics Division).
2005. In Figure 11.2 these turning points are illustrated by the dashed lines
(measuring anti-dumping only) and solid lines (measuring all TTBs) starting
to branch out in 2004 (for the ﬂow ﬁgures) and 2005 (for the stock ﬁgures).
Table 11.1 again documents how safeguard coverage expanded drastically
from 0.07% (2 HS-06 products) of the imported products initially in 2005 to
1.9% (83 HS-06 products) by 2008.
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In 2006, Turkey imposed China-speciﬁc safeguards over four HS-06 im-
ported products and initiated investigations covering ﬁve other products
that did not subsequently turn into China-speciﬁc safeguard measures. The
imposed China-speciﬁc safeguard measures were expired in 2009. There were
three HS-06 products (from India) investigated for CVDs that were eventually
imposed in 2009; these covered 0.07% of the imported products at the HS-06
level (Table 11.1).
Figure 11.2 illustrates intermittent jumps in the ﬂow of TTBs (grey solid
lines in panels (a) and (b)), ie in the newly initiated TTB investigations at the
product level. There was a big jump in 1994 when the number of products
investigated hit 144, which covered 3.2% of the imported product lines and
1.8% of the imports by value (Figure 11.2 and Table 11.1). The WTO’s sub-
sequent Trade Policy Review of Turkey indicated that ‘…the large build-up
of cases initiated through 1994 may be explained by the overvalued domes-
tic currency, which, as in a number of other countries, might have caused
domestic industries to seek protection through anti-dumping measures…’
(WTO 1998, p 59). Turkey did experience a drastic currency crisis in 1994 as
its currency depreciated by 36% in real terms against the US dollar (see again
Figure 11.1(b)) and real GDP per capita contracted by about 6.3% (see again
Figure 11.1(a)). The surge in the number of products investigated in 1994 was
mostly due to the new investigations in the textiles sector. These did not sub-
sequently result in anti-dumping measures so there was not a corresponding
jump in the stock of anti-dumping measures in Figure 11.2(a).
In Figure 11.2(b) we present the stock and ﬂow estimates based on Equa-
tion (1.2) and thus trade-weight the indicators to better account for the eco-
nomic importance of the TTBs.6 When we consider the share of import value
of each target-country–product combination, there was actually a sudden
increase in the value of products subject to anti-dumping in 1995 (after a
small drop in 1994 due to the crisis), although the number of anti-dumping-
products did not change noticeably (see again Figure 11.2(a)). This diﬀerence
is due to the fact that a few new products in the metals and plastics/rubbers
industries were added to the stock of products already under anti-dumping.
Similarly, the jump in 1994 in the ﬂow of anti-dumping investigations is not
as pronounced when we consider their share in total imports by value as
opposed to counts of products. This jump is completely due to the 138 newly
investigated HS-06 products in the textiles (excluding silk and wool) sector. In
terms of trade value, they do not amount to much when compared with other
sectors like metals. The cross-industry variation in the use of TTBs is further
explored in Section 4.
A second jump in anti-dumping investigated products occurred in 2000 (see
Figure 11.2 and Table 11.1). Several of the earlier anti-dumping measures were
6Note that only non-oil total imports are used for the denominator in Equation (1.2) to
avoid price volatility and hence to ensure consistency in the estimates over time.
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394 The Great Recession and Import Protection
revoked during this year, and this was also one year prior to the requirement
that Turkey, as part of the EU customs union, would have to completely phase
out all remaining protection on ‘sensitive sectors’ and adopt the EU’s PTAs
(Togan 2000). Moreover, in late 2000, Turkey experienced a liquidity crisis
that turned into a major ﬁnancial crisis in early 2001 (Onis 2009), as real GDP
per capita contracted by 7.1% (see again Figure 11.1(a)). This macroeconomic
shock is also a likely contributor to the demands for additional import protec-
tion. Given the lag between the initiation of anti-dumping investigations and
the imposition of anti-dumping measures, Turkey’s anti-dumping stock grad-
ually increased from 2001 onwards (Figure 11.2(a) and Table 11.1). Again due
to the liquidity crisis, the import value of the goods covered by TTBs ﬁrst fell
in 2001, before increasing until 2009 when the next crisis hit (Figure 11.2(b)).
In 2009, the total (non-oil) imports were signiﬁcantly contracted by 36% due
to the global economic crisis. We discuss the eﬀects of this crisis on the use
of TTBs and make comparisons with earlier crises in Section 2.4.
There was a steady stream of new anti-dumping investigations beginning
in 2002 with signiﬁcant jumps again in 2004, 2008 and 2009 (the grey dashed
line in Figure 11.2(a)). The increase in other TTB investigations—ﬁrst in 2006
and then through 2008—led to some divergence in the ﬂow of anti-dumping
versus the other TTBs. This is shown by the gaps between the solid and dashed
grey lines in Figure 11.2(a).
Table 11.2 presents information on the TTB investigation cases and their
outcomes.7 Some anti-dumping investigations involve just one country, while
others involve several. Each anti-dumping case in Table 11.2 refers to unique
country–investigation combinations. In Section 5 we further break down the
anti-dumping investigation cases by target country and examine cross-target-
country diﬀerences. Between 1990 and 1999, Turkey initiated a total of 62
anti-dumping cases and 64.5% resulted in a ﬁnal measure (Table 11.2). How-
ever, between 2000 and 2009, the anti-dumping investigations were decisively
more likely to end in new barriers as 95.1% of the 143 cases resulted in ﬁnal
measures.
Turkey initiated its ﬁrst ﬁve global safeguard investigations in 2004, and
40% of them resulted in the imposition of ﬁnal measures.8 Between 2006 and
2009, all of Turkey’s ten safeguard investigations resulted in measures. In
2005, Turkey initiated its ﬁrst China-speciﬁc safeguard investigation, which
resulted in a new trade barrier, whereas the other two investigations initiated
in 2006 had negative outcomes. Finally, Turkey initiated only one CVD inves-
tigation (against India) during the period (in 2008) and that resulted in a ﬁnal
measure.
7Investigations that have missing initiation and ﬁnal decision information are not
included in the calculations.
8Notice the diﬀerence between anti-dumping cases that are target-country speciﬁc and
safeguard investigations that apply to ‘world’ as the target country.
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In addition to Turkey’s increase in its initiations over the 2000s, the higher
rate of initiations ﬁnding support also played a role in expanding the stock of
its TTBs. In the next subsection we analyse the duration of TTB measures and
examine whether there was sluggishness in their removal, potentially adding
to the recent build-up.
2.3 Duration of TTBs
The Uruguay Round made sunset reviews after ﬁve years a requirement for
anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless, enforcement is lax and WTO’s Anti-
Dumping Agreement ‘allows WTO members great latitude in their determi-
nation of the likelihood of dumping and injury resumption’ (Cadot et al
2007). Turkey oﬃcially adopted the Anti-Dumping Agreement in 1999 (Oﬃ-
cial Gazette 1999), agreeing to limit deﬁnitive anti-dumping measures to ﬁve
years. Nevertheless, according to Turkey’s legislation on the Prevention of
Unfair Competition in Imports, a ‘deﬁnitive anti-dumping duty may remain in
force as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is
causing injury’ (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade 2010,
p 3). In Table 11.3 we present information on the duration of anti-dumping
measures in Turkey at the investigation level. Using the available Turkish data
in the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a), we ﬁnd that 45 anti-
dumping measures have been revoked with an average duration of 7.09 years;
36% of measures were revoked in 5 years, and 60% were revoked in 6 to 10
years. One anti-dumping measure lasted for 15 years (against Belarus in the
textiles sector for ‘polyster synthetic staple ﬁbers (not processed)’ from 1994
to 2009) and one lasted for 4 years.
Anti-dumping measures in the textiles sector had an average duration of 9
years, which is above Turkey’s overall anti-dumping average. However, anti-
dumping measures against China had an average duration of 7.4 years, which
is roughly the same as Turkey’s anti-dumping measures against other coun-
tries. As will be discussed below, Turkey uses TTBs frequently in the textiles
sector and to target China. We analyse cross-industry variation in Turkish use
of TTBs in Section 4 and we explore foreign-exporter incidence in Section 5.
While Turkey has revoked 45 anti-dumping measures, 128 measures were
still in eﬀect as of June 2010. Although these barriers have not yet been
removed, 55% of them are already beyond 5 years in duration. On average,
the overall duration for all cases is 5.4 years thus far, with a similar average
ﬁgure for textiles and China.
In panel (b) of Table 11.3, starting from 1995 (ﬁve years beyond which the
ﬁrst anti-dumping measures were imposed), we present the annual data for
the percentage of anti-dumping measures imposed ﬁve or more years ago
that have still not been revoked. Until 1999, as might be expected, in the
absence of a sunset review legislation, almost all cases remained in eﬀect
beyond ﬁve years. However, beginning in 2000 (the year after the Turkish anti-
dumping legislation), all but two anti-dumping measures that were imposed
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Table 11.3: Duration of Turkey’s anti-dumping measures.
(a) Duration
Number of Number of
anti-dumping anti-dumping
cases cases (still
Number (already in force as
of years revoked) of June 2010)
10 9
20 1 1
30 6
41 2 0
51 6 1 2
64 2 5
77 2 4
83 1 1
97 2
10 6 7
11 0 1
12 0 0
13 0 0
14 0 0
15 1 0
Total 45 128
Average duration 7.09 years 5.4 years
Average duration 9 years 5.7 years
(textiles)
Average duration 7.4 years 5.4 years
(China)
(b) Percentage of anti-dumping measures imposed
ﬁve or more years ago but still not revoked
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
% 100.0 100.0 89.5 83.3 84.6 2.9 2.9 2.9
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
% 2.9 5.7 20.9 29.2 42.4 51.1 60.9 64.6
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a).
prior to 2000 were revoked. Therefore, the percentage of anti-dumping mea-
sures imposed ﬁve or more years ago but still not revoked remained in single
digits between 2000 and 2004. Of the 147 anti-dumping measures that Turkey
imposed since 2000, 5% were retired within ﬁve years, 3% were retired in seven
years and the remaining 92% were still in force as of June 2010. Consequently,
the percentage of measures that linger beyond ﬁve years has increased con-
sistently from 2005, reaching 64.6% by 2010.
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Turkey enacted its legislation on safeguards in 2004 according to which
‘the duration of safeguard measures shall not exceed 4 (four) years, including
the duration of any provisional measure unless it is extended…in accordance
with the results of a new investigation to be initiated…[and] the total period of
application of a safeguard measure shall not exceed 10 years’ (Oﬃcial Gazette
2004). Of the 12 global safeguard measures imposed since 2005, 2 expired in
2008, 5 had not expired as of 2010, 4 were supposed to expire in 2009 but
were extended until 2012, and 1 was supposed to expire in 2009 but was
revoked in 2010. Therefore, there is some evidence of tardiness in Turkey’s
removal of global safeguard measures as well.
There was only one China-speciﬁc safeguard measure that was imposed in
2006 and it expired in 2009. Finally, there was only one CVD case that came
into force in 2009 and was still in eﬀect as of 2010.
2.4 The 2008–9 Global Economic Crisis and the Use of TTBs
In 2008 and 2009, Turkey experienced a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
products subject to TTBs (Table 11.1 and Figure 11.2, stock ﬁgures). Through-
out the period from 1990 to 2009, Turkey’s predominant TTB policy was
anti-dumping with an increasingly upward trend in the coverage of products.
However, since ﬁrst turning to their use in 2005, safeguard measures quickly
became an important TTB for Turkey, complementing its use of anti-dumping
measures.
While the share of Turkey’s products subject to anti-dumping in its total
number of imported products (Equation (1.1) estimate) increased from 3.3% in
2005 to 4.4% in 2009, the share of products covered under global safeguards
increased even more dramatically—from 0.04% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2009 (see
Table 11.1, stock ﬁgures). Turkey’s anti-dumping coverage steadily increased,
beginning in 2001. In that respect, the global safeguards, China-speciﬁc safe-
guards and CVDs that Turkey has subsequently introduced has not replaced
the anti-dumping measures that it has in force.
During the 1994 currency crisis in Turkey, there was an explosion in the
number of anti-dumping investigations, as illustrated by the jump in the solid
grey line in Figure 11.2(a), even though the stock ﬁgures did not change visi-
bly (solid black line). However, as indicated above, due to the compositional
change in products subject to anti-dumping, their import value increased in
1995 (Figure 11.2(b)).
In late 2000, Turkey suﬀered a liquidity crisis, followed by a ﬁnancial crisis
in early 2001. Having been almost absent between 1995 and 1999, new anti-
dumping investigations re-emerged in 2000. However, it is hard to disentangle
the eﬀect of the crisis from the fact that earlier anti-dumping measures were
revoked in 2000 and also because Turkey was expected to complete trade
liberalisation with the EU and to adopt an array of EU-related bilateral agree-
ments during this period.
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Apart from the signiﬁcant emergence of global safeguard measures, it is
hard to argue that Turkey’s considerable increase in TTB use during 2008–9
was not part of an already existing upward trend in contingent protection. In
2009, only one product was under global safeguard investigation and all the
existing safeguard measures were set to expire by 2012. The China-speciﬁc
safeguard measure that was in force against one product expired in 2009.
Turkey introduced CVDs for the ﬁrst time in 2009. If new global safeguards,
China-speciﬁc safeguards or CVD measures do not rise in the post-crisis
period, it might be possible to partly attribute the 2008–9 increase in non-
anti-dumping TTB measures to the global economic crisis.
A more formal analysis is required to determine whether crises entail more
protection through TTBs. What is clear, however, is that the number of new
investigations (ﬂow) increased in crisis periods, as can be observed by the
signiﬁcant jumps in the solid grey line in Figure 11.2(a) in 1994, 2000 and
2008.
Although the decisiveness in turning anti-dumping investigations into ﬁnal
measures seems to be stronger over the 2000s, this was moderated slightly
during the 2008–9 crisis. The percentage of initiated investigations resulting
in measures actually declined to 78.3% (of 23 investigations) in 2008 before
rising slightly to 83.3% (of 6 investigations) in 2009. This contrasts with the
2002–7 period, in which 100% of the 92 investigations resulted in imposed
TTBs (Table 11.2).
The duration of anti-dumping measures not being revoked at the ﬁve-year
mark (as required by sunset reviews) also increased after 2005, as discussed in
the previous subsection. While the 2008–9 crisis may make it easier to justify
the extension of TTBs, any delay in their removal seems to be in line with
pre-crisis trends.
Turkey did not resort to other policy changes such as tariﬀ increases in
the crisis period, with the exception of a tariﬀ increase in ‘beam ﬁsh’ in 2010
(GlobalTradeAlert2010).9 However,thisproductisalreadyexcludedfromthe
EU agreement, and thus the restriction on Turkey changing its tariﬀ policy due
to the customs union with the EU may be preventing other plausible increases
in its applied tariﬀs—many of which are way below their bound rates given
the signiﬁcant trade liberalisation in Turkey since the Uruguay Round.
In the next section, we explore the relationship between tariﬀs, imports,
PTAs and Turkey’s use of TTBs.
9Global Trade Alert also identiﬁes a public procurement legislation in December 2008
(measure no. 1098) allowing a 15% price preference for domestic suppliers. However, given
the lack of information about this policy prior to 2008, it is hard to compare the crisis era
with earlier periods.
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3 TARIFFS, IMPORTS, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
Turkey has a complex structure of tariﬀs including speciﬁc, ad valorem and
compound components as well as a mass housing fund levy on imports.
The internal taxes, namely special consumption tax, value-added tax and
stamp duty apply in a cascading manner on top of each other, creating yet
another diﬀerential for imported goods. For instance, value-added tax applies
to imports inclusive of tariﬀs, levies and special consumption tax. Yet the
average protection levels are fairly low (apart from agricultural goods and
food items). Togan (2010) computes ad valorem equivalents of nominal pro-
tection rates in Turkey, taking into account the complexities of the Turkish
customs procedures and ﬁnds that the simple average nominal protection
rate against the EU was 9.12% in 2009. However, it was actually 0% in all sec-
tors except agriculture (52.2%) and chemicals (0.08%). The MFN protection
rate averaged 13.86% with 56.5% in agriculture, 8.93% in textiles and 8.03% in
footwear and miscellaneous manufactures. When only tariﬀs plus the mass
housing fund levy are considered, the WTO (1998) estimates that average MFN
tariﬀs declined from 26.7% in 1993 to 12.7% in 1998.
The drastic intra-group and extra-group trade liberalisation—brought on
by the adoption of the common external tariﬀ of the EU and its preferential
agreements, as well as the requirement to ﬁnalise the liberalisation of sen-
sitive sectors—are potential contributing factors to the rise in Turkey’s use
of TTBs. Due to various trade policy commitments with the EU, TTBs oﬀer
some of the few outlets where Turkey enjoys a certain level of trade policy
independence.
In this section we examine how Turkey’s imports, tariﬀs and PTAs interact
with its use of TTBs. Using the available UNCTAD TRAINS data on applied MFN
and preferential tariﬀs, we ﬁrst look at the trends in tariﬀs for all products
that have been subjected to a TTB, versus the remainder, with the exception of
agricultural goods. As indicated above, the tariﬀ rates in the agricultural sec-
tor are very high and they are excluded from the Turkey–EU agreement. Con-
sequently, Turkey does not impose any TTBs in this sector. We also exclude
oil industry products that are solely imported, not comparable with other
imports, and also subject to price volatility. Figure 11.3(a) shows that average
MFN tariﬀs for TTB products were always higher than the tariﬀs for non-
TTB products during the 1990–2009 period. The gap ranged between 2% (in
1993) and 4% (in 1997). This suggests that Turkey used TTBs for products
that were already more protected through tariﬀs, and hints at a complemen-
tarity between the two forms of protection. Therefore, it is plausible to argue
that tariﬀ liberalisation might have accelerated the use of TTBs, especially
after 2000. Nevertheless, a suggestion of causality requires a more formal
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analysis that would necessitate controlling for the eﬀects of various other
factors.10
In addition to trade liberalisation concerning the EU, Turkey also entered
agreements to completely eliminate tariﬀs in industrial goods with Israel by
2000; with Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Lithuania by 2001;
with Romania, Bulgaria and Poland by 2002; with Estonia and Latvia by entry
into force of agreement in 2004; with Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina by
2007; and with Macedonia by 2008 (WTO 2003). Computing preference mar-
gins as the diﬀerence between MFN tariﬀs and the lowest available preferen-
tial tariﬀ by product, Figure 11.3(b) illustrates that preference margins were
higher for TTB products over time. One interpretation of this is that products
with a larger preference margin were more likely to be protected by TTBs.
Given that preferential tariﬀs for the products involved were either duty-free
or very low, preferential margins also directly reﬂect the cross-product vari-
ation in MFN tariﬀs in a similar way to Figure 11.3(a). Therefore, it is not
possible to disentangle the importance of the two channels aﬀecting the use
of TTBs without a formal econometric analysis.
Figure 11.3(c) illustrates Turkey’s import values for TTB versus non-TTB
products, normalising their 1990 ﬁgures to 100. Imports of TTB products have
expanded more rapidly, suggesting once more the import-competing nature
and hence political sensitivity of these products for policymakers.
In addition to the independence from the EU in the use of TTBs against third
countries, there is no restriction on TTB use between the EU and Turkey. In Fig-
ure 11.3(d), we report the percentage share of HS-06-product–target-country
combinations subject to a TTB by Turkey’s PTA partners versus non-partners.
This calculation is similar in spirit to Equation (1.1) (discussed in Section 2.1)
in terms of being a count measure. It is computed as the number of distinct
HS-06-product–TTB-country combinations as a share of all export-country–
HS-06-product combinations, dropping observations for countries supplying
less than 1% of the imports for a given product. In Figure 11.3(e) we present
the percentage share of the import value of HS-06 products subject to a TTB
by PTA partner, which is an application of Equation (1.2) (discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1).
Figures 11.3(d) and 11.3(e) describe results for four diﬀerent target groups:
‘EU15’ includes the 15 EU members as of 1996, the year Turkey formed the
10Another point to check would be to compare the anti-dumping margins with the tariﬀ
overhang (bound MFN tariﬀ rates minus applied tariﬀs) but this cannot be performed for
Turkey given the incompatibility of product codes (and lack of correspondence) in the
Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a) with WTO’s consolidated tariﬀ sched-
ules and four diﬀerent versions of the HS code (8 to 12 digit) in the TRAINS data set. Given
that MFN tariﬀs are actually determined in tandem with the EU, Turkey does not have
the ability to raise its applied tariﬀs that are not bound instead of introducing new TTBs.
Otherwise, the question of whether anti-dumping margins exceed the tariﬀ overhang could
be used to investigate whether Turkey is using TTBs ‘unfairly’.
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Figure 11.3: Turkey’s tariﬀs, PTAs, preference margins, imports and TTBs. (a) Average
tariﬀs for TTB versus non-TTB products. (b) Preference margins for TTB versus non-TTB
products. (c) Import values for TTB versus non-TTB products.
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(d)
(e)
Figure 11.3: Continued: (d) Share of HS-06 product–target-country combinations sub-
ject to a TTB by PTA partner (stock); (e) share of the import value of HS-06 products
subject to a TTB by PTA partner (stock).
Source: (a) author’s calculations using TRAINS, UNCTAD and Temporary Trade Barri-
ers Database (Bown 2010a). (b) Author’s calculations using TRAINS and Temporary
Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a). (c) Author’s calculations using Temporary
Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a) and Comtrade.
customs union with the EU; ‘CEE’ includes the Central and Eastern European
countries with which Turkey initially signed an FTA and which joined (or are
in process of joining) the EU after 1996 (namely, Bulgaria, former Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and former Yugoslavia); ‘FTA’ includes two
other countries with which Turkey has an FTA (Israel and Pakistan); and ‘MFN’
includes the remainder of the target countries subject to a TTB.
Until 2003, the number of HS-06 products from EU15 that Turkey subjected
to TTBs was minimal, averaging 2.4 between 1990 and 2000, none in 2001 and
2002, 6 between 2003 and 2008, and ﬁnally 2 in 2009. Temporary trade barrier
products from CEE countries averaged 17.9 between 1990 and 2000, none in
2001 and 2002, and averaged only 2.4 between 2003 and 2009. For the FTA
group, there were 20 HS-06 products from Pakistan subject to TTBs in 1992
and 1993, and 1 HS-06 product from Israel under TTBs between 2003 and
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2008. The rest of the MFN countries shouldered the burden of TTBs with a
signiﬁcant upward trend beginning in 2002 (Figure 11.3(d)).
Figure 11.3(e) presents the import values of TTB products by target country
as a share of total imports. Again, non-PTA countries (identiﬁed as MFN) con-
stitute the highest share of TTB imports with the exception of Pakistan (FTA
group) in 1992 and 1993. As might be expected, although the share of TTB-
products is small for EU15, their incidence is higher in terms of import value.
The import value of TTB products for CEE countries was initially small but
increased to more than EU15 values by 2003. However, PTA imports subject
to TTBs are relatively negligible as compared with non-PTA imports starting
from 1995. The cross-target-country distribution of TTBs is examined further
in Section 5.
4 CROSS-INDUSTRY VARIATION IN THE USE OF
TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS OVER TIME
4.1 General Trends
The use of contingent protection is frequently concentrated in only a few
sectors. In Figure 11.4(a) we present the stock estimates across a selected
subset of HS-02 industries/sections based on a variant of Equation (1.1). In
Figure 11.4(b) we present stock estimates based on import value as deﬁned
by Equation (1.2) discussed in Section 2.1. Finally, in panels (c) and (d) of
Figure 11.4, we present ﬂow versions of Equation (1.1) and Equation (1.2)
estimates across a selected subset of HS-02 industries/sections.
Table 11.4(a) documents the stock versions of Equation (1.1) and Equa-
tion (1.2) estimates across all HS-02 industries/sections and, wherever appli-
cable, at the HS-02 or HS-04 level if the products subject to TTBs refer to
speciﬁc two-digit or four-digit industries within the HS-02 section rather than
covering several subsectors. For example, rather than considering the mineral
products sector, which spans chapters 25–27 at the HS-02 level, we report the
salt category, whose HS code is 25 because this is the only subcategory in
which a Turkish TTB (namely, a global safeguard) applies. Similarly, rather
than the ‘raw hides, skins, leather and furs’ sector covering HS-02 chapters
41–43, we report HS-04 level sector 4202, ‘[Leather] travel goods, handbags,
wallets, jewelry cases etc’. Then, in Table 11.4(b), we present the ﬂow versions
of Equation (1.1) and Equation (1.2) estimates (ie based on new investigations)
across the same HS-02 industries/sections.
Until the end of 2000, stone/ceramics/glass consistently had the highest
number of products subject to TTBs.11 In 1992 and 1993, textiles (exclud-
ing silk and wool) exceeded stone/ceramics/glass, which was followed by
11Note that the only TTB measure used by Turkey until 2005 was anti-dumping.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 11.4: Cross-industry variation in Turkey’s use of TTBs: (a) share of HS-06 prod-
ucts subject to a TTB by industry (stock); (b) share of the value of HS-06 imports subject
to a TTB by industry (stock).
metals as the next biggest TTB target between 1990 and 2000 (see Fig-
ure 11.4(a) and Table 11.4(a)). However, when we consider the import shares
using import values of target-country–product combinations subject to TTBs
(ie a Equation (1.2) variant) in the 1990–1994 period, textiles is the most
important economically sizeable sector covered, followed by wood/paper and
stone/ceramics/glass (see Figure 11.4(b) and Table 11.4(a)). Beginning in 1995,
import value share of metals is ﬁrst (1% of all non-oil imports), followed by
plastics/rubbers (0.17%) and textiles (0.11%).
Consider next the measure of new TTB investigations (ﬂow) between 1990
and1994.AmajorityofnewTTBswereintextilesfollowedbystone/ceramics/
glass. In textiles, 56 diﬀerent HS-06 products were investigated in 1991, 21 in
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(c)
(d)
Figure 11.4: Continued: (c) Share of HS-06 products under new TTB investigation by
industry (ﬂow); (d) share of the value of HS-06 imports under new TTB investigation by
industry (ﬂow).
Source: author’s calculations using using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown
2010a) and Comtrade.
1992 and 138 in 1994 (see again Figure 11.4(c) and Table 11.4(b)). Yet when
we rank TTB coverage for new investigations by value of imports, metals is
ﬁrst in 1994 and textiles second (Figure 11.4(d) and Table 11.4(b)).
Starting in 2001, the highest stock of products subject to TTBs by count
was clearly textiles, with notable shares of plastics/rubbers and metals (Fig-
ure 11.4(a) and Table 11.4(a)). Beginning in 2006, other sectors became promi-
nent users: footwear, machinery/electrical, and wood/paper, and later leather
handbags in 2008 and 2009 (Table 11.4(a)). Between 1995 and 2008, metals
had the largest share of TTB-covered imports by value, closely followed by tex-
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tiles from 2002 to 2008 (Figure 11.4(b) and Table 11.4(a)). However, textiles
commanded the highest share by import value in the crisis year of 2009. The
share of plastics/rubbers by import value was sizeable, beginning in 2003,
joined by footwear and machinery/electrical in 2006 and leather handbags in
2009. Figure 11.4 (panels (a) and (b)) also illustrates this as the ‘other’ category
expanded during 2003–9.
An important implication from these observations is that the incidence of
TTBs has become more widespread across sectors as Turkey’s overall cover-
age has increased over time. In 2008–9, most new investigations (ﬂow) were
again in textiles, followed by plastics/rubbers and metals (see panels (c) and
(d) of Figure 11.4, and panel (b) of Table 11.4). A few other sectors had inves-
tigations that were small in terms of import value. One exception is the CVD
case against India in chemicals in 2008 (Table 11.4(b)). Overall, it is not clear
whether the late 2000s trend of diversiﬁcation of industries subject to TTBs
will continue in the post-crisis era.
In Figure 11.5 we separate the stock and ﬂow ﬁgures by share of import
value within selected sectors over time (a variant of Equation (1.2) estimates)
in order to more clearly assess within-industry trends.
There is a clear upward trend in TTBs against textiles after 2002, with a
signiﬁcant jump in 2008 due to new investigations (Figure 11.5(a)). The share
of the import value of HS-06 products subject to TTBs relative to all textiles
imports expanded from an average of only 4% prior to 2002 to 36% in 2009.
Plastics/rubber imports were ﬁrst subjected to TTBs in 1995 following
investigations in 1993 and 1994 (Figure 11.5(b)). After dipping in 2001 and
2002, there was a dramatic increase in the import share associated with new
investigations in 2001. Turkey implemented the additional TTBs in this sector,
beginning in 2003, with notable new initiations in 2004 and 2006 resulting
in an average of 12% of plastics/rubbers imports (by value) being covered
by TTBs.
The metals sector initiated investigations covering only two HS-06 products
(namely, steel billets) in 1994. Nevertheless, these products commanded a
remarkable 1.1% of total imports by value and were not revoked until 2008.
The share of metals dropped from 1.5% to 0.16% of imports by value in 2009
(Figure 11.4(b) and Figure 11.4(d)). The within-sector coverage rate by import
value of metals was also substantial, averaging 50% between 1995 and 2008
(Figure 11.5(c)).
The stone/ceramic/glass sector (HS 68–70) had a small but robust share of
total imports by value between 1992 and 2000. Temporary trade barriers in
this sector largely disappeared between 2001 and 2005, only to return, begin-
ning in 2006 (Figure 11.4(b)). The within-sector share of imports subject to
TTBs relative to the more general stone/glass sector (HS 68–71) was notewor-
thy, with an average above 10% during the period, except between 2001 and
2005 (Figure 11.5(d)).
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0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
1 9 9 0 9 19 29 39 49 59 69 79 89 9 2 0 0 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9
Percent
b. Plastics/Rubbers (HS 39-40)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Percent
c. Metals (HS 72-83)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Percent
Stock: Subject to TTB
Flow: New TTB
Investigation
Figure 11.5: Turkey’s use of TTBs by share of import value within industries.
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d. Stone/Glass (HS 68-71)
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e. Machinery/Electrical (HS 84-85)
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Figure 11.5: Continued.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade. Temporary trade barriers include anti-dumping, CVDs, safeguards and
China-speciﬁc safeguards.
Finally, machinery/electrical had a small share of TTB coverage by import
value through the 1990s. New investigations from 2004 until 2007 allowed
TTBs to reach a considerable share of imports beginning in 2005. By 2008,
42% of imports within the sector were covered by TTBs (Figure 11.5(d)).
4.2 Contributing Factors to TTB Use across Industries
Turkey experienced signiﬁcant trade liberalisation both bilaterally and against
third countries by forming a customs union with the EU in 1996. It also signed
several of the EU’s pre-existing preferential agreements under the expectation
that Turkey would eventually become a member of the EU.
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Although the industrial goods originating from the EU were already receiv-
ing a duty-free status as of 1996, Turkey was granted exceptions for some
‘sensitive’ products until 2001. These included ‘motor vehicles with an engine
capacity smaller than 2,000cc, bicycles, leather cases and bags, footwear and
their parts, furniture, chinaware and ceramic ware, iron and steel wires and
ropes not electrically insulated, and paper or paperboard sacks and bags for
cement or fertilisers’ (WTO 1998, p 35). The TTBs that Turkey introduced over
the 1990–2009 period directly include these ‘sensitive’ products.
In the case of textiles/clothing, which is Turkey’s largest export sector, quo-
tas were still in eﬀect in the 1990s, as was permitted under the WTO Agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing and as part of the trade policy harmonisation
requirement with the EU. The expiration of this agreement in January 2005,
accompanied by China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001, were likely con-
tributors to the expanding set of products in this sector being targeted by
Turkish TTBs beginning in 2002.
5 FOREIGN EXPORTER INCIDENCE OF
TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS OVER TIME
5.1 By Country Group
Using the World Bank classiﬁcation of countries by income, we divide the set
of exporters subject to Turkey’s TTBs into four groups: China, South Korea
(OECD high income), non-China (includes low-income, lower-middle-income
and upper-middle-income countries) and high income (includes both OECD
and non-OECD high-income countries). In Figure 11.6(a) we present the stock
estimates of a variant of Equation (1.1), that is, we analyse the variation in
the use of TTBs across country groups by counts of product–target-country
combinations for measures in force.12 Similarly, in Figure 11.6(b) we present
stock estimates based on Equation (1.2) by country group, using import values
of each country–product combination subject to TTBs.13 In panels (c) and (d)
of Figure 11.6 we depict the ﬂow versions of Equation (1.1) and Equation (1.2)
estimates.Thispartoftheanalysisexcludesglobalsafeguards,whichtypically
apply to all countries, as opposed to the other three TTB measures, which are
country speciﬁc.
Since the early 1990s, Turkey has used TTBs predominantly against devel-
oping countries, ie countries in the non-China group and China itself. Apply-
ing Equation (1.1) on a country-group basis, the percentage share of HS-06
products subject to TTBs between 1990 and 2000 averaged 0.020% for the
12Recall that this is computed as the share of distinct HS-06-product–TTB-country combi-
nations as a share of all export-country–HS-06-product combinations, dropping the obser-
vations for countries supplying less than 1% of imports for a given product.
13Again, only non-oil imports are considered for consistency.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 11.6: Cross-country variation in Turkey’s use of TTBs: (a) share of HS-06 prod-
uct–target-country combinations subject to a TTB by country group (stock); (b) share of
the import value of HS-06 products subject to a TTB by country group (stock).
high-income group, 0.005% for South Korea, 0.018% for China, and 0.120% for
the rest of the developing countries (Figure 11.6(a)). After a drop in cover-
age for all groups except China in 2001, it increased again for all groups in
2002 as compared with the 1990–2000 period. The percentage of imported
goods subject to TTBs from high-inome exporters was 0% for 2001 and 2002,
and averaged 0.025% between 2002 and 2009. For South Korea, the share of
products under TTBs had a stable average of 0.086% between 2002 and 2009.
In the case of China, there was a dramatic increase in the share of imported
products subject to TTBs. The average was 0.44% for the 2002–9 period, start-
ing at 0.31% in 2002 and reaching 0.61% in 2009. For the non-China develop-
ing country group, the average coverage rate of HS-06-product–target-country
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(c)
(d)
Figure 11.6: Continued: (c) Share of HS-06 product–target-country combinations under
new TTB investigation by country group (ﬂow); (d) share of the import value of HS-06
products under new TTB investigation by country group (ﬂow).
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade. Temporary trade barriers include anti-dumping, CVDs, safeguards and
China-speciﬁc safeguards.
combinations was 0.38%, steadily increasing from 0.27% in 2002 to 0.40% in
2008, and signiﬁcantly rising to 0.60% in 2009 (Figure 11.6(a)).
Consider next the value of imports from target exporting countries as a
share of total imports (ie employing Equation (1.2) by country group). For
products subject to TTBs, the import share by value in high-income and non-
China developing countries were initially quite similar (Figure 11.6(b)). The
import-value shares of China and South Korea also began at relatively low
levels. Between 1995 and 2000, the import-value share of non-China develop-
ing countries increased signiﬁcantly to an average of 1.27%, while high-income

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 417 — #437






Turkey: Temporary Trade Barriers 417
economies averaged 0.10%. China and South Korea’s shares remained small
at an average of 0.06% and 0.05%, respectively.
For the high-income group, import-value share of their products subject to
TTBs dropped to 0% in 2001 and 2002, then averaged 0.20% between 2003
and 2008, and ﬁnally decreased to 0.16% by 2009 with the global economic
crisis. South Korea, as a high-income emerging market, had an average import-
value share of 0.30% from 2002 to 2008, surpassing all other high-income
economies subject to TTBs. For the non-China group, the import share started
at 1.09% in 2002, increased to 1.89% in 2008, and fell to 0.77% in 2009. There-
fore, non-China developing countries continued to have the highest import-
value share of products subject to TTBs until 2008. China started with an
import share of 0.22% in 2002, steadily increasing through 2009 to 0.98%
(Figure 11.6(b)).
These ﬁgures show that Turkey’s use of TTBs is mainly a developing coun-
try/emerging market phenomenon and is increasingly applied towards China.
In terms of the counts of products, most TTB investigations were also pre-
dominantly against developing countries (Figure 11.6(c)). When import values
are considered, the largest share of investigations in the late 2000s has been
against China, followed by non-China developing countries (Figure 11.6(d)).
Figure 11.7(a) focuses on the share of anti-dumping investigation cases (as
opposed to anti-dumping products at the HS-06 level) across the same four
country groups. The number of measures against China in force (stock) as a
share of total number of anti-dumping cases started at 14% in 1990, consis-
tently averaging around 14% until 2000. Later on, China’s share rose to 25% in
2001, to 39% in 2002, and ﬁnally reached 46% in 2009. Non-China developing
and high-income countries both started at 43% in 1990. While the non-China
group averaged 62% between 1991 and 2001, its share then decreased to an
average of 45% between 2002 and 2009. The high-income group averaged 27%
between 1992 and 1994 before its share gradually decreased to 10% by 2000,
0% in 2001 and 2002, increasing to an average of 9% between 2003 and 2009.
While South Korea faced no investigations in 1990 and 1991, its exporters
faced, on average, 5% of investigations between 1992 and 2000. Its share rose
to an average of 17% in the 2001–2 period, when other high-income countries
did not face any anti-dumping measures, and decreased to an average of 5%
between 2003 and 2009. In terms of the number of anti-dumping investiga-
tions, China alone became as large a target as the entire non-China developing
economies by the late 2000s (Figure 11.7(a)).
Figure 11.7(b) presents Turkey’s import market shares by country group
subject to anti-dumping measures. Among the group of countries subject
to anti-dumping measures, China’s import market share averaged 7% from
1990 to 1999, and 12.7% from 2000 to 2009. Comparing panels (a) and (b) of
Figure 11.7, China’s anti-dumping burden was disproportional to its import
market share. Non-China developing countries made up, on average, 38% of
Turkey’s import market between 1990 and 1999 and 41% between 2000 and
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Figure 11.7: Cross-country variation in Turkey’s anti-dumping investigations: (a) share
of anti-dumping cases among target-country groups (stock); (b) import market share of
target-country groups subject to anti-dumping.
Source: author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010a)
and Comtrade.
2009. The anti-dumping burden on non-China developing countries was also
slightly disproportional to their import market share. South Korea had an
import market share of 7% for 1990–1999 and 6% for 2000–2009, therefore,
its anti-dumping burden was roughly proportional to its market share. Finally,
high-income countries had an average market share of 47% for the 1990–1999
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period and 40% for 2000–2009. In terms of market share, high-income coun-
tries were underrepresented as targets for anti-dumping.
5.2 By Country
Table11.5detailsthecountriesfrequentlytargetedbyTurkey’sTTBs. Between
1990 and 2000, Romania was targeted the most, followed by Indonesia and
China in terms of the number of HS-06 products subject to anti-dumping
measures (Table 11.5(a)). This group was followed by Taiwan and South Korea.
The second part of Table 11.5(a) considers the import-value share of target-
country–product combinations. South Korea had a higher share than the other
individual countries between 1990 and 1994 and in 2000, although it had
fewer products subject to anti-dumping measures. This is due to the fact that
South Korea is the only country classiﬁed as ‘high income’ within the group
of target countries displayed.
China became Turkey’s largest target of TTBs in 2001, facing TTBs in 63
HS-06 products (Table 11.5(a)). The rest of Turkey’s trading partners faced
TTBs over a total of only 15 products. Turkey increased the number of HS-06
products subject to TTBs from China from 93 in 2002 to 190 products in
2009(Table11.5(a))asitinitiatednewinvestigationseveryyear(Table11.5(b)).
SouthKorea,Taiwan,MalaysiaandThailandwerethenextmosttargetedcoun-
tries, holding a relatively stable stock of about 25–30 products subject to TTBs
between 2002 and 2009 (Table 11.5(a)). India emerged as an important target
in 2009 with 40 TTB-covered products mostly due to Turkey’s imposition of a
CVD measure. Indonesia and Vietnam also emerged as targets with 37 and 8
products, respectively, covered by TTBs by 2009. Romania (which joined the
EU in 2007) had only one product subject to an anti-dumping imposed initially
in 2003 that was part of a multicountry anti-dumping measure—a rare occa-
sion that included other EU members such as Germany and the Netherlands.
In general, Turkey has not targeted established EU members, even though
there is no restriction on the use of anti-dumping measures between the EU
and Turkey.
Table 11.5(b) presents ﬂow ﬁgures regarding newly initiated investigations
across target countries. There were a large number of products investigated
in 1994 and almost none between 1995 and 1999. Turkey targeted China with
the most new investigations (140 products), followed by Indonesia (138), India
(74) and South Korea (64) in 1994. The second spike in new investigations
came in 2000 when China was the most frequently targeted (85 products),
followed by Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia. Finally, the rise in
the stock of products subject to TTBs imported from India and Indonesia
(Table 11.5(a)) was foreshadowed by the surge in investigations against them
in 2008 (Table 11.5(b)).
The second part of Table 11.5(b) illustrates the import-value shares of these
same countries’ products subject to TTB investigations as a share of total
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imports (Equation (1.2) estimate). China was the most targeted exporter until
1994. Between 1995 and 2000, South Korea was the most targeted country
before this shifted to Romania in 2001. In 2002, Thailand and India’s anti-
dumping investigations had the highest import-value share despite covering
fewer products than China’s. However, beginning in 2003, China again became
the country with the highest share of Turkey’s import value subject to TTB
ﬂows (Table 11.5(b)).
Finally, in Table 11.6, following Bown (2010b) and Prusa (2010), we present
the cross-country distribution of anti-dumping investigations (rather than
HS-06 products). We divide the sample into two eras: 1990–1999 and 2000–
2009. We then rank the target countries based on the total number of anti-
dumping investigations against them and report the highest nine countries
along with totals of the remaining countries separated into two groups: high
income and non-high income.
Between 1990 and 1999, China faced 14% of Turkey’s anti-dumping cases,
followed by Romania (9%) and Russia (8%). China was involved in 27% of all
distinct investigations, followed by Romania (18%) and Russia (16%). When we
compare the ranking based on involvement rates with import market share
relative to all target countries, each of the top nine countries were dispropor-
tionately represented in anti-dumping investigations. For example, China was
investigated at the highest rate but it ranked only tenth in terms of its share
of Turkish imports (Table 11.6).
Between 1990 and 1999, Taiwan was most frequently named as the only
country in its respective anti-dumping investigations with a 67% rate, whereas
China was investigated as the only country in 33% of its anti-dumping cases.
Romania had the highest share of its investigations resulting in measures with
an 88% rate. Russia had a 71% rate, while China had a 50% rate.
Between 2000 and 2009, China clearly became the single biggest target
with involvement in 43% of all anti-dumping cases and 82% of distinct anti-
dumping investigations. This ﬁgure becomes even starker when comparing
China with the next countries in line: Taiwan and Thailand faced only 7%
(13%) and 6% (12%) of the anti-dumping cases (distinct anti-dumping inves-
tigations), respectively. Moreover, in 65% of the anti-dumping cases brought
against China, it was the only country named in the investigations (a signiﬁ-
cant increase from its 33% rate between 1990 and 1999). China was trailed by
Russia with a 33% rate of being named as the only country in its anti-dumping
cases, for the same period.
For the 2000–2009 period, China’s share of Turkey’s imports increased sub-
stantially. This contrasts with, for example, Russia, which had Turkey’s sec-
ond largest share of imports, but was the ninth highest anti-dumping target.
Finally, when compared with the 1990–1999 period, the rate at which Turkey’s
cases resulted in measures was signiﬁcantly higher. It was 97% for China (60
of the 62 cases) and 100% for countries ranked second to eighth place. This
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might be an indication that investigations were carried out more decisively
and may be a further contributing factor to the rise in Turkey’s TTB use.
The last column of Table 11.6 reports the mean ﬁrm level anti-dumping
margins by country for the two eras. These rates are expressed in ad valorem
terms, and we focus on the average of the minimum and maximum margins. In
the 1990–1999 period, China faced an average anti-dumping margin of 278%,
followed by Bulgaria at 111%, whereas the rest faced a 33% rate on average.
In the 2000–2009 period, China again stayed in front with an anti-dumping
margin of 91%, followed by Thailand at 59%, while the remainder had a 23%
rate on average.
6 CONCLUSION
Turkey has been an active user of TTBs, and especially anti-dumping mea-
sures, since the early 1990s. At the same time, it has signiﬁcantly liberalised
its foreign trade through WTO commitments and through formation of a cus-
toms union with the EU in 1996. As part of the harmonisation eﬀorts with the
EU, Turkey has signed several free-trade agreements and has also started to
grant unilateral preferences through the Generalised System of Preferences.
Over the 2000s, Turkey’s use of TTBs increased both in terms of the number
of products covered and in terms of their economic importance, as evidenced
by the rise in the value of imports subject to TTBs. There is also evidence
that TTB initiations more frequently result in imposed measures and there
is some tardiness in the removal of existing barriers. Each of these factors
contributes to the build-up of Turkey’s stock of barriers. While Turkey was
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the 2008–9 global economic crisis, it is diﬃcult to
argue that the crisis was the main factor in the surge of TTB protection, given
that this increase is part of a pre-existing upward trend. Yet the response to
the crisis may come with a few years’ lag, and thus a more deﬁnitive analysis
requires observations beyond 2009.
Turkey’s TTB coverage has spread over a larger number of industries over
time. Furthermore, Turkey has begun to complement its anti-dumping policy
by introducing global safeguards, China-speciﬁc safeguards and CVDs. The
products targeted with TTBs overlap with Turkey’s list of ‘sensitive’ prod-
ucts omitted from the 1996 agreement with the EU and for which tariﬀs were
phased out by 2001. The forces of political economy and import competi-
tion that keep tariﬀs high in these sectors also seem to make them potential
targets for TTBs.
Turkey’s TTBs mainly aim at developing countries and emerging markets
and are imposed at rates that are disproportional to their import market
shares. Nevertheless, China increasingly bears the brunt of Turkey’s TTB pro-
tection over the 2000s, as compared with any other nation or country group.
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South Africa: From Proliferation to
Moderation
LAWRENCE EDWARDS1
1 INTRODUCTION
Like many other middle-income economies in the 1990s, South Africa reduced
import tariﬀs in accordance with the oﬀer made during the Uruguay Round of
the GATT/WTO. However, there were important diﬀerences in the subsequent
reform process. First, the period coincided with the demise of apartheid and
the transition towards a democratically elected government. This led to the
inclusion into the policy space of previously unrepresented interests, which,
it is argued, impacted powerfully on the substance of industrial policy (Lewis
et al 2004).
Second, South Africa became a proliﬁc user of anti-dumping measures dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s, making it the ﬁfth-largest user of these
measures (after the USA, the EU, India and Argentina) in this period (WTO
2003, p 34).
However, South Africa responded diﬀerently to the ﬁnancial crisis in its
initiation and use of anti-dumping measures to oﬀset the adverse eﬀects of
the recession (Bown 2011b). Whereas the stock of product lines subject to
TTBs increased in many developing countries, in South Africa the stock of
TTBs fell.
This chapter explores the dimensions of South Africa’s use of TTBs in more
detail, drawing on the product-level Temporary Trade Barriers Database of
Bown (2010). Its objective is fourfold. First, the chapter documents the evo-
lution of the ﬂow and stock of imported products subject to TTBs in South
Africa. Second, it explores whether South Africa’s use of TTBs changed during
the ﬁnancial crisis. Third, the chapter investigates whether the proliﬁc use of
anti-dumping measures by South Africa during the 1990s reﬂects a ‘reversal’
of the multilateral tariﬀ liberalisation that took place during the period. The
eﬀect of the various PTAs on South Africa’s use of anti-dumping measures
1School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. Email:
lawrence.edwards@uct.ac.za.
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after 2000 is also explored. Finally, the chapter seeks to establish whether
the industrial characteristics that correlate with the stock of products sub-
ject to anti-dumping measures have changed over time.
The focus of the chapter is primarily on anti-dumping measures. South
Africa has made very little use of safeguards (one case in 2007) and CVDs
(only four aﬃrmative ﬁnal decisions). These CVDs largely apply to the same
products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures, and thus the analysis and con-
clusions are unlikely to be aﬀected by their exclusion.
The key ﬁndings of the analysis are as follows. South Africa’s use of TTBs
is characterised by two distinct periods. During the 1990s, South Africa used
anti-dumping duties widely as an instrument to protect domestic industries
from disruptive price competition. This process reversed after 2001 and the
stock of imported products subject to anti-dumping measures fell. For exam-
ple, by 2009, the number of partner speciﬁc product lines at the HS-06 level
aﬀected by anti-dumping measures had declined to 83 from a peak of 201 in
2002. The share of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping measures declined from
1% to 0.63% over the same period. This period also corresponds to a shift in
the incidence of anti-dumping measures towards developing countries, with
China and India targeted in particular.
Unlike other emerging economies surveyed by Bown (2011b) and described
elsewhere in this volume, South Africa did not increase its use of anti-dumping
measures in response to the ﬁnancial crisis. The stock of imported prod-
ucts aﬀected by anti-dumping measures actually declined. A key reason for
this was the decision by the High Court that the ﬁve-year window period for
the implementation of anti-dumping-duties would commence from the date
that preliminary, and not ﬁnal, duties were imposed. The implication was
that various sunset reviews in process or soon to be initiated were termi-
nated. A particular characteristic of the anti-dumping measures aﬀected by
this ruling was that many of them had already been in place for ten years or
more.
Whilethisisthedominantsourceofthedeclineinthestockofanti-dumping
measures, there is also no evidence of an increase in industry petitions for
anti-dumping investigations in response to the crisis. The response by South
Africa during the crisis therefore stands in contrast to that of many other
developing countries.
The chapter also explores whether the proliﬁc use of anti-dumping mea-
sures during the 1990s served to insulate domestic industries from the eﬀects
of tariﬀ liberalisation after 1995. The evidence suggests that anti-dumping
duties were not used as a substitute for tariﬀ protection. Products on which
anti-dumping duties were imposed faced smaller tariﬀ reductions than other
products. In addition, the probability of imposing anti-dumping measures
on EU members declined after the South Africa–EU free-trade agreement was
implemented, despite the reduction in tariﬀs.
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Finally, the chapter uses econometric estimates to identify conditional rela-
tionships that help to explain the sectoral composition of anti-dumping mea-
sures. These are used for descriptive purposes rather than as tests of theory-
based hypotheses. Products that faced high tariﬀs, high import penetration
and that were produced by concentrated industries were more likely to be
protected by anti-dumping measures. This relationship did not change signif-
icantly over the period. One interpretation of this outcome is that the political
economy of tariﬀ policy may not have changed, despite the political transition
to democracy. This opens an area of future research.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 documents
the changes in South Africa’s stock and ﬂow of TTBs from 1992 to 2009,
with particular emphasis placed on its response to the economic crisis of
2008–9. Section 3 explores whether anti-dumping measures were used to oﬀ-
set or reverse the process of multilateral liberalisation from the mid-1990s.
Section 4 then focuses on the industries targeted by anti-dumping measures
and presents various estimates to identify the industrial characteristics that
may explain these patterns.
2 THE STOCK AND FLOW OF TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS
2.1 A Brief History of Anti-Dumping Institutions in South Africa
South Africa’s use of TTBs has a long history. In 1914, it became the fourth
country after Canada, Australia and New Zealand to promulgate anti-dumping
legislation (Brink 2008, p 256). This was followed by a period of relatively
intensive use of anti-dumping and countervailing measures with over 90
investigations undertaken between 1921 and 1947 (Joubert 2005). By 1958,
21 of 37 anti-dumping decrees in force were in South Africa (Finger 1993).
The 1970s led to a shift in South Africa’s trade policy as concerns mounted
about the continued dependence on gold as a source of foreign currency and
the diminishing contribution of import substitution towards growth (Fallon
and de Silva 1994; Edwards et al 2009). This gave rise to a relaxation of quanti-
tative restrictions as well as to the introduction of an export incentive scheme.
South Africa’s policy of using TTBs to protect local industries also changed as
it was considered that the high tariﬀs at the time provided suﬃcient protec-
tion to domestic companies. In 1978, all anti-dumping duties were removed
and disruptive competition was treated through the use of formula duties that
maintained import prices above set ﬂoors. If international prices fell below
the reference price, additional duties were imposed.2
2The amount of duty payable (Dc) if the import price (Pm) fell below the reference price
(Pz) was calculated as Dc = Pm−(1 − θ)Pz. The ad valorem equivalent rate therefore
increases as the ‘freight on board’ price declines (WTO 1998).
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This system essentially continued until 1992, when a specialist unit was
established in the Department of Trade and Industry to deal with anti-
dumping and countervailing investigations. Various guides to the policy and
procedure for actions against disruptive competition were published at this
time, but it was South Africa’s joining the WTO in 1994 and the require-
ment that it conform to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
GATT 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement) that deﬁned how subsequent anti-
dumping investigations would be conducted (Joubert 2005). Nevertheless, it
took until 2003, with the help of some pressure from the other WTO mem-
bers, for the South African government to amend legislation on anti-dumping,
countervailing and safeguard actions to comply with the requirements of the
WTO agreements. An outcome of this process was the establishment of a new
body, the International Trade Administration Committee (ITAC), to admin-
ister trade remedies and tariﬀ changes within South Africa (Joubert 2005;
WTO 2003).3
There was one further important development. South Africa, together with
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia, formed the Southern African Cus-
toms Union (SACU). Under the 1969 SACU Agreement, members applied the
customs, excise, sales, anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties set
by South Africa (WTO 2003). This agreement was replaced with the 2002 SACU
Agreement that came into force on 15 July 2004. The 2002 agreement intro-
duced, inter alia, new institutional structures to deal with the formulation of
policies of SACU and the approval of customs tariﬀs, rebates, refunds or draw-
backs and trade-related remedies (WTO 2003). An objective of these new insti-
tutionalstructureswastodemocratisethedecision-makingprocesswithinthe
customs union (Joubert 2005).
For example, in terms of the SACU Agreement, national bodies such as
the ITAC for South Africa are to forward recommendations on customs, anti-
dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties to a centralised Tariﬀ Board,
which is constituted by an even number of members from each member state
(Brink 2005; WTO 2003). The Tariﬀ Board in turn makes a recommendation
to the Council of Ministers—the supreme decision-making institution—which
is constituted by the Ministers (or Secretaries) of Trade of the member states.
Decision making in this body is to be made by consensus.
As of 2010, the SACU Tariﬀ Board has not yet been constituted and ITAC
continues to make decisions on behalf of the SACU members. Nevertheless,
the proposed establishment of these institutions is expected to fundamentally
alter the way in which SACU tariﬀ policies are implemented in the future.
3TheInternationalTradeAdministration(ITA)Actwaspromulgatedon22January2003.
Anti-dumping regulations to guide ITAC in conducting its anti-dumping investigations
were promulgated in November 2003.
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2.2 Tariﬀs and TTBs Since the 1990s
The early 1990s signalled a dramatic shift in South Africa’s trade policy.4
Although some eﬀort had been made to liberalise prior to 1994, trade policy
in essence remained protectionist (Edwards 2005; Edwards et al 2009). In its
oﬀer to the GATT/WTO during the Uruguay Round, South Africa committed
to bind 98% of its tariﬀs, rationalise the over 12,000 tariﬀ lines and replace
the quantitative restrictions with tariﬀs on agricultural products. In addition,
South Africa participated as a ‘developed’ country and hence was required to
make more substantive reductions in its bound rates than developing coun-
tries.
The outcome was a simpliﬁcation of the tariﬀ book and a decline in nom-
inal and eﬀective protection that was comparable with other middle-income
countries (Edwards 2005). Table 12.1 summarises the tariﬀ reform from 1994
to 2009. The number of tariﬀ lines fell from over 11,000 in 1994 to 6,701 in
2009. Transparency was improved with the share of product lines subject to
ad valorem rates rising from 68.6% in 1994 to over 97% in 2009. There were
also considerable reductions in the number of international tariﬀ spikes (tar-
iﬀs in excess of 15%), but less progress was made in reducing the number
of diﬀerent tariﬀ rates, which, at over 100 in 2009, still far exceeds the 6
proposed during the Uruguay negotiations.5
The bulk of the MFN reform took place prior to 2000; very little additional
progress was made subsequently in the 2000s (Edwards et al 2009). For exam-
ple, the weighted-average import tariﬀ fell from 21.4% (inclusive of import
surcharges) in 1994 to 12.8% in 1999, but then to only 8.1% in 2009. The aver-
age 2009 MFN tariﬀ is almost identical to its 2000 value. Further progress in
tariﬀ reduction was achieved through PTAs: from 2000 for the EU and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and from 2007 for EFTA.
By 2009, average protection on imports from SADC countries was 0.5%, and
it was 2.3% and 5.4% on imports from EFTA and the EU, respectively.
The decline in average levels of protection coincided with an increased
use of anti-dumping measures. Table 12.2 documents the initiation of anti-
dumping investigations after requests by South African industries over the
1992–2009 period. Most of the investigations covered multiple products at
the HS-08 level and targeted multiple countries. The number of newly initi-
ated investigations averaged just over ten during the 1990s, with a relatively
high number occurring during the period of tariﬀ reform after 1995. In addi-
tion, applications for anti-dumping measures were increasingly successful,
rising from 56% on average during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s to 81% in the
4I refer to South Africa, not SACU, as SACU tariﬀ policy was deﬁned by South Africa
under the 1969 SACU Agreement.
5Domestic tariﬀ spikes are deﬁned as those exceeding three times the overall simple
average applied rate. International tariﬀ spikes are deﬁned as those exceeding 15% and
nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%.
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Table 12.1: Structure of Southern African Customs Union tariﬀs, 1994–2009.
2009
  
1994 1999 EFTA EU MFN SADC
1 Number of tariﬀ lines 11,231 7,694 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701
2 Share ad valorem (%) 68.6 74.3 97.7 97.4 96.8 98.6
3 Share formula (%) 8.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
4 Number of distinct 773 272 111 108 100 43
tariﬀ rates
– Ad valorem 31 42 54 52 40 3
– Other 742 230 57 56 60 40
5 Duty-free lines 26.1 42.7 61.4 65.0 54.0 98.4
(% all lines)
6 Domestic tariﬀ ‘spikes’ 43.6 43.4 37.0 29.7 44.3 0.8
(% all lines)
7 International tariﬀ ‘spikes’ 50.4 43.0 17.5 7.4 31.5 0.6
(% all lines)
8 Nuisance’ applied rates 1.8 1.6 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.6
(% all lines)
9 Simple average
– Tariﬀ 17.9 12.8 5.5 3.3 8.1 0.2
– Import surcharge 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
– Tariﬀ incl. surcharge 21.4 12.8 5.5 3.3 8.1 0.2
10 Import weighted average
– Tariﬀ 15.5 8.2 2.3 5.4 6.8 0.5
– Import surcharge 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
– Tariﬀ incl. surcharge 17.4 8.2 2.3 5.4 6.8 0.5
– Agriculture 7.8 10.9 7.6 1.0 2.8 10.6
– Mining 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
– Manufacturing 19.2 9.2 2.3 5.5 8.8 0.1
11 Eﬀective protection 36.3 17.5 11.6
Calculations are based on the published South African tariﬀ schedules including ad valorem equiva-
lents. Eﬀective protection rates include import surcharges imposed in the early 1990s and are calcu-
lated using the 2002 supply–use table provided by Statistics South Africa. ‘SADC’ stands for Southern
African Development Community.
Source: Edwards (2005), updated with the 2009 tariﬀ schedule obtained from South African Revenue
Services.
second half of the 1990s. The increased proportion of anti-dumping investi-
gations receiving aﬃrmative decisions corresponds with a similar increase in
the support of applications for tariﬀ increases (Casale and Holden 2002).
After 2001, the number of newly initiated investigations declined and, with
the exception of 2005, there were fewer than six cases initiated each year. The
proportion of investigations leading to imposed anti-dumping measures also
fell. The use of anti-dumping measures in South Africa is therefore charac-
terised by two distinct periods: a rise in use during the 1990s, and a decline
from 2001.
These trends are also reﬂected in Figure 12.1, which plots two indicators
of the stock and ﬂow of anti-dumping measures and investigations using
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Figure 12.1: South Africa’s use of TTBs, 1992–2009: (a) imported HS-06 products
aﬀected by anti-dumping measures (calculated using Equation (1.1)), by count; and
(b) import value aﬀected by anti-dumping measures (calculated using Equation (1.2)).
Source: author’s calculations. An HS-06 product is classiﬁed as having an anti-dump-
ing measure A rise in the realif an anti-dumping measure is imposed on at least one
subproduct. In ﬁve cases, the date when the anti-dumping measure was revoked was
missing. In these instances it was assumed that the measure was revoked ﬁve years
after the date of ﬁnal imposition. The stock in each year includes products revoked
in that year. Revoked products only aﬀect stock in the subsequent year; 2010 reﬂects
the stock in the beginning of the year and uses 2009 import values as weights.
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Table 12.2: South Africa’s TTB initiations and outcomes.
Number of Number
initiations Percentage of CVD
Number of with ﬁnal resulting in Number initiations
anti-dumping anti-dumping imposed of CVD with ﬁnal
initiations measure measures initiations measure
1992 9 7 77.8 — —
1993 11 7 63.6 — —
1994 9 1 11.1 — —
1995 8 6 75.0 — —
1996 19 12 63.2 — —
1997 5 4 80.0 1 0
1998 13 12 92.3 1 0
1999 10 10 100.0 2 0
2000 8 5 62.5 6 3, 1(p)
2001 3 3 100.0 1 1
2002 4 2 50.0 — —
2003 5 1 20.0 — —
2004 4 1 25.0 — —
2005 11 5 45.5 — —
2006 3 0 0.0 — —
2007 5 3 60.0 — —
2008 2 2 100.0 2 1(p)
2009 2 1 50.0 — —
Total 131 82 62.6 — —
Preliminary decisions on anti-dumping duties are used in two cases: one for 2007 and one for 2009.
Each anti-dumping and CVD investigation may cover imports of a particular product over multiple
countries; ‘(p)’ denotes preliminary.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010).
the methodology presented in the Introduction. The anti-dumping data are
obtained from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown 2010) and
updated using various South African Gazettes (this primarily involved updat-
ing the list of products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures). Anti-dumping
duties in South Africa are often applied at the HS-08 level. However, the analy-
sis here is conducted at the HS-06 level (revision 1988/92) as there is no con-
cordance map that links the various revisions of the HS at the eight-digit level.
The solid lines in Figure 12.1 reﬂect the stock of products under anti-
dumping duties, while the dashed lines reﬂect the ﬂow of products that are
subject to newly initiated anti-dumping investigations. Panel (a) presents a
simple measure of the product coverage calculated as the count of distinct
HS-06 products facing anti-dumping duties (either preliminary or ﬁnal) or
investigations as a proportion of the number of HS-06 product lines with
positive import values. Panel (b) presents the share of imports aﬀected by
anti-dumping measures or investigations. The calculation is based on Equa-
tion (1.2) from the Introduction and uses counterfactual import values for
products aﬀected by anti-dumping investigations or anti-dumping measures.
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An important consideration when analysing the ﬁgures is that the stock in
each year includes products revoked in that year. Revoked products there-
fore only decrease the stock in the subsequent year.
Looking ﬁrst at the count of products (panel (a)), there was a dramatic
increase in the proportion of imported HS-06 products facing anti-dumping
duties from 0.25% (12 products) in 1993 to 2.35% (110 products) in 2002.
What drove this increase was a persistently high number of products covered
in new investigations; these averaged around 17 for each year from 1993 to
2001 (0.37% of product lines). The share of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping
measures reveals similar increases (panel (b)). In 1993, only 0.11% of imports
by value were aﬀected by anti-dumping measures. By 2002, this had increased
to 0.99%.
South Africa’s use of anti-dumping measures at this time was high com-
pared with its international peers, and the country was estimated to be the
ﬁfthlargestuserofthesemeasures(aftertheUSA,theEU,IndiaandArgentina)
by the end of the 1990s (WTO 2003).
The increase through 2002 is contrasted by the subsequent decline in the
stock of anti-dumping measures. The number of HS-06 products facing at
least one anti-dumping measure fell from 110 to 55 (1.23% of product lines)
in 2009. Much of the decline occurred from 2006 to 2008 as the ﬁve-year win-
dow period for anti-dumping duties imposed during the late 1990s lapsed. By
the beginning of 2010, only 35 HS-06 product lines, or less than 1% of product
lines, were targeted by anti-dumping measures. The number of products cov-
ered by new investigations also fell and averaged only 6 per year from 2002,
much less than the average of 17 for the prior period.
Similar trends are evident when considering the share of imports aﬀected
by anti-dumping measures (panel (b)). The share of imports aﬀected by anti-
dumping measures rose to 1% in 2002 and then fell to 0.49% by the beginning
of 2010. An interesting diﬀerence from the count of products (panel (a)) is
that the decline in the share of import value targeted was more moderate,
suggesting that anti-dumping duties were more likely to remain on product–
country combinations in which import values were relatively large.6
Table 12.2 illustrates a similar trend in South Africa’s use of CVDs. South
Africa initiated a total of 13 CVD investigations, with all but two of these
occurring in the period 1997–2001. Many of the products covered by CVDs
are similar to those of the anti-dumping investigations. Many of these inves-
tigations were terminated and a total of 6 cases led to the imposition of pre-
liminary or ﬁnal CVDs (see Table 12.3). At most 3 of these remained in place
by 2009.
The period since the 1990s is therefore characterised by a change in South
Africa’s use of TTBs: from relatively intensive use in the 1990s to a shift away
6Or, more precisely, predicted to be large, as the import weights are based on counter-
factual estimates of import values of products facing anti-dumping measures.
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from TTB protection after 2000. The factors that may explain these trends
will be explored more thoroughly in the following sections. There is also an
additional characteristic of South Africa’s use of TTBs: namely, the decline in
coverage during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9. The following section explores
the reasoning behind this in more detail.
2.3 Temporary Trade Barriers and the 2008–9 Recession
Like the rest of the world, the Great Recession had a sharp negative impact
on the South African economy. Capital controls and tight banking regulations
implied that the South African banking and ﬁnancial sector were well cap-
italised and not highly exposed to high-risk, foreign-currency-denominated
assets (South African Reserve Bank 2009). The banking sector was therefore
mostly protected against the direct eﬀects of the global ﬁnancial crisis. The
real economy, however, was not immune to changes brought about by the col-
lapse of world trade and the decline of world economic growth. South African
exports and import volumes declined sharply (Figure 12.2) in the third quarter
of 2008 and had not recovered to pre-crisis levels by the end of 2010. Man-
ufacturing output also fell by close to 15% in 2009. Unemployment, which
had been declining, rose from 23.2% in the third quarter of 2008 to 25.3% in
the third quarter of 2010 with over 500,000 jobs lost (Statistics South Africa
2010).7
Historically, periods of weak economic growth have been associated with
increased lobbying for protection. This was evident in the late 1980s, when
the Board of Trade and Tariﬀs (BTT) received an increased number of applica-
tions from businesses for protection in the form of ad valorem and formula
duties (Bell 1992). During the 1990s, ﬁrms were also more likely to ﬁle an
anti-dumping petition in response to declines in employment and the BTT
was more likely to grant an aﬃrmative decision during periods of weak eco-
nomic growth (Drope 2007).8
Yet an analysis of Figure 12.1 reveals a decline in the initiation of anti-
dumping investigations and the stock of product lines subject to anti-
dumping measures. For example, the number of HS-06 product lines on which
at least one anti-dumping duty is imposed declined from 61 in 2007 to 54
in 2008. The share of imports facing anti-dumping measures also hardly
changed during the crisis. In total, only four new anti-dumping investigations
were initiated in 2008 and 2009 (Table 12.4). Aﬃrmative dumping decisions
(preliminary or ﬁnal) were granted in a total of 6 cases in this period. The
7According to Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (P0211), total
employment fell from 13.65 million in September 2008 to 13.06 million in September
2010.
8However, Casale and Holden (2002), for tariﬀ changes, and Drope (2007), for anti-
dumping duties, ﬁnd that an aﬃrmative decision was more likely if the ﬁrm had experi-
enced positive employment growth during the prior period.
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Figure 12.2: South African quarterly exports, imports and the real eﬀective exchange
rate.
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2010). A rise in the real eﬀective exchange rate
reﬂects a real appreciation of the South African rand.
decline in the stock of products subject to anti-dumping measures can there-
fore primarily be attributed to the removal of anti-dumping duties imposed
previous to the crisis. In 8 of the 12 cases where anti-dumping duties were ter-
minated, these duties had been applied for more than ﬁve years (Table 12.4).
The decline in the stock of products subject to anti-dumping measures con-
trasts with the international evidence presented in Bown (2011b). He ﬁnds,
for example, that, on average, countries increased the stock of product lines
subject to TTBs by 25% during the crisis, with developing countries increasing
their stock of product coverage by 40%.
There are a number of explanations for the trends during the crisis, the
most important of which relates to the Supreme Court of Appeal ruling on
anti-dumping sunset reviews in September 2007. This ruling determined that
the ﬁve-year period over which anti-dumping duties could be applied unless
extended after a sunset review commences at the ‘date of imposition of the
provisional payments where such provisional payments were imposed and
not the date of the ﬁnal decision to impose deﬁnitive anti-dumping duties’
(own italics) (ITAC 2008).9
9See also Brink (2007b). In a later ruling, the March 2010 case of the ITAC versus
SCAW South Africa, the Constitutional Court determined that the ﬁve-year period may
be extended by ITAC for a maximum of 18 months to allow for a review of existing anti-
dumping duties and to make appropriate recommendations to the Minister. If a decision
is not made within this period, the anti-dumping duty must automatically lapse at the end
of the ﬁve years (Shepstone & Wylie Attorneys 2010).
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Figure 12.3: South Africa’s revocations of anti-dumping measures, by product–country
combination.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Stock in each year includes
products revoked in that year. Revoked products only aﬀect stock in subsequent year.
This ruling had wide ramiﬁcations for industries where current and immi-
nent anti-dumping sunset reviews were not ﬁnalised or initiated prior to the
ending of the ﬁve-year term. Duties in these cases (cut paper (A4), carbon
black, welded and galvanized pipes, aluminium hollowware) had to be termi-
nated (ITAC 2008) (see Table 12.4). These made up a third of the cases where
anti-dumping duties were terminated in 2008 and 2009.10
The eﬀect of the decision is also reﬂected in Figure 12.3, which presents
the number and proportion of the stock of product–country anti-dumping
measures revoked in each year. Consistent with the trends presented in Fig-
ure 12.1, the post-2000 period is characterised by a rise in the number of anti-
dumping measures being revoked. The share of the stock aﬀected, however,
is greatest in 2009 when 35% of all country–product anti-dumping measures
were revoked. This decline is not reﬂected in the 2009 value for the share of
HS-06 products facing an anti-dumping measure in Figure 12.1, as the stock of
products in the diagram includes products revoked in that year. However, the
sharp decline in the stock of products subject to anti-dumping measures is
revealed in the year 2010 of Figure 12.1(a), where the HS-06 product coverage,
excluding new measures imposed in 2010, fell to 0.8% (35 product lines).
10In the case of cut paper and carbon black, ITAC had already completed sunset reviews
and had recommended that duties be terminated. However, ITAC was interdicted from
sending its recommendation to the Minister until after its recommendation could be
reviewed in the High Court. Duties were then terminated as a result of the ruling by the
Appellate Court.
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Table 12.4: South Africa’s TTBs in 2008–9: investigations, dumping decisions and
revoked duties.
Final
Final dumping
Initiation dumping decision Year
Product year Country decision year revoked
New investigations
Tall oil fatty acid 2008 Sweden A 2009 —
Stainless steel sinks 2008 China, Malaysia A 2009 —
Staple polyester ﬁbre 2009 China A 2009 —
Picks 2009 India A (p) 2010 (p) —
Pre-recession investigations
Welded link steel chain 2007 China A 2008 —
Citric acid 2007 China T — —
Plates/sheets/ﬁlm/foil 2007 Taiwan, China A 2008 —
and strip of polymers
of vinyl chloride (PVC)
Extruded aluminium 2007 China A (p) 2008 (p) —
proﬁles
Revoked duties
Cut paper (A4) 1998 Brazil, Indonesia A 1999 2008
Picks 1995 India A 1996 2009
Aluminium hollowware 1995 China, Egypt A 1997 2009
Circuit breakers 1996 France, Italy A 1997 2009
Uncoated wood-free 1996 Brazil, Poland A 1998 2009
paper
Suspension PVC 1996 Brazil, France, A 1997 2009
UK, USA
Stainless steel tubes 1998 South Korea, A 1999 2009
and pipes Malaysia, Taiwan
Carbon black 1998 Egypt, India A 1999 2009
Welded and galvanized 2001 India A 2002 2009
tubes/pipes and
hollow proﬁles
Colour coated 2002 Australia A 2004 2009
steel plate
Acrylic fabrics 2003 China Missing — 2009
Acrylic fabrics 2003 Turkey A 2004 2009
‘(p)’ denotes preliminary decision. In the column ’Final dumping decision’, ‘T’ denotes terminated,
and ‘A’ denotes aﬃrmative decision made.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010).
One implication of the High Court decision is that we are unable to observe
the outcomes of the internal deliberation by ITAC on whether to extend or
terminate the dumping duties relating to these sunset reviews. Yet the High
Court decision aﬀected only half of the cases in which anti-dumping measures
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were revoked (Table 12.4). The decision to revoke the remaining anti-dumping
measures during this period therefore suggests that ITAC did not become
more lenient in its extension of anti-dumping measures in response to the
ﬁnancial crisis.
The High Court decision helps explain to why existing duties were termi-
nated during the crisis, but an important additional characteristic of 2008–9
is that the number of new investigations did not rise relative to prior levels.
A possible explanation is that the macroeconomic conditions in South Africa
prior to the crisis were not favourable for a determination of injury in the anti-
dumping investigation. Anti-dumping determinations are based on data cov-
ering the three years prior to the initiation of the investigation. South Africa
was experiencing above average economic growth rates prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis: 5% per annum compared with the 2–3% of the 1990s. The local currency
had also gradually depreciated in real terms from early 2006 (see Figure 12.2),
which helped insulate domestic industries from international price competi-
tion.11 Finally, the rand depreciated sharply (from R6.76 to the US dollar in
the fourth quarter of 2007 to R9.95 to the US dollar in the ﬁrst quarter of
2009) and import volumes dropped during the ﬁrst few months of the crisis
(Figure 12.2), further insulating domestic producers from injury associated
with foreign price competition. An appreciation of the rand associated with
an inﬂow of foreign currency in subsequent months has more than oﬀset the
initial depreciation. The eﬀect that this may have on anti-dumping ﬁlings by
industries and the decisions by ITAC is yet to be seen.
2.4 Duration
The stock of products subject to TTBs is an outcome of new anti-dumping
measures imposed as well as the continuation or removal of anti-dumping
measures in response to the sunset reviews that are mandated by the WTO’s
anti-dumping agreement. Anti-dumping measures can be retained for a fur-
ther ﬁve-year cycle if the investigation ﬁnds that the removal of the anti-
dumping measure will lead to a recurrence of injury caused by renewed dump-
ing. This section analyses the duration of South Africa’s anti-dumping mea-
sures and explores whether changes in the duration may account for shifts in
the trend of the stock of products subject to TTBs.
Figure 12.4 plots the number of product–country anti-dumping measures
according to the duration over which the measure is applied. The duration is
calculated in years from date of ﬁnal anti-dumping measure imposed to year
revoked. Only cases in which anti-dumping measures are imposed prior to
11Empirical evidence provided by Casale and Holden (2002) and Drope (2007) indicates
that the BTT (now ITAC) has been less likely to impose higher tariﬀs or anti-dumping
duties if the currency depreciated prior to the initiation of the investigation.
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Figure 12.4: Duration of anti-dumping measures in South Africa that were imposed
prior to 2005.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Only includes anti-
dumping measures for which ﬁnal aﬃrmative decisions were made in years up to
2004. Revoked anti-dumping measures for which the date of revocation is missing
are excluded.
2005 are included to allow for the completion of the ﬁve-year anti-dumping
cycle by the end of 2009. The actual duration over which an anti-dumping
measure is applied may be longer as preliminary barriers are not included.
Furthermore, the actual duration also depends on the month that the anti-
dumping measure is imposed and revoked.12 Figure 12.4 also plots the aver-
age duration of product–country anti-dumping measures still enforced as of
the end of 2009.
Most product–country anti-dumping measures are revoked within the man-
dated ﬁve-year cycle. In total, 64% of all anti-dumping measures were revoked
within this period. The modal duration is ﬁve years, as found by Tovar for
the case of India (this volume), but there are three cases in which product–
country anti-dumping measures were revoked after 14 years. There are also 36
product–countryanti-dumpingmeasuresimposedpriorto2005thatwerestill
in force as of the end of 2009. Four of these were imposed towards the end of
1993, resulting in a duration of more than 16 years. These products covered
12One caveat to the approach followed here is that anti-dumping measures are imple-
mented and revoked in diﬀerent months of the year. The approach followed here assumes
that the date of enforcement and revocation is mid-year. For example, the duration of a
product subject to an anti-dumping measure from 2000 to 2005 is calculated as ﬁve years.
The actual duration could range from four years (31 December 2000 to 1 January 2005)
to six years (1 January 2000 to 31 December 2005).
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Figure 12.5: Percentage of import value aﬀected by South Africa’s anti-dumping mea-
sures, by duration categories.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Excludes product–country
combinations for which the year of revocation is missing. Categories cover products
according to whether anti-dumping measures were imposed for more than or up to
ﬁve years.
imports of shovels, picks, forks, rakes and acetaminophenol from China.13
While South Africa revoked most of the product–country anti-dumping mea-
sures within the ﬁve-year window, those that extended beyond ﬁve years dis-
proportionately aﬀected import values. This is shown in Figure 12.5, which
decomposestheshareofSouthAfrica’simportvalueaﬀectedbyanti-dumping
measures according to whether the product–country anti-dumping barrier
was applied for up to ﬁve years or for more than ﬁve years. Products aﬀected
by anti-dumping measures for less than ﬁve years accounted for a peak of
0.32% of South Africa’s import value in 2002, whereas the share of imports
aﬀected by products on which anti-dumping measures exceeded ﬁve years
rose steadily to 0.64% in 2002, and remained at these levels until 2007 before
beginning to fall.
Figure 12.5 also reveals that the decline in the share of South Africa’s import
value targeted by anti-dumping measures from 2002 to 2007 can primarily be
13In the case of garden picks, the SACU industry indicated that it would prefer a new
investigation to extend the scope of the product to prevent circumvention of the anti-
dumping measure. The ITAC therefore decided not to initiate the sunset review and, as a
result, the duties were withdrawn. The preliminary investigations in 2010 found evidence
of dumping but not of injury.
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Figure 12.6: Mean duration of South Africa’s product–country ﬁnal anti-dumping mea-
sures, by year of implementation.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Duration is calculated from
year of ﬁnal anti-dumping measure imposed to year revoked. One caveat is that anti-
dumping measures are implemented and revoked during diﬀerent months of the year.
The approach followed here assumes that the date of enforcement and revocation is
mid-year. The duration of a product subject to an anti-dumping measure from 2000 to
2005 is therefore calculated as ﬁve years. The actual duration could range from four
(31 December 2000–1 January 2005) to six years (1 January 2000–31 December 2005).
There are no observations for 1995 as no ﬁnal anti-dumping measures were imposed
in that year, although various provisional anti-dumping measures were imposed.
attributed to the revocation of anti-dumping measures on products that faced
at most ﬁve years of anti-dumping barriers. It is only from 2007 that anti-
dumping measures that had been in place for more than ﬁve years began to be
revoked on a signiﬁcant scale. For example, the average duration of product–
country anti-dumping measures revoked in 2001–6 was 5.1 years. This rose
to an average of 7.2 years in 2007, 9 years in 2008 and 8.4 years in 2009.
The average duration of anti-dumping measures that were still applied as of
the end of 2009 was 7.9 years. Most of the anti-dumping barriers currently
applied have therefore been in place for a relatively long time period.
In conclusion, the composition of stock of products facing anti-dumping
measures has shifted strongly towards those products on which anti-dumping
measures have been imposed for some time. This is an outcome of two eﬀects.
First is the failure to revoke anti-dumping measures on products that account
for a relatively high share of South Africa’s import value. The second con-
tributing factor is a decline in the average duration of anti-dumping barriers
initiated after 2000. Figure 12.6 plots the mean duration of product–country
anti-dumping measures by year of imposition of the ﬁnal anti-dumping mea-
sure. The average duration of anti-dumping measures initiated in the 1990s
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was 6.1 years. This declined to an average of 4.5 years from 2000 through
2004.
These trends are consistent with those found for India, Argentina, Turkey,
China and the EU by Cadot et al (2007). Their explanation is that, in part, this
reﬂects the compliance by these countries to the introduction of mandatory
sunset reviews during the Uruguay Round. Practitioners in South Africa have
also argued that the requirements to have an anti-dumping duty maintained
following a sunset review have become more onerous than those required
to have the duty imposed in the ﬁrst instance (Brink 2005, 2007a).14 The
ITAC argues that the decline in duration reﬂects a more rigorous process of
evaluating evidence of dumping and the eﬀects that anti-dumping measures
have on downstream industries, including the public.15
2.5 The Geographic Composition of Anti-Dumping Measures
The geographic composition of imported products facing South Africa’s anti-
dumping measures has also changed. South African industries have requested
anti-dumping investigations against a wide range of countries. In total, anti-
dumping investigations were initiated against 47 countries over the period
from 1992 to 2009. Table 12.5 presents a list of all the countries against which
three or more anti-dumping investigations were initiated over the period,
ranked according to the number of initiations. China tops the rankings with
45 anti-dumping initiations, 25 of which resulted in imposed measures. This
is followed by India with 26 initiations and then a number of high-income
countries such as Germany, Hong Kong, USA, Taiwan, South Korea and the
United Kingdom, all of which faced more than 10 investigations from 1992 to
2009.
This table belies a change in South African industries’ targeting of anti-
dumping against imports from developing countries. Figure 12.7 decomposes
the stock of product–country anti-dumping barriers according to the region
or country that is being targeted. The ﬁgure illustrates the total count of
HS-06 product—trading partner combinations on which anti-dumping mea-
sures are imposed. Trading partners are categorised as China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, India, other emerging economies and high-income economies.16 Hong
14The industry, for example, is required to obtain prima facie evidence that dumping is
likely to continue or recur. In many cases, the good is no longer imported from the country
on which anti-dumping duties have been applied. It is also diﬃcult to obtain normal value
information from exporters who are also aware of the impending lapse of the duties (Brink
2005). Finally, the notiﬁcation of the impending lapse of an anti-dumping duty has been
irregular and places a considerable burden on ﬁrms who have only 30 days from the
date of publication to indicate whether they would require the anti-dumping duties to be
maintained.
15Interview with Siyabulela Tsengiwe: ITAC Chief Commissioner (Tsengiwe 2011).
16Theclassiﬁcationofhigh-incomeandemergingeconomiesisbasedontheWorldBank’s
classiﬁcation of countries according to 2009 gross national income per capita.
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Table 12.5: South Africa’s anti-dumping initiations and outcomes by country.
Number of
initiations %
Number of with ﬁnal resulted in
anti-dumping anti-dumping imposed
initiations measure measures Income group
China 45 25 55.6 Lower middle income
India 26 19 73.1 Lower middle income
Germany 17 9 52.9 High income: OECD
Hong Kong 16 11 68.8 High income: non-OECD
USA 16 8 50.0 High income: OECD
Taiwan 15 8 53.3 High income: non-OECD
South Korea 14 13 92.9 High income: OECD
United 11 5 45.5 High income: OECD
Kingdom
Spain 10 3 30.0 High income: OECD
Indonesia 10 6 60.0 Lower middle income
Belgium 9 4 44.4 High income: OECD
France 9 5 55.6 High income: OECD
Thailand 8 5 62.5 Lower middle income
Brazil 8 4 50.0 Upper middle income
Australia 7 5 71.4 High income: OECD
Netherlands 7 3 42.9 High income: OECD
Malaysia 7 3 42.9 Upper middle income
Italy 4 2 50.0 High income: OECD
Turkey 4 2 50.0 Upper middle income
Saudi Arabia 3 0 0.0 High income: non-OECD
Singapore 3 2 66.7 High income: non-OECD
Austria 3 1 33.3 High income: OECD
Canada 3 2 66.7 High income: OECD
Ireland 3 2 66.7 High income: OECD
Sweden 3 2 66.7 High income: OECD
Egypt 3 3 100.0 Lower middle income
Anti-dumping investigations were initiated against 47 countries over the period 1992–2009.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010).
Kong is treated separately as the BTT tended to treat imports from Hong Kong
as originating in China as re-exports (Holden 2002).
During the early 1990s, South Africa’s anti-dumping duties were predomin-
antly applied on imports from high-income economies. However, as the stock
of HS-06–partner coverage increased from 1996, there was a shift towards
targeting products imported from developing countries. This shift continued
even after 2002 as the stock of imported products subject to anti-dumping
measures declined. By 2009, high-income countries (including Taiwan and
Hong Kong) made up just over one out of every three (28 of 83) anti-dumping
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Figure 12.7: South Africa’s anti-dumping stock imposed on developing and developed
countries and regions.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Figure reﬂects the total
count of HS-06 product-by-partner combinations facing anti-dumping measures.
duties imposed on product–partner combinations. This is substantially lower
than in the 1990s, when 50–80% of all anti-dumping duties were imposed on
high-income countries.
To get a sense of how restrictive these anti-dumping measures were, Fig-
ure 12.8 decomposes the stock of anti-dumping duties according to the
region or country targeted. Panel (a) presents the percentage of product
(HS-06)–trading partner combinations aﬀected by anti-dumping measures,
while panel (b) presents the share (stock) of import value from each coun-
try that faced anti-dumping duties in each year.
Like other emerging economies (Bown 2011b), there has been a shift in the
targeting of anti-dumping measures towards developing economy exporters.
A relatively high and growing proportion of products imported from China,
India and Hong Kong faced anti-dumping measures up until 2002. Further-
more, up to 2002, South African industries targeted the same products
imported from both China and Hong Kong when they initiated anti-dumping
investigations. This reﬂected the concern that Chinese exports were being
rerouted via Hong Kong (Holden 2002). After China joined the WTO, the anti-
dumping duties on imports from Hong Kong were revoked, and by 2006 no
anti-dumping duties were imposed on imports from this country.
The shift towards targeting developing countries is most evident in Fig-
ure 12.8(b), which plots the share of import value from each country or region
aﬀected by anti-dumping measures. There was a general rise in the value of
imports targeted by anti-dumping measures for both developed and develop-
ing regions, but there was a sharp divergence towards the targeting of China,
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Figure 12.8: South Africa’s anti-dumping stock imposed on developed and emerging
countries and regions.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). Panel (a) is calculated using
a modiﬁed version of Equation (1.1) (Bown, this volume). The numerator is the count of
HS-06 product–partner combinations facing anti-dumping measures. The denomina-
tor is the number of HS-06 product–partner combinations with positive trade values.
Panel (b) is constructed following Equation (1.2) (Bown, this volume). Import weights
include counterfactual estimates of the import value of products facing anti-dumping
measures following the approach presented in Chapter 1 by Bown.
India and other emerging economies beginning in 1997. Imports from Tai-
wan and Hong Kong were also targeted, but for the remaining high-income
economies the share of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping measures remained
stable at around 0.5% up to 2005, after which it declined.
For China, India and other emerging economies, the share of imports
aﬀected by South Africa’s anti-dumping measures rose to 2–2.5% by 2002.
After 2002, the share of developing country imports aﬀected by anti-dumping
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measures fell, but the decline was sharper for other emerging economies (fell
to less than 1% of import values) than for China and India, which remained
close to 2%. For Taiwan, there was a slight increase (to 1.65%) in the share of
the value of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping measures.
In summary, South Africa’s use of anti-dumping measures has evolved con-
siderably throughout the post-1990 period. The 1990s were a period of wide-
spread use of anti-dumping measures with a relatively strong focus on high-
income countries. Beginning in 2000, South Africa reduced its use of anti-
dumping measures, although the composition of the stock of products tar-
geted shifted towards products on which anti-dumping measures have been
imposed for some time. Further, developing countries (and China and India
in particular) were increasingly targeted.
What explains these shifts? The following two sections explore two pos-
sible explanations for some of the trends.17 Section 3 examines a possible
association with tariﬀ liberalisation, while Section 4 explores various indus-
trial determinants of anti-dumping measures.
3 ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TARIFF PROTECTION
As has been noted, South Africa became a proliﬁc user of anti-dumping mea-
sures during the 1990s. One possible explanation is that, like their Indian
counterpart (see Bown and Tovar 2011), the Board of Trade and Tariﬀs (which
was replaced by ITAC after 2003) used anti-dumping measures to oﬀset the
WTO-negotiated decline in tariﬀ protection. This possibility has been raised,
but not tested, by a number of authors who have studied South Africa’s use
of anti-dumping measures (Holden 2002; Joubert 2005; Brink 2005; National
Board of Trade 2005).
This view is also consistent with the evidence on tariﬀ changes during the
1990s. For example, Casale and Holden (2002) ﬁnd that applications for tar-
iﬀ increases were more likely to be accepted in the post-1995 period even
after conditioning on various deterministic variables including concentration,
employment changes, capital stock and the real exchange rate. Although the
tariﬀ increases did not reverse the decline in protection, they argue that they
softened the adjustment process.
This section uses product-level data to examine whether South Africa used
anti-dumping exceptions to reverse or oﬀset its commitments to lower tar-
17An explanation not dealt with here is the change in the institutional and policy regime
following the creation of ITAC to administer trade remedies in South Africa. South Africa
also granted China market economy status in 2004, which may have reduced the number
of requests ﬁled by businesses for anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports as
well as the likelihood that evidence of dumping and injury are found. More recently, the
emphasis in the Department of Trade and Industry’s National Industrial Policy Framework
placed on reducing the costs of inputs may have deterred industries within the base metals
and chemicals sectors from ﬁling anti-dumping requests.
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Figure 12.9: South Africa’s average tariﬀs on anti-dumping-protected HS-06 products
and non-anti-dumping-protected products.
Source: author’s calculations. HS-08-level tariﬀs including ad valorem equivalents of
non-ad valorem rates are aggregated up using unadjusted import values as weights. A
product at the HS-06 level is deﬁned as an anti-dumping-protected product if it faced
at least one anti-dumping measure during 1992–2009.
iﬀs under the WTO agreement. It also examines whether South Africa’s anti-
dumping behaviour altered once it entered into free-trade agreements with
the EU, SADC and EFTA in the post-2000 period.
3.1 Multilateral Liberalisation
Figure 12.9 plots South Africa’s import-weighted average tariﬀ imposed on
HS-06 products that faced or did not face an anti-dumping measure over the
period 1992–2009. The average import tariﬀ on both these categories was
just above 16% in 1993. Subsequently, there was a divergence with the average
tariﬀ on products that never faced an anti-dumping measure, falling by half by
1999. In contrast, the average tariﬀ on the anti-dumping-protected category
of products did not change at all over this period. It is only after 2000 that
the average tariﬀ on the anti-dumping-protected goods fell, but even then
the average tariﬀ remained substantially higher than on other goods’ tariﬀ
levels.
This relationship does not show causation, though it suggests common
underlying political economy determinants of anti-dumping measures and
tariﬀs in South Africa. To investigate this more thoroughly, we exploit the
country, product and time variation of the database and estimate the associ-
ation between past changes in tariﬀs and the probability of an investigation
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being initiated. The speciﬁcation of the equation is as follows:
ADic,t = β1 DADexisti,c,t +β2 ln(1 + tariﬀi,c,t)
+ β3 ln(uvi,c,t−1) + β4 ln(mi,c,t−1)
+ β5 ln(rerc,t) + β6 Dformulai,t
+ cntryc /producti + λt + εi,c,t
where the dependent variable ADic,t is a binary variable and equals 1 if an
anti-dumping investigation is initiated on a partner–product (denoted by c
and i, respectively) combination in year t. The data used vary by time, country
and product. DADexist is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an anti-dumping
measure is already imposed on a product–country combination in year t. The
inclusion of this variable deals with the issue that an investigation is unlikely
to be initiated on product–country combinations already facing anti-dumping
measures.
To capture the eﬀect of tariﬀ reform on anti-dumping investigations, the
equation includes the log-applied tariﬀ rate and a dummy variable for whether
the HS-06 product line contains a formula duty. Formula duties had been
used in place of anti-dumping measures prior to the 1990s and this variable
is included in order to identify whether their removal is associated with an
increased use of anti-dumping measures. Also included are lagged import
values and import unit values to account for the probability of a determination
of injury and dumping (Blonigen and Prusa 2003). These variables are lagged
to address concurrent eﬀects that the investigation may have on unit values
and imports of the product from the targeted country.
Macroeconomic eﬀects are captured through the inclusion of the log bilat-
eral real exchange rate (a rise reﬂects an appreciation) and a time-ﬁxed eﬀect
for changes in aggregate GDP. Knetter and Prusa (2003), for example, ﬁnd that
a depreciation of the currency reduces the probability of anti-dumping peti-
tion ﬁlings (see also Casale and Holden (2002) for South Africa). We do not
have data over time for industrial characteristics such as concentration, cap-
ital intensity, employment, etc that have been shown to be important deter-
minants of anti-dumping petitions (Blonigen and Prusa 2003). However, we
include country by product ﬁxed eﬀects that capture time-invariant politi-
cal economy inﬂuences on anti-dumping petitioning at the country–product
level. The equations are estimated using ordinary least-squares estimations.
The results are presented in Table 12.6.
The ﬁrst column presents the results for the full 1993–2009 period. The
coeﬃcients reﬂect the change in the probability of a product–country speciﬁc
anti-dumping investigation being initiated in response to a change (1% change
in the case of the log variables) of the explanatory variable. The coeﬃcients are
small, reﬂecting the large number of imported product–country combinations
relative to anti-dumping investigations.
As found in the international empirical literature, anti-dumping investiga-
tions are more likely to occur against products that experienced increasing
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Table 12.6: Tariﬀ liberalisation and the initiation of investigations.
1993–2009 1993–2000 2001–9
123
ADexistst −0.04768∗∗∗ −0.06390∗∗ −0.03413∗
(0.01234) (0.03195) (0.01748)
ln(uv)t−1 −0.00006∗∗∗ 0.00002 −0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00001)
ln(tariﬀ)t 0.00061 0.00313∗∗ −0.00404∗∗
(0.00066) (0.00155) (0.00178)
ln(rer)t 0.00013 0.00141 0.00039∗∗∗
(0.00021) (0.00095) (0.00012)
Dformulat 0.00466∗∗∗ 0.00265∗∗ −0.00023∗∗
(0.00112) (0.00135) (0.00012)
ln(imports)t−1 0.00012∗∗∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00006) (0.00002)
N 763,602 264,916 498,686
F 10.5 5.73 3.54
Fixed eﬀects Country/ Country/ Country/
product year product year product year
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ‘*’ denotes p<0.1; ‘**’ denotes p<0.05;
‘***’ denotes p<0.01’.
import values and decreasing import unit values. However, we ﬁnd no associa-
tion between the bilateral real exchange rate and anti-dumping petitions. The
coeﬃcient on average tariﬀ is also not signiﬁcant, although the probability of
an investigation on a particular product rises if a formula duty is imposed.
Given trends in the stock of products facing anti-dumping measures in
South Africa, it makes sense to split the period into years before and after
2000. Column 2 presents the results for the period from 1993 to 2000. This
was the period during which the extensive reductions in MFN tariﬀ rates took
place. The coeﬃcient on the tariﬀ variable is now signiﬁcant, but it is positive,
implying that a rise in protection during this period was associated with a rise
in the probability of an anti-dumping investigation being initiated. Further-
more, anti-dumping investigations continued to be positively associated with
the presence of a formula duty, despite their earlier use as a substitute for
anti-dumping measures. These results suggest that anti-dumping measures
were not used to oﬀset the eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions and the removal of
formula duties. Rather, those industries that were successful in negotiating
more moderate reductions in MFN rates in the early 1990s and the contin-
ued use of formula duties were also those that were more active in initiating
anti-dumping investigations.
This relationship changed in the post-2000 period (column 3) and reduc-
tions in tariﬀs and removal of formula duties are associated with a rise in
the probability of an anti-dumping investigation. This result suggests that

“trade_barriers” — 2011/7/5 — 10:57 — page 455 — #475






South Africa: From Proliferation to Moderation 455
anti-dumping was used by industries to oﬀset the eﬀect of tariﬀ reform in
the post-2000 period. The economic impact, however, is likely to be small.
Most-favoured-nation reform in South Africa progressed very slowly from
2000, which helps to explain why the number of anti-dumping investigations
declined, despite the reductions in tariﬀs. South Africa engaged in various
PTAs beginning in 2000. We address the impact of these on anti-dumping
investigations and anti-dumping measures in the following section.
A further contributing factor was the exchange rate. After 2000, anti-
dumping investigations were more likely to be initiated against countries
whose bilateral real exchange rate depreciated vis-à-vis South Africa. This
helps to explain the relatively low number of investigations in 2002 when
the rand depreciated, the slight increase afterwards through 2005 as the rand
appreciated, and the subsequent decline as the rand once again depreciated.
Finally, throughout each period, anti-dumping investigations were more likely
to be initiated against products from countries where import values rose and
unit values fell.
3.2 Preferential Trade Agreements
Liberalisation under South Africa’s various PTAs provides additional insight
into the relationship between trade policy and the use of anti-dumping mea-
sures. Each preferential agreement contains provisions on anti-dumping,
countervailing and safeguard measures (Joubert 2005). Yet the eﬀect on the
use of anti-dumping measures is potentially ambiguous. First, ﬁrms with lob-
bying power may already have negotiated exceptions or a phase down of
tariﬀs that insulate them from increased price competition under the PTA.
Second, the tariﬀ board may be less willing to impose duties on countries
with which trade agreements have been negotiated. Both of these cases would
lead to a decline in the initiation and success of anti-dumping investiga-
tions. In contrast, lower tariﬀs and increased price competition in response
to preferential access may induce industries to initiate anti-dumping investi-
gations, particularly if the scope to apply for tariﬀ increases is restricted by
the agreement.
Figure 12.10 decomposes the ﬂow of investigations and the stock of anti-
dumping measures according to South Africa’s three preferential partners.
Panel (a) presents the count of imported partner–product (HS-06 level) combi-
nations subject to anti-dumping investigations (ﬂow), while panel (b) presents
the share of value of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping measures (stock). The
EU grouping in each diagram includes all current EU members, ie the sample
of countries in the diagram does not change in accordance with the change in
EU membership over time. South Africa’s free-trade agreements with the EU
and SADC started in 2000 while the EFTA FTA commenced in 2007. We are
interested in identifying changes in the stock and ﬂow of imported products
subject to anti-dumping measures or investigations that correlate with the
commencement of the FTAs.
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Figure 12.10: South Africa’s use of anti-dumping measures by preferential trading
partner.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). ‘EU’ denotes all EU mem-
bers as of 2009. Products are deﬁned at the HS-06 level. Import weights include coun-
terfactual estimates of the import value of products facing anti-dumping measures
following the approach described in Chapter 1 by Bown.
No anti-dumping measures were imposed on EFTA countries in any year, so
this FTA is ignored. The remaining groupings experienced similar increases in
the share of value of imports aﬀected by anti-dumping measures up to 1997
(panel (b)), although the anti-dumping duties on SADC members is entirely
attributed to aluminium hollowware imported from Zimbabwe. After 1997,
negotiations on the EU and SADC FTA commenced. As is shown in panel (a),
the number of initiations against future EU FTA partners declined, falling to at
most one per year by 2002. As a consequence, the stock of imported products
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from EU countries aﬀected by anti-dumping measures (panel (b)) remained
less than 0.5% of the value of imports for the remainder of the period. This is
contrasted by the continued increase in South Africa’s share of imports from
non-PTA countries (MFNs) facing anti-dumping measures.
For SADC members, there was a spike in product-level initiations in
1999 that is attributable to imports of bedlinen from Malawi. These goods
accounted for a high share of South Africa’s total imports from SADC mem-
bers, which helps to explain the dramatic increase in the share of SADC
imports aﬀected by the imposition of preliminary anti-dumping duties in
2000. In 2003, the anti-dumping duties on aluminium hollowware from Zim-
babwe were revoked and this was followed by the removal of anti-dumping
duties on bedlinen from Malawi in 2006.
The ﬁgures suggest that, at least in the case of the EU FTA, the negotiation
and implementation of a FTA may be associated with a decline in the ﬂow of
new investigations and the stock of anti-dumping measures imposed against
partner countries. To test this more rigorously, we estimate the following
equation using ordinary least squares:
ADict = βefta Deftact +βeu Deuct +βsadc Dsadcct +cntryc /producti +λt + εict
The dependent variable ADict is a binary variable for the stock of prod-
ucts subject to anti-dumping measures and equals 1 for all partner–product
(denoted by c and i, respectively) combinations subject to an anti-dumping
measure in year t. The dummy variables for each preferential agreement equal
1 over the years in which the PTAs are active for that member (ie the variable
varies over time according to when the country becomes a member of the
EU). The control group in the estimation are MFN countries. The equation is
a less restrictive version of a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation.18
The beta coeﬃcients can therefore be interpreted as the change in probabil-
ity of an imported product facing an anti-dumping measure in response to
the PTA.
18Assume, for simplicity, that the only preferential agreement that South Africa joined
with was SADC in 2001. A simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation to measure the
eﬀect of the FTA on the stock of products aﬀected by anti-dumping duties is the following:
ADict = (α + β1 D2001) × Dsadcct +β2 D2001+εict
where Dsadc is a dummy variable for SADC members and D2001 equals 1 for the period
over which the FTA operates (and 0 otherwise). β1, the coeﬃcient on the double-interaction
term, measures the change in the stock of products aﬀected by anti-dumping measures
that can be attributed to the FTA. Intuitively, the speciﬁcation compares the change in
the stock of anti-dumping measures imposed on SADC members after the FTA is formed
(ﬁrst diﬀerence) with the change in the stock of anti-dumping measures imposed on non-
SADC after the FTA is formed (second diﬀerence). The speciﬁcation estimated replaces
the region and FTA dummy variables with country-by-product ﬁxed eﬀects and time-ﬁxed
eﬀects. This is a less restrictive speciﬁcation as it allows for heterogeneity across countries
and products in base level of the stock of anti-dumping measures.
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Estimates explaining the ﬂow of anti-dumping initiations were also con-
ducted, but these did not yield any signiﬁcant relationships. The focus of
these estimates is therefore on the stock of products aﬀected by anti-dumping
measures.
The results19 are as follows:
ADict =− 0.009Deftact − 0.067Deuct + 0.040Dsadcct,
t-statistic : (0.64), (2.92)∗∗∗,( 0.57),
Obs = 1,297,422,F -statistic = 7.32∗∗∗, R2-within = 0.0007.
The results suggest that formation of the FTA with the EU was associated
with a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of imported products
from EU members subject to anti-dumping measures. No association is found
for SADC or EFTA countries.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that anti-dumping measures were
not used to directly oﬀset the decline in protection associated with multilat-
eral tariﬀ liberalisation in the 1990s. Furthermore, the conclusion of PTAs,
particularly with the EU, appears to be associated with a decline in the stock
of imported products subject to anti-dumping measures. The relationship
between tariﬀ reform and use of anti-dumping measures for South Africa
therefore diﬀers from other countries such as India (Moore and Zanardi 2008;
Bown and Tovar 2011).
4 THE INDUSTRIAL DETERMINANTS OF ANTI-DUMPING POLICY
This section brieﬂy documents the changing sectoral patterns of South
African anti-dumping initiations. It also presents a descriptive regression
analysis to identify the various industrial correlates of the stock of products
subject to anti-dumping measures.
Table 12.7 decomposes South Africa’s use of anti-dumping initiations and
measures by industry. Industries are aggregated according to the section
headings of the Harmonized System. The average values for the entire 1992–
2009 period are presented.
The dominant users of anti-dumping duties are base metals with 53 inves-
tigations and textiles and clothing with 35 investigations. As a proportion
of HS-06 product lines, however, non-metallic minerals, base metals, plastic
products, paper products and footwear requested to initiate the most inves-
tigations with over 7% of all product lines aﬀected. These are also typically
the industries in which anti-dumping duties were imposed, whether measured
as the count of distinct HS-06 products aﬀected (column 2) or the share of
19Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are multi-
pliedby100. Theestimatesincludecountry-by-productandtime-ﬁxedeﬀects. ‘***’denotes
p<0.01.
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import value aﬀected (column 1). These sectors, however, were not the domi-
nant import sectors—none made up more than 5% of the total value of South
Africa’s imports from 1992 to 2009.
Figure 12.11 presents a visual decomposition of the importance of anti-
dumping measures within the four dominant industry users. The ﬁgures illus-
trate heterogeneity across industries in the evolution of the stock of products
targeted by anti-dumping measures. A key diﬀerence in these sectors com-
pared with the trends for the overall economy (Figure 12.1) is that the share of
import value targeted by anti-dumping measures remained high or continued
to rise after 2002. The share of paper imports aﬀected more than halved from
2007 to 2009 as existing anti-dumping measures were revoked and then fell to
under 0.5% by the end of 2009 as duties on cut paper (Brazil and Indonesia)
and uncoated wood-free paper (Brazil and Poland) were removed in accor-
dance with the High Court ruling on sunset reviews.
The share of imports of textiles and clothing also fell from 2008, ﬁrst in
response to changes in the composition of import values and then in response
to the revocation of 9 of the 13 product–country anti-dumping measures that
were placed in response to the High Court ruling. Similarly, in the base metals
sector, 10 of the 24 product–country anti-dumping measures were revoked,
but the eﬀect on the share of imports by the beginning of 2010 (see 2010∗) was
small as new anti-dumping measures were imposed in 2009 on stainless steel
sinks from China (see Table 12.4). In contrast, there was a rise in the share of
imports of non-metallic minerals aﬀected by anti-dumping measures, but this
reﬂects changes in the composition of imports rather than new anti-dumping
measures.
The industrial composition of anti-dumping initiations bears some resem-
blance to the industrial composition in the rest of the world. Bekker (2006),
for example, notes that the top six industries targeted by anti-dumping inves-
tigations by 29 countries from 1987 to 2004 include base metals, chemicals,
plastics and rubber, machinery equipment, textiles and clothing, and pulp and
paper. Other than machinery equipment, these are also amongst the most tar-
geted industries by South African ﬁrms.
However, there are unique South African interests that have helped shape
its tariﬀ policy (Drope 2007). South Africa has a long history of using tariﬀs
in the pursuit of industrial development (Bell 1997; Edwards 2005; National
Board of Trade 2005). In the early stages of import substitution industrial-
isation prior to the Second World War, tariﬀ policy was used to encourage
substitution of imports of consumer goods by local manufacturers (Fallon
and de Silva 1994). In addition, it focused on creating employment opportu-
nities for white labour (Zarenda 1977). From the 1950s, tariﬀ and industrial
policy shifted towards deepening import replacement in upstream industries
including the basic metals and chemicals subsectors. A characteristic of the
trade regime during this period was the extreme speciﬁcity of protection. Tar-
iﬀs were designed on a case-by-case basis (Fallon and de Silva 1994).
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Figure 12.11: Share of South Africa’s import value aﬀected by anti-dumping measures,
by sector.
Source: author’s calculations using data from Bown (2010). 2010 reﬂects the stock at
the beginning of the year and uses 2009 import values as weights.
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The implication was that, by the late 1980s, South Africa had an extremely
complex tariﬀ structure, despite attempts to simplify the structure from the
1970s (Belli et al 1993). An additional outcome was that there was consider-
able scope for industries to lobby for protection in the face of international
competition. This was evident in the late 1980s, when a wide range of indus-
tries responded to the recession by applying for (and being awarded) tariﬀ
increases. Finally, the industrial policy incentives led to a highly concentrated
industrial structure and powerful business sectors that wielded inﬂuence over
the government (Drope 2007).
The democratic election of the new government in 1994 coincided with
a shift in South Africa’s development strategy from export promotion with
import controls to greater openness through tariﬀ liberalisation (Edwardset al
2009). It also led to the inclusion of previously unrepresented interests into
the policy space. It is argued that this impacted powerfully on the substance
of industrial policy (Lewis et al 2004) as the state attempted to strike a balance
between addressing the needs of existing business sectors, new black-owned
enterprises, vocal unions and the previously disenfranchised majority.
The application of anti-dumping duties in the post-1994 period provides a
unique opportunity to test the outcomes of these interactions (see also Drope
2007).20 This requires a more comprehensive analysis than is possible in this
chapter. As an alternative, this section presents preliminary estimates that
identify the industrial characteristics that correlate with the stock of products
subject to anti-dumping measures in South Africa. It then looks at whether
these have changed over time.
Table 12.8 presents various estimates explaining the initiation of investiga-
tions and the stock of products targeted by anti-dumping measures in man-
ufacturing. The aim of these regressions is primarily descriptive and they do
not explicitly test any theoretically based hypothesis. The dependent vari-
able varies by product (HS-06) and time, and equals 1 if any investigation or
anti-dumping measure is targeted against a country in that year. The inde-
pendent variables include various indicators commonly used in the political
economy literature of trade barriers. Trade-related variables at the HS-06 level
include the log import value (lagged), log tariﬀs, log unit values (lagged) and
a dummy if a formula duty was imposed on any HS eight-digit product within
the HS-06 product line. Variables for industry characteristics include concen-
tration (share employment of four largest ﬁrms), unskilled wage share, share
of white workers, and value added per worker (a proxy for eﬃciency). All these
variables are deﬁned at the four-digit level of the South African Standardized
Industrial Classiﬁcation and are obtained from the 1996 manufacturing cen-
20South Africa’s GATT oﬀer was also the outcome of negotiations between the apartheid
government, businesses and the African National Congress (ANC) and its partners. How-
ever, the ANC was not yet in power and needed to appeal to international investors as well
as to make compromises to the existing state (see Bell 1997).
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sus. Unfortunately, data at this level of disaggregation are not available over
time.21
The relationships are estimated using a probit model.22 The presented coef-
ﬁcients reﬂect the marginal change in the probability of an investigation or
anti-dumping measure in response to a marginal change in the explanatory
variable.
The ﬁrst column of Table 12.8 presents the results for the anti-dumping
investigations based on the full sample of data. The signs of the coeﬃcients
are mostly consistent with the earlier estimates presented in Table 12.6. A new
insight gained from these regressions, which exploit the cross-product varia-
tion (as opposed to the within-country–product variation in Table 12.6), is that
the investigations are more likely to occur in industries with relatively high
value added per worker. Surprisingly, concentration is only weakly related
to anti-dumping investigations. Except for tariﬀs, which lose signiﬁcance in
2001–9, there is no change in the relationship for the pre-2000 (column 2) and
post-2000 (column 3) periods. The results for investigations over the ﬁnancial
crisis period are also similar to those of the full sample, although there were
too few investigations in this period for any meaningful interpretation.
Columns 5–8 present results for the estimates predicting the probability of
a product being subject to an anti-dumping measure. The results for tariﬀs,
unit values and import values are equivalent to those for the anti-dumping
investigations and remain signiﬁcant in all periods, including during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. A product is more likely to face an anti-dumping measure if the unit
price is relatively low, tariﬀs are high, and import values are large. Employ-
ment numbers are a signiﬁcant determinant of anti-dumping measures, with
industries that employ relatively large numbers of workers more likely to
be protected. This relationship is strongest in the post-2000 period. In addi-
tion, industries that intensively use unskilled workers were also more likely to
be protected through anti-dumping measures in the post-2000 period. These
results may reﬂect the concern by the state about the persistently high unem-
ployment rates. The ﬁnding is also similar to that of Casale and Holden (2002)
for tariﬀ changes in South Africa.
Overall, the variables explaining anti-dumping investigations and the use
of anti-dumping measures appear to be consistent over the full 1992–2009
period. There is some evidence that the BTT and ITAC increasingly targeted
employment-intensive sectors with anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless, the
resultsdonotsuggestamajorstructuralshiftintheinitiationofanti-dumping
investigations or the use of anti-dumping measures to protect industries. One
interpretation is that the institutional structures governing tariﬀ policy have
21There are data at the SIC three-digit level, but they cover less than 40 industries. The
four-digit data cover 112 industries.
22The probit model is deﬁned as Pr(ADit = 1) = Φ(xitβ), where Φ is the standard
cumulative normal distribution.
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not changed signiﬁcantly despite the political transition in 1994. A more rig-
orous analysis is required to ascertain the validity of this interpretation.
5 CONCLUSION
This chapter explores South Africa’s use of TTBs from the early 1990s through
the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–9. South Africa is found to have been a pro-
liﬁc user of anti-dumping measures during the 1990s, but to have made con-
siderable progress in reducing the number of products and share of import
value subject to these measures after 2001. By early 2010, the share of imports
aﬀected by anti-dumping measures had fallen to 0.49%, less than half the peak
of 1% in 2000. Another insight from the background review is that the inci-
dence of anti-dumping measures in South Africa has shifted towards devel-
oping countries, in particular China and India. This corresponds with shifts
in other emerging economies. The chapter also reveals a decline in the aver-
age duration of anti-dumping measures that corresponds with the decline in
stock of products targeted by anti-dumping measures beginning in 2000.
A second focus of the chapter is South Africa’s response to the global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. South Africa did not increase its use of anti-dumping measures in
response to the ﬁnancial crisis and therefore diﬀers from some other emerg-
ing economies. However, the decline in the use of anti-dumping measures can
largely be attributed to a High Court ruling regarding when the ﬁve-year cycle
for anti-dumping measures commences (from the date of the ﬁrst decision to
impose anti-dumping duties, whether preliminary or ﬁnal). As a consequence,
numerous sunset reviews were terminated and the anti-dumping measures
revoked. Therefore, the decline in anti-dumping stock from 2008 to end-2009
did not reﬂect an active response by the ITAC to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The remainder of the chapter looks at the various correlates of anti-
dumping measures in South Africa. We ﬁnd that South Africa’s proliﬁc use
of anti-dumping measures in the 1990s does not reﬂect a reversal of multi-
lateral or preferential tariﬀ liberalisation. Rather, protection through tariﬀs
and anti-dumping measures appear to have common political economy deter-
minants. The formation of the SA–EU free-trade agreement has also reduced
the probability of products imported from the EU facing anti-dumping mea-
sures. Finally, we ﬁnd that the industrial characteristics that correlate with the
stock of products subject to anti-dumping measures have remained largely
unchanged, although there appears to be an increased targeting of high
employment sectors that use unskilled labour relatively intensively.
Lawrence Edwards is Associate Professor in the School of Economics at the
University of Cape Town, South Africa.
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“Why didn’t the global economic crisis of 2008–9 lead to a massive outbreak 
of protectionism?  Chad P. Bown and his associates perform the great service 
of taking a very close look at trade policies around the globe to identify where 
trade barriers crept up and where they didn’t.  This book will be required 
reading for anyone interested in understanding why the world trading system 
survived the shock so well.  At the same time, it reinforces the importance of 
careful monitoring of country trade policies.”
Douglas A. Irwin, Robert E. Maxwell ’23 Professor, Department of Economics, 
Dartmouth College
“With the onset of the Great Recession, the world trading system faced a 
defining moment. How has it performed? Answers to this question will be 
debated for years, but this timely volume takes a critical first systematic 
step in advancing our understanding of how countries did – and did not –
respond to economic collapse with import restrictions. The editor has brought 
together a world-class team of empirical trade researchers to explore this 
question for eleven major developed and developing countries, and the result 
is a collection of studies rich in detail and subtle in implication that will help 
shape the research agenda on trade policy for years to come. This is a must-
read volume for anyone interested in the world economy, researchers and 
policy-makers alike.”
Robert W. Staiger, Holbrook Working Professor, Department of Economics, 
Stanford University
“The years 2008 and 2009 witnessed a financial crisis, but not a trade crisis 
and a protectionist tsunami, in sharp contrast to the 1930s.  Why such a 
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‘temporary trade barriers’ (antidumping, antisubsidy and safeguard measures) 
to such a resilience.  It covers eleven of the largest economies, relies on a 
massive effort to have the best data available and provides a subtle mix of 
economic and legal analyses.  It is definitively a must for everybody who 
wants to understand our troubled times.”
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